Late in 1990, the Center for the Study of Ethics in the Professions at Illinois Institute of Technology (lIT) received a grant of more than $200,000 from the National Science Foundation to try a campus-wide approach to integrating professional ethics into its technical curriculum.! Enough has now been accomplished to draw some tentative conclusions. I am the grant's principal investigator. In this paper, I shall describe what we at lIT did, what we learned, and what others, especially philosophers, can learn (...) from us. We set out to develop an approach that others could profitably adopt. I believe that we succeeded. (shrink)

This paper argues that hume's discussion of personal identity in treatise i.Iv.6 is misinterpreted and overrated. Far from seeking a justification for ascribing identity to persons, Hume dismissed all such ascriptions as mistaken; his 'account' in i.Iv.6 is an attempt to explain how the supposed mistake arises. His own criteria of unity/identity, On the strength of which he excludes persons, Are themselves ill-Founded: they are criteria for individuating etc., 'things', The only ones hume, Who failed to grasp locke's point that (...) identity goes with classified items, Was able to find. (shrink)

Although the participants in the initial situation of justice in John Rawls’ Theory of Justice choose principles of justice only, their choices have implications for other moral concerns. The only check on the self-interest of the participants is that there be unanimous acceptance of the principles. But, since animals are not participants, it is possible that principles will be adopted which confiict with what Rawls calls“duties of compassion and humanity” toward animals. This is a consequence of the initial situation’s assumption (...) that principles of justice can be determined independently of other moral considerations. We question this assumption, and show that satisfactory modifications of Rawls’ initial situation undermine its contractarian basis and require the rejection of exclusively self-interested participants. (shrink)

Although the participants in the initial situation of justice in John Rawls’ Theory of Justice choose principles of justice only, their choices have implications for other moral concerns. The only check on the self-interest of the participants is that there be unanimous acceptance of the principles. But, since animals are not participants, it is possible that principles will be adopted which confiict with what Rawls calls“duties of compassion and humanity” toward animals. This is a consequence of the initial situation’s assumption (...) that principles of justice can be determined independently of other moral considerations. We question this assumption, and show that satisfactory modifications of Rawls’ initial situation undermine its contractarian basis and require the rejection of exclusively self-interested participants. (shrink)

Nanotechnology is developing far faster than our understanding of its effects. This lapping of our understanding by speedy development is typical of new technologies, and in the United States we let development occur, introducing new artifacts into the world, without any serious attempt to understand beforehand their effects, long-term or short-term. We have been willing to pay the price of pushing the technological envelope, but pushing the nanotechnological envelope has some special risks, requiring more caution.

Every human activity has its characteristic features, the general tendencies that are often difficult to perceive for those engaged in the activity. Such general tendencies are of special concern to those managing in such activities, whether one is coaching soccer or running a corporation, for only with knowledge of such tendencies can one engage in intelligent managing and, more important, intelligent moral action. For the activity of business is not value-neutral, and if one is to manage morally in business, one (...) must come to understand its general tendencies insofar as they affect values. (shrink)

Both professors and institutions of higher education benefit from a vision of academic life that is grounded more firmly in myth than in history. According to the myth created by that traditional vision, scholars pursue research wherever their drive to knowledge takes them, and colleges and universities transmit the fruits of that research to contemporary and future generations as the accumulated wisdom of the ages. Yet the economic and social forces operating on colleges and universities as institutions, as well as (...) on the interests of faculty members within them, are making the myth embodied in the traditional ideal of the academy more and more difficult to sustain. Questions about what an institution of higher education ought to be, about what professors ought to do, and about what relations professors ought to have to the institutions which employ them are being raised and pushed to the fore. These are not theoretical questions, but practical questions of immediate import that must be answered relatively quickly -- and wisely -- if institutions of higher education and professors are not to find themselves inextricably in the grip of forces they cannot change. The myth of disinterested academic research-however beautiful -- and however beneficial -- is under siege. (shrink)

