47 found
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  1. The Evidential Conditional.Vincenzo Crupi & Andrea Iacona - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (6):2897-2921.
    This paper outlines an account of conditionals, the evidential account, which rests on the idea that a conditional is true just in case its antecedent supports its consequent. As we will show, the evidential account exhibits some distinctive logical features that deserve careful consideration. On the one hand, it departs from the material reading of ‘if then’ exactly in the way we would like it to depart from that reading. On the other, it significantly differs from the non-material accounts which (...)
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  2. Three Ways of Being Non-Material.Vincenzo Crupi & Andrea Iacona - 2022 - Studia Logica 110:47-93.
    This paper develops a probabilistic analysis of conditionals which hinges on a quantitative measure of evidential support. In order to spell out the interpreta- tion of ‘if’ suggested, we will compare it with two more familiar interpretations, the suppositional interpretation and the strict interpretation, within a formal framework which rests on fairly uncontroversial assumptions. As it will emerge, each of the three interpretations considered exhibits specific logical features that deserve separate consideration.
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  3. The Logic of the Evidential Conditional.Eric Raidl, Andrea Iacona & Vincenzo Crupi - 2022 - Review of Symbolic Logic 15 (3):758-770.
    In some recent works, Crupi and Iacona have outlined an analysis of ‘if’ based on Chrysippus’ idea that a conditional holds whenever the negation of its consequent is incompatible with its antecedent. This paper presents a sound and complete system of conditional logic that accommodates their analysis. The soundness and completeness proofs that will be provided rely on a general method elaborated by Raidl, which applies to a wide range of systems of conditional logic.
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  4. Conditionals: Inferentialism Explicated.Vincenzo Crupi & Andrea Iacona - 2024 - Erkenntnis.
    According to the view of conditionals named 'inferentialism', a conditional holds when its consequent can be inferred from its antecedent. This paper identifies some major challenges that inferentialism has to face, and uses them to assess three accounts of conditionals: one is the classical strict account, the other two have recently been proposed by Douven and Rott. As will be shown, none of the three proposals meets all challenges in a fully satisfactory way. We argue through novel formal results that (...)
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  5. Outline of a Theory of Reasons.Vincenzo Crupi & Andrea Iacona - 2023 - Philosophical Quarterly 73 (1):117-142.
    This paper investigates the logic of reasons. Its aim is to provide an analysis of the sentences of the form ‘p is a reason for q’ that yields a coherent account of their logical properties. The idea that we will develop is that ‘p is a reason for q’ is acceptable just in case a suitably defined relation of incompatibility obtains between p and ¬q. As we will suggest, a theory of reasons based on this idea can solve three challenging (...)
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  6. On bayesian measures of evidential support: Theoretical and empirical issues.Vincenzo Crupi, Katya Tentori & and Michel Gonzalez - 2007 - Philosophy of Science 74 (2):229-252.
    Epistemologists and philosophers of science have often attempted to express formally the impact of a piece of evidence on the credibility of a hypothesis. In this paper we will focus on the Bayesian approach to evidential support. We will propose a new formal treatment of the notion of degree of confirmation and we will argue that it overcomes some limitations of the currently available approaches on two grounds: (i) a theoretical analysis of the confirmation relation seen as an extension of (...)
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  7. On the Logical Form of Concessive Conditionals.Vincenzo Crupi & Andrea Iacona - 2022 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 51 (3):633-651.
    This paper outlines an account of concessive conditionals that rests on two main ideas. One is that the logical form of a sentence as used in a given context is determined by the content expressed by the sentence in that context. The other is that a coherent distinction can be drawn between a reading of ‘if’ according to which a conditional is true when its consequent holds on the supposition that its antecedent holds, and a stronger reading according to which (...)
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  8. Verisimilitude and Belief Change for Conjunctive Theories.Gustavo Cevolani, Vincenzo Crupi & Roberto Festa - 2011 - Erkenntnis 75 (2):183-202.
    Theory change is a central concern in contemporary epistemology and philosophy of science. In this paper, we investigate the relationships between two ongoing research programs providing formal treatments of theory change: the (post-Popperian) approach to verisimilitude and the AGM theory of belief change. We show that appropriately construed accounts emerging from those two lines of epistemological research do yield convergences relative to a specified kind of theories, here labeled “conjunctive”. In this domain, a set of plausible conditions are identified which (...)
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  9. Generalized Information Theory Meets Human Cognition: Introducing a Unified Framework to Model Uncertainty and Information Search.Vincenzo Crupi, Jonathan D. Nelson, Björn Meder, Gustavo Cevolani & Katya Tentori - 2018 - Cognitive Science 42 (5):1410-1456.
    Searching for information is critical in many situations. In medicine, for instance, careful choice of a diagnostic test can help narrow down the range of plausible diseases that the patient might have. In a probabilistic framework, test selection is often modeled by assuming that people's goal is to reduce uncertainty about possible states of the world. In cognitive science, psychology, and medical decision making, Shannon entropy is the most prominent and most widely used model to formalize probabilistic uncertainty and the (...)
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  10.  72
    On the determinants of the conjunction fallacy: Probability versus inductive confirmation.Katya Tentori, Vincenzo Crupi & Selena Russo - 2013 - Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 142 (1):235.
  11. Probability, confirmation, and the conjunction fallacy.Vincenzo Crupi, Branden Fitelson & Katya Tentori - 2007 - Thinking and Reasoning 14 (2):182 – 199.
    The conjunction fallacy has been a key topic in debates on the rationality of human reasoning and its limitations. Despite extensive inquiry, however, the attempt to provide a satisfactory account of the phenomenon has proved challenging. Here we elaborate the suggestion (first discussed by Sides, Osherson, Bonini, & Viale, 2002) that in standard conjunction problems the fallacious probability judgements observed experimentally are typically guided by sound assessments of _confirmation_ relations, meant in terms of contemporary Bayesian confirmation theory. Our main formal (...)
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  12.  90
    A Second Look at the Logic of Explanatory Power (with Two Novel Representation Theorems).Vincenzo Crupi & Katya Tentori - 2012 - Philosophy of Science 79 (3):365-385.
    We discuss the probabilistic analysis of explanatory power and prove a representation theorem for posterior ratio measures recently advocated by Schupbach and Sprenger. We then prove a representation theorem for an alternative class of measures that rely on the notion of relative probability distance. We end up endorsing the latter, as relative distance measures share the properties of posterior ratio measures that are genuinely appealing, while overcoming a feature that we consider undesirable. They also yield a telling result concerning formal (...)
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  13.  80
    Comparison of confirmation measures.Katya Tentori, Vincenzo Crupi, Nicolao Bonini & Daniel Osherson - 2007 - Cognition 103 (1):107-119.
  14.  86
    State of the field: Measuring information and confirmation.Vincenzo Crupi & Katya Tentori - 2014 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 47 (C):81-90.
  15. An Axiomatic System for Concessive Conditionals.Eric Raidl, Andrea Iacona & Vincenzo Crupi - 2023 - Studia Logica 112 (1):343-363.
    According to the analysis of concessive conditionals suggested by Crupi and Iacona, a concessive conditional $$p{{\,\mathrm{\hookrightarrow }\,}}q$$ p ↪ q is adequately formalized as a conjunction of conditionals. This paper presents a sound and complete axiomatic system for concessive conditionals so understood. The soundness and completeness proofs that will be provided rely on a method that has been employed by Raidl, Iacona, and Crupi to prove the soundness and completeness of an analogous system for evidential conditionals.
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  16.  68
    Confirmation as partial entailment: A representation theorem in inductive logic.Vincenzo Crupi & Katya Tentori - 2013 - Journal of Applied Logic 11 (4):364-372.
  17. New Axioms for Probability and Likelihood Ratio Measures.Vincenzo Crupi, Nick Chater & Katya Tentori - 2013 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (1):189-204.
