Results for 'Voluntary agency'

999 found
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  1.  5
    My Action Lasts Longer: Potential Link Between Subjective Time and Agency During Voluntary Action.Shu Imaizumi & Tomohisa Asai - 2017 - Consciousness and Cognition 51:243-257.
  2.  9
    When One’s Sense of Agency Goes Wrong: Absent Modulation of Time Perception by Voluntary Actions and Reduction of Perceived Length of Intervals in Passivity Symptoms in Schizophrenia.Kyran T. Graham-Schmidt, Mathew T. Martin-Iverson, Nicholas P. Holmes & Flavie A. V. Waters - 2016 - Consciousness and Cognition 45:9-23.
  3. Human Agency and Neural Causes.Jason D. Runyan - 2013 - Palgrave-Macmillan.
  4. Agency and Responsibility in Aristotle's Eudemian Ethics.Jozef Müller - 2015 - Phronesis: A Journal for Ancient Philosophy 60 (2):206-251.
    I defend two main theses. First, I argue that Aristotle’s account of voluntary action focuses on the conditions under which one is the cause of one’s actions in virtue of being (qua) the individual one is. Aristotle contrasts voluntary action not only with involuntary action but also with cases in which one acts (or does something) due to one’s nature (for example, in virtue of being a member of a certain species) rather than due to one’s own desires (...)
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  5. Hume and the Metaphysics of Agency.Joshua M. Wood - 2014 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 52 (1):87-112.
    I examine Hume’s ‘construal of the basic structure of human agency’ and his ‘analysis of human agency’ as they arise in his investigation of causal power. Hume’s construal holds both that volition is separable from action and that the causal mechanism of voluntary action is incomprehensible. Hume’s analysis argues, on the basis of these two claims, that we cannot draw the concept of causal power from human agency. Some commentators suggest that Hume’s construal of human (...) is untenable, unduly skeptical, or uniquely entailed by the limits of empiricism. However, as I argue, these criticisms depend either on a misunderstanding of Hume’s analysis of human agency or on a neglect of the historical context of his view. (shrink)
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  6.  29
    Confounders in Voluntary Consent About Living Parental Liver Donation: No Choice and Emotions. [REVIEW]M. E. Knibbe, E. L. M. Maeckelberghe & M. A. Verkerk - 2007 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 10 (4):433-440.
    Parents’ perception of having no choice and strong emotions like fear about the prospect of living liver donation can lead professionals to question the voluntariness of their decision. We discuss the relation of these experiences (no choice and emotions), as they are communicated by parents in our study, to the requirement of voluntariness. The perceived lack of choice, and emotions are two themes we found in the interviews conducted within the “Living Related Donation; a Qualitative-Ethical Study” research program. As a (...)
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  7.  48
    Intoxication and the Act/Control/Agency Requirement.Susan Dimock - 2012 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 6 (3):341-362.
    Doug Husak has argued, persuasively I think, that there is no literal ‘act requirement’ in Anglo-American law. I begin by reviewing Husak’s reasons for rejecting the act requirement, and provide additional reasons to think he is right to do so. But Husak’s alternative, the ‘control condition’, I argue, is inadequate. The control requirement is falsified by the widespread practice of holding extremely intoxicated offenders liable for criminal conduct they engage in even if they lack control over their conduct at the (...)
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  8. The Concept of Voluntary Motor Control in the Recent Neuroscientific Literature.Paul E. Tibbetts - 2004 - Synthese 141 (2):247-76.
    The concept of voluntary motor control frequently appears in the neuroscientific literature, specifically in the context of cortically-mediated, intentional motor actions. For cognitive scientists, this concept of VMC raises a number of interesting questions: Are there dedicated, modular-like structures within the motor system associated with VMC? Or is it the case that VMC is distributed over multiple cortical as well as subcortical structures? Is there any one place within the so-called hierarchy of motor control where voluntary movements could (...)
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  9. Understanding the Voluntary Act Principle.Andrew Botterell - 2012 - In François Tanguay-Renaud & James Stribopoulos (eds.), Rethinking Criminal Law Theory: New Canadian Perspectives in the Philosophy of Domestic, Transnational, and International Criminal Law. Hart Publishing.
    In broad outline, the chapter proceeds as follows. As indicated above, the Voluntary Act Principle has two components. The first part, the act component, claims that criminal liability can be imposed on an accused only for the performance of an act. The second part, the voluntariness component, claims that criminal liability can be imposed on an accused only for the voluntary performance of an act. I will argue that both components of the Voluntary Act Principle are in (...)