An understanding of the ethical problems that have arisen in the funding of scientific research at universities requires some attention to doctrines that have traditionally been held about science itself. Such doctrines, we hope to show, are themselves central to many of these ethical problems. It is often thought that the questions examined by scientists, and the theories that guide scientific research, are chosen for uniquely scientific reasons, independently of extra-scientific questions of value or merit. We shall argue that this (...) is an illusion. It is an illusion to think, especially in the present era, that science can even have a coherent direction apart from extra-scientific considerations. (shrink)

Hume was accused of partiality as soon as the first volume of his Histories reached the public. No better test can be found for whether he was partial than by looking at how he writes of Queen Elizabeth I. If his history is biased, we would expect her sex to make a difference to the history. We shall find, however, that Hume treats Elizabeth as a rational being who is a sovereign, and that he achieves, insofar as he describes her (...) reign, the general point of view appropriate to the impartiality demanded of historians. We shall also find evidence that he did not give up on his grand project to provide the foundations for ?a compleat system of the sciences? after the Treatise failed to excite a murmur. His Histories , using the method of causal analysis common to all his works, illustrate not only his moral theory but also, for instance, his claim that we can find laws in political systems as certain as those of physics. (shrink)

This book examines the concept of civility and the conditions of civil disagreement in politics and education. Although many assume that civility is merely polite behavior, it functions to aid rational discourse. Building on this basic assumption, the book offers multiple accounts of civility and its contribution to citizenship, deliberative democracy, and education from Eastern and Western as well as classic and modern perspectives. Given that civility is essential to all aspects of public life, it is important to address how (...) civility may be taught. While much of the book is theoretical, contributors also apply theory to practice, offering concrete methods for teaching civility at the high school and collegiate levels. (shrink)

Moral sensitivity affects whether and how we see others, note moral concerns, respond with delicacy, and navigate complex social interactions. Scholars from a variety of fields explore the concept of moral sensitivity and how it develops, beginning with a natural moral capacity for sensitivity towards others that is shaped in a variety of ways through relationships, forms of teaching, and social institutions. Each of these influences alters the capacity as well as one’s responses in complex ways. The concept of moral (...) sensitivity deepens as progressive chapters demonstrate its increasing complexity through development within individuals, over time, as they mature, and as their relationships and social contexts expand. The chapters integrate research from philosophy, psychology, neuroscience, literature, education, and media and technology studies, with key chapters by Darcia Narváez, Nancy E. Snow, Michael S. Pritchard, and Stephen J. Thoma and a Foreword by Owen Flanagan. It is the only comprehensive presentation of interdisciplinary work on moral sensitivity that integrates a theoretical, methodological, and pedagogical analysis. This highly interdisciplinary approach provides a new way of thinking about the relationship of individuals to society and moral sensitivity as a social phenomenon, extending current research in ethics, moral psychology, and psychology toward situated, embodied, and contextual analyses. (shrink)

As our powerful medical technology continues rapidly to develop, we seem to be confronted by fresh bioethical dilemmas at an ever increasing rate. This volume provides an introduction to modern thinking on these issues, concentrating particularly on paternalism, informed consent and euthanasia.

In 1963, Chief Justice Earl Warren called the 'fantastic advances in the field of electronic communication' a danger to the privacy of the individual. If we use the privacy torts as developed in American law --- intrusion, disclosure, false light, appropriation --- we can see how dangerous those advances have been regarding our privacy. We will see how readily so many can do so much more to invade the privacy of so many more. We will also see a thread running (...) through the privacy torts that was not readily visible before: invasions of privacy treat us as objects to be observed, revealed, manipulated, and used. (shrink)

What marks the traditional privacy torts of disclosure, intrusion, false light, and appropriation is that they require an invasion, an intrinsic harm caused by someone doing something to us without our consent. But we are now voluntarily giving up information about ourselves--to our physicians, for instance--that is being gathered into databases that are brought and sold and that can be appropriated by those who wish to assume our identities. The way in which our privacy