174 found
Order:
Disambiguations
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong [161]W. Sinnott-Armstrong [12]Walter P. Sinnott-Armstrong [2]
See also
  1. Moral Skepticisms.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2006 - Oxford University Press.
    All contentious moral issues--from gay marriage to abortion and affirmative action--raise difficult questions about the justification of moral beliefs. How can we be justified in holding on to our own moral beliefs while recognizing that other intelligent people feel quite differently and that many moral beliefs are distorted by self-interest and by corrupt cultures? Even when almost everyone agrees--e.g. that experimental surgery without consent is immoral--can we know that such beliefs are true? If so, how? These profound questions lead to (...)
  2.  58
    Consequentialism.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  3. Moral Skepticism and Justification.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 1996 - In Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Mark Timmons (eds.), Moral Knowledge? New Readings in Moral Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  4. Practical Interests, Relevant Alternatives, and Knowledge Attributions: An Empirical Study.Joshua May, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Jay G. Hull & Aaron Zimmerman - 2010 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (2):265–273.
    In defending his interest-relative account of knowledge in Knowledge and Practical Interests (2005), Jason Stanley relies heavily on intuitions about several bank cases. We experimentally test the empirical claims that Stanley seems to make concerning our common-sense intuitions about these bank cases. Additionally, we test the empirical claims that Jonathan Schaffer seems to make in his critique of Stanley. We argue that our data impugn what both Stanley and Schaffer claim our intuitions about such cases are. To account for these (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   62 citations  
  5. Blame, Not Ability, Impacts Moral “Ought” Judgments for Impossible Actions: Toward an Empirical Refutation of “Ought” Implies “Can”.Vladimir Chituc, Paul Henne, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Felipe De Brigard - 2016 - Cognition 150:20-25.
    Recently, psychologists have explored moral concepts including obligation, blame, and ability. While little empirical work has studied the relationships among these concepts, philosophers have widely assumed such a relationship in the principle that “ought” implies “can,” which states that if someone ought to do something, then they must be able to do it. The cognitive underpinnings of these concepts are tested in the three experiments reported here. In Experiment 1, most participants judge that an agent ought to keep a promise (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  6.  84
    What’s Wrong with Joyguzzling?Ewan Kingston & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (1):169-186.
    Our thesis is that there is no moral requirement to refrain from emitting reasonable amounts of greenhouse gases solely in order to enjoy oneself. Joyriding in a gas guzzler provides our paradigm example. We first distinguish this claim that there is no moral requirement to refrain from joyguzzling from other more radical claims. We then review several different proposed objections to our view. These include: the claim that joyguzzling exemplifies a vice, causes or contributes to harm, has negative expected value, (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  7. It's Not My Fault: Global Warming and Individual Moral Obligations.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2005 - In Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Richard Howarth (eds.), Perspectives on Climate Change. Elsevier. pp. 221–253.
    A survey of various candidates shows that there is no defensible moral principle that shows that individuals have an obligation to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   46 citations  
  8.  29
    How to Allow Conscientious Objection in Medicine While Protecting Patient Rights.Aaron Ancell & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2017 - Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 26 (1):120-131.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  9. An Empirical Refutation of ‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can’.Paul Henne, Vladimir Chituc, Felipe De Brigard & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2016 - Analysis 76 (3):283-290.
    Most philosophers assume that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’, and most of them hold that this principle is true not only universally but also analytically or conceptually. Some skeptics deny this principle, although they often admit some related one. In this article, we show how new empirical evidence bolsters the skeptics’ arguments. We then defend the skeptical view against some objections to the empirical evidence and to its effect on the traditional principle. In light of the new evidence, we conclude that philosophers (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  10. I'm Not the Person I Used to Be: The Self and Autobiographical Memories of Immoral Actions.Matthew L. Stanley, Paul Henne, V. Iyengar, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Felipe De Brigard - 2017 - Journal of Experimental Psychology. General 146 (6).