     
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  10.  70
    Intentional Binding and the Sense of Agency: A Review.James W. Moore & Sukhvinder S. Obhi - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (1):546-561.
    It is nearly 10 years since Patrick Haggard and colleagues first reported the ‘intentional binding’ effect . The intentional binding effect refers to the subjective compression of the temporal interval between a voluntary action and its external sensory consequence. Since the first report, considerable interest has been generated and a fascinating array of studies has accumulated. Much of the interest in intentional binding comes from the promise to shed light on human agency. In this review we survey studies (...)
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  11.  40
    Having a Body Versus Moving Your Body: How Agency Structures Body-Ownership.Manos Tsakiris, Gita Prabhu & Patrick Haggard - 2006 - Consciousness and Cognition 15 (2):423-432.
    We investigated how motor agency in the voluntary control of body movement influences body awareness. In the Rubber Hand Illusion , synchronous tactile stimulation of a rubber hand and the participant’s hand leads to a feeling of the rubber hand being incorporated in the participant’s own body. One quantifiable behavioural correlate of the illusion is an induced shift in the perceived location of the participant’s hand towards the rubber hand. Previous studies showed that the induced changes in body (...)
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  12.  48
    Modulating the Sense of Agency with External Cues.James W. Moore, Daniel M. Wegner & Patrick Haggard - 2009 - Consciousness and Cognition 18 (4):1056-1064.
    We investigate the processes underlying the feeling of control over one’s actions . Sense of agency may depend on internal motoric signals, and general inferences about external events. We used priming to modulate the sense of agency for voluntary and involuntary movements, by modifying the content of conscious thought prior to moving. Trials began with the presentation of one of two supraliminal primes, which corresponded to the effect of a voluntary action participants subsequently made. The perceived (...)
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  13. What is the Accordion Effect?Michael E. Bratman - 2005 - The Journal of Ethics 10 (1-2):5-19.
    In "Action and Responsibility,'' Joel Feinberg pointed to an important idea to which he gave the label "the accordion effect.'' Feinberg's discussion of this idea is of interest on its own, but it is also of interest because of its interaction with his critique, in his "Causing Voluntary Actions,'' of a much discussed view of H. L. A. Hart and A. M. Honoré that Feinberg labels the "voluntary intervention principle.'' In this essay I reflect on what the accordion (...)
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  14.  56
    Intentional Binding and Higher Order Agency Experience.James W. Moore & Patrick Haggard - 2010 - Consciousness and Cognition 19 (1):490-491.
    Recent research has shown that human instrumental action is associated with systematic changes in time perception: The interval between a voluntary action and an outcome is perceived as shorter than the interval between a physically similar involuntary movement and an outcome. The study by, Ebert and Wegner suggests that this change in time perception is related to higher order agency experience. Notwithstanding certain issues arising from their study, which are discussed, we believe it offers validation of binding as (...)
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  15.  35
    Subjective Agency and Awareness of Shared Actions.Lars Strother, Kristin A. House & Sukhvinder S. Obhi - 2010 - Consciousness and Cognition 19 (1):12-20.
    Voluntary actions and their distal effects are intimately related in conscious awareness. When an expected effect follows a voluntary action, the experience of the interval between these events is compressed in time, a phenomenon known as ‘intentional binding’ . Current accounts of IB suggest that it serves to reinforce associations between our goals and our intention to attain these goals via action, and that IB only occurs for self-generated actions. We used a novel approach to study IB in (...)
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  16.  20
    Induced Power Changes the Sense of Agency.Sukhvinder S. Obhi, Kristina M. Swiderski & Sonja P. Brubacher - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (3):1547-1550.
    Power differentials are a ubiquitous feature of social interactions and power has been conceptualised as an interpersonal construct. Here we show that priming power changes the sense of agency, indexed by intentional binding. Specifically, participants wrote about episodes in which they had power over others, or in which others had power over them. After priming, participants completed an interval estimation task in which they judged the interval between a voluntary action and a visual effect. After low-power priming, participants (...)
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  17.  41
    Experiences of Voluntary Action.Patrick Haggard & Henry C. Johnson - 2003 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (9-10):72-84.
