The issues and problems of mandatory vaccination policy and roll out in First Nations communities are unique and do not concern the safety and effectiveness of vaccines. These issues are also independent of more specific arguments of mandatory vaccination of healthcare workers as a condition of employment. As important as these issues are, they do not consider the complex politics of ongoing settler colonialism and First Nations community relations. In this paper, we also set aside the very real problems of (...) disinformation, hesitancy, scientific and health illiteracy, and other concerns that drive vaccine hesitancy and refusal. These affect all communities, including First Nations communities. We, instead describe the dominant arguments in favour of mandatory vaccination and critique them in terms of the disputed legitimacy of Settler-Colonial decision-making as it impacts First Nations communities. We contend cultural responsiveness and safety—not state compulsion—must remain the first principles of any engagement—including vaccination—with First Nations Peoples, families, and communities. (shrink)

R W K Paterson; Towards an Axiology of Knowledge, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 13, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 91–100, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1.

There are numerous ‘solutions’ to the problem of evil, from which theists can and do freely take their pick. It is fairly clear that any attempt at a solution must involve a scaling-down of one or more of the assertions out of whose initial conflict the problem arises – either by a downward revision of what we mean by omnipotence, or omniscience, or benevolence, or by minimizing the amount or condensing the varieties of evil actually to be found in the (...) universe. And indeed, in one or more of these different ways, the charge of logical inconsistency can no doubt always be vouchsafed at least a formal answer. Unfortunately, the mere ironing-out of formal inconsistencies does not of itself go very far towards providing a solution to this central problem of theism which will be morally, religiously, and intellectually convincing and acceptable as well as logically impeccable. Everything depends on how the inconsistencies are ironed out. For every attempt at a solution of the problem of evil has to be made at a price, in keeping with the scale and type of conceptual or ethical readjustments which it requires of us. And if the solutions which are generally offered seldom seem to carry much conviction, this is because the price they require us to pay nearly always seems far too high. A ‘solution’ to the problem of evil that is to count as a genuine solution must not require us to make any conceptual or ethical readjustments which it would not on independent grounds be entirely reasonable to make. A ‘solution’ that was finally to count as the solution of the problem of evil would presumably need to be that particular one which required us to make only those conceptual and ethical readjustments which were on independent grounds the ones that it was the most reasonable to make. What follows is offered as a solution, in the above sense, of the problem of evil. However, I shall not here attempt to argue that it is the solution. (shrink)

This work gives a fresh approach to the discussion of psychological phenomena in philosophical terms. Beginning with a discussion of the emotions and feelings, it works back to a theory of willing and judging. The method is analytic, and the influence of Wittgenstein and Ryle is everywhere in evidence, though in different ways: the author usually improves on what Ryle, but simply approves of what Wittgenstein, says. In the final two chapters, the theory of judgment put forward by Geach in (...) Mental Acts is modified and extended to apply to acts of will, in the light of what has been said in the earlier chapters about emotions, feelings and desires.--R. H. K. (shrink)

We critically evaluate the ways in which competence in medical ethics has been evaluated. We report the initial stage in the development of a relevant, reliable and valid instrument to evaluate core critical thinking skills in medical ethics. This instrument can be used to evaluate the impact of medical ethics education programmes and to assess whether medical students have achieved a satisfactory level of performance of core skills and knowledge in medical ethics, within and across institutions.

Background: Although fair distribution of healthcare services for older patients is an important challenge, qualitative research exploring clinicians’ considerations in clinical prioritisation within this field is scarce. Objectives: To explore how clinicians understand their professional role in clinical prioritisations in healthcare services for old patients. Design: A semi-structured interview-guide was employed to interview 45 clinicians working with older patients. The interviews were analysed qualitatively using hermeneutical content analysis. Participants: 20 physicians and 25 nurses working in public hospitals and nursing homes (...) in different parts of Norway. Results and interpretations: The clinicians struggle with not being able to attend to the comprehensive needs of older patients, and being unfaithful to professional ideals and expectations. There is a tendency towards lowering the standards and narrowing the role of the clinician. This is done in order to secure the vital needs of the patient, but is at the expense of good practice and holistic role modelling. Increased specialisation, advances and increase in medical interventions, economical incentives, organisational structures, and biomedical paradigms, may all contribute to a narrowing of the clinicians’ role. Conclusion: Distributing healthcare services in a fair way is generally not described as integral to the clinicians’ role in clinical prioritisations. If considerations of justice are not included in clinicians’ role, it is likely that others will shape major parts of their roles and responsibilities in clinical prioritisations. Fair distribution of healthcare services for older patients is possible only if clinicians accept responsibility in these questions. (shrink)

R W K Paterson; Towards an Axiology of Knowledge, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 13, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 91–100, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1.

