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Veli Mitova [13]Velislava Atanasova Mitova [1]
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Veli Mitova
University of Johannesburg
  1. Truthy Psychologism About Evidence.Veli Mitova - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (4):1105-1126.
    What sorts of things can be evidence for belief? Five answers have been defended in the recent literature on the ontology of evidence: propositions, facts, psychological states, factive psychological states, all of the above. Each of the first three views privileges a single role that the evidence plays in our doxastic lives, at the cost of occluding other important roles. The fifth view, pluralism, is a natural response to such dubious favouritism. If we want to be monists about evidence and (...)
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  2. Believable Evidence.Veli Mitova - 2017 - Cambridge University Press.
    Believable Evidence argues that evidence consists of true beliefs. This claim opens up an entirely overlooked space on the ontology of evidence map, between purely factualist positions and purely psychologist ones. Veli Mitova provides a compelling three-level defence of this view in the first contemporary monograph entirely devoted to the ontology of evidence. First, once we see the evidence as a good reason, metaethical considerations show that the evidence must be psychological and veridical. Second, true belief in particular allows epistemologists (...)
     
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  3.  11
    Decolonising Knowledge Here and Now.Veli Mitova - forthcoming - Philosophical Papers:1-22.
    The topic of epistemic decolonisation is currently the locus of lively debate both in academia and in everyday life. The aim of this piece is to isolate a few main strands in the philosophical lite...
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  4. The Factive Turn in Epistemology.Veli Mitova (ed.) - 2018 - Cambridge University Press.
    When you believe something for a good reason, your belief is in a position to be justified, rational, responsible, or to count as knowledge. But what is the nature of this thing that can make such a difference? Traditionally, epistemologists thought of epistemic normative notions, such as reasons, in terms of the believer's psychological perspective. Recently, however, many have started thinking of them as factive: good reasons for belief are either facts, veridical experiences, or known propositions. This ground breaking volume (...)
     
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  5. A Quasi-Pragmatist Explanation of Our Ethics of Belief.Veli Mitova - 2009 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 28 (3):113-130.
     
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  6.  6
    Explanatory Injustice and Epistemic Agency.Veli Mitova - forthcoming - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-16.
    What is going on when we explain someone’s belief by appeal to stereotypes associated with her gender, sexuality, race, or class? In this paper I try to motivate two claims. First, such explanations involve an overlooked form of epistemic injustice, which I call ‘explanatory injustice’. Second, the language of reasons helps us shed light on the ways in which such injustice wrongs the victim qua epistemic agent. In particular, explanatory injustice is best understood as occurring in explanations of belief through (...)
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  7.  46
    Why W. K. Clifford Was a Closet Pragmatist.Veli Mitova - 2008 - Philosophical Papers 37 (3):471-489.
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  8.  7
    Clearing Space for Extreme Psychologism About Reasons.Veli Mitova - 2016 - South African Journal of Philosophy 35 (3):293-301.
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  9. Epistemic Motivation: Towards a Metaethics of Belief.Veli Mitova - 2011 - In Andrew Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Reasons for Belief. Cambridge University Press.
     
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  10.  30
    The Value of Epistemic Norms.Veli Mitova - 2005 - South African Journal of Philosophy 24 (2):65-76.
    t is argued that, contrary to popular pragmatist opinion, the source of epistemic normativity does not lie in the realm of practical rationality. Epistemic norms are indeed hypothetical, as the pragmatist anticipates, but he has misjudged how much their antecedent can do for him. I first consider the most general argument available to the pragmatist. I then focus on the way John Heil and Hilary Kornblith have refined it. Kornblith's position poses the most plausible challenge to the defender of the (...)
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  11.  16
    What Do I Care About Epistemic Norms?Veli Mitova - 2016 - In Pedro Schmechtig & Martin Grajner (eds.), Epistemic Reasons, Norms, and Goals. De Gruyter. pp. 199-224.
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  12.  1
    What Do I Care About Epistemic Norms?Veli Mitova - 2016 - In Martin Grajner & Pedro Schmechtig (eds.), Epistemic Reasons, Norms and Goals. De Gruyter. pp. 199-224.
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  13.  15
    Age and Agency.Veli Mitova - 2012 - Philosophical Papers 41 (3):335-369.
    Abstract I defend the following three-part hypothesis: (1) the sense that one is running out of time diminishes one's capacity to reauthor oneself; (2) this capacity is constitutive of agency par excellence; so, (3) the sense of running out of time attenuates agency. (2) is shown to enjoy both intuitive and abductive plausibility. (1) and (3) are confirmed by existing reflections on old age, as well as by empirical research.
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