    Psychologists have traditionally approached phenomenology by describing perceptual states, typically in the context of vision. The control of actions has often been described as 'automatic', and therefore lacking any specific phenomenology worth studying. This article will begin by reviewing some historical attempts to investigate the phenomenology of action. This review leads to the conclusion that, while movement of the body itself need not produce a vivid conscious experience, the neural process of voluntary action as a whole has distinctive phenomenological (...)
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  18.  51
    Sense of Agency, Associative Learning, and Schizotypy.James W. Moore, Anthony Dickinson & Paul C. Fletcher - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (3):792-800.
    Despite the fact that the role of learning is recognised in empirical and theoretical work on sense of agency , the nature of this learning has, rather surprisingly, received little attention. In the present study we consider the contribution of associative mechanisms to SoA. SoA can be measured quantitatively as a temporal linkage between voluntary actions and their external effects. Using an outcome blocking procedure, it was shown that training action–outcome associations under conditions of increased surprise augmented this (...)
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  19.  21
    Experiences of Voluntary Action.Patrick Haggard & Helen Johnson - 2003 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (9-10):9-10.
    Psychologists have traditionally approached phenomenology by describing perceptual states, typically in the context of vision. The control of actions has often been described as 'automatic', and therefore lacking any specific phenomenology worth studying. This article will begin by reviewing some historical attempts to investigate the phenomenology of action. This review leads to the conclusion that, while movement of the body itself need not produce a vivid conscious experience, the neural process of voluntary action as a whole has distinctive phenomenological (...)
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  20.  1
    Voluntary Obligation and Contract.Aditi Bagchi - 2019 - Theoretical Inquiries in Law 20 (2):433-455.
    Absent mistake or misrepresentation, most scholars assume that parties who agree to contract do so voluntarily. Scholars tend further to regard that choice as an important exercise in moral agency. Hanoch Dagan and Michael Heller are right to question the quality of our choices. Where the fundamental contours of the transaction are legally determined, parties have little opportunity to exercise autonomous choice over the terms on which they deal with others. To the extent that our choices in contract do (...)
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  21.  22
    “But You Would Be the Best Mother”: Unwomen, Counterstories, and the Motherhood Mandate.Anna Gotlib - 2016 - Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 13 (2):327-347.
    This paper addresses and challenges the pronatalist marginalization and oppression of voluntarily childless women in the Global North. These conditions call for philosophical analyses and for sociopolitical responses that would make possible the necessary moral spaces for resistance. Focusing on the relatively privileged subgroups of women who are the targets of pronatalist campaigns, the paper explores the reasons behind their choices, the nature and methods of Western pronatalism, and distinguishes three specific sources of some of the more lasting, and stigmatizing (...)
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  22.  44
    The Voluntary Provision of Public Goods.Leon Felkins - manuscript
    Some people voluntarily provide public goods while others take a free ride. Are the providers acting rationally? Should they instead follow the example of the free-rider? What are the rational and moral justifications for voluntary provision? This dissertation examines five ways to justify voluntary provision: rational prudence, social norms, group agency, fairness, and altruism. It suggests that altruism provides the best possible defense. Considerations of fairness may also provide a justification in some circumstances, but generally this argument (...)
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  23.  69
    An Essay on Doxastic Agency.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2005 - Dissertation, University of Rochester
    The problem of doxastic agency concerns what sort of agency humans can exercise with regard to forming doxastic attitudes such as belief. In this essay I defend a version of what James Montmarquet calls "The Asymmetry Thesis": Coming to believe and action are asymmetrical with respect to direct voluntary control. I argue that normal adult human agents cannot exercise direct voluntary control over the acquisition of any of their doxastic attitudes in the same way that they (...)
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  24.  25
    Agency and Mental States in Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder.Judit Szalai - 2016 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 23 (1):47-59.
    The dominant philosophical conceptions of obsessive-compulsive behavior present its subject as having a deficiency, usually characterized as volitional, due to which she lacks control and choice in acting. Compulsions (mental or physical) tend to be treated in isolation from the obsessive thoughts that give rise to them. I offer a different picture of compulsive action, one that is, I believe, more faithful to clinical reality. The clue to (most) obsessive-compulsive behavior seems to be the way obsessive thoughts, which are grounded (...)
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  25.  50
    Thomas Reid on Active Power and Free Agency.Xiangdong Xu - 2011 - Frontiers of Philosophy in China 6 (3):369-389.