Many philosophers believe that there is a causal condition on perception, and that this condition is a conceptual truth about perception. A highly influential argument for this claim is based on intuitive responses to Gricean style thought experiments. Do the folk share the intuitions of philosophers? Roberts et al. (2016) presented participants with two kinds of cases: Blocker cases (similar to Grice’s case involving a mirror and a pillar) and Non-Blocker cases (similar to Grice’s case involving a clock and brain (...) stimulation). They found that a substantial minority agreed that seeing occurs in the Non-Blocker cases, and that in the Blocker cases significantly less agreed that seeing occurs. They thus hypothesized that folk intuitions better align with a no blocker condition than with a causal condition. This paper continues this line of enquiry with two new experiments. The paper investigates the generality and robustness of Roberts et al.’s findings by expanding the sense modalities tested from only vision to audition and olfaction as well. The paper also uses Gricean style thought experiments as a case study for investigating the “reflection defense” against the negative project in experimental philosophy. Our results replicate and extend Roberts et al.’s study and support their hypothesis that folk intuitions better align with a no blocker condition. They also provide an empirical reason to doubt the reflection defense. (shrink)

The title essay was originally presented as two lectures inaugurating the John Dewey lectures at Columbia. It is an important essay for understanding Quine's work for it brings together many themes at the center of his thinking since Word and Object. Quine quotes with approval Dewey's statement "meaning is primarily a property of behavior" and then goes on to consider a thesis which, according to Quine, is a consequence of such a behavioral theory of meaning, i.e., the thesis of the (...) indeterminacy of meaning and translation. Quine relates this indeterminacy thesis, which he has been defending for some time, to language learning, the foundations of mathematics, and to a general view of ontological relativity. Other essays in the volume concern natural kinds and the various paradoxes of confirmation, propositional objects, quantification and existence and the empirical basis of science. All the essays are post-1965 except the introductory essay which was Quine's Presidential Address to the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association in 1956. This address was something of an introduction to the ideas to appear in Word and Object and is placed at the beginning of this collection to emphasize that all the essays collected here expand on and defend some of the positions of Word and Object. Quine's fluid style is everywhere in evidence.--R. H. K. (shrink)

Philosophical inquiry has the capacity to push boundaries in teaching and learning interactions with students and improve teacher’s pedagogical experiences. This paper focuses on the potential for Philosophy to foster pedagogical transformation. Two groups of primary school teachers, 59 in total, have been involved in a comparison of pedagogical transformation between teachers who implemented Philosophy and teachers who used thinking tools for conceptual exploration. A mixed methods approach, including, questionnaires and semi-structured interviews, was employed to inquire into the effect of (...) teaching Philosophy on teachers’ perceptions of their pedagogy. This paper describes how the engagement in communities of philosophical inquiry results in a significant improvement in perceptions of pedagogy, teacher thinking and student engagement. (shrink)

Drawing on interviews with 140 young British males, this article explores the ways in which men talk about their own bodies and bodily practices, and those of other men. The specific focus of interest is a variety of body modification practices. We argue, however, that the significance of this analysis extends beyond the topic of body modification. In discussing the appearance of their bodies, the men we interviewed talked less about muscle and skin than about their own selves located within (...) particular social, cultural and moral universes. This article shows that, in talking about seemingly trivial questions such as whether to have one’s nose pierced or join a gym, men are actively engaged in regulating normative masculinity. Our analysis lends support to the claim that the body has become a new (identity) project in high/late/post-modernity, but shows how fraught with difficulties this project is for young men who must simultaneously work on and discipline their bodies while disavowing any (inappropriate) interest in their own appearance. The analysis highlights the pervasive individualism of young men’s discourses, and the absence of alternative ways of making sense of embodied experiences. (shrink)

