36 found
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  1.  45
    On Bayesian Measures of Evidential Support: Theoretical and Empirical Issues.Vincenzo Crupi, Katya Tentori & and Michel Gonzalez - 2007 - Philosophy of Science 74 (2):229-252.
    Epistemologists and philosophers of science have often attempted to express formally the impact of a piece of evidence on the credibility of a hypothesis. In this paper we will focus on the Bayesian approach to evidential support. We will propose a new formal treatment of the notion of degree of confirmation and we will argue that it overcomes some limitations of the currently available approaches on two grounds: (i) a theoretical analysis of the confirmation relation seen as an extension of (...)
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  2. Verisimilitude and Belief Change for Conjunctive Theories.Gustavo Cevolani, Vincenzo Crupi & Roberto Festa - 2011 - Erkenntnis 75 (2):183-202.
    Theory change is a central concern in contemporary epistemology and philosophy of science. In this paper, we investigate the relationships between two ongoing research programs providing formal treatments of theory change: the (post-Popperian) approach to verisimilitude and the AGM theory of belief change. We show that appropriately construed accounts emerging from those two lines of epistemological research do yield convergences relative to a specified kind of theories, here labeled “conjunctive”. In this domain, a set of plausible conditions are identified which (...)
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  3. Probability, Confirmation, and the Conjunction Fallacy.Vincenzo Crupi, Branden Fitelson & Katya Tentori - 2008 - Thinking and Reasoning 14 (2):182 – 199.
    The conjunction fallacy has been a key topic in debates on the rationality of human reasoning and its limitations. Despite extensive inquiry, however, the attempt to provide a satisfactory account of the phenomenon has proved challenging. Here we elaborate the suggestion (first discussed by Sides, Osherson, Bonini, & Viale, 2002) that in standard conjunction problems the fallacious probability judgements observed experimentally are typically guided by sound assessments of _confirmation_ relations, meant in terms of contemporary Bayesian confirmation theory. Our main formal (...)
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  4.  35
    A Second Look at the Logic of Explanatory Power (with Two Novel Representation Theorems).Vincenzo Crupi & Katya Tentori - 2012 - Philosophy of Science 79 (3):365-385.
  5.  14
    Comparison of Confirmation Measures.Katya Tentori, Vincenzo Crupi, Nicolao Bonini & Daniel Osherson - 2007 - Cognition 103 (1):107-119.
  6.  11
    On the Determinants of the Conjunction Fallacy: Probability Versus Inductive Confirmation.Katya Tentori, Vincenzo Crupi & Selena Russo - 2013 - Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 142 (1):235.
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  7.  32
    State of the Field: Measuring Information and Confirmation.Vincenzo Crupi & Katya Tentori - 2014 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 47:81-90.
  8.  45
    Irrelevant Conjunction: Statement and Solution of a New Paradox.Vincenzo Crupi & Katya Tentori - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (1):1-13.
    The so‐called problem of irrelevant conjunction has been seen as a serious challenge for theories of confirmation. It involves the consequences of conjoining irrelevant statements to a hypothesis that is confirmed by some piece of evidence. Following Hawthorne and Fitelson, we reconstruct the problem with reference to Bayesian confirmation theory. Then we extend it to the case of conjoining irrelevant statements to a hypothesis that is dis confirmed by some piece of evidence. As a consequence, we obtain and formally present (...)
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  9.  12
    On the Conjunction Fallacy and the Meaning of and , yet Again: A Reply To.Katya Tentori & Vincenzo Crupi - 2012 - Cognition 122 (2):123-134.
  10.  6
    Why Quantum Probability Does Not Explain the Conjunction Fallacy.Katya Tentori & Vincenzo Crupi - 2013 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (3):308-310.
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  11. The Whole Truth About Linda: Probability, Verisimilitude and a Paradox of Conjunction.Gustavo Cevolani, Vincenzo Crupi & Roberto Festa - 2010 - In Marcello D'Agostino, Federico Laudisa, Giulio Giorello, Telmo Pievani & Corrado Sinigaglia (eds.), New Essays in Logic and Philosophy of Science. College Publications. pp. 603--615.
