EU promotes norms which lack a basis in EU law and do not directly translate into the acquis communautaire EU. Limits of EU conditionality in the area of minority rights are visible in closer look at the EU’s monitoring mechanism, including Regular Reports, which locate EU’s minority criterion in the domestic political context. Reports have structure broadly follows the Copenhagen criteria. Serious efforts are needed for achieving practical results flowing from the implementation of the legislative framework pertaining to minority issues. (...) The same factors also affected the mechanisms’ ability to influence that implementation. These factors concern the following: confusion regarding the juridical nature of the minority rights instruments, the vagueness or flexibility in the formulation of the standards, and unclarity as to the beneficiaries of the standards. Issue of soft instruments, vague norms and the lack of a definition of the beneficiaries of the norms will continue to trouble the minds of Governments, minorities, international mechanisms. EU must undertaking efforts to sharpen and further clarify the existing standards and to persuade Governments that existence of minority groups can enrich a society as a whole and that measures to preserve their specific characteristics will reduce the risks of violent conflicts. The case of Croatia, through Regular Reports, shows acceptation of European standards of minority protection in legal area, but with the limits in their implementation. In these circumstances Regular Reports describes attitude of EU toward minority issue; it is not priority of EU in accession process, difficulties in monitoring the implementation of minority issues and lack of precise definition norms in minority rights area. (shrink)

In this article author proves connection between liberalism and multiculturalism in individual?s political freedom. Individual freedom connected with political participation, in multicultural contexts, can be shown as means to achieve group recognition demands. Liberal conception of liberty in multicultural context shows that a major interest of multicultural groups through political participation necessary respect individual?s liberty. Multiculturalism follows liberal demand for freedom of choice and participation as preconditions for self determination determined by the reason, but through politics of difference, because for (...) multiculturalism is not acceptable liberal thesis of cultural homogenous society. U radu autor dokazuje da je politicka sloboda pojedinca poveznica liberalizma i multikulturalizma. Individualna sloboda, kao temelj liberalizma, moze u multikulturalnom kontekstu, biti prikazana kao sredstvo ostvarenja zahtjeva za grupno priznanje kroz politicku participaciju. Multikulturalisti takodjer slijede liberalno zalaganje za mogucnost slobodnog izbora i djelovanja pojedinca koji afirmacijom razuma moze ostvariti svoje samoodredjenje, ali kroz priznaje razlicitosti jer ne prihvacaju liberalnu tezu o kulturnoj homogenoj zajednici. (shrink)

This article examines the global and worsening problem of research misconduct as it relates to bio-medico-legal education. While research misconduct has serious legal implications, few adequate legal remedies exist to deal with it. With respect to teaching, research ethics education should be mandatory for biomedical students and physicians. Although teaching alone will not prevent misconduct, it promotes integrity, accountability, and responsibility in research. Policies and law enforcement should send a clear message that researchers should adhere to the highest standards of (...) ethics in research. It is vital that researchers and physicians understand basic aspects of law and the legal system in order to develop understanding of the medico-legal issues not just in the legal context, but with a sound grounding in ethics, social and theoretical contexts so that they can practice good medicine. Routine and holistic research ethics education across the curriculum for medical students and resident physicians, and continuing medical education for practicing doctors, are probably the best ways to accomplish this goal. (shrink)

Heidegger war weder Philosoph der Wissenschaft noch Philosoph der Naturwissenschaft. Die Wissenschaft war, wie Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker gut bemerkt, „weder der Ausgangspunkt noch das Ziel seines Denkens”. Vielmehr handelt es sich, so von Weizsäcker, um ein gegenseitiges Missverständnis: „Die Naturwissenschaft hat das, was Heidegger ihr zu sagen hatte, bisher nicht verstanden. Heidegger hat umgekehrt, so scheint es mir, die Naturwissenschaft nicht bis auf den Grund durchzudenken vermocht.” Vielleicht wäre es der Sache selbst angemessener zu sagen, dass es sich um (...) kein bloßes Missverständnis handelt, sondern um die Bemühung Heideggers, das Denken und die Wissenschaft radikal neu zu bestimmen. (shrink)