    The paper argues that it is a mistake to interpret Thomas Reid as holding a libertarian notion of freedom, and to make use of Reid to argue in support of a libertarian position. More precisely, this paper shows that Reid’s theory of agent-causation may not be what these philosophers take it to be, once such crucial notions as agent-causation and active power in Reid’s theory of free agency have been fully explicated. Reid is more committed to accepting the view (...)
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  26.  12
    Testing the Implementation of Clinical Guidelines.H. I. Goldberg & H. McGough - 1990 - IRB: Ethics & Human Research 13 (6):1-7.
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  27.  29
    Core and Ancillary Epistemic Virtues.Terry Horgan, Matjaž Potrč & Vojko Strahovnik - 2018 - Acta Analytica 33 (3):295-309.
    We argue, primarily by appeal to phenomenological considerations related to the experiential aspects of agency, that belief fixation is broadly agentive; although it is rarely voluntary, nonetheless, it is phenomenologically agentive because of its significant phenomenological similarities to voluntary-agency experience. An important consequence is that epistemic rationality, as a central feature of belief fixation, is an agentive notion. This enables us to introduce and develop a distinction between core and ancillary epistemic virtues. Core epistemic virtues involve (...)
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  28.  5
    Thomas Reid on Active Power and Free Agency.X. U. Xiangdong - 2011 - Frontiers of Philosophy in China 6 (3):369-389.
  29. Controlling Attitudes.Pamela Hieronymi - 2006 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (1):45-74.
    I hope to show that, although belief is subject to two quite robust forms of agency, "believing at will" is impossible; one cannot believe in the way one ordinarily acts. Further, the same is true of intention: although intention is subject to two quite robust forms of agency, the features of belief that render believing less than voluntary are present for intention, as well. It turns out, perhaps surprisingly, that you can no more intend at will than (...)
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  30. Deciding to Believe Redux.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2014 - In Jonathan Matheson Rico Vitz (ed.), The Ethics of Belief: Individual and Social. Oxford University Press. pp. 33-50.
    The ways in which we exercise intentional agency are varied. I take the domain of intentional agency to include all that we intentionally do versus what merely happens to us. So the scope of our intentional agency is not limited to intentional action. One can also exercise some intentional agency in omitting to act and, importantly, in producing the intentional outcome of an intentional action. So, for instance, when an agent is dieting, there is an exercise (...)
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  31.  62
    Reclaiming Volition: An Alternative Interpretation of Libet's Experiment.Jing Zhu - 2003 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (11):61-77.
    Based on his experimental studies, Libet claims that voluntary actions are initiated by unconscious brain activities well before intentions or decisions to act are consciously experienced by people. This account conflicts with our common-sense conception of human agency, in which people consciously and intentionally exert volitions or acts of will to initiate voluntary actions. This paper offers an alternative interpretation of Libet's experiment. The cause of the intentional acts performed by the subjects in Libet's experiment should not (...)
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  32. Doxastic Decisions and Controlling Belief.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2006 - Acta Analytica 21 (1):102-114.
    I critique Matthias Steup’s account of exercising direct voluntary control over coming to have doxastic attitudes via doxastic decisions. I show that the sort of agency Steup argues is exercised in doxastic decision-making is not sufficient for agents to exercise direct voluntary control over their doxastic attitudes. This counts against such putative decisions being the locus of direct control in doxastic agency. Finally, I briefly consider what, if any, consequences the failure of Steup’s theory of doxastic (...)
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  33.  7
    Responsibility Between Neuroscience and Criminal Law. The Control Component of Criminal Liability.Sofia Bonicalzi & Patrick Haggard - 2019 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 10 (2):103-119.
    : The paper discusses the contribution that the neuroscience of action can offer to the legal understanding of action control and responsibility in the case of adult individuals. In particular, we address the issues that follow. What are the cognitive capacities that agents must display in order to be held liable to punishment in criminal law? Is the legal model of liability to punishment compatible with a scientifically informed understanding of voluntary behaviour? To what extent should the law take (...)
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  34. Compatibilism and Doxastic Control.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2006 - Philosophia 34 (2):143-152.
    Sharon Ryan has recently argued that if one has compatibilist intuitions about free action, then one should reject the claim that agents cannot exercise direct voluntary control over coming to believe. In this paper I argue that the differences between beliefs and actions make the expectation of direct voluntary control over coming to believe unreasonable. So Ryan's theory of doxastic agency is untenable.