    We provide a 'verisimilitudinarian' analysis of the well-known Linda paradox or conjunction fallacy, i.e., the fact that most people judge the probability of the conjunctive statement "Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement" (B & F) as more probable than the isolated statement "Linda is a bank teller" (B), contrary to an uncontroversial principle of probability theory. The basic idea is that experimental participants may judge B & F a better hypothesis about Linda as compared (...)
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  12. Toward a Grammar of Bayesian Confirmation.Vincenzo Crupi, Roberto Festa & Carlo Buttasi - 2010 - In M. Suàrez, M. Dorato & M. Redéi (eds.), EPSA Epistemology and Methodology of Science: Launch of the a European Philosophy of Science Association. Springer. pp. 73--93.
  13.  18
    Judging the Probability of Hypotheses Versus the Impact of Evidence: Which Form of Inductive Inference Is More Accurate and Time‐Consistent?Katya Tentori, Nick Chater & Vincenzo Crupi - 2016 - Cognitive Science 40 (3):758-778.
    Inductive reasoning requires exploiting links between evidence and hypotheses. This can be done focusing either on the posterior probability of the hypothesis when updated on the new evidence or on the impact of the new evidence on the credibility of the hypothesis. But are these two cognitive representations equally reliable? This study investigates this question by comparing probability and impact judgments on the same experimental materials. The results indicate that impact judgments are more consistent in time and more accurate than (...)
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  14. A Verisimilitudinarian Analysis of the Linda Paradox.Gustavo Cevolani, Vincenzo Crupi & Roberto Festa - 2012 - VII Conference of the Spanish Society for Logic, Methodology and Philosphy of Science.
    The Linda paradox is a key topic in current debates on the rationality of human reasoning and its limitations. We present a novel analysis of this paradox, based on the notion of verisimilitude as studied in the philosophy of science. The comparison with an alternative analysis based on probabilistic confirmation suggests how to overcome some problems of our account by introducing an adequately defined notion of verisimilitudinarian confirmation.
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  15.  61
    How the Conjunction Fallacy is Tied to Probabilistic Confirmation: Some Remarks on Schupbach (2009).Katya Tentori & Vincenzo Crupi - 2012 - Synthese 184 (1):3-12.
    Crupi et al. (Think Reason 14:182–199, 2008) have recently advocated and partially worked out an account of the conjunction fallacy phenomenon based on the Bayesian notion of confirmation. In response, Schupbach (2009) presented a critical discussion as following from some novel experimental results. After providing a brief restatement and clarification of the meaning and scope of our original proposal, we will outline Schupbach’s results and discuss his interpretation thereof arguing that they do not actually undermine our point of view if (...)
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  16.  12
    Updating: Learning Versus Supposing.Jiaying Zhao, Vincenzo Crupi, Katya Tentori, Branden Fitelson & Daniel Osherson - 2012 - Cognition 124 (3):373-378.
  17.  39
    Sleeping Beauty Goes to the Lab: The Psychology of Self-Locating Evidence.Matteo Colombo, Jun Lai & Vincenzo Crupi - unknown
    The Sleeping Beauty Problem is a challenging puzzle in probabilistic reasoning, which has attracted enormous attention and still fosters ongoing debate. The problem goes as follows: Suppose that some researchers are going to put you to sleep. During the two days that your sleep will last, they will briefly wake you up either once or twice, depending on the toss of a fair coin. After each waking, they will put you back to sleep with a drug that makes you forget (...)
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  18.  64
    Bayesian Confirmation by Uncertain Evidence: A Reply to Huber [2005].Vincenzo Crupi, Roberto Festa & Tommaso Mastropasqua - 2008 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (2):201 - 211.
    Bayesian epistemology postulates a probabilistic analysis of many sorts of ordinary and scientific reasoning. Huber ([2005]) has provided a novel criticism of Bayesianism, whose core argument involves a challenging issue: confirmation by uncertain evidence. In this paper, we argue that under a properly defined Bayesian account of confirmation by uncertain evidence, Huber's criticism fails. By contrast, our discussion will highlight what we take as some new and appealing features of Bayesian confirmation theory.