Suzanne Langer's earlier works on the philosophy of art, particularly her Feeling and Form, are the points of departure for this general study of the phenomena of life and mind which she clearly intends to be her magnum opus. This is the first of two volumes, the second volume as yet unpublished. Her main thesis is that the "departure [of man] from the normal pattern of animal mentality is a vast and special evolution of feeling in the hominoid stock". She (...) opposes all attempts to bifurcate nature into matter and mind, and in this regard aligns herself with the main currents of contemporary thought. But the centrality she gives to the notion of feeling is uniquely her own, separating her views from those of most other contemporary thinkers and providing the most controversial part of her book. In different places throughout the work, the term "feeling" includes within its scope "sensation," "inward tension," "pain," "emotion," "intent," and a number of other phenomena. Critics of the work will no doubt argue that the theory cannot overcome the vagueness engendered by giving this central concept such a wide scope. But before making a final judgment on this point they will have to pay special attention to the second and third parts of this book where her concept of feeling slowly takes shape through reflection on the arts and on the nature of living things. In a second volume she promises to move beyond living things in general to the distinctive features of human consciousness. A second respect in which this work differs from much other writing in the philosophy of mind is the wealth of references and examples from the biological and psychological sciences which display the encyclopedic interests and openness which have always characterized Suzanne Langer's writings.--R. H. K. (shrink)

This book critically examines the case for and against the belief in personal survival of bodily death. It discusses key philosophical questions. How could a discarnate individual be identified as a person who was once alive? What is the relationship between minds and their brains? Is a 'next world' conceivable? The book also examines classic arguments for the immortality of the soul, and focuses on types of prima facie evidence of survival: near-death experiences, apparitions, mediumistic communications, and ostensible reincarnation cases.

Diskussion over begrebet 'skønhed', og om hvordan den påvirker vores liv.

Three short essays on the position of the philosopher and philosophy in modern society. Maritain illuminates the situation of the philosopher in a milieu of conflicting systems. The final essay, which deals with the relation of science and religion, shows evidence of a growing appreciation by Maritain of the aims of modern science.--R. H. K.

A comprehensive introduction to modal logic is long overdue and this one has many virtues. It is clearly written and should be accessible to any student who has at least one semester of basic logic and is willing to read carefully and think abstractly. The first part, on modal propositional logic, begins with a summary account of classical propositional logic, the axiomatization of Principia Mathematica being the basis for the development of modal logics throughout the book. The transition to modal (...) logic is nicely motivated by a clear presentation of intuitive notions of modality and the requirements to be included in a modal logic. Thereafter three standard systems of modal propositional logic are developed axiomatically, Feys' system T and Lewis' systems S4 and S5. The semantics for these systems is then developed in the manner of Kripke with some terminological modifications. The explanation of accessibility relations between possible worlds is made especially clear through a helpful analogy with certain sorts of games. Decision procedures and completeness proofs are then developed. A similar pattern of exposition is given to modal predicate logic in Part II, the difference being that Henkin-type methods are used in the completeness proofs. Because of the many philosophical problems raised by modal predicate logic, Part II contains more philosophical discussion than Part I. A discussion of identity and descriptions in modal predicate logic is also included. The third and final part is a survey of modal systems beginning with the Lewis' systems S1-S5 and going on to systems weaker and stronger than the Lewis' systems and others which are independent of them. Systems with alternative primitives and axiomatic bases are also discussed. A final chapter discusses the relation of Boolean algebras to modal logics and brief appendices deal with natural deduction systems of modal logic, systems of entailment, alternative notations and the semantics of Kripke and Hintikka among other topics. There are exercises at the end of each chapter. This summary suggests the merits of this introduction, its clear exposition and the enormous amount of material it brings together and summarizes.--R. H. K. (shrink)

The first part of this long two-part work is a history of the development of the modern theory of the atom from Dalton to the present. The second part offers philosophical reflections on this history beginning with a discussion of epistemological implications and following that with an account of ontological implications. The author deals with familiar questions about the reality of micro-particles, complementarity, indeterminism, the role of the observer and other topics. But he also discusses topics like holism, atomic order, (...) the intelligibility of matter and others which are less commonly discussed by philosophers in connection with modern physical theories. The author, who is trained in physics as well as philosophy, has a flair for metaphysical speculation as well as wide knowledge of contemporary physical theory. He stresses the novelties of the quantum conception of matter, argues against its critics like Bohm, and sees it as presenting a radically new conception of atomic order despite its commitment to indeterminism. The views of Werner Heisenberg, who encouraged the author to write the book and who read it in manuscript, have clearly influenced the author, although they do not dominate his thinking.--R. H. K. (shrink)