    Probability ratio and likelihood ratio measures of inductive support and related notions have appeared as theoretical tools for probabilistic approaches in the philosophy of science, the psychology of reasoning, and artificial intelligence. In an effort of conceptual clarification, several authors have pursued axiomatic foundations for these two families of measures. Such results have been criticized, however, as relying on unduly demanding or poorly motivated mathematical assumptions. We provide two novel theorems showing that probability ratio and likelihood ratio measures can be (...)
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  18. The whole truth about Linda: probability, verisimilitude and a paradox of conjunction.Gustavo Cevolani, Vincenzo Crupi & Roberto Festa - 2010 - In Marcello D'Agostino, Federico Laudisa, Giulio Giorello, Telmo Pievani & Corrado Sinigaglia (eds.), New Essays in Logic and Philosophy of Science. College Publications. pp. 603--615.
    We provide a 'verisimilitudinarian' analysis of the well-known Linda paradox or conjunction fallacy, i.e., the fact that most people judge the probability of the conjunctive statement "Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement" (B & F) as more probable than the isolated statement "Linda is a bank teller" (B), contrary to an uncontroversial principle of probability theory. The basic idea is that experimental participants may judge B & F a better hypothesis about Linda as compared (...)
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  19. Probability, Evidential Support, and the Logic of Conditionals.Vincenzo Crupi & Andrea Iacona - 2021 - Argumenta 6:211-222.
    Once upon a time, some thought that indicative conditionals could be effectively analyzed as material conditionals. Later on, an alternative theoretical construct has prevailed and received wide acceptance, namely, the conditional probability of the consequent given the antecedent. Partly following critical remarks recently ap- peared in the literature, we suggest that evidential support—rather than conditional probability alone—is key to understand indicative conditionals. There have been motivated concerns that a theory of evidential conditionals (unlike their more tra- ditional counterparts) cannot generate (...)
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  20.  97
    Irrelevant conjunction: Statement and solution of a new paradox.Vincenzo Crupi & Katya Tentori - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (1):1-13.
    The so‐called problem of irrelevant conjunction has been seen as a serious challenge for theories of confirmation. It involves the consequences of conjoining irrelevant statements to a hypothesis that is confirmed by some piece of evidence. Following Hawthorne and Fitelson, we reconstruct the problem with reference to Bayesian confirmation theory. Then we extend it to the case of conjoining irrelevant statements to a hypothesis that is dis confirmed by some piece of evidence. As a consequence, we obtain and formally present (...)
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  21.  59
    On the conjunction fallacy and the meaning of and, yet again: A reply to.Katya Tentori & Vincenzo Crupi - 2012 - Cognition 122 (2):123-134.
  22. How the conjunction fallacy is tied to probabilistic confirmation: Some remarks on Schupbach (2009).Katya Tentori & Vincenzo Crupi - 2012 - Synthese 184 (1):3-12.
    Crupi et al. (Think Reason 14:182–199, 2008) have recently advocated and partially worked out an account of the conjunction fallacy phenomenon based on the Bayesian notion of confirmation. In response, Schupbach (2009) presented a critical discussion as following from some novel experimental results. After providing a brief restatement and clarification of the meaning and scope of our original proposal, we will outline Schupbach’s results and discuss his interpretation thereof arguing that they do not actually undermine our point of view if (...)
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  23.  38
    Critique of pure Bayesian cognitive science: A view from the philosophy of science.Vincenzo Crupi & Fabrizio Calzavarini - 2023 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 13 (3):1-17.
    Bayesian approaches to human cognition have been extensively advocated in the last decades, but sharp objections have been raised too within cognitive science. In this paper, we outline a diagnosis of what has gone wrong with the prevalent strand of Bayesian cognitive science (here labelled pure Bayesian cognitive science), relying on selected illustrations from the psychology of reasoning and tools from the philosophy of science. Bayesians’ reliance on so-called method of rational analysis is a key point of our discussion. We (...)
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  24. Updating: Learning versus supposing.Jiaying Zhao, Vincenzo Crupi, Katya Tentori, Branden Fitelson & Daniel Osherson - 2012 - Cognition 124 (3):373-378.