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  19.  2
    From is to Ought, and Back: How Normative Concerns Foster Progress in Reasoning Research.Vincenzo Crupi & Vittorio Girotto - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5.
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  20.  5
    Confirmation as Partial Entailment: A Representation Theorem in Inductive Logic.Vincenzo Crupi & Katya Tentori - 2013 - Journal of Applied Logic 11 (4):364-372.
  21.  44
    Inductive Logic.Vincenzo Crupi - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (6):641-650.
    The current state of inductive logic is puzzling. Survey presentations are recurrently offered and a very rich and extensive handbook was entirely dedicated to the topic just a few years ago [23]. Among the contributions to this very volume, however, one finds forceful arguments to the effect that inductive logic is not needed and that the belief in its existence is itself a misguided illusion , while other distinguished observers have eventually come to see at least the label as “slightly (...)
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  22.  39
    Note of the Editors.Vincenzo Crupi, Branden Fitelson, Ole Hjortland & Florian Steinberger - 2013 - Erkenntnis 79 (S6):1-1.
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  23.  70
    Formal and Empirical Methods in Philosophy of Science.Vincenzo Crupi & Stephan Hartmann - 2010 - In Friedrich Stadler et al (ed.), The Present Situation in the Philosophy of Science. Springer. pp. 87--98.
    This essay addresses the methodology of philosophy of science and illustrates how formal and empirical methods can be fruitfully combined. Special emphasis is given to the application of experimental methods to confirmation theory and to recent work on the conjunction fallacy, a key topic in the rationality debate arising from research in cognitive psychology. Several other issue can be studied in this way. In the concluding section, a brief outline is provided of three further examples.
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  24. Tematizzazione e matematizzazione: Note sulla filosofia della scienza di Heidegger (1925-1938).Vincenzo Crupi - 2000 - Filosofia 51 (2):251-277.
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  25. Epistemologia del caso-AIDS: un case-study per la metodologia dei programmi di ricerca scientifici.Vincenzo Crupi - 2000 - Epistemologia 23 (2):243-280.
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  26.  8
    An Argument for Not Equating Confirmation and Explanatory Power.Vincenzo Crupi - 1996 - Philosophy of Science 63:21-6.
  27. Hempel vs. Lakatos. La metodologia dei programmi di ricerca scientifici e il problema dei presupposti.Vincenzo Crupi - 1999 - Epistemologia 22 (2):189-222.
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  28.  12
    Trish Galzebrook, Heidegger's Philosophy of Science.Vincenzo Crupi - 2003 - Human Studies 26 (1):133-139.
  29.  3
    Scienza, ontologia, metafisica. Heidegger e i nomi della filosofia.Vincenzo Crupi - 1999 - Iride: Filosofia e Discussione Pubblica 12 (3):627-646.
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  30.  7
    Review: Reframing Heidegger and Science. [REVIEW]Vincenzo Crupi - 2003 - Human Studies 26 (1):133 - 139.
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  31.  1
    Erratum to “Confirmation as Partial Entailment” [Journal of Applied Logic 11 364–372].Vincenzo Crupi & Katya Tentori - 2014 - Journal of Applied Logic 12 (2):230-231.
  32.  2
    L'interpretazione in discussione. Universalità e linguisticità nell'ermeneutica filosofica.Vincenzo Crupi - 2003 - Iride: Filosofia e Discussione Pubblica 16 (3):493-510.
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  33. Aspetti cognitivi della razionalità medica: dall'evidenza alla decisione.Vincenzo Crupi - 2005 - Nuova Civiltà Delle Macchine 23 (4):69-78.
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  34. Ancora Duhem E Quine.Vincenzo Crupi - 2002 - Epistemologia 25 (1):5-38.
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  35. Noisy Probability Judgment, the Conjunction Fallacy, and Rationality: Comment on Costello and Watts.Vincenzo Crupi & Katya Tentori - 2016 - Psychological Review 123 (1):97-102.
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  36. Pseudodiagnosticity Revisited.Vincenzo Crupi, Katya Tentori & Luigi Lombardi - 2009 - Psychological Review 116 (4):971-985.
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