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Profile: Valerie Tiberius (University of Minnesota)
  1.  12
    Valerie Tiberius (2008). The Reflective Life: Living Wisely with Our Limits. Oxford University Press.
    How can we live life wisely? Tiberius argues that we need to develop the kind of wisdom that emphasizes the importance of learning from experience. We need to care about things that sustain us and give us good experiences, have perspective on our successes and failures, and be moderately self-aware and cautiously optimistic about human nature.
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  2. Molly Paxton, Carrie Figdor & Valerie Tiberius (2012). Quantifying the Gender Gap: An Empirical Study of the Underrepresentation of Women in Philosophy. Hypatia 27 (4):949-957.
    The lack of gender parity in philosophy has garnered serious attention recently. Previous empirical work that aims to quantify what has come to be called “the gender gap” in philosophy focuses mainly on the absence of women in philosophy faculty and graduate programs. Our study looks at gender representation in philosophy among undergraduate students, undergraduate majors, graduate students, and faculty. Our findings are consistent with what other studies have found about women faculty in philosophy, but we were able to add (...)
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  3.  11
    Daniel M. Haybron & Valerie Tiberius (2015). Well-Being Policy: What Standard of Well-Being? Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1 (4):712--733.
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  4. Valerie Tiberius (2006). Well-Being: Psychological Research for Philosophers. Philosophy Compass 1 (5):493–505.
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  5.  56
    Valerie Tiberius (2013). Why Be Moral? Can the Psychological Literature on Well-Being Shed Any Light? Res Philosophica 90 (3):347-364.
    In Plato’s dialogue the Republic, Glaucon challenges Socrates to prove that the just (or moral) life is better or more advantageous than the unjust one. Socrates’s answer to the challenge is notoriously unsatisfying. Could new research on well-being in philosophy and psychology allow us to do better? After distinguishing two different approaches to the question “why be moral?” I argue that while new research on well-being does not provide an answer that would satisfy Glaucon, it does shed light on the (...)
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  6. Valerie Tiberius & Alexandra Plakias (2010). Well-Being. In John Michael Doris (ed.), The Moral Psychology Handbook. Oxford University Press. pp. 402--432.
     
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  7.  58
    Valerie Tiberius (2006). How to Think About Virtue and Right. Philosophical Papers 35 (2):247-265.
    Robert Johnson argues that virtue ethical accounts of right action fail because they cannot take account of the fact that there are things we ought to do precisely because we do not possess virtuous character traits. Self-improving actions are his paradigm case and it would indeed be a problem if virtue ethics could not make sense of the propriety of self-improvement. To solve this serious problem, I propose that virtue ethics ought to define right action in terms of the virtuous (...)
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  8. Valerie Tiberius, Cultural Differences and Philosophical Accounts of Well-Being.
    In cross-cultural studies of well-being psychologists have shown ways in which well-being or its constituents are tailored by culture (Arrindell et. al. 1997, Diener and Diener 1995, Kitayama et. al. 2000, Oishi & Diener 2001, Oishi et. al. 1999). Some psychologists have taken the fact of cultural variance to imply that there is no universal notion of well-being (Ryan and Deci, 2001, Christopher 1999). Most philosophers, on the other hand, have assumed that there is a notion of well-being that has (...)
     
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  9.  33
    Valerie Tiberius & Jason Swartwood (2011). Wisdom Revisited: A Case Study in Normative Theorizing. Philosophical Explorations 14 (3):277-295.
    Extensive discussions of practical wisdom are relatively rare in the philosophical literature these days. This is strange given the theoretical and practical importance of wisdom and, indeed, the etymology of the word "philosophy." In this paper, we remedy this inattention by proposing a methodology for developing a theory of wisdom and using this methodology to outline a viable theory. The methodology we favor is a version of wide reflective equilibrium. We begin with psychological research on folk intuitions about wisdom, which (...)
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  10.  69
    Valerie Tiberius (2007). Substance and Procedure in Theories of Prudential Value. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (3):373 – 391.
    In this paper I argue that the debate between subjective and objective theories of prudential value obscures the way in which elements of both are needed for a comprehensive theory of prudential value. I suggest that we characterize these two types of theory in terms of their different aims: procedural (or subjective) theories give an account of the necessary conditions for something to count as good for a person, while substantive (or objective) theories give an account of what is good (...)
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  11. Valerie Tiberius (2009). The Reflective Life: Wisdom and Happiness for Real People. In Lisa Bortolotti (ed.), Philosophy and Happiness. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 215--32.
     