  25.  53
    Judging the Probability of Hypotheses Versus the Impact of Evidence: Which Form of Inductive Inference Is More Accurate and Time‐Consistent?Katya Tentori, Nick Chater & Vincenzo Crupi - 2016 - Cognitive Science 40 (3):758-778.
    Inductive reasoning requires exploiting links between evidence and hypotheses. This can be done focusing either on the posterior probability of the hypothesis when updated on the new evidence or on the impact of the new evidence on the credibility of the hypothesis. But are these two cognitive representations equally reliable? This study investigates this question by comparing probability and impact judgments on the same experimental materials. The results indicate that impact judgments are more consistent in time and more accurate than (...)
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  26. Toward a Grammar of Bayesian Confirmation.Vincenzo Crupi, Roberto Festa & Carlo Buttasi - 2009 - In M. Suàrez, M. Dorato & M. Rèdei (eds.), EPSA Epistemology and Methodology of Science: Launch of the European Philosophy of Science Association. Springer. pp. 73--93.
  27.  45
    Why quantum probability does not explain the conjunction fallacy.Katya Tentori & Vincenzo Crupi - 2013 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (3):308-310.
  28.  34
    From is to ought, and back: how normative concerns foster progress in reasoning research.Vincenzo Crupi & Vittorio Girotto - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5.
  29. Inductive Logic.Vincenzo Crupi - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (6):641-650.
    The current state of inductive logic is puzzling. Survey presentations are recurrently offered and a very rich and extensive handbook was entirely dedicated to the topic just a few years ago [23]. Among the contributions to this very volume, however, one finds forceful arguments to the effect that inductive logic is not needed and that the belief in its existence is itself a misguided illusion , while other distinguished observers have eventually come to see at least the label as “slightly (...)
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  30.  18
    Pseudodiagnosticity revisited.Vincenzo Crupi, Katya Tentori & Luigi Lombardi - 2009 - Psychological Review 116 (4):971-985.
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  31.  16
    Erratum to “Confirmation as partial entailment” [Journal of Applied Logic 11 364–372].Vincenzo Crupi & Katya Tentori - 2014 - Journal of Applied Logic 12 (2):230-231.
  32.  49
    Noisy probability judgment, the conjunction fallacy, and rationality: Comment on Costello and Watts (2014).Vincenzo Crupi & Katya Tentori - 2016 - Psychological Review 123 (1):97-102.
  33.  38
    Bayesians too should follow Wason: A comprehensive accuracy-based analysis of the selection task.Filippo Vindrola & Vincenzo Crupi - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
    Wason’s selection task is a paramount experimental problem in the study of human reasoning, often connected with the celebrated ravens paradox in the philosophical literature. Various normative accounts of the selection task rely on a Bayesian approach. Some claim vindication of participants’ rationality. Others don’t, thus following Wason’s original intuition that observed responses are mistaken. In this article we argue that despite claims to the contrary, all these accounts actually speak to the same effect: Wason was right. First, we provide (...)
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  34. Formal and Empirical Methods in Philosophy of Science.Vincenzo Crupi & Stephan Hartmann - 2009 - In Friedrich Stadler et al (ed.), The Present Situation in the Philosophy of Science. Springer. pp. 87--98.
    This essay addresses the methodology of philosophy of science and illustrates how formal and empirical methods can be fruitfully combined. Special emphasis is given to the application of experimental methods to confirmation theory and to recent work on the conjunction fallacy, a key topic in the rationality debate arising from research in cognitive psychology. Several other issue can be studied in this way. In the concluding section, a brief outline is provided of three further examples.
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  35.  66
    Note of the Editors.Vincenzo Crupi, Branden Fitelson, Ole Hjortland & Florian Steinberger - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S6):1-1.
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  36. A verisimilitudinarian analysis of the Linda paradox.Gustavo Cevolani, Vincenzo Crupi & Roberto Festa - 2012 - VII Conference of the Spanish Society for Logic, Methodology and Philosphy of Science.