    People maintain a positive identity in at least two ways: They evaluate themselves more favorably than other people, and they judge themselves to be better now than they were in the past. Both strategies rely on autobiographical memories. The authors investigate the role of autobiographical memories of lying and emotional harm in maintaining a positive identity. For memories of lying to or emotionally harming others, participants judge their own actions as less morally wrong and less negative than those in which (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  11. Moral Appraisals Affect Doing/Allowing Judgments.Fiery Cushman, Joshua Knobe & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2008 - Cognition 108 (2):353-380.
    An extensive body of research suggests that the distinction between doing and allowing plays a critical role in shaping moral appraisals. Here, we report evidence from a pair of experiments suggesting that the converse is also true: moral appraisals affect doing/allowing judgments. Specifically, morally bad behavior is more likely to be construed as actively ‘doing’ than as passively ‘allowing’. This finding adds to a growing list of folk concepts influenced by moral appraisal, including causation and intentional action. We therefore suggest (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   36 citations  
  12. Are Moral Judgments Unified?Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Thalia Wheatley - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (4):451-474.
  13. Moral Intuitionism Meets Empirical Psychology.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2006 - In Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (eds.), Metaethics After Moore. Oxford University Press.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   37 citations  
  14.  11
    Moral Appraisals Affect Doing/Allowing Judgments.Fiery Cushman, Joshua Knobe & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2008 - Cognition 108 (1):281-289.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   29 citations  
  15. Can Psychopathic Offenders Discern Moral Wrongs? A New Look at the Moral/Conventional Distinction.E. Aharoni, W. Sinnott-Armstrong & K. A. Kiehl - 2012 - Journal of Abnormal Psychology (2):484-497..
    A prominent view of psychopathic moral reasoning suggests that psychopathic individuals cannot properly distinguish between moral wrongs and other types of wrongs. The present study evaluated this view by examining the extent to which 109 incarcerated offenders with varying degrees of psychopathy could distinguish between moral and conventional transgressions relative to each other and to nonincarcerated healthy controls. Using a modified version of the classic Moral/Conventional Transgressions task that uses a forced-choice format to minimize strategic responding, the present study found (...)
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  16. Moral Dilemmas.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 1988 - Blackwell.
    A strong tradition in philosophy denies the possibility of moral dilemmas. Recently, several philosophers reversed this tradition. In this dissertation, I clarify some fundamental issues in this debate, argue for the possibility of moral dilemmas, and determine some implications of this possibility. ;In chapter I, I define moral dilemmas roughly as situations where an agent morally ought to adopt each of two alternatives but cannot adopt both. Moral dilemmas are resolvable if and only if one of the moral oughts overrides (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   45 citations  
  17. Is Morality Unified? Evidence That Distinct Neural Systems Underlie Moral Judgments of Harm, Dishonesty, and Disgust.Carolyn Parkinson, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Philipp E. Koralus, Angela Mendelovici, Victoria McGeer & Thalia Wheatley - 2011 - Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 23 (10):3162-3180.
    Much recent research has sought to uncover the neural basis of moral judgment. However, it has remained unclear whether "moral judgments" are sufficiently homogenous to be studied scientifically as a unified category. We tested this assumption by using fMRI to examine the neural correlates of moral judgments within three moral areas: (physical) harm, dishonesty, and (sexual) disgust. We found that the judgment ofmoral wrongness was subserved by distinct neural systems for each of the different moral areas and that these differences (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  18. Moral Psychology: Freedom and Responsibility.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.) - forthcoming - MIT Press.
  19.  96
    Pyrrhonian Skepticism.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.) - 2004 - Oxford University Press.
    Throughout the history of philosophy, skepticism has posed one of the central challenges of epistemology. Opponents of skepticism--including externalists, contextualists, foundationalists, and coherentists--have focussed largely on one particular variety of skepticism, often called Cartesian or Academic skepticism, which makes the radical claim that nobody can know anything. However, this version of skepticism is something of a straw man, since virtually no philosopher endorses this radical skeptical claim. The only skeptical view that has been truly held--by Sextus, Montaigne, Hume, Wittgenstein, and, (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   21 citations  
  20. Responsibility for Forgetting.Samuel Murray, Elise D. Murray, Gregory Stewart, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Felipe De Brigard - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (5):1177-1201.
    In this paper, we focus on whether and to what extent we judge that people are responsible for the consequences of their forgetfulness. We ran a series of behavioral studies to measure judgments of responsibility for the consequences of forgetfulness. Our results show that we are disposed to hold others responsible for some of their forgetfulness. The level of stress that the forgetful agent is under modulates judgments of responsibility, though the level of care that the agent exhibits toward performing (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  21. The Disunity of Morality and Why It Matters to Philosophy.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2012 - The Monist 95 (3):355-377.
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  22. Neuroprediction, Violence, and the Law: Setting the Stage.Thomas Nadelhoffer, Stephanos Bibas, Scott Grafton, Kent A. Kiehl, Andrew Mansfield, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Michael Gazzaniga - 2012 - Neuroethics 5 (1):67-99.
    In this paper, our goal is to survey some of the legal contexts within which violence risk assessment already plays a prominent role, explore whether developments in neuroscience could potentially be used to improve our ability to predict violence, and discuss whether neuropredictive models of violence create any unique legal or moral problems above and beyond the well worn problems already associated with prediction more generally. In Violence Risk Assessment and the Law, we briefly examine the role currently played by (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  23. `Ought' Conversationally Implies `Can'.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 1984 - Philosophical Review 93 (2):249-261.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   60 citations  
  24.  43
    Against Some Recent Arguments for ‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can’: Reasons, Deliberation, Trying, and Furniture.Paul Henne, Jennifer Semler, Vladimir Chituc, Felipe De Brigard & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (1):131-139.
    Many philosophers claim that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’. In light of recent empirical evidence, however, some skeptics conclude that philosophers should stop assuming the principle unconditionally. Streumer, however, does not simply assume the principle’s truth; he provides arguments for it. In this article, we argue that his arguments fail to support the claim that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  25. Is Moral Phenomenology Unified?Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2008 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (1):85-97.
    In this short paper, I argue that the phenomenology of moral judgment is not unified across different areas of morality (involving harm, hierarchy, reciprocity, and impurity) or even across different relations to harm. Common responses, such as that moral obligations are experienced as felt demands based on a sense of what is fitting, are either too narrow to cover all moral obligations or too broad to capture anything important and peculiar to morality. The disunity of moral phenomenology is, nonetheless, compatible (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  26.  11
    Neuromarketing: Ethical Implications of its Use and Potential Misuse.Steven J. Stanton, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Scott A. Huettel - 2017 - Journal of Business Ethics 144 (4):799-811.
    Neuromarketing is an emerging field in which academic and industry research scientists employ neuroscience techniques to study marketing practices and consumer behavior. The use of neuroscience techniques, it is argued, facilitates a more direct understanding of how brain states and other physiological mechanisms are related to consumer behavior and decision making. Herein, we will articulate common ethical concerns with neuromarketing as currently practiced, focusing on the potential risks to consumers and the ethical decisions faced by companies. We argue that the (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  27.  85
    What Makes Killing Wrong?W. Sinnott-Armstrong & F. G. Miller - 2013 - Journal of Medical Ethics 39 (1):3-7.
    What makes an act of killing morally wrong is not that the act causes loss of life or consciousness but rather that the act causes loss of all remaining abilities. This account implies that it is not even pro tanto morally wrong to kill patients who are universally and irreversibly disabled, because they have no abilities to lose. Applied to vital organ transplantation, this account undermines the dead donor rule and shows how current practices are compatible with morality.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  28. Begging the Question.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 1999 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (2):174 – 191.
    No topic in informal logic is more important than begging the question. Also, none is more subtle or complex. We cannot even begin to understand the fallacy of begging the question without getting clear about arguments, their purposes, and circularity. So I will discuss these preliminary topics first. This will clear the path to my own account of begging the question. Then I will anticipate some objections. Finally, I will apply my account to a well-known and popular response to scepticism (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   27 citations  
  29. Intention, Temporal Order, and Moral Judgments.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Ron Mallon, Tom Mccoy & Jay G. Hull - 2008 - Mind and Language 23 (1):90–106.
