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Valerie A. Thompson [29]Valerie Thompson [5]Valerie A. . Thompson [1]
  1.  24
    The Role of Answer Fluency and Perceptual Fluency as Metacognitive Cues for Initiating Analytic Thinking.Valerie A. Thompson, Jamie A. Prowse Turner, Gordon Pennycook, Linden J. Ball, Hannah Brack, Yael Ophir & Rakefet Ackerman - 2013 - Cognition 128 (2):237-251.
    Although widely studied in other domains, relatively little is known about the metacognitive processes that monitor and control behaviour during reasoning and decision-making. In this paper, we examined the conditions under which two fluency cues are used to monitor initial reasoning: answer fluency, or the speed with which the initial, intuitive answer is produced, and perceptual fluency, or the ease with which problems can be read. The first two experiments demonstrated that answer fluency reliably predicted Feeling of Rightness judgments to (...)
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  2.  33
    Conflict, Metacognition, and Analytic Thinking.Valerie A. Thompson & Stephen C. Johnson - 2014 - Thinking and Reasoning 20 (2):215-244.
    One hundred and three participants solved conflict and non-conflict versions of four reasoning tasks using a two-response procedure: a base rate task, a causal reasoning task, a denominator neglect task, and a categorical syllogisms task. Participants were asked to give their first, intuitive answer, to make a Feeling of Rightness judgment, and then were given as much time as needed to rethink their answer. They also completed a standardized measure of IQ and the actively open-minded thinking questionnaire. The FORs of (...)
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  3.  21
    Do Smart People Have Better Intuitions?Valerie A. Thompson, Gordon Pennycook, Dries Trippas & Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2018 - Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 147 (7):945-961.
  4.  29
    Uncertain Deduction and Conditional Reasoning.Jonathan St B. T. Evans, Valerie A. Thompson & David E. Over - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6.
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  5.  16
    Meta-Reasoning: Monitoring and Control of Thinking and Reasoning.Rakefet Ackerman & Valerie A. Thompson - 2017 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 21 (8):607-617.
  6.  86
    Dual Process Theories: A Metacognitive Perspective.Valerie A. Thompson - 2009 - In Keith Frankish & Jonathan St B. T. Evans (eds.), In Two Minds: Dual Processes and Beyond. Oxford University Press.
  7.  17
    The Mythical Dual-Process Typology.Gordon Pennycook, Wim De Neys, Jonathan St B. T. Evans, Keith E. Stanovich & Valerie A. Thompson - 2018 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 22 (8):667-668.
  8.  4
    The Smart Intuitor: Cognitive Capacity Predicts Intuitive Rather Than Deliberate Thinking.Matthieu Raoelison, Valerie A. Thompson & Wim De Neys - 2020 - Cognition 204:104381.
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  9.  41
    Analytic Thinking: Do You Feel Like It?Valerie Thompson & Kinga Morsanyi - 2012 - Mind and Society 11 (1):93-105.
    A major challenge for Dual Process Theories of reasoning is to predict the circumstances under which intuitive answers reached on the basis of Type 1 processing are kept or discarded in favour of analytic, Type 2 processing (Thompson 2009 ). We propose that a key determinant of the probability that Type 2 processes intervene is the affective response that accompanies Type 1 processing. This affective response arises from the fluency with which the initial answer is produced, such that fluently produced (...)
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  10.  6
    Frequency Versus Probability Formats in Statistical Word Problems.Jonathan StB. T. Evans, Simon J. Handley, Nick Perham, David E. Over & Valerie A. Thompson - 2000 - Cognition 77 (3):197-213.
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  11.  37
    Matching Bias on the Selection Task: It's Fast and Feels Good.Valerie A. Thompson, Jonathan St B. T. Evans & Jamie I. D. Campbell - 2013 - Thinking and Reasoning 19 (3-4):431-452.
    We tested the hypothesis that choices determined by Type 1 processes are compelling because they are fluent, and for this reason they are less subject to analytic thinking than other answers. A total of 104 participants completed a modified version of Wason's selection task wherein they made decisions about one card at a time using a two-response paradigm. In this paradigm participants gave a fast, intuitive response, rated their feeling of rightness for that response, and were then allowed free time (...)
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  12.  67
    The Role of Training, Alternative Models, and Logical Necessity in Determining Confidence in Syllogistic Reasoning.Jamie A. Prowse Turner & Valerie A. Thompson - 2009 - Thinking and Reasoning 15 (1):69 – 100.
    Prior research shows that reasoners' confidence is poorly calibrated (Shynkaruk & Thompson, 2006). The goal of the current experiment was to increase calibration in syllogistic reasoning by training reasoners on (a) the concept of logical necessity and (b) the idea that more than one representation of the premises may be possible. Training improved accuracy and was also effective in remedying some systematic misunderstandings about the task: those in the training condition were better at estimating their overall performance than those who (...)
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  13.  12
    The Task-Specific Nature of Domain-General Reasoning.Valerie A. Thompson - 2000 - Cognition 76 (3):209-268.
  14.  43
    Belief Bias in Informal Reasoning.Valerie Thompson & Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2012 - Thinking and Reasoning 18 (3):278 - 310.
