Late medieval theories of language and contemporary philosophy of language have been compared on numerous occasions. Here, we would like to compare two debates: that between the nature of Virtus sermonis , on the medieval side—focusing on a statute published in 1340 by the Faculty of Arts of the University of Paris and its opponents—and, on the contemporary side, the on-going discussion on the semantics-pragmatics distinction and how the truth-value of an utterance should be established. Both the statute (...) and Gricean pragmatics insist on the importance of taking into account the speaker's intention and the context in establishing the signification of an utterance. Yet, upon closer examination, a more convincing parallel might be drawn between the statute's position and current theories in truth-conditional pragmatics. Focusing on a few aspects of the statute that seem to find a counterpart within contemporary pragmatics, we try to show how the issues they give rise to converge, but also diverge. (shrink)

The focus of this article is the manner in which Thomas Ebendorfer of Hasselbach, a Viennese theologian lecturing on Book I of the Sentences in 1421, deals with the topic of virtus sermonis and the relation between theology, philosophy, and logic in his Prologue from the autograph MS Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, 4369 (ff. 7r–8v). By combining a double classification of each science (into acquisita vs. infusa) with a double perspective of their relation (temporal vs. natural), and by making (...) a strong claim for theology’s role in advancing new logical theories, Ebendorfer’s view reflects a progressive awareness of the distinction between theology and philosophy which, in turn, entails very different applications of virtus sermonis in the two sciences. An edition of the Prologue is provided in the Appendix. (shrink)

Manuel Alejandro Serra Pérez L’expression « virtus essendi » utilisée par Thomas d’Aquin dans certains passages de ses oeuvres a été un des sujets abordés dans le thomisme contemporain chez les plus importants commentateurs d’Aquin. Étienne Gilson fut le premier des commentateurs qui écrivit des notes explicatives sur son sens, montrant que ce pouvoir dont l’expression parle fait référence à la source d’où provient toute perfection et actualité, l’esse ut actus essendi. De son côté, le dominicain canadien Lawrence Dewan, (...) particulièrement intéressé à montrer que cette « virtus » est partagée par les deux co-principes de l’étant, à savoir, la forme et l’être, considère au contraire que la doctrine thomiste de la « virtus essendi » développe plutôt le thème que la forme est le principe de l’être (principium essendi). Face à ces deux lectures contraires, dans cet article nous proposons d’en faire une analyse systématique et de proposer une possible piste d’investigation qui éclaire le sens de ce que Thomas d’Aquin comprend par l’expression « virtus essendi ». (shrink)

The subject of this article is the way in which Grotius imitated his Roman model Tacitus in his own Annales. He does this by quotations and allusions, but also, more subtly, by adopting some of Tacitus stylistic peculiarities like brevitas, inconcinnitas and the insertion of sententiae. The imitation of Tacitus is most conspicuous in important sections of the Annales like the opening chapters and the introductions of the main characters. Tacitus is the prime model of Grotius, but not the only (...) one, as is shown by borrowings from Sallust, Pliny the Younger and Vergil. (shrink)

The first part of this essay analyses the beginning of the philosophy of the brain in early Greece by looking at the Pythagorean theories of the brain. The knowledge of this innovative achievement of the Pythagorean school was never completely lost; it also got through to the Middle Ages. The second part focuses on the effect of Pythagorean thinking on Albert the Great. Albert systematically studied all available sources on Pythagoreanism and in doing so acquired extensive knowledge of this philosophical (...) movement. In the process, he also thought through the psychology of the Pythagoreans and came across their brain theory, which he carefully analysed, commented on, and criticised. Albert interpreted the brain-theoretical theses of the Pythagoreans that came to his knowledge from the viewpoint of a speculative construct of Pythagorean psychology, but in essence his accounts, as the third part of this article proves, match the historically secured facts from ancient sources: Albert knew that the Pythagoreans had not only thought out the relationship between mind and brain, but had also considered the question, which is so intensely debated today, whether animals think. The fourth and final part concludes the investigation by reconstructing the basic lines of Albert’s own brain theory: Albert developed a philosophy of the mind which, although allowing a mediated relationship of the intellect with the brain, rather emphasised the separation of the mind from the somatic sphere. From his point of view, the brain has no decisive function in the thought process. Because the Pythagoreans had thought differently, Albert only took critical note of their views. (shrink)

In his treatment of magic, Albert the Great was not guided by traditional biases. Important testimonies to that effect are found in his De mineralibus, one of his works on natural philosophical matters, which explained the allegedly magic ef fects of precious stones in terms of a systematically elaborated theory. Albert invoked in this context suitable metaphysical principles: the power of a particular stone derives, according to his view, from its respective species and the forma substantialis associated with it. By (...) thus integrating magical effects into the rational and conceptual framework of natural philosophy, the Dominican left the methods of other mineralogical authors far behind. The resulting demystification allowed the science of mineralogy to reach a new level of philosophical and scientific sophistication. (shrink)

This article offers the first critical edition of the most important version of Francis of Marchia's famous question 1 of his commentary on Book IV of the Sentences, in which the Franciscan theologian puts forth his virtus derelicta theory of projectile motion. The introduction attempts to place Marchia's theory in its proper context. The theory might seem to us an obvious improvement on Aristotle, but rather than an immediate and complete break with tradition that all scholastics quickly adopted, Marchia's (...) virtus derelicta was more a stage in a gradual process that had begun many decades before and did not find universal acceptance among his first successors. Moreover, Marchia himself did not take the theory to what might seem the obvious conclusion that Jean Buridan would draw, because Marchia employed the virtus derelicta to explain more phenomena than just projectile motion. (shrink)

Robert Pasnau’s paper presents a strong thesis, which it does not manage to substantiate. The thesis in question is that the Aristotelian doctrine of the identity of the knower and the known, as interpreted by St. Thomas, cannot possibly be used to fend off skepticism.

This article takes as its point of departure the conviction that late medieval science should be studied in its own right, and not merely to determine whether it presaged developments in early modern science. Case in point: Francis of Marchia's theory of virtus derelicta, the theory that the motion of a projectile through the air is due to a force left behind by the original motive force. Certainly, Marchia's view is not a forerunner of inertia. Nevertheless, it is argued (...) that virtus derelicta breaks with two important Aristotelian principles of motion: "everything that has a beginning must necessarily also have an end" and "form is always indivisible." Thus, virtus derelicta is neither an Aristotelian solution to the problem of projectile motion nor a development on the road to early modern science; it belongs to a new (but subsequently undeveloped) understanding of motion. (shrink)

Straipsnyje siūlomos konceptualios priemonės, leidžiančios formuluoti tvirtinimą, kad tose socialinių mokslų filosofijos teorijose, kuriose veiksmų atpažinimas yra laikomas metodologiniu socialinio aiškinimo pagrindu, jis yra traktuojamas kaip „virtus dormitiva“. Tuomet veiksmų atpažinimas gali būti suprantamas kaip tiesioginė veiksmų tipų įžvalga elgsenoje arba neapibrėžta, holistinė veiksmų interpretavimo procedūra. Abiem atvejais susiduriama su neskaidrios ir toliau neaiškinamos pažįstančiojo episteminės galios postulavimu. „Virtus dormitiva“ problema tampa ypač aštri, jei pripažįstame veiksmo atpažinimo problemos metodologinį pirmumą prieš veiksmo aiškinimo problemą1.Pagrindiniai žodžiai: veiksmų atpažinimas, veiksmų (...) aiškinimas, veiksmų tipai ir atvejai, socialinių mokslų filosofija. (shrink)