    The traditional philosophical doctrine of double effect claims that agents’ intentions affect whether acts are morally wrong. Our behavioral study reveals that agents’ intentions do affect whether acts are judged morally wrong, whereas the temporal order of good and bad effects affects whether acts are classified as killings. This finding suggests that the moral judgments are not based on the classifications. Our results also undermine recent claims that prior moral judgments determine whether agents are seen as causing effects intentionally rather (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  30.  16
    Moral Relativity and Intuitionism.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2002 - Philosophical Issues 12 (1):305-328.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   23 citations  
  31.  11
    Classy pyrrhonism.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2004 - In Pyrrhonian Skepticism. Oxford University Press. pp. 188--207.
    This essay invokes a technical framework of contrast classes within which Pyrrhonians can accept knowledge claims that are relativized to specific contrast classes, but avoid all unrelativized knowledge claims and all presuppositions about which contrast classes are really relevant. Pyrrhonians can then assert part of the content of everyday knowledge claims without privileging the everyday perspective or any other perspective. This framework provides a precise way to understand the central claims of neo-Pyrrhonism while avoiding most, if not all, of the (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  32.  74
    Moral Intuitions.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Liane Young & Fiery Cushman - 2010 - In John Michael Doris (ed.), The Moral Psychology Handbook. Oxford University Press. pp. 246--272.
    Moral intuitions are strong, stable, immediate moral beliefs. Moral philosophers ask when they are justified. This question cannot be answered separately from a psychological question: How do moral intuitions arise? Their reliability depends upon their source. This chapter develops and argues for a new theory of how moral intuitions arise—that they arise through heuristic processes best understood as unconscious attribute substitutions. That is, when asked whether something has the attribute of moral wrongness, people unconsciously substitute a different question about a (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  33. Moral Knowledge? New Readings in Moral Epistemology.Sinnott-Armstrong Walter & Timmons Mark (eds.) - 1996 - Oxford University Press.
    In Moral Knowledge? New Readings in Moral Epistemology, editors Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Mark Timmons bring together eleven specially commissioned essays by distinguished moral philosophers exploring the nature and possibility of moral knowledge. Each essay represents a major position within the exciting field of moral epistemology in which a proponent of the position presents and defends his or her view and locates it vis-a-vis competing views. The authors include established philosophers such as Peter Railton, Robert Audi, Richard Brandt, and Simon Blackburn, (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  34. Expressivism and Embedding.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (3):677-693.
    Expressivism faces four distinct problems when evaluative sentences are embedded in unassertive contexts like: If lying is wrong, getting someone to lie is wrong, Lying is wrong, so Getting someone to lie is wrong. The initial problem is to show that expressivism is compatible with - being valid. The basic problem is for expressivists to explain why evaluative instances of modus ponens are valid. The deeper problem is to explain why a particular argument like - is valid. The deepest problem (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  35.  39
    Morality, Normativity, and Society.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & David Copp - 1996 - Philosophical Review 105 (4):552.
    A complete moral theory should combine substantive ethics with metaethics, including moral semantics, moral epistemology, moral ontology, moral psychology, and the definition of morality. All of these topics and more are discussed with great clarity, insight, and originality in Copp’s remarkable book. Some of Copp’s positions are known from earlier articles, but his book reveals interconnections that increase the plausibility of each view separately and of the structure as a whole.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   24 citations  
  36. A Solution to Forrester's Paradox of Gentle Murder.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 1985 - Journal of Philosophy 82 (3):162-168.
  37.  38
    Readiness Potentials Driven by Non-Motoric Processes.Prescott Alexander, Alexander Schlegel, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Adina L. Roskies, Thalia Wheatley & Peter Ulric Tse - 2016 - Consciousness and Cognition 39:38-47.