Reichenbach wrote this book just after taking the first course Einstein ever taught on the theory of relativity. His important and influential work The Philosophy of Space and Time was written several years later and relied in part on the axiomatization of the special and general theories of relativity already worked out in this book. For special relativity Reichenbach divides his axioms into two sets, the light axioms which relate light signals to the topology and metric of time and space, (...) and the matter axioms which do the same for rigid rods and clocks. Thus the axioms focus on the conventions uniting theory and observation and give more insight into the physical foundations of the theory than do most axiomatizations. Reichenbach's approach has been criticized by Weyl and others, but at least some of the criticism seems to rest on a misunderstanding of what Reichenbach was attempting to do. Now that this early work has been translated into English, there is hope that it will be more widely read. There is no doubt that students of the theory or of recent philosophical discussion of space and time will profit from a careful reading of this book.--R. H. K. (shrink)

The much neglected "fifth sense" provides the subject matter for this analytical study. The author distinguishes two kinds of perception associated with this sense, perception by touch and perception of bodily state, and gives an account of the nature of the sensations proper to each. The latter are divided into intransitive bodily sensations and transitive bodily sensations. The greater part of the book is devoted to developing the thesis that bodily sensations can be interpreted as sense impressions of occurrences in (...) our own body.--R. H. K. (shrink)

This fifth volume in the Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science is devoted primarily to the natural sciences, but like previous volumes in this series there is considerable variety in the topics discussed and the approaches taken by different contributors differ markedly. The first contribution is a 150 page essay by A. Grünbaum which is a reply to Hilary Putnam's critique of Grünbaum's philosophy of geometry. The essays by Peter Havas on causality and relativity and by Carl F. von (...) Weizäcker on the unity of physics are essays on the foundations of physical science by physicists who have distinguished themselves in this area. Helpful comments are added to the Havas' paper by John Stachel and to the von Weizäcker paper by Francis Zucker. Zucker provides a useful introduction to von Weizäcker's ambitious project of unifying physics for reader's unfamiliar with von Weizäcker's work. A symposium on theoretical entities and functional explanation in biology is included, with a paper by June Goodfield and comments by Ernst Mayr and Joseph Agassi. Historical essays include a discussion of hypotheses in Newton's philosophy and the development of the cognitive faculties in the theories of Ernst Mach. In addition, there are essays on logic in relation to physical science, measurement, models, symmetry, proof, truth, and the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory.--R. H. K. (shrink)

One of the aims of this book is to bring contemporary research in the neurological and physiological sciences into relationship with discussions in the philosophy of mind. The author does not deny the significance of ordinary talk about the mind, including talk about actions, intentions, beliefs and the like, but he wants to see how this language is compatible with evolutionary and neurophysiological accounts of man. He frequently refers to and accepts Charles Taylor's arguments that "peripheralist" or S-R behavioral theories (...) fail to account for the intentionality of mental states and the teleology of behavior. In fact, one way of reading this book is to see it as an attempt to answer a question raised by Taylor's book: If "peripheralist" theories of behavior cannot account for intentionality and teleology, can a "centralist" or neurophysiological theory of man account for these characteristics? The key chapters of the book attempt to answer this question in the affirmative. The author thinks of the intentionalist characterization of the physical structures of behavior as a "heuristic overlay" on the extensional account of functioning. But the two descriptions, intentional and extensional, are linked together by a series of hypotheses describing the evolutionary source of the functioning. The important problem is to explain how conceptual content or information gets into the neurophysiological picture. The author attempts to deal with this as well as with other problems about the nature of mind including introspection, consciousness, imagery, reasoning, intention, action and language. His discussion of the neurophysiological background for his speculations is purposely general in order to free his conclusions from specific empirical hypotheses about the nervous system which may turn out to be false. This purposeful limitation makes his argument less convincing in some places than it might have been. But he is asking important questions and offering answers to them which deserve careful consideration.--R. H. K. (shrink)

The author offers some interesting suggestions for the rewriting of the history of logic which modern developments in symbolic logic demand. He divides the history into two parts, the first dealing with what is called the Aristotelian core of logic and the improvements made on that core within a basically classical tradition, and the second, with the tradition of improvements inspired by Leibniz' idea of mathematical logic. The book is brief and much less of a comprehensive history than a prolegomena.--R. (...) H. K. (shrink)