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  12.  37
    Valerie Tiberius (2000). Humean Heroism: Value Commitments and the Source of Normativity. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (4):426–446.
    This paper addresses the question "In virtue of what do practical reasons have normative force or justificatory power?" There seems to be good reason to doubt that desires are the source of normativity. However, I argue that the reasons to be suspicious of desire-based accounts of normativity can be overcome by a sufficiently sophisticated account. The position I defend in this paper is one according to which desires, or more generally, proattitudes, do constitute values and provide rational justifications of actions (...)
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  13.  71
    Valerie Tiberius (2014). How Theories of Well-Being Can Help Us Help. Journal of Practical Ethics 2 (2):1-19.
    Some theories of well-being in philosophy and in psychology define people’s well-being in psychological terms. According to these theories, living well is getting what you want, feeling satisfied, experiencing pleasure, or the like. Other theories take well-being to be something that is not defined by our psychology: for example, they define well-being in terms of objective values or the perfection of our human nature. These two approaches present us with a trade-off: The more we define well-being in terms of people’s (...)
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  14.  74
    Valerie Tiberius & John D. Walker (1998). Arrogance. American Philosophical Quarterly 35 (4):379 - 390.
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  15.  18
    Valerie Tiberius (2012). Constructivism and Wise Judgment. In Jimmy Lenman & Yonatan Shemmer (eds.), Constructivism in Practical Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 195.
    In this paper I introduce a version of constructivism that relies on a theory of practical wisdom. Wise judgment constructivism is a type of constructivism because it takes correct judgments about what we have “all-in” reason to do to be the result of a process we can follow, where our interest in the results of this process stems from our practical concerns. To fully defend the theory would require a comprehensive account of wisdom, which is not available. Instead, I describe (...)
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  16. Erik Angner & Valerie Tiberius, Commentary.
    In the history of Western philosophy, questions of well-being and happiness have played a central role for some 2,500 years. Yet, when it comes to the systematic empirical study of happiness and satisfaction, philosophers are relative latecomers. Empirically-minded psychologists began studying systematically the determinants and distribution of happiness and satisfaction – understood as positive or desirable subjectively experienced mental states – during the 1920’s and 30’s, as personality psychology emerged as a bona fide subdiscipline of psychology shortly after World War (...)
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  17.  12
    Valerie Tiberius (2002). Perspective: A Prudential Virtue. American Philosophical Quarterly 39 (4):305 - 324.
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  18. Valerie Tiberius & Alicia Hall (2010). Normative Theory and Psychological Research: Hedonism, Eudaimonism and Why It Matters. Journal of Positive Psychology 5 (3):212-225..
    This paper is a contribution to the debate about eudaimonism started by Kashdan, Biswas-Diener, King, and Waterman in a previous issue of The Journal of Positive Psychology. We point out that one thing that is missing from this debate is an understanding of the problems with subjective theories of well-being that motivate a turn to objective theories. A better understanding of the rationale for objective theories helps us to see what is needed from a theory of well-being. We then argue (...)
     
