Nietzsche im Film ist ein Thema, das noch immer zu den Desiderata der Nietzsche-Forschung zu rechnen ist. Zwar haben sich, vorrangig im Kontext von Kunstausstellungen, in denen der Philosoph zum Darstellungsobjekt gemacht worden ist, auch Stimmen gemeldet, die sich für Nietzsche als Filmfigur interessierten, aber das gesamte Panorama der Filmlandschaften unter der Optik von Person und Werk Nietzsches, seinen Gestaltungsideen und philosophischen Inhalten zu besichtigen, steht noch immer aus. Vorliegender Band kann diese Lücke nicht schließen, will aber mit seinen Beiträgen (...) im Nietzscheschen Sinne ‘Fingerzeige’ geben, die Leerstellen mit Interpretationsangeboten zu besetzen, die weiterer Forschungsarbeit Anregung sein wollen. Die Beiträge richten daher ihr Augenmerk sowohl auf Spiel- und Dokumentarfilme, in denen der Philosoph in persona zum Thema wird, ebenso aber auf solche Filmarbeiten, in denen seine Welt- und Menschenvorstellungen aufgenommen und verarbeitet werden. Zudem geht es um denkerisch experimentelle Überlegungen, Nietzsches Art des Denkens in die Nähe filmischen Denkens zu rücken — um in beiden der Projektionsarbeit, der produktiven Verbindung von Fiktion und Realität, Medienabhängigkeit und Bild- resp. Sprachmächtigkeit nachzugehen. Bis zur Zertrümmerung von Götzen, die vorher produziert und angebetet worden waren. Unter anderem vom Medium Film selbst, von dem sie dann entzaubert werden. (shrink)
The theses presented here all depart from the assumption that ethics as a philosophical discipline is not contingent upon a theological grounding or justification. What is more: philosophical ethics may not have recourse to religious reasons. But this does not exclude the possibility that philosophically justified ethics may be made richer through reference to the beliefs and faith of those who follow it. Such an ethics elucidated by recourse to faith can strengthen and clarify both personal motives of ethical behavior (...) and its social attractivity. This view is developed in ten theses for a Protestant ethics. (shrink)
In the opening of this paper I argue, contrary to a notion commonly found in the humanities and social sciences above all, and ironically yet not any less resolutely for all that, that in fact nature still exists. Subsequently I criticize the arguably more prevalent conviction that culture stands in opposition to nature. In contrast I argue for the thesis that culture is nothing more or less than a specific form of life that can only develop within nature. More than (...) this: it can only ever develop as nature; and it can only accomplish this with nature. This is shown by examples for the case of technology, which was decisive for the emergence of culture. Every technology can only start by using natural means. Hence we can show that we can only ever understand culture as a part of nature that differentiates itself, like all parts of nature, according to the external and internal conditions of that particular life. Thus culture is one of the countless evolutionary products of nature. (shrink)
The basis for the secrecy is equally apparent, being furnished by Kant a bit later: it could, he suggests, damage the repute of governments to take counsel in foreign affairs from their “subjects.” As a consequence, what can only be publicly executed ought to be agreed on previously in strict secrecy. The state may thus only “tacitly... summon its citizens” to “publicly discuss the general maxims of warfare and peacemaking”. Quite superfluously, a few lines later Kant expressly concedes that “no (...) particular agreement... in this particular point” is needed, corresponding as it does to the imperative of general “human reason.” The public status here openly endowed with secrecy thus has as its object nothing less than something morally and legally self-evident. (shrink)