The chief topics discussed in this carefully written book are the nature of definitions in science, the distinction between observational and theoretical terms, changes in scientific concepts and the role of analogies and models in science. The unifying theme is that of meaning in the sciences. Its treatment by Achinstein indicates a trend in recent philosophy of science toward finding a middle ground between two antithetical positions on the topic of the meaning of scientific terms. On the one side stands (...) the traditional positivist and logical empiricist account which distinguishes sharply between the meaning of observational and theoretical terms, and on the other side, the more recent views of Feyerabend, Kuhn, Hanson, Toulmin and others who stress the dependence of the meaning of observational terms on that of theoretical terms and the change of meaning of all terms connected with a theory when the theory changes. Achinstein argues cogently that the extreme versions of these positions will not work. Their main problem is that their treatment of meaning is too rigid and monolithic. His own discussion of meaning in the early chapters on definition bristles with distinctions, nuances, and concrete examples from the sciences. In terms of the distinctions of this part of the book he is later able to argue against Feyerabend and Kuhn that in changes of scientific concepts such as characterize scientific revolutions not all of the meaning connections of the various terms need be altered. He also argues that of the many ways proposed to distinguish between theoretical and observational terms, no one is fundamental, though each may be relevant to certain categories of questions one might want to raise about scientific terms. This book thus leads away from the simpler doctrinal statements of the past about the meaning of scientific terms toward a theory of meaning requiring more distinctions, qualifications, nuances, and more subtlety all around.--R. H. K. (shrink)

This is the first of a number of volumes designed to review the philosophical work which has been done in various areas of philosophy between the years 1956 and 1966. It succeeds an earlier three volume publication entitled Philosophy in the Mid-Century which covered the period from 1949 to 1955. This first volume in the series covers the fields of logic, philosophical logic, foundations and philosophy of mathematics. For anyone interested in these fields, the book is an indispensable guide. The (...) procedure is that an expert in a given area writes a summary of the work done in the area in the last ten years and adds a bibliography covering the same period. In all there are thirty-two such essays, most written in English, but a few in French and German. Some representative essays and their authors are the following: On the logical side, Modal Logic, Many Valued Logics, Logic of Practical Discourse, Semantics, Model Theory, Pragmatics, Chronological or Tense Logic, The Logic of Questions, Combinatory Logic and others. There are two general essays on recent developments in philosophical logic and a number of essays on the development of logic in various Eastern and Western European countries and Japan. On the mathematical side are three essays on foundations of set theory and mathematics, essays on Intuitionism in mathematics, and general essays by A. Church, H. Freudenthal and others. The essays are generally of high caliber and the bibliographies in most cases very comprehensive. Occasionally the essays contain not only summary of work done but original suggestions and development of ideas. It would be hard to find a more useful guide for the philosopher overwhelmed by the many developments in these fields in recent years.--R. H. K. (shrink)

This second volume in the series designed to review the work done in various areas of philosophy during the period 1956-1966 is concerned with the philosophy of science. There are forty essays on a variety of topics in the philosophy of science describing the work done in that area in the past decade and a bibliography covering the same period. Most are in English, some in French or German. Some representative topics and their authors are: Laws, Models, Causality, Induction and (...) Probability, Scientific Methodology, Time, Space, Cosmology, Philosophy and Physics, Quantum Theory, Biology and Philosophy. In addition there are several general essays on the influence of various philosophers and scientists on current developments in the philosophy of science, on the ethical and philosophical implications of science, on Cybernetics, Information Theory, Game theory and a number of essays on the development of philosophy of science in different countries of Western and Eastern Europe and Japan. Like the first volume of this series, this book is an indispensable guide to anyone interested in the field, and a place should be made for it on every library shelf---where there is an interest in philosophy of science.--R. H. K. (shrink)

In 1933, Bonhoeffer delivered some lectures on Christology at the University of Berlin. They were later reconstructed by his students and finally published in 1960 in Germany. This book is the English translation of that reconstruction. The book contains an introduction and sections on "The Present Christ--The 'Pro me'," and "The Historical Christ." Underlying these are the valid questions Bonhoeffer thought Christology should answer: who? and where? rather than the invalid traditional question: how? Who is Jesus Christ? These questions lead (...) to the answer of His presence in the Church in his pro me structure as Word, as sacrament, and as community. The question, Where is Jesus Christ? receives three answers: Jesus Christ is at the border of my existence; Jesus Christ is the center and meaning of history; Jesus Christ is the heart of nature. Somewhat difficult, the book is not for those uninitiated in theology. Yet, since Christology is the key to Bonhoeffer's whole thought, the translation is an important contribution to Bonhoeffer scholarship in the English-speaking world.--R. G. K. (shrink)

