16 found
Order:
See also
Valtteri Arstila
University of Turku (PhD)
  1.  42
    Subjective Time: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Temporality.Valtteri Arstila & Dan Lloyd (eds.) - 2014 - MIT Press.
    Our awareness of time and temporal properties is a constant feature of conscious life. Subjective temporality structures and guides every aspect of behavior and cognition, distinguishing memory, perception, and anticipation. This milestone volume brings together research on temporality from leading scholars in philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience, defining a new field of interdisciplinary research. The book's thirty chapters include selections from classic texts by William James and Edmund Husserl and new essays setting them in historical context; contemporary philosophical accounts of lived (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  2.  94
    Temporal Experiences Without the Specious Present.Valtteri Arstila - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (2):287-302.
    Most philosophers believe that we have experiences as of temporally extended phenomena like change, motion, and succession. Almost all theories of time consciousness explain these temporal experiences by subscribing to the doctrine of the specious present, the idea that the contents of our experiences embrace temporally extended intervals of time and are presented as temporally structured. Against these theories, I argue that the doctrine is false and present a theory that does not require the notion of a specious present. Furthermore, (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  3.  71
    Perceptual Learning Explains Two Candidates for Cognitive Penetration.Valtteri Arstila - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (6):1151-1172.
    The cognitive penetrability of perceptual experiences has been a long-standing topic of disagreement among philosophers and psychologists. Although the notion of cognitive penetrability itself has also been under dispute, the debate has mainly focused on the cases in which cognitive states allegedly penetrate perceptual experiences. This paper concerns the plausibility of two prominent cases. The first one originates from Susanna Siegel’s claim that perceptual experiences can represent natural kind properties. If this is true, then the concepts we possess change the (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  4.  53
    Theories of Apparent Motion.Valtteri Arstila - 2016 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (3):337-358.
    Apparent motion is an illusion in which two sequentially presented and spatially separated stimuli give rise to the experience of one moving stimulus. This phenomenon has been deployed in various philosophical arguments for and against various theories of consciousness, time consciousness and the ontology of time. Nevertheless, philosophers have continued working within a framework that does not reflect the current understanding of apparent motion. The main objectives of this paper are to expose the shortcomings of the explanations provided for apparent (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  5.  39
    Cognitive Penetration, Hypnosis and Imagination.Valtteri Arstila - 2017 - Analysis 77 (1):3-10.
    The thesis of cognitive penetrability, according to which cognitive states can affect perceptual experiences, remains the topic of intense debate among philosophers. A new candidate for a case of cognitive penetration is presented and defended. The candidate is based on studies involving suggestions that something is a certain way, which are usually given under hypnosis, rather than mere request to imagine that things are a certain way.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  6.  23
    Keeping Postdiction Simple.Valtteri Arstila - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 38:205-216.
    abstract Postdiction effects are phenomena in which a stimulus influences the appearance of events taking place before it. In metacontrast masking, for instance, a masking stimulus can ren- der a target stimulus shown before the mask invisible. This and other postdiction effects have been considered incompatible with a simple explanation according to which (i) our perceptual experiences are delayed for only the time it takes for a distal stimulus to reach our sensory receptors and for our neural mechanisms to process (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  7. The Causal Theory of Perception Revisited.Valtteri Arstila & Kalle Pihlainen - 2009 - Erkenntnis 70 (3):397-417.
    It is generally agreed upon that Grice's causal theory of perception describes a necessary condition for perception. It does not describe sufficient conditions, however, since there are entities in causal chains that we do not perceive and not all causal chains yield perceptions. One strategy for overcoming these problems is that of strengthening the notion of causality. Another is that of specifying the criteria according to which perceptual experiences should match the way the world is. Finally, one can also try (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  8.  20
    What Makes Unique Hues Unique?Valtteri Arstila - 2018 - Synthese 195 (5):1849-1872.
    There exist two widely used notions concerning the structure of phenomenal color space. The first is the notion of unique/binary hue structure, which maintains that there are four unique hues from which all other hues are composed. The second notion is the similarity structure of hues, which describes the interrelations between the hues and hence does not divide hues into two types as the first notion does. Philosophers have considered the existence of the unique/binary hue structure to be empirically and (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  9.  20
    Desires, Magnitudes, and Orectic Penetration.Valtteri Arstila - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (8):1175-1185.
    Dustin Stokes argues for the existence of orectic penetration, a phenomenon in which a desire-like state penetrates our perceptual experience. His candidate for a case of orectic penetration is the most convincing candidate presented thus far. It is argued here that his candidate and his further arguments for the existence of orectic penetration do not support the claim that orectic penetration takes place. As a result, it is concluded that there are no convincing cases of desire-like states penetrating perceptual experience.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  10.  14
    Erratum To: Perceptual Learning Explains Two Candidates for Cognitive Penetration.Valtteri Arstila - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (5):1149-1150.
  11.  11
    Defense of the Brain Time View.Valtteri Arstila - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  12.  35
    When is Cognitive Penetration a Plausible Explanation?Valtteri Arstila - 2018 - Consciousness and Cognition 59:78-86.
    Albert Newen and Petra Vetter argue that neurophysiological considerations and psychophysical studies provide striking evidence for cognitive penetration. This commentary focuses mainly on the neurophysiological considerations, which have thus far remained largely absent in the philosophical debate concerning cognitive penetration, and on the cognitive penetration of perceptual experiences, which is the form of cognitive penetration philosophers have debated about the most. It is argued that Newen and Vetter's evidence for cognitive penetration is unpersuasive because they do not sufficiently scrutinize the (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  13.  48
    Color Eliminativism and Intuitions About Colors.Valtteri Arstila - 2010 - Rivista di Estetica 43:29-45.
    The philosophical debate over the nature of color has been governed by what we have learnt from color vision science and what color phenomenology suggests to us. It is usually thought that color eliminativism, which maintains that physical objects do not have any properties that can be identified with colors, can account for the former but not the latter. After all, what could be more obvious than the external world to be colored? Here I outline one color eliminativistic response to (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  14.  21
    We Would Like to Thank the Following for Contributing to the Journal as Reviewers This Past Year: Fred Adams Jonathan Adler.Kenneth Aizawa, Liliana Albertazzi, Keith Allen, Sarah Allred, Marc Alspector-Kelly, Kristin Andrews, André Ariew, Valtteri Arstila, Anthony Atkinson & Edward Averill - 2009 - Philosophical Psychology 22 (6):817-818.
  15.  1
    Brain Reading and the Popular Press.Valtteri Arstila - 2011 - Res Cogitans 8 (1).
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16. The Illusions of Time: Philosophical and Psychological Essays on Timing and Time Perception.Adrian Bardon, Valtteri Arstila, Sean Power & Argiro Vatakis (eds.) - forthcoming - Palgrave Macmillan.
    No categories
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark