Philosophy of history is not a subject which has hitherto attracted much attention in this country. Preoccupation with the methods and achievements of the natural sciences, and distaste for the sort of rationale of history as a whole which Hegel and others offered under the title in the early nineteenth century, have served to make most British philosophers accord its problems only the most casual recognition. It is therefore all the more interesting to find an English writer of unusual powers (...) both of argument and expression, who was himself an historian of distinction in his special field, devoting a large part of his philosophical thinking to the problems of historical knowledge and their wider implications. Unfortunately, R. G. Collingwood was not able to begin the major work on philosophy of history, to writing which, as we are told in the introduction to the present book, he had looked forward for twenty-five years, until his powers were seriously affected by bad health, and he did not live to complete it. But though the full results of his thinking on the subject are lost, we are now able, thanks to the skilful work of his friend Professor T. M. Knox, to study what is in effect an extensive interim report on it. Professor Knox has produced The Idea of History largely on the basis of lectures which Collingwood prepared in 1936, supplemented by two essays already published which date from the same period and a certain amount of material from the unfinished Principles of History written in 1939. (shrink)

This essay amounts to a commentary on some of the leading doctrines of the Analogies of Experience, whose main contention I take to be that we should not be in possession of a unitary time-system unless certain things were true, and indeed necessarily true, of the world of experienced fact. A unitary time-system is one in which all temporal ascriptions—all dates and durations—are directly relateable; it makes sense inside such a system to ask of every supposed happening whether it preceded, (...) followed or was simultaneous with anything else which is taken to happen. Kant assumes, obviously correctly as it seems to me, that the temporal system we have at least purports to be unitary in this way. He also assumes, again as I see it uncontrovertibly, that statements assigning dates to events or durations to processes are intended to say something about the objective world, instead of to record what particular persons happen to feel. We do contrast real with apparent duration, but it is the former which necessarily occupies our primary attention, for only if we first fix the real position of some things in the temporal process can we speak effectively of the apparent position of other things. The real, here as elsewhere, is the normal, the apparent the deviant, and you cannot understand the deviant until you grasp that from which it deviates. Our chief aim in operating a system of temporal concepts must accordingly be to say what objectively is the case. (shrink)

Goldstein attempts to establish a middle position between the idealist and the realist arguments concerning truth and fact in history. Though fact serves as the touchstone of truth, we cannot verify propositions, especially historical propositions, in terms of fact. Nowell-Smith argues that Goldstein cannot acknowledge the importance of reality for everyday affairs, while denying its importance in history. Goldstein could have avoided such problems by realizing that if he is an opponent of historical realism, he must be a supporter of (...) historical idealism. He could resolve Nowell-Smith's objections by adopting the Kantian argument which contrasts two types of judgment; judgment proper and particular attempts at judgment. Statements of objective fact, including historical facts, would be considered judgment proper. This would still allow for some judgments which did not fulfill objective criteria, but could count as knowledge. (shrink)

Study of Hegel’s philosophy of history in English-speaking countries has so far been made difficult by the lack of a full and authentic translation of his famous lectures on the subject and by the absence of anything like a serious commentary on what he wrote. Both deficiencies are alleviated, if not entirely removed, by the two works under review. Professor Nisbet has produced a complete translation of the version of Hegel’s introduction which the late Johannes Hoffmeister published in 1955 under (...) the title Die Vernunft in der Geschichte; he includes everything in that volume except the index, and follows Hoffmeister in distinguishing typographically between material which comes from Hegel’s own manuscript and material taken from students’ notes or earlier editions. Hoffmeister’s version of the introduction is, as is well known, much fuller than that by Karl Hegel which was the basic text for previous English translations; to have it available in a reliable and well-printed form is clearly an enormous improvement. It has of course to be pointed out that even now the English reader lacks access to the full text of Hegel’s lectures so far as they can be reconstructed, since once he gets beyond the Introduction he has to fall back on Sibree, who had only Karl Hegel to go on. Lasson in 1920 produced three volumes, running to nearly 950 pages, covering Hegel’s detailed history of the world; Sibree gets through the same material in about 370. There is obviously a lot to be done before we have anything like a complete English rendering of what Hegel is supposed to have said. For that matter, there are difficulties even with the text here translated, as Hoffmeister himself pointed out. Hegel’s manuscript is clear enough, but the material added to it belongs to different versions of the course and is taken from the notes of different auditors; there is no indication here of the source and date of these interpolated passages. Whether there is any real possibility now of constructing a better arranged version must remain doubtful, though obviously Hoffmeister at one time proposed to make the attempt. Meantime, we must be grateful to Nisbet for having made available in excellent English the best German text of Hegel’s Introduction. It is to be hoped that the publishers will soon issue it in paperback form, so that it can replace the inferior versions now in general academic use. (shrink)

What is the Critique of Pure Reason about? The terminology of the work is so perplexing, its argument so obscurely expressed, that the ordinary reader may be forgiven if he puts it down at the end very much in the dark as to what it all means. He will have seen that in it Kant has attempted to establish certain conclusions: the subjectivity of space and time, the existence and objective validity of a number of a priori concepts or categories, (...) the falsity of the arguments used to defend the metaphysical system most widely favoured in German learned circles in the eighteenth century; but though he has grasped all this he may yet have failed to make sense of the work as a whole. It is the old story of not seeing the wood for trees; and in this case the fault is more excusable than in most, for the individual trees each demand so much attention and are so difficult to get round that it is all too easy to forget the very existence of the wood. At the worst, one may think that there is no wood at all; only a miscellaneous aggregate of individual trees which have nothing to do with each other. (shrink)