The paper provides a reconstruction of the notion of material Apriori while exhibiting the anti-Kantian inspiration and factual grounding thereof. The attempt is made to show that a non-formal Apriori obtains because the sensuous has a normative character; further, that the difference between material and formal eidetic laws is rooted in the difference between sensuous contents, given in experience, and intellectual contents, originating in activities of judgement. The material Apriori is not independent of all experience, since it is grounded on (...) sensuous eidetic contents and thus depends on the latter’s givenness and characteristics. It is thanks precisely to this ,contingency‘ that it has an ontological significance. (shrink)
The paper provides a reconstruction of the notion of genetic phenomenology while trying to demonstrate that its elaboration leads Husserl to dismiss de facto the main motivation of his idealism—namely the idea that at the basis of constitution is an immanent and formless stuff shaped or animated by subjective acts. Indeed genetic analysis shows that the original stuff of constitution consists of sensuous contents structured according to a material lawfulness grounded on their peculiarity. By affecting the subject, such contents motivate (...) the performing of intentional acts and are the genuine motor of constitution. The genetic ground of apperceptions is thus material content. (shrink)
Der Aufsatz will nachweisen, dass Husserls Denken in der Tat eine Erledigung des Cartesianismus darstellt. Es wird gezeigt, dass Husserls Denken eine ganz andere Auffassung der Wahrnehmung und der Evidenz als Descartes zugrunde liegt. Denn – im Vorgriff auf eine Einsicht, die gegenwärtig in der analytischen Philosophie vertreten wird – meint Husserl, eine Wahrnehmung oder Evidenz könne nur aufgrund anderer Wahrnehmungen oder Evidenzen bezweifelt werden. Deshalb setzt jede solche Bezweifelung das Vertrauen in die Wahrnehmung oder Evidenz voraus und kann nicht (...) die Wahrnehmung oder Evidenz als solche betreffen, sondern lediglich ihre einzelnen Fälle. Demzufolge ist die phänomenologische Reduktion nicht eine Art methodischer Zweifel, und das Husserlsche cogito hat nicht dieselbe Bedeutung wie das Cartesianische cogito. All das beruht auf einer Auffassung der Wirklichkeit, deren Kern in der Identifikation von Wirklichkeit und Erfahrbarkeit liegt, die aber keine Reduktion der Dinge auf das Bewusstsein impliziert. (shrink)
I develop a phenomenological critique to Husserl’s metaphysics, by showing that – contrary to what the majority of critical literature claims – metaphysical questions are alien to phenomenology. Husserl engages with the discussion of these topics only because of ideological-existential motives, and, when he deals with that problems, he does not use the phenomenological method, but the regressive and constructive procedure, which he himself elsewhere criticizes. Konsequent zu sein, ist die größte Obliegenheit eines Philosophen, und wird doch am seltensten angetroffen. (...) Kant, Kritik der praktischen Vernunft. Die Vernunft ist immer beim Menschen die gehorsamste Dienerin des Herzens; was er wünscht, das stellt er sich als seiend vor und demonstriert er, wenn er einmal zu räsonieren anfängt, a priori aus der Vernunft als notwendig. Feuerbach, Die Unsterblichkeitsfrage vom Standpunkt der Anthropologie. It were better […] never to look beyond the present material world. By supposing it to contain the principle of its order within itself, we really assert it to be God; and the sooner we arrive at that Divine Being, so much the better. Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. (shrink)
This paper tries to show that Husserl’s phenomenology can be considered as a form of radical empiricism in the sense of James, since it holds—like traditionalempiricism—that sensuous experience is the foundation and the source of justifi cation of knowledge, but—in contrast with traditional empiricism—it holds that there are relations, which are given in the sensuous experience just as well contents. Reality is sensuous and the structure of reality is equally sensuous. By an analysis of the concepts of the sensuous relation, (...) of the material a priori, and of association, it is showed that Husserl—in contrast with transcendentalism—confers a normative role to the peculiarity of sensuous contents, which determines their objective connections and also the structure of the world before the intellectual activities of the subject. At the same time, it is pointed out that Husserl has never entirely gotten over the Cartesian psychologism of Brentano and of traditional empiricism, that leads him to consider only the immanent as properly present. Finally, the paper discusses Husserl’s concept of the life-world, which originates from Avenarius’ idea of the natural concept of the world, and his position regarding the relation between experience and science. (shrink)
This paper analyses the question of animals in the framework of the phenomenological problem of the common world. First, it underlines the contrast between Husserl’s idea of animals as subjects acting in accordance with a motivation, and the views of Descartes, Heidegger and Sellars, who consider animal behaviour as mechanical or instinctive. After an account of the phenomenological approach to the question of the common world and of Husserl’s position concerning animals, it is showed that the results of scientific research (...) on animal behaviour mainly confirm that position. (shrink)
I deal with the relation between phenomenology and realism while examining Ingarden’s critique towards Husserl. I exhibit the empiricist nucleus of Husserl’s phenomenology, according to which the real is what can be sensuously experienced. On this basis, I argue that Husserl’s phenomenology is not idealistic, in opposition to the realistic phenomenology, according to which reality consists in entities which cannot be sensuously experienced and are thus ideal. Finally I attempt to show that the idealistic elements of Husserl’s thinking do not (...) originate from the transcendental turn, but from a remainder of psychologism that contradicts his empiricism. (shrink)
The paper analyses Husserl’s critique of Kant’s regressive transcendental method while trying to show that at the basis of it is an opposite conception of the conditions of possibility of experience: whereas for Kant experience is structured by the subject through intellectual forms, for Husserl it has a structure before the intervention of the subject. Therefore–contrary to Iso Kern’s opinion–the contrast between Kant and Husserl cannot be traced back to mere methodical divergences.