The expressed aim of Alf Ross' study is to lay the philosophical foundations for deontic logic by explicating the concepts of directive and norm. But there is a wider significance to his task, for he makes clear throughout that the concepts of directive and norm are central to a wide variety of disciplines, including moral, legal, and social philosophy, linguistics and the other social sciences. Moreover, the test of adequacy of his explications include an appeal to the usefulness the concepts (...) have, not only to the logician, but for the moral and legal philosopher and especially in the case of his account of norms, for the social scientist. He begins with a discussion of speech acts, developing a distinction between indicative and directive speech. A "directive" is defined in terms of directive speech as an action-idea conceived as a pattern of behavior in directive speech and a variety of different sorts of directives are distinguished. A "norm" is then defined as a directive which stands in a certain kind of relation to social facts and the elements of norms are discussed. Finally, Ross offers an interpretation of deontic logic as a set of postulates defining directive speech. He discusses some of the problems of interpretation although he does not make contact with some of the more recent discussion of deontic paradoxes, e.g., the paradoxes engendered by contrary-to-duty imperatives. This is an informative and thought provoking study. The writing is very clear and the reader is guided throughout by a helpful analytical index.--R. H. K. (shrink)

The author traces the development of the concept of an empirical scientific theory from pre-critical thought through Aristotle. Parmenides is credited with recognizing the distinction between abstract concepts and the empirical world. Zeno's paradoxes and the skepticism of the sophists are seen not only as the two major obstacles to any empirical theory but also as containing implicitly the criteria of a theory, i.e., that it must not lead to paradoxes, and that it be objectively true. Plato, in his Sophist, (...) proves that an empirical theory is possible by resolving the paradoxes and by refuting the sophists' claim that false belief is impossible. The second part of Plato's Parmenides is seen as an attempt to present and evaluate alternative "structures of the world". Finally, the author discusses Aristotle's Physics as a thoroughly worked out theory. The author's frequent use of the technical terminology of contemporary philosophy of science helps him to bring these ancient works up to date, but also yields interpretations which are anachronistic. The book is original and often insightful.—R. J. K. (shrink)

In an introductory sketch of history of scholastic interest in aesthetics, the author notes the reawakening of Thomistic interest in this subject since the last century. He adds, with evidence drawn from nineteenth and twentieth century works, that this interest has been accompanied by methodological confusions and a misunderstanding of the theory of beauty of St. Thomas himself. He seeks to remedy this situation with a scholarly treatment of Aquinas' theory of beauty, divided into two parts; the first a genetic (...) investigation of the development of Thomas's ideas on beauty, the second a systematic account of the mature theory. A notable attempt to develop Aquinas' ideas on this subject from the entire corpus of his writings and not merely from the Summas and one or two other major works.--R. H. K. (shrink)

In this phenomenological approach to meaning, the author defines his task as one of taking account of the kinds of relations the logical order can have to the preconceptual order. This preconceptual order is represented by a pre-logical activity which is called "experiencing." There is experiencing of meaning as well as of things. This "experienced or felt meaning" is said to be as important a dimension of meaning as the traditional modes distinguished by philosophers, e.g., denotation, connotation. Apparent throughout is (...) the author's concern as a psychotherapist to find theoretical foundations for clinical methods.--R. H. K. (shrink)

The author outlines and compares the ethics of the six orthodox systems, Buddhism, Jainism and the Cärväka System as well as the ethical teaching of the Vedas, Upanishads and the Bahagavadgïtä. The concluding four chapters deal with the ethics of Tagore, Radhakrishnan, Gandhi and Nehru. Dr. Sharma is particularly concerned with showing that the ethics of these schools have more in common than is ordinarily supposed, that ethics must be grounded in metaphysics and that the ethical theories of the East (...) are "superior" to those of the West. The highly polemical nature of this book, as well as the author's reliance on secondary sources detracts from its purported usefulness to the scholar and student.—R. J. K. (shrink)

