In 2002, Belgium was the second country in the world to legalize euthanasia following the Netherlands. Since then, a few studies dealing with Belgium euthanasia practices have been published that are based on a survey given to a sample of physicians and nurses . All these studies from the past decade have implicitly proposed the practice of euthanasia as a medical act. Moreover, the last article published in this journal argued that the Belgian experiment concerning medical end-of-life decisions is unique (...) in the world and that the Belgian palliative care system, including euthanasia, should serve as a role-model for the rest of the world .The Belgium law provides a definition for euthanasia which lacks the analytical precision to apply it to medical studies . When analyzing the latest data provided by the Belgian Federal Euthanasia Comm .. (shrink)

In his moral psychology, Prof. Frankfurt pays special attention to two strongly related issues which should be given pride of place in every genuine account of human action and behaviour: these issues are the problem of personal autonomy and what I would like to call the problem of self-constitution. The first concerns the question what it means to be a fully human, rational agent, i.e., someone who is accountable for and in one way or another conscious of what he does (...) and desires; the second concerns the question how human beings become selves or persons with a particular identity, i.e., somebody who is not only accountable for and conscious of his or her own deeds, desires and preferences at a given time, but also able to identify with his or her personal life-history, as a through time related structure of deeds, beliefs, volitions, preferences and desires.In the following, I shall first of all formulate a rather free interpretation of the important and penetrating reflections of Prof. Frankfurt on the concept of care, which, as I understand it, accounts for the interdependence of autonomy and self-constitution. I shall then formulate a critical reflection and some related questions, more or less inspired by Charles Taylor’s investigations of the constitution of the self and the problem of rational autonomy. As is well known, Taylor has been partly influenced by Frankfurt’s writings on these issues, but of course — and that’s what my questions will be about — I leave it to Prof. Frankfurt to determine how well Taylor’s suggestive account of the constitution of the authentic self fits the Frankfurtian descriptive metaphysics of human mind and action. (shrink)

Hume’s short and unlucky relation with Rousseau is a famous episode in the biography of these two towering figures of the Enlightenment. Undoubtedly, Hume’s fierce reaction towards the betrayal of Rousseau mirrors his high esteem of friendship as such. Though Hume never elaborated a systematic account of friendship, his writings contain numerous references to the pivotal role of this ”calm passion’ and ”virtue’ as a source of personal happiness and social harmony. This article reconstructs the encounter and quarrel with Rousseau (...) in order to better understand Hume’s views on the value and fragility of friendship. Hume appears to defend a rather classical account of friendship that is deeply influenced by Aristotle and Cicero, but at the same time bears witness to the particularity of 18th century Enlightenment culture. (shrink)

Hume’s sceptical attack on the rational theology of his days is closely interwoven with his attempt to develop a wholly naturalistic account of morality. Hume thus explores the possibility to develop an ethics devoid of any reliance on traditional faith or any type of theistic-providential metaphysics. In this article the consequences of this position are examincd. First, two major versions of a theistic-providential underpinning of morality in the tradition of 18th-century British moral philosophy, notably those from Samuel Clarke and Francis (...) Hutcheson, are examined. In the following, a reconstruction is made of Hume’s sceptical attack on the rational theology of his days . In a third move, the consequences of Hume’ s religious scepticism for the positive articulation of his ethical theory are pointed out. In the conclusion it becomes apparent that Hume’s religious scepticism remains strongly influenced by the classical idea of an intrinsic relation between contemplation and moral wisdom: but the contemplative wisdom of Hume’s ‘true religion’ is of a radical anti-teleological kind and implies indeed a breach with the Christian inspired moral metaphysics of his days. (shrink)

To balance a large state or society, whether monarchical or republican, on general laws, is a work of so great difficulty, that no human genius, however comprehensive, is able, by the mere dint of reason and reflection, to effect it.Andrew Sabl’s Hume’s Politics: Coordination and Crisis in the History of England is an impressive tribute to the Tacitus of the eighteenth century. His study offers a reading of the History of England “as if it were a treatise on this one (...) subject: how conventions of political authority arise, change, improve by various measures, and die”.1 Hume’s History, according to Sabl, is much more than a mere narrative of the gradual emergence of a stable constitutional monarchy on the English... (shrink)

According to Terence Penelhum, Philo's confession in the last part of Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion reveals on the side of the author a reconciliatory and pacifying attitude towards the liberal moderate clergy of his days. This article investigates whether another reading of this intriguing text is not more appropriate. It defends the idea that Philo's speeches and Cleanthes' reactions to it in the last part of the Dialogues reveal on Hume's side an attitude of mild despair and isolation towards (...) the religious culture of eighteenth-century Scotland, in both its orthodox and more moderate form. (shrink)

This article forms a critical reflection on the views of Spinoza, developed in the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, on the role of the ‘ceremonial law’ in the moral life of ancient Hebrew culture. According to Spinoza, a merely external obedience to the ceremonial law should not be confused with the sense of obligation towards the moral Divine Law of ‘justice and charity’: only in this last one can true piety be found. The idea is defended that Spinoza’s critical attitude towards the Jewish (...) ceremonial law should be understood against the larger background of his hermeneutics of superstition throughout the TTP. In the TTP superstition is unmasked as a form of undue adherence to a particular religious tradition and to merely outer ceremonies and practices. Superstition should be distinguished, however, from true religion, which, according to Spinoza, leads towards piety and virtue. How the idea of true religion, identified in the Ethics as the practical disposition and form of life of the truly wise philosopher, could be accounted for within the context of the TTP is investigated. The central thesis of this article is that despite his critical attitude towards the Jewish ceremonial law Spinoza should acknowledge – according to his own religious anthropology – that a genuine religion for ordinary human beings presupposes the adherence in one form or another to a religious tradition. Without a religious tradition, it appears, no concrete moral life, so no piety, is possible. This implies, however, that in Spinoza’s view there remains a gap between the true religion of the philosopher and true religion as it can be found in the life of ordinary humans. (shrink)