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  19.  43
    Valerie Tiberius (2002). Virtue and Practical Deliberation. Philosophical Studies 111 (2):147-172.
    The question of how to reason well is an important normative question,one which ultimately motivates some of our interest in the more abstracttopic of the principles of practical reason. It is this normative questionthat I propose to address by arguing that given the goal of an importantkind of deliberation, we will deliberate better if we develop certainvirtues. I give an account of the virtue of stability and I argue thatstability makes reasoners reason better. Further,I suggest at the end of the (...)
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  20.  47
    Valerie Tiberius (1997). Full Information and Ideal Deliberation. Journal of Value Inquiry 31 (3):329-338.
  21.  38
    Valerie Tiberius (2002). Practical Reason and the Stability Standard. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 5 (3):339-354.
    In this paper I argue that one of the standards that governs practical reasoning is the stability standard. The stability standard, I argue, is a norm that is constitutive of practical reasoning: insofar as we do not take violations of this norm to be relevant considerations, we do not count as engaged in reasoning at all. Furthermore, I argue that it is a standard we can explicitly employ in order to deliberate about our ends or desires themselves. Importantly, this standard (...)
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  22.  91
    Valerie Tiberius (2010). Appiah and the Autonomy of Ethics. Neuroethics 3 (3):209-214.
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  23.  1
    Valerie Tiberius (2000). Deliberation About the Good: Justifying What We Value. Routledge.
    This work advances a theory of deliberation about the goals, projects and values that constitute a good or worthwhile life for a person. The central argument begins with the assumption that the concerns most people have in this kind of deliberation are to discover which goals are worth pursuing, or which ends worth valuing, given those features of ourselves that we find important on reflection, and choose our goals and values in such a way that our choices can bear our (...)
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  24.  86
    Valerie Tiberius (2005). Value Commitments and the Balanced Life. Utilitas 17 (1):24-45.
    According to critics such as Bernard Williams, traditional ethical theories render it impossible to lead good and meaningful lives because they emphasize moral duty or the promotion of external values at the expense of the personal commitments that make our lives worth living from our own perspective. Responses to this criticism have not addressed the fundamental question about the proper relationship between a person's commitments to moral values and her commitments to non-moral or personal values. In this article, I suggest (...)
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  25.  73
    Valerie Tiberius (2009). The Practical Irrelevance of Relativism. Analysis 69 (4):722-731.
    I learned a lot from reading Jesse Prinz's ambitious and entertaining book, The Emotional Construction of Morals. I think he’d be pleased to know that I learned many interesting things that I would not ordinarily find in a book of academic philosophy. Also, even when I disagreed with him, almost all of my questions were anticipated and addressed as the book proceeded, which is a very satisfying experience as a reader and high praise in philosophy. I say ‘almost all’ of (...)
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  26.  28
    Valerie Tiberius (2013). In Defense of Reflection. Philosophical Issues 23 (1):223-243.
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  27.  22
    Valerie Tiberius (2012). Open-Mindedness And.. Normative Contingency. Oxford Studies in Metaethics 7:182.
  28.  43
    Valerie Tiberius (2005). Wisdom and Perspective. Journal of Philosophy 102 (4):163 - 182.
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  29.  21
    Valerie Tiberius (2013). Beyond the Experience Machine: How to Build a Theory of Well-Being. In Matthew C. Haug (ed.), Philosophical Methodology: The Armchair or the Laboratory? Routledge. pp. 398.
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  30. Valerie Tiberius & Michelle Mason (2009). Eudaimonia. In Shane J. Lopez (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Positive Psychology. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 1--351.
  31.  47
    Valerie Tiberius (2005). Julia Driver, Uneasy Virtue (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), Pp. VII + 134. Utilitas 17 (3):350-351.
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  32.  47
    Valerie Tiberius (2002). Maintaining Conviction and the Humean Account of Normativity. Topoi 21 (1-2):165-173.
  33.  12
    Valerie Tiberius (1999). Justifying Reasons for Valuing. Southern Journal of Philosophy 37 (1):141-158.
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  34.  3
    Valerie Tiberius (2016). Facing the Facts and Living Well: Comments on Neera Badhwar, Well-Being: Happiness in a Worthwhile Life. Journal of Value Inquiry 50 (1):219-226.
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  35.  19
    Valerie Tiberius (2006). Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View (Christine Swanton). [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2):494-497.
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  36.  8
    Valerie Tiberius (2013). Well-Being, Wisdom and Thick Theorizing: On the Division of Labor Between Moral Philosophy and Positive Psychology. In Simon Kirchin (ed.), Thick Concepts. Oxford University Press. pp. 217.
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  37.  9
    Valerie Tiberius (1999). Justifying Reasons for Valuing: An Argument Against the Social Account. Southern Journal of Philosophy 37 (1):141-158.
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  38.  11
    Valerie Tiberius (2005). Thomas Augst, The Clerk's Tale: Young Men and Moral Life in Nineteenth‐Century America:The Clerk's Tale: Young Men and Moral Life in Nineteenth‐Century America. Ethics 115 (2):386-389.
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  39.  1
    Valerie Tiberius (2000). The Moral Parameters of Good Talk: A Feminist Analysis Maryann Neely Ayim Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1997, Viii + 255 Pp., $45.00. [REVIEW] Dialogue 39 (01):161-.
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  40. Kevin Aho, Robert Audi, Peter A. French, Al Gini, Charles Guignon, Annette Holba, Marcia Homiak, Mike W. Martin & Valerie Tiberius (2010). The Value of Time and Leisure in a World of Work. Lexington Books.
    This book is concerned with how we should think and act in our work, leisure activities, and time utilization in order to achieve flourishing lives. The scope papers range from general theoretical considerations of the value, e.g. 'What is a balanced life?', to specific types of considerations, e.g. 'How should we cope with the effects of work on moral decision-making?'.
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  41. Michelle Mason & Valerie Tiberius (2009). Aristotle. In Shane J. Lopez (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Positive Psychology. Wiley-Blackwell.
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  42. Valerie Tiberius (1999). Deliberation About the Good: Justifying What We Have. Garland.
    This dissertation advances a theory of deliberation about the goals, projects and values that constitute a good or worthwhile life for a person. The central argument begins with the assumption that the concerns most people have in this kind of deliberation are to discover which goals are worth pursuing, or which ends worth valuing, given those features of ourselves that we find important on reflection, and choose our goals and values in such a way that our choices can bear our (...)
     
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  43. Valerie Tiberius (2014). Moral Psychology: A Contemporary Introduction. Routledge.
    This is the first philosophy textbook in moral psychology, introducing students to a range of philosophical topics and debates such as: What is moral motivation? Do reasons for action always depend on desires? Is emotion or reason at the heart of moral judgment? Under what conditions are people morally responsible? Are there self-interested reasons for people to be moral? Moral Psychology: A Contemporary Introduction presents research by philosophers and psychologists on these topics, and addresses the overarching question of how empirical (...)
     
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  44. Valerie Tiberius (2000). The Moral Parameters of Good Talk. Dialogue 39 (1):161-162.
     
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