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  35.  16
    De la intención en el respeto al derecho: respuesta al profesor Kervégan.Domingo Blanco Fernández - 2009 - Logos. Anales Del Seminario de Metafísica [Universidad Complutense de Madrid, España] 42:25-35.
    Desde la separación estricta de ética y derecho, la Rechtslehre kantiana sostiene que es la ética la que exige al sujeto que haga suya la máxima de actuar conforme al derecho. En la misma línea defiende J. F. Kervégan que los sujetos habríamos de reconocer como un deber ético el respeto a las normas jurídicas, sin que esto quiera decir que el derecho dependa de la ética, pues en estricto derecho no podría tenerse a la intención de conciencia como móvil (...)
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  36.  30
    Free Will and Chisholm’s Varieties of Causation.Irving Thalberg - 1971 - Idealistic Studies 1 (May):149-159.
    Professor Chisholm’s lively “Reflections on Human Agency” develop themes which have appeared in at least nine earlier papers of his on action and the kindred topic of events. His latest variations on the Incompatibility thesis will be my sole concern here. This is the doctrine that fully voluntary deeds of a free agent, for which we may justifiably hold him accountable, cannot result from earlier or contemporaneous events. Chisholm’s general Incompatibility formula reads.
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  37.  14
    Agency in the Absence of Reason-Responsiveness: The Case of Dispositional Impulsivity in Personality Disorders.Gloria Ayob - 2016 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 23 (1):61-73.
    It has recently been argued that persons diagnosed with a personality disorder ought to be held responsible for their actions because these actions are voluntary. Defending this claim, Hannah Pickard contends that exercising choice and control are definitive of voluntary action, and that the behaviors that are constitutive of PD are behaviors over which we have choice and control. Thus PD behaviors are voluntary, and on this basis, their agents can be held properly responsible for this type (...)
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  38. Ethics with Aristotle.Sarah Broadie - 1991 - Oxford University Press.
    In this incisive study Sarah Broadie gives an argued account of the main topics of Aristotle's ethics: eudaimonia, virtue, voluntary agency, practical reason, akrasia, pleasure, and the ethical status of theoria. She explores the sense of "eudaimonia," probes Aristotle's division of the soul and its virtues, and traces the ambiguities in "voluntary." Fresh light is shed on his comparison of practical wisdom with other kinds of knowledge, and a realistic account is developed of Aristototelian deliberation. The concept (...)
  39. Games and the Art of Agency.C. Thi Nguyen - 2019 - Philosophical Review 128 (4):423-462.
    Games may seem like a waste of time, where we struggle under artificial rules for arbitrary goals. The author suggests that the rules and goals of games are not arbitrary at all. They are a way of specifying particular modes of agency. This is what make games a distinctive art form. Game designers designate goals and abilities for the player; they shape the agential skeleton which the player will inhabit during the game. Game designers work in the medium of (...)
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  40.  11
    Who's in Control Here?: Robert V. Hannaford.Robert V. Hannaford - 1976 - Philosophy 51 (198):421-430.
    The question arises from recent arguments, including one by G. E. M. Anscombe, which hold that a belief in one's ability to choose one's actions is incompatible with a causal account of the world. For, if one's arguments deny either choice or causal sequences, how can one account for human control of actions? If to control one's actions means to work to cause some chosen end, and if either point of the argument were correct, how could anyone ever control one's (...)
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  41.  15
    Who's in Control Here?Robert V. Hannaford - 1976 - Philosophy 51 (October):421-430.
    The question arises from recent arguments, including one by G. E. M. Anscombe, which hold that a belief in one's ability to choose one's actions is incompatible with a causal account of the world. For, if one's arguments deny either choice or causal sequences, how can one account for human control of actions? If to control one's actions means to work to cause some chosen end, and if either point of the argument were correct, how could anyone ever control one's (...)
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  42. Unconscious Cerebral Initiative and the Role of Conscious Will in Voluntary Action.Benjamin Libet - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (4):529-66.
    Voluntary acts are preceded by electrophysiological (RPs). With spontaneous acts involving no preplanning, the main negative RP shift begins at about200 ms. Control experiments, in which a skin stimulus was timed (S), helped evaluate each subject's error in reporting the clock times for awareness of any perceived event.
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  43. Beyond the Comparator Model: A Multi-Factorial Two-Step Account of Agency.Matthis Synofzik, Gottfried Vosgerau & Albert Newen - 2008 - Consciousness and Cognition 17 (1):219-239.