In the age of information overload, the primary concern for many knowledge areas becomes the organisation and retrieval of data. Artists have a unique opportunity, at this historical juncture, to play a role in the definition and design of systems of access and retrieval, and at the very least comment on the existing practices. In this article I show how some personalities have foreshadowed and indeed influenced the current practices and huge efforts in digitising our collective knowledge. This article is (...) an effort to broadly contextualise the current atmosphere and environment that ‘information architects’ are confronted with. (shrink)

In this paper, author tries to analyze complex character of the relation between law and morality in contemporary law philosophy. There are three approaches to the issue of relation between law and morality: natural law theory, positivist and Anglo-American analytical jurisprudence. The identity thesis-law and morality are basically identical, although basic principles of morality are subordinated to the positive legal rules; the separation thesis-law and morality are quite different system of norms: positive legal rules are completely deprived of any moral (...) content; Polarity thesis - law and morality are different systems of norms which complement to each other. The polarity thesis is exemplified in theories of Herbert Hart and Ronald Dworkin's. At the logical level, polarity thesis overcomes and specifically synthesizes abstract character and reductionism of identity and separation thesis. At the socio-historical level, the polarity thesis is result of historical development of legal and political institutions. U ovom clanku autor nastoji da analizira odnos morala i prava u okviru savremene pravne teorije. Odnos prava i morala moze se posmatrati na tri razlicita nacina: teza o identitetu - pravo i moral su osnovi identicni sistemi normi pri cemu su pozitivne pravne norme podredjene osnovnim moralnim principima, teza o odvajanju - pravo i moral su konacno razliciti sistemi normi, teza o polaritetu - pravo i moral su dva razlicita normativna sistema, ali se oni medjusobno radikalno ne iskljucuju, vec izmedju njih postoji znacajan nivo dodirivanja i nadopunjavanja. Ova teza na najbolji nacin je predstavljena u pravnim teorijama H.L.A Harta i Ronalda Dworkina. Na logickom nivou, teza o polaritetu na specifican nacin sintetise i prevladava jednostranosti teze o identitetu i teze o odvajanju. U isti mah na socioistorijskom nivou, ova teza proizvod je specificnog istorijsko-socijalnog razvitka angloamerickih pravnih i politickih institucija. U tekstu se ukazuje i na relevanciju ove teorijske kontraverze pri suocavanju sa prosloscu posttotalitarnih politickih poredaka i drustava. (shrink)

Radoslav Baltezarevic, Borivoje Baltezarevic, Piotr Kwiatek and Vesna Baltezarevic ABSTRACT: The emergence of the Internet and various forms of virtual communities has led to the impact of a new social space on individuals who frequently replace the real world with alternative forms of socializing. In virtual communities, new ‘friendships’ are easily accepted; however, how this...

Heidegger wasn’t a philosopher of science, nor a philosopher of natural science. In Carl Richard von Weizsäcker’s remark, science in Heidegger’s opinion wasn’t “the source nor the objective of his thinking”. In fact, according to Weizsäcker, the point is in mutual misunderstanding. “Until now the science hasn’t understood what Heidegger meant to say to it, while on the other hand, as it seems to me, Heidegger couldn’t thoroughly think the nature science through.” Maybe it would be more to the point (...) to say that it wasn’t just about misunderstanding, but more about Heidegger’s effort to define thinking and science in a radically new approach. The radicalism of his endeavor is, maybe, best shown in his insulting sentence : “Science doesn’t think.” That doesn’t mean only that there’s a gap between thinking and science, but also that this gap is unsurmountable. Thus, the point isn’t in any kind of an objective, but in “establishing the inner structure of science: that in its essence it is to be, on one level, in reference to what philosophy thinks, but in itself is not concerned about what it is supposed to think and forgets about it”. (shrink)

