Two of the terms in the title are from Vidyānandin’s Tattvārtha-śloka-vārttika, which is his commentary on Umāsvāti’s Tattvārtha-sūtra. Sūtra 6 of the TAS states the following: pramāṇa-nayair adhigamaḥ, ‘knowledge—of the seven categories—is obtained through the pramāṇas and the nayas’). Vidyānandin’s commentary on this sūtra 6 entails a total of 56 ślokas, with his own prose vārttika on each of them in varying lengths. TAŚV 1, 6, 1–8 deal with particulars and universals, for which he uses the synonymous pairs (...) aṃśa/aṃśin and avayava/avayavin. That he is attacking the Buddhist position regarding this age old theme in Indian philosophy, is evident also in that he quotes Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇa-vārttika. By the time he comes to his TAŚV 1, 6, 6, he establishes that an object as a whole is open to perception and that the Buddhist also accepts perception as a valid means of knowledge, but does not accept the perception of an object as a whole. From TAŚV 1, 6, 11 onwards Vidyānandin continues with the same theme, elaborating his attack of the Buddhist view even further, doing so in terms of svasaṃvedana, pratyakṣa and pramāṇa. The presentation will attempt to deal with these concepts in order to see how Vidyānandin vindicates the Jaina position vis-à-vis the Buddhist one. This presentation will continue from my previous study of Vidyānandin’s TAŚV 1, 6, 1–10. (shrink)

Jaina authors use a pluralistic epistemological model as a tool to claim the superiority of Jainism over the other schools of Indian thought. In this article the general tendency of the Jaina’s epistemic pluralism is discussed and it is shown how the Digambara Jaina Vidyānandin tries to establish the Jainas’ pluralism on rational grounds by identifying erroneous epistemic alternatives through methodological falsification.

Investigation into the True Teaching by Jens W. Borgland is a translation of the 10th century Jain philosophical Sanskrit text Satyasasanapariksa, composed by Vidyanandin. The text, which is incomplete, presents and refutes 12 Indian philosophical systems, the most important of which are Sautrantika and Yogacara Buddhism, Advaita Vedanta, Nyaya-Vaisesika, Samkhya, Mimamsa and Carvaka. Criticizing these from the standpoint of the Jain anekantavada (theory of manysidedness), Vidyanandin aims to establish the superior status of Jain philosophy. In addition to providing an English (...) translation of this text from the Sanskrit, with explanatory notes, the study places it in the context of Jain philosophy and investigates the arguments Vidyanandin employs in his refutations of his rivals. The doctrines Vidyanandin ascribes to his rivals are also examined and compared to presentations of their doctrines in secondary literature on Indian philosophy and in some cases to how these doctrines are presented in the original literature of the schools in question. Some issues are highlighted as requiring further research. Furthermore, the investigation shows considerable influence from Vidyanandin's predecessors Samantabhadra and Akalanka on Vidyanandin's argumentation. The clearest example of this influence is shown on comparing the sections of the Satyasasanapariksa in which Vidyanandin quotes the Aptamimamsa of Samantabhadra (ca 600 CE) with Akalanka's (ca 770 CE) commentary to these verses in his Astasati. (shrink)