This is the first comprehensive study of Schrödinger's scientific and philosophical writings. The task requires a person trained thoroughly in physical science and yet capable of appreciating the sometimes puzzling philosophical ideas Schrödinger put forward. Professor Scott, a physicist, is remarkably successful at communicating both the physical and the philosophical ideas. After a brief summary of Schrödinger's diverse writings, he divides the writings into four groups which are treated in separate chapters. The first group, including very early papers, deals with (...) Schrödinger's work on Statistical Mechanics, and statistical theories in general. The second covers the crucial development of Wave Mechanics. The third concerns Schrödinger's interpretation of quantum mechanics and the important departures from the prevailing views of the Copenhagen school. Finally the fourth group contains Schrödinger's views on life and the self. The author shows that Schrödinger was led to his doctrine of identity by reflecting on the paradox of freedom and determinism. His study "What is Life?" convinced him that living systems are governed by the law of causality but he also believed that men were free. The doctrine of identity was his solution to the paradox. Scott is critical of this solution and a number of other doctrines of Schrödinger. The book is clearly written throughout and is a good introduction to Schrödinger's thought.--R. H. K. (shrink)

This publication of the proceedings of the first of a new series of colloquia to be held at the University of Western Ontario contains an opening address on existence and quantification by W. V. Quine and three symposia. The paper discussed in the first of these symposia, "Descartes' Ontological Argument" by Anthony Kenny, follows closely one chapter of Kenny's recent book on Descartes. Kenny's paper contains both an interesting account of Descartes' views and some challenging remarks about ontological arguments in (...) general. His paper is discussed in separate commentaries by Norman Malcolm and Terence Penelhum. An interesting feature of this volume is that some comments from the floor are recorded and included along with the regular commentaries. Ernest Sosa and Bernard Williams comment on Kenny's paper along with Malcolm and Penelhum. Kenny responds to all four commentators. The other two symposia follow a similar format. The second, "On Events and Event-descriptions," features a paper by R. M. Martin which focuses on the logic of event descriptions and their role in scientific explanation. Events for Martin are extensional entities, unlike facts, but like facts they are "fictitious in the sense of being handled on virtually." His views are discussed by Donald Davidson, R. J. Butler and Wesley Salmon. In the third symposium on "Existence Assumptions in Practical Thinking," Stephan Körner elaborates on his view of effective choice, relating his account to those of Hume, Kant, and Peirce on the specific topic of the relationship of choice and natural necessity. The commentaries of J. J. Thomson and Bernard Williams are helpful here in getting Körner to clarify his interesting views. In sum, this first colloquium at the University of Western Ontario features genuine philosophical communication on some important issues.--R. H. K. (shrink)

This book is an introduction to certain problems in the philosophy of science through the study of four case histories in the history of science. It is designed for undergraduate science majors whom, the author feels, often have difficulties connecting the usual discussions in the philosophy of science with the science they have studied and are studying. Each case history is followed by a commentary which considers its philosophical implications. The first case, Harvey's discovery of the circulation of the blood, (...) is treated briefly and from it some implications are drawn about the relation of simple theories and the facts supporting them. The next three cases are considerably more complicated and receive more extended treatment. The first of these concerns scientific work on the motions and spacing of the planets from early Babylonian and Greek observations and theories to Kepler and Newton. The second concerns the development of the periodic table of the elements from Dalton to Mendeleev and the third discusses gene theories of inheritance from Mendel onward. In connection with these studies the author considers questions about the nature of theories and theoretical entities, methods of testing theories, the dependence of observation on theory and the issues of reduction among other topics. Although he limits his discussion to a few selected topics in the philosophy of science he has written an informative and interesting study which should fulfill its stated aims.--R. H. K. (shrink)

This book is far more than an exposition of Frege's logical system and semantic concepts, although it is that. The author puts forward the challenging thesis that in trying to cope with Russell's paradox Frege deserted principles of his system which he had relied on throughout. Sternfeld attempts to show, by offering his own interpretation of Frege's logical theory, that if Frege had relied consistently on his previously formulated logical principles, Russell's paradox would have given him no trouble. Further, he (...) uses these arguments as a basis for defending the general thesis that paradoxes and other difficulties with various logical systems can only be discussed relative to the philosophical principles underlying the logical system and adopted independently of it. While these are the most challenging of the book's theses they are not its only topics. The author seems to have read everything by and about Frege and is in control of his material. There will undoubtedly be disagreements over his interpretation of Frege because Frege did not write to make expositors happy. But all students of Frege, as well as students of the philosophy of logic and philosophy of mathematics, will find this book rewarding.--R. H. K. (shrink)