  38. Abstract + Concrete = Paradox.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2007 - In Joshua Knobe & Shaun Nichols (eds.), Experimental Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
  39.  15
    Moral Dilemmas.Earl Conee & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (2):460.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   28 citations  
  40. Perspectives on Climate Change.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Richard Howarth (eds.) - 2005 - Elsevier.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  41. Neurolaw and Neuroprediction: Potential Promises and Perils.Thomas Nadelhoffer & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (9):631-642.
    Neuroscience has been proposed for use in the legal system for purposes of mind reading, assessment of responsibility, and prediction of misconduct. Each of these uses has both promises and perils, and each raises issues regarding the admissibility of neuroscientific evidence.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  42.  10
    Implicit Moral Evaluations: A Multinomial Modeling Approach.C. Daryl Cameron, B. Keith Payne, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Julian A. Scheffer & Michael Inzlicht - 2017 - Cognition 158:224-241.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  43. Some Varieties of Particularism.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 1999 - Metaphilosophy 30 (1&2):1-12.
    Analytic particularism claims that judgments of moral wrongness are about particular acts rather than general principles. Metaphysical particularism claims that what makes true moral judgments true is not general principles but nonmoral properties of particular acts. Epistemological particularism claims that studying particular acts apart from general principles can justify beliefs in moral judgments. Methodological particularism claims that we will do better morally in everyday life if we look carefully at each particular decision as it arises and give up the search (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  44. Insanity Defenses.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Ken Levy - 2011 - In John Deigh & David Dolinko (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of the Criminal Law. Oxford University Press. pp. 299--334.
    We explicate and evaluate arguments both for and against the insanity defense itself, different versions of the insanity defense (M'Naghten, Model Penal Code, and Durham (or Product)), the Irresistible Impulse rule, and various reform proposals.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  45.  77
    Morality Without God?Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2009 - Oxford University Press.
    This book should fit well with the debates raging over issues like evolution and intelligent design, atheism, and religion and public life as an example of a ...
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  46. Is Psychopathy a Mental Disease?Thomas Nadelhoffer & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2013 - In Nicole Vincent (ed.), Neuroscience and legal responsibility. Oxford University Press. pp. 229–255.
    Whether psychopathy is a mental disease or illness can affect whether psychiatrists should treat it and whether it could serve as the basis for an insanity defense in criminal trials. Our understanding of psychopathy has been greatly improved in recent years by new research in psychology and neuroscience. This illuminating research enables us to argue that psychopathy counts as a mental disease on any plausible account of mental disease. In particular, Szasz's and Pickard's eliminativist views and Sedgwick's social constructivist account (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  47. Mixed-Up Meta-Ethics.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2009 - Philosophical Issues 19 (1):235-256.
    My topic is the old debate between moral realists and moral expressivists. Although I will eventually adopt a Pyrrhonian position, as usual, my main goal is neither to argue for this position nor to resolve this debate but only to explore some new options that mix together realism and expressivism in various ways. Nothing that I say will be conclusive, but I hope that some of it will be suggestive.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  48.  26
    Do Psychopaths Refute Internalism?Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2014 - In Schramme Thomas (ed.), Being Amoral: Psychopathy and Moral Incapacity. pp. 187-208.
    The chapter focuses on the philosophical debate between moral motivational internalism and externalism. The author analyzes and thereby challenges the conceptual problems underlying this quarrel in relation to the apparent empirical findings on psychopathy. Major obstacles in making progress in this debate are conceptual and methodological problems. First, there is not a clear-cut and undisputed definition of moral internalism. Second, empirical results about a lack of moral judgment are not forthcoming, since it is not certain how to test such an (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  49.  70
    Emotion and Reliability in Moral Psychology.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2011 - Emotion Review 3 (3):288-289.
    Instead of arguing about whether moral judgments are based on emotion or reason, moral psychologists should investigate the reliability of moral judgments by checking rates of framing effects in different kinds of moral judgments under different conditions by different people.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  50. Handbook on Psychopathy and Law.Kent A. Kiehl & Walter P. Sinnott-Armstrong (eds.) - 2013 - Oxford University Press.
1 — 50 / 174