    In two experiments we tested the hypothesis that the mechanisms that produce belief bias generalise across reasoning tasks. In formal reasoning (i.e., syllogisms) judgements of validity are influenced by actual validity, believability of the conclusions, and an interaction between the two. Although apparently analogous effects of belief and argument strength have been observed in informal reasoning, the design of those studies does not permit an analysis of the interaction effect. In the present studies we redesigned two informal reasoning tasks: the (...)
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  15.  45
    Everyday Reasoning with Inducements and Advice.Eyvind Ohm & Valerie A. Thompson - 2004 - Thinking and Reasoning 10 (3):241 – 272.
    In two experiments, we investigated how people interpret and reason with realistic conditionals in the form of inducements (i.e., promises and threats) and advice (i.e., tips and warnings). We found that inducements and advice differed with respect to the degree to which the speaker was perceived to have (a) control over the consequent, (b) a stake in the outcome, and (c) an obligation to ensure that the outcome occurs. Inducements and advice also differed with respect to perceived sufficiency and necessity, (...)
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  16.  15
    The Role of Answer Fluency and Perceptual Fluency in the Monitoring and Control of Reasoning: Reply To.Valerie A. Thompson, Rakefet Ackerman, Yael Sidi, Linden J. Ball, Gordon Pennycook & Jamie A. Prowse Turner - 2013 - Cognition 128 (2):256-258.
    In this reply, we provide an analysis of Alter et al. response to our earlier paper. In that paper, we reported difficulty in replicating Alter, Oppenheimer, Epley, and Eyre’s main finding, namely that a sense of disfluency produced by making stimuli difficult to perceive, increased accuracy on a variety of reasoning tasks. Alter, Oppenheimer, and Epley argue that we misunderstood the meaning of accuracy on these tasks, a claim that we reject. We argue and provide evidence that the tasks were (...)
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  17.  80
    Conditional Probability and Pragmatic Conditionals: Dissociating Truth and Effectiveness.Eyvind Ohm & Valerie A. Thompson - 2006 - Thinking and Reasoning 12 (3):257 – 280.
    Recent research (e.g., Evans & Over, 2004) has provided support for the hypothesis that people evaluate the probability of conditional statements of the form if p then q as the conditional probability of q given p , P( q / p ). The present paper extends this approach to pragmatic conditionals in the form of inducements (i.e., promises and threats) and advice (i.e., tips and warnings). In so doing, we demonstrate a distinction between the truth status of these conditionals and (...)
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  18.  37
    Effects of Perspective and Belief on Analytic Reasoning in a Scientific Reasoning Task.Erin L. Beatty & Valerie A. Thompson - 2012 - Thinking and Reasoning 18 (4):441-460.
  19.  32
    Frequency Versus Probability Formats in Statistical Word Problems.Jonathan St B. T. Evans, Simon J. Handley, Nick Perham, David E. Over & Valerie A. Thompson - 2000 - Cognition 77 (3):197-213.
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  20.  23
    Normativism Versus Mechanism.Valerie A. Thompson - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (5):272-273.
    Using normative correctness as a diagnostic tool reduces the outcome of complex cognitive functions to a binary classification (normative or non-normative). It also focuses attention on outcomes, rather than processes, impeding the development of good cognitive theories. Given that both normative and non-normative responses may be produced by the same process, normativity is a poor indicator of underlying processes.
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  21.  12
    Disfluent Fonts Don’T Help People Solve Math Problems.Andrew Meyer, Shane Frederick, Terence C. Burnham, Juan D. Guevara Pinto, Ty W. Boyer, Linden J. Ball, Gordon Pennycook, Rakefet Ackerman, Valerie A. Thompson & Jonathon P. Schuldt - 2015 - Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 144 (2):e16-e30.
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  22. Towards a Metacognitive Dual Process Theory of Conditional Reasoning.Valerie Thompson - 2010 - In Mike Oaksford & Nick Chater (eds.), Cognition and Conditionals: Probability and Logic in Human Thinking. Oxford University Press.
     
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  23.  56
    Rationale and Guidelines for Empirical Adversarial Collaboration: A Thinking & Reasoning Initiative.Tim Rakow, Valerie Thompson, Linden Ball & Henry Markovits - 2015 - Thinking and Reasoning 21 (2):167-175.
  24.  38
    Examining the Representation of Causal Knowledge.Jonathan A. Fugelsang, Valerie A. Thompson & Kevin N. Dunbar - 2006 - Thinking and Reasoning 12 (1):1 – 30.
    Three experiments investigated reasoners' beliefs about causal powers; that is, their beliefs about the capacity of a putative cause to produce a given effect. Covariation-based theories (e.g., Cheng, 1997; Kelley, 1973; Novick & Cheng, 2004) posit that beliefs in causal power are represented in terms of the degree of covariation between the cause and its effect; covariation is defined in terms of the degree to which the effect occurs in the presence of the cause, and fails tooccur in the absence (...)
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  25.  15
    Corrigendum to “The Role of Answer Fluency and Perceptual Fluency as Metacognitive Cues for Initiating Analytic Thinking” [COGNIT 128/2 237–251]. [REVIEW]Valerie A. Thompson, Jamie A. Prowse Turner, Gordon Pennycook, Linden J. Ball, Hannah Brack, Yael Ophir & Rakefet Ackerman - 2014 - Cognition 130 (1):140.