    There is an increasing amount of empirical work investigating the sense of agency, i.e. the registration that we are the initiators of our own actions. Many studies try to relate the sense of agency to an internal feed-forward mechanism, called the ‘‘comparator model’’. In this paper, we draw a sharp distinction between a non-conceptual level of feeling of agency and a conceptual level of judgement of agency. By analyzing recent empirical studies, we show that the comparator (...)
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  44. Phenomenal Abilities: Incompatibilism and the Experience of Agency.Oisín Deery, Matthew S. Bedke & Shaun Nichols - 2013 - In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility. Oxford University Press. pp. 126–50.
    Incompatibilists often claim that we experience our agency as incompatible with determinism, while compatibilists challenge this claim. We report a series of experiments that focus on whether the experience of having an ability to do otherwise is taken to be at odds with determinism. We found that participants in our studies described their experience as incompatibilist whether the decision was (i) present-focused or retrospective, (ii) imagined or actual, (iii) morally salient or morally neutral. The only case in which participants (...)
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  45. Is Collective Agency a Coherent Idea? Considerations From the Enactive Theory of Agency.Mog Stapleton & Tom Froese - 2015 - In Catrin Misselhorn (ed.), Collective Agency and Cooperation in Natural and Artificial Systems. Springer Verlag. pp. 219-236.
    Whether collective agency is a coherent concept depends on the theory of agency that we choose to adopt. We argue that the enactive theory of agency developed by Barandiaran, Di Paolo and Rohde (2009) provides a principled way of grounding agency in biological organisms. However the importance of biological embodiment for the enactive approach might lead one to be skeptical as to whether artificial systems or collectives of individuals could instantiate genuine agency. To explore this (...)
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  46. Agency and Responsibility.Pamela Hieronymi - forthcoming - In Luca Ferrero (ed.), Routledge Handbook for the Philosophy of Agency. New York, NY, USA:
    I first sketch the different things we might have in mind, when thinking about responsibility. I then relate each of those to possible investigations of human agency. The most interesting such relation, in my opinion, is that between agency and what I call “responsibility as mattering.” I offer some hypotheses about that relation.
     
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  47. Agency, Narrative, and Mortality.Roman Altshuler - forthcoming - In Luca Ferrero (ed.), Routledge Handbook for the Philosophy of Agency. New York: Routledge.
    Narrative views of agency and identity arise in opposition to reductionism in both domains. While reductionists understand both identity and agency in terms of their components, narrativists respond that life and action are both constituted by narratives, and since the components of a narrative gain their meaning from the whole, life and action not only incorporate their constituent parts but also shape them. I first lay out the difficulties with treating narrative as constitutive of metaphysical identity and turn (...)
     
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  48. Embodied Cognition and Temporally Extended Agency.Markus Schlosser - 2018 - Synthese 195 (5):2089-2112.
    According to radical versions of embodied cognition, human cognition and agency should be explained without the ascription of representational mental states. According to a standard reply, accounts of embodied cognition can explain only instances of cognition and agency that are not “representation-hungry”. Two main types of such representation-hungry phenomena have been discussed: cognition about “the absent” and about “the abstract”. Proponents of representationalism have maintained that a satisfactory account of such phenomena requires the ascription of mental representations. Opponents (...)
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  49. Exercising Doxastic Freedom.Conor McHugh - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):1-37.
    This paper defends the possibility of doxastic freedom, arguing that doxastic freedom should be modelled not on freedom of action but on freedom of intention. Freedom of action is exercised by agents like us, I argue, through voluntary control. This involves two conditions, intentions-reactivity and reasons-reactivity, that are not met in the case of doxastic states. Freedom of intention is central to our agency and to our moral responsibility, but is not exercised through voluntary control. I develop (...)
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  50. A Shelter From Luck: The Morality System Reconstructed.Matthieu Queloz - manuscript
    The “morality system,” Bernard Williams writes, is “a deeply rooted and still powerful misconception of life.” It combines, in ways that Williams finds problematic, certain quite special conceptions of value, motivation, obligation, practical necessity, responsibility, voluntariness, blame, and guilt. But why does the morality system combine just these ideas in the way it does? And what exactly is wrong with it? This essay seeks to answer these questions by reconstructing the morality system from the ground up, starting by explaining why (...)
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