    The Linda paradox is a key topic in current debates on the rationality of human reasoning and its limitations. We present a novel analysis of this paradox, based on the notion of verisimilitude as studied in the philosophy of science. The comparison with an alternative analysis based on probabilistic confirmation suggests how to overcome some problems of our account by introducing an adequately defined notion of verisimilitudinarian confirmation.
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  37. Sleeping Beauty Goes to the Lab: The Psychology of Self-Locating Evidence.Matteo Colombo, Jun Lai & Vincenzo Crupi - unknown - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (1):173-185.
    Analyses of the Sleeping Beauty Problem are polarised between those advocating the “1/2 view” (“halfers”) and those endorsing the “1/3 view” (“thirders”). The disagreement concerns the evidential relevance of self-locating information. Unlike halfers, thirders regard self-locating information as evidentially relevant in the Sleeping Beauty Problem. In the present study, we systematically manipulate the kind of information available in different formulations of the Sleeping Beauty Problem. Our findings indicate that patterns of judgment on different formulations of the Sleeping Beauty Problem do (...)
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  38.  23
    An argument for not equating confirmation and explanatory power.Vincenzo Crupi - 1996 - Philosophy of Science 63:21-6.
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  39. Aspetti cognitivi della razionalità medica: dall'evidenza alla decisione.Vincenzo Crupi - 2005 - Nuova Civiltà Delle Macchine 23 (4):69-78.
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  40. Ancora Duhem E Quine.Vincenzo Crupi - 2002 - Epistemologia 25 (1):5-38.
     
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  41.  72
    Bayesian Confirmation by Uncertain Evidence: A Reply to Huber [2005].Vincenzo Crupi, Roberto Festa & Tommaso Mastropasqua - 2008 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (2):201-211.
    Bayesian epistemology postulates a probabilistic analysis of many sorts of ordinary and scientific reasoning. Huber ([2005]) has provided a novel criticism of Bayesianism, whose core argument involves a challenging issue: confirmation by uncertain evidence. In this paper, we argue that under a properly defined Bayesian account of confirmation by uncertain evidence, Huber's criticism fails. By contrast, our discussion will highlight what we take as some new and appealing features of Bayesian confirmation theory. 1. Introduction2. Uncertain Evidence and Bayesian Confirmation3. Bayesian (...)
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  42. Epistemologia del caso-AIDS: un case-study per la metodologia dei programmi di ricerca scientifici.Vincenzo Crupi - 2000 - Epistemologia 23 (2):243-280.
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  43.  40
    Generalized Confirmation and Relevance Measures.Vincenzo Crupi - 2017 - In Michela Massimi, Jan-Willem Romeijn & Gerhard Schurz (eds.), EPSA15 Selected Papers: The 5th conference of the European Philosophy of Science Association in Düsseldorf. Cham: Springer. pp. 285-295.
    The main point of the paper is to show how popular probabilistic measures of incremental confirmation and statistical relevance with qualitatively different features can be embedded smoothly in generalized parametric families. In particular, I will show that the probability difference, log probability ratio, log likelihood ratio, odds difference, so-called improbability difference, and Gaifman’s measures of confirmation can all be subsumed within a convenient biparametric continuum. One intermediate step of this project may have interest on its own, as it provides a (...)
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  44. Hempel vs. Lakatos. La metodologia dei programmi di ricerca scientifici e il problema dei presupposti.Vincenzo Crupi - 1999 - Epistemologia 22 (2):189-222.
     
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  45.  16
    L'interpretazione in discussione. Universalità e linguisticità nell'ermeneutica filosofica.Vincenzo Crupi - 2003 - Iride: Filosofia e Discussione Pubblica 16 (3):493-510.
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  46.  34
    Scienza, ontologia, metafisica. Heidegger e i nomi della filosofia.Vincenzo Crupi - 1999 - Iride: Filosofia e Discussione Pubblica 12 (3):627-646.
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  47.  17
    Trish Galzebrook, Heidegger's Philosophy of Science. [REVIEW]Vincenzo Crupi - 2003 - Human Studies 26 (1):133-139.