We propose a descriptive version of the classical multi-attribute utility model; to that end, we add a new parameter, momentary salience, to the customary formulation. The addition of this parameter allows the theory to accommodate changes in the decision maker’s mood and circumstances, as the saliencies of anticipated consequences are driven by concerns of the moment. By allowing for the number of consequences given attention at the moment of decision to vary, the new model mutes the criticism that SEU models (...) call for an omniscient decision maker. Use of the model is illustrated with a large-scale longitudinal study showing that adolescent smokers have higher utility for smoking than nonsmokers. We also propose to use the model hierarchically to describe everyday decisions that people deal with repeatedly. Big decisions, which set policy, guide a host of nested little decisions, which in turn lead to action. For a little decision, one of the options will be consistent with the policy, and will inherit its high utility. Accordingly, most little decisions will be made quickly and will follow the policy. However, people do sometimes decide to violate their own policies, and we describe how these lapses can lead to collapse of the policy. (shrink)

This paper formulates and axiomatizes utility models for denumerable time streams that make no commitment in regard to discounting future outcomes. The models address decision under certainty and decision under risk. Independence assumptions in both contexts lead to additive or multiplicative utilities over time periods that allow unambiguous comparisons of the relative importance of different periods. The models accommodate all patterns of future valuation. This discount-neutral feature is attained by restricting preference comparisons to outcome streams or probability distributions on outcome (...) streams that differ in at most a finite number of periods. (shrink)

In making the following suggestions I have assumed the chronological possibility of allusions in the Aetia Prologue on the one hand to the quarrel with Apollonius Rhodius, and on the other to Arsinoe II. . That such a combination is possible is maintained by Rostagni in Rivista di Filologia, 1928, pp. 1 sqq. The textual supplements offered here, while intended to support the double hypothesis, differ from his in some points; notably in regard to the question of where the allusion (...) to Arsinoe is to be introduced into the text of Callimachus . It need hardly be said that the supposed allusions to the queen and to the rival poet do not necessarily stand or fall together. In the case of the former it might not be altogether incredible that such an allusion should have been made after her death; whilst the most obvious consequence in regard to Apollonius would be that, if a date before 270 B.C. be accepted for the Prologue, his birth would have to be placed as early as possible—say, 295–290 B.C. However this may be, it is here sought to complete, in the above sense, certain passages in the Prologue with the aid of the British Museum Scholiast . In regard to the latter a fresh study of the original text by the editor has been utilized, to say nothing of his valuable suggestions and criticisms; in the case of P. the facsimile in Ox. Pap. XVII. is depended upon. The silence of S. on some of the supposed points may fairly be adduced in objection to them; but it may be noted that he does not comment on Πυγμαίων , and that his exposition, where it can be checked, seems to be somewhat hasty and unbalanced. Further, we do not know what may have preceded the portion of his work which has survived. (shrink)

The construction assumed for the first sentence in this passage is that adopted by Verrall and Headlam, apart from some differences in detail. It seems unlikely that δών can refer to what precedes, as some have thought; for it can hardly be supposed that the poet, who is using speed and economy , would pause to tell us that the great Seer merely ‘sees’ two distinctively coloured birds which ‘have appeared near by in a conspicuous station’ compare Homer's method . (...) Also it would involve us in the doubtful construction Ατρεϊδας έδάη λαγοδαίτας for ‘he knew the . to be the λ.’ ; the nearest parallel to this would appear to be Xen. Anab. 1. 7. 4 οους γνώσεσθε τοùς νθρπονς, where the adjective makes some difference. (shrink)

The construction assumed for the first sentence in this passage is that adopted by Verrall and Headlam, apart from some differences in detail. It seems unlikely that δών can refer to what precedes, as some have thought; for it can hardly be supposed that the poet, who is using speed and economy, would pause to tell us that the great Seer merely ‘sees’ two distinctively coloured birds which ‘have appeared near by in a conspicuous station’ compare Homer's method. Also it (...) would involve us in the doubtful construction Ατρεϊδας έδάη λαγοδαίτας for ‘he knew the. to be the λ.’ ; the nearest parallel to this would appear to be Xen. Anab. 1. 7. 4 οους γνώσεσθε τοùς νθρπονς, where the adjective makes some difference. (shrink)