Awarded the 1988 Johnsonian Prize in Philosophy. Published with the aid of a grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities.

Mathematical realism is the doctrine that mathematical objects really exist, that mathematical statements are either determinately true or determinately false, and that the accepted mathematical axioms are predominantly true. A realist understanding of set theory has it that when the sentences of the language of set theory are understood in their standard meaning, each sentence has a determinate truth value, so that there is a fact of the matter whether the cardinality of the continuum is א2 or whether there are (...) measurable cardinals, whether or not those facts are knowable by us. (shrink)

Tarski and Mautner proposed to characterize the "logical" operations on a given domain as those invariant under arbitrary permutations. These operations are the ones that can be obtained as combinations of the operations on the following list: identity; substitution of variables; negation; finite or infinite disjunction; and existential quantification with respect to a finite or infinite block of variables. Inasmuch as every operation on this list is intuitively "logical", this lends support to the Tarski-Mautner proposal.

Mathematical realism is the doctrine that mathematical objects really exist, that mathematical statements are either determinately true or determinately false, and that the accepted mathematical axioms are predominantly true. A realist understanding of set theory has it that when the sentences of the language of set theory are understood in their standard meaning, each sentence has a determinate truth value, so that there is a fact of the matter whether the cardinality of the continuum is א2 or whether there are (...) measurable cardinals, whether or not those facts are knowable by us. (shrink)

This is not an overly ambitious paper. What I would like to do is to take a thesis that most people would regard as wildly implausible, and convince you that it is, in fact, false. What's worse, the argument I shall give is by no means airtight, though I hope it's reasonably convincing. The thesis has to do with the fuzzy boundaries of terms that refer to familiar middle-sized objects, terms like ‘Kilimanjaro’ and ‘the tallest mountain in Africa.’ It is (...) intuitively clear that Kilimanjaro has a fuzzy boundary, so that there are some clods of earth at the base of the mountain for which there isn't anything, either in our practices in using the word ‘Kilimanjaro’ or in the facts of geography, that determines an answer to the question whether the clod is a part of Kilimanjaro. (shrink)

That reference is inscrutable is demonstrated, it is argued, not only by W. V. Quine's arguments but by Peter Unger's "Problem of the Many." Applied to our own language, this is a paradoxical result, since nothing could be more obvious to speakers of English than that, when they use the word "rabbit," they are talking about rabbits. The solution to this paradox is to take a disquotational view of reference for one's own language, so that "When I use 'rabbit,' I (...) refer to rabbits" is made true by the meaning of the word "refer." The reference relation is extended to other languages by translation. The explanation for this peculiarly egocentric conception of semantics-questions of others' meanings are settled by asking what I mean by words of my language-is to be found in our practice of predicting and explaining other people's behavior by empathetic identification. I understand other people's behavior by asking what I would do in their place. (shrink)

Vann McGee; XIII*—Two Problems with Tarski's Theory of Consequence, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 92, Issue 1, 1 June 1992, Pages 273–292, htt.

Deflationists about truth embrace the positive thesis that the notion of truth is useful as a logical device, for such purposes as blanket endorsement, and the negative thesis that the notion doesn’t have any legitimate applications beyond its logical uses, so it cannot play a significant theoretical role in scientific inquiry or causal explanation. Focusing on Christopher Hill as exemplary deflationist, the present paper takes issue with the negative thesis, arguing that, without making use of the notion of truth conditions, (...) we have little hope for a scientific understanding of human speech, thought, and action. For the reference relation, the situation is different. Inscrutability arguments give reason to think that a more-than-deflationary theory of reference is unattainable. With respect to reference, deflationism is the only game in town. (shrink)

George Boolos (1984, 1985) has extensively investigated plural quantifi- cation, as found in such locutions as the Geach-Kaplan sentence There are critics who admire only one another, and he found that their logic cannot be adequately formalized within the first-order predicate calculus. If we try to formalize the sentence by a paraphrase using individual variables that range over critics, or over sets or collections or fusions of critics, we misrepresent its logical structure. To represent plural quantification adequately requires the logical (...) resources of the full second-order predicate calculus. (shrink)

Reviewed Works:S. N. Artemov, B. M. Schein, Arithmetically Complete Modal Theories.S. N. Artemov, E. Mendelson, On Modal Logics Axiomatizing Provability.S.N. Artemov, E. Mendelson, Nonarithmeticity of Truth Prdicate Logics of Provability.V. A. Vardanyan, E. Mendelson, Arithmetic Complexity of Predicate Logics of Provability and Their.S. N. Artemov, E. Mendelson, Numerically Correct Provability Logics.

This chapter presents a response to Chapter 1. The arguments put forward in that chapter attempted to drive us from the paradise created by Cantor’s theory of infinite number. The principal complaint is that Cantor’s proof that the subsets of a set are more numerous than its elements fails to yield an adequate diagnosis of Russell’s paradox. This chapter argues that Cantor’s proof was never meant to be a diagnosis of Russell’s paradox. Further, it argues that Cantor’s theory is fine (...) as it is. (shrink)

There's Something about Gödel is a bargain: two books in one. The first half is a gentle but rigorous introduction to the incompleteness theorems for the mathematically uninitiated. The second is a survey of the philosophical, psychological, and sociological consequences people have attempted to derive from the theorems, some of them quite fantastical.The first part, which stays close to Gödel's original proofs, strikes a nice balance, giving enough details that the reader understands what is going on in the proofs, without (...) giving so many that the reader feels overburdened. Perhaps he skimps too much on details, as when he decides not to explain how to convert recursive definitions into explicit ones. Also, I wish he had talked about Löb's theorem. But these are small complaints.The second half discusses a sampling of what one reads about Gödel's theorems in philosophy journals and in the popular press, and here Berto often finds himself exasperated, especially by …. (shrink)