Heidegger n’était ni un philosophe de la science ni un philosophe de la science de la nature. Pour lui, la science n’était, comme l’a justement remarqué Carl Richard von Weizsäcker, « ni le point de départ ni la finalité de sa pensée ». De surcroît, selon Weizsäcker, il s’agit d’une incompréhension mutuelle : « La science, jusqu’à présent, n’a pas compris ce que Heidegger souhaitait lui dire ; à l’inverse, Heidegger, il me semble, n’a pu approfondir la science de la (...) nature. » Peut-être serait-il plus approprié de parler, non pas d’une simple incompréhension, mais de l’effort de Heidegger de déterminer la pensée et la science d’une façon radicalement novatrice. « La science ne pense pas » : cette phrase, offensante, comme l’a désignée Heidegger lui-même, illustre peut-être le mieux la radicalité de sa démarche. Non seulement elle indique qu’il existe, entre la pensée et la science, un hiatus, mais affirme, en plus, que celui-ci est infranchissable. Ce n’est pas une objection ; il s’agit en fait de « déterminer la structure intrinsèque de la science : que dans son essence, elle soit portée vers ce que pense la philosophie, sans toutefois mettre en question elle-même ce qu’il faut penser et en l’oubliant ». (shrink)

Heidegger nije bio ni filozof znanosti niti filozof prirodne znanosti. Znanost nije za njega bila, kako dobro primjećuje Carl Richard von Weizsäcker, »ni izlazište niti cilj njegova mišljenja«. Štoviše, prema Weizsäckeru, riječ je o obostranom nerazumijevanju: »Znanost do sada nije razumjela što joj je Heidegger htio reći, dok Heidegger obratno, tako mi se čini, nije mogao temeljito promisliti prirodnu znanost.« Možda bi bilo primjerenije samoj stvari reći, da nije riječ o pukom nerazumijevanju, već o naporu Heideggera da mišljenje i znanost (...) radikalno novo odredi. Radikalnost njegova poduhvata pokazuje možda najbolje uvredljiva rečenica : »Znanost ne misli.« Ona ne želi samo reći da postoji jaz između mišljenja i znanosti, već također da je on nepremostiv. Pritom nije riječ o nikakvom prigovoru, već o »utvrđivanju unutarnje strukture znanosti: da je u njezinoj biti, da je s jedne strane upućena na to, što misli filozofija, no sama se ne osvrće na to što treba misliti i zaboravlja ga.«. (shrink)

Karl Jaspers écarte l’idée répandue selon laquelle le rapport entre la théologie et la philosophie est opposition entre foi et connaissance ou révélation et raison. L a foi n’est pas irrationnelle. Cette polarité du rationnel et de l’irrationnel ne tendrait qu’à la confusion de l’existence. La foi philosophique, celle de l’homme qui pense, aura toujours pour signe propre une liaison indispensable avec le savoir. L e sens de la science ne peut être lui-même prouvé scientifiquement. Seule la philosophie peut l’éclairer.

Jaspers lehnt die vulgäre Auffassung des Verhältnisses von Theologie und Philosophie, die auf den Gegensatzformen von Glauben und Wissen, Offenbarung und Vernunft gründet, ab Der Glaube ist nicht irrational. Die Polarität von rational und irrational kann nur zur Verwirrung der Existenz führen. Für ihn haben Theologie bzw. Religion nicht weniger mit Erkenntnis und Denken zu tun als die Philosophie. Er wehrt sich gegen die Auffassung, die auf der Gegensätzlichkeit von Philosophie und Religion beharrt.

Jaspers rejects vulgar understanding of the relationship between theology and philosophy, founded on opposition between faith and knowledge, revelation and reason. Faith is not irrational. Polarity between rational and irrational could lead nowhere but to chaos of existence. Philosophical faith as the faith of a man who thinks, is always connected with knowledge. Althought science and philosophy are mutually interconnected, they are of a different kind. The meaning of science is not scientifically provable, it can be discovered only by philosophy.

Jaspers odbija vulgarno shvaćanje odnosa teologije i filozofije, koje se temelji na suprotnosti vjere i znanja, objave i uma. Vjera nije iracionalna. Polarnost racionalnog i iracionalnog može voditi samo k smetenosti egzistencije. Filozofijska vjera kao vjera misaonog čovjeka, u svako je doba povezana sa znanjem. Iako su znanost i filozofija jedna za drugu vezane, među njima postoji razlika. Smisao znanosti nije znanstveno dokaziv, njega može samo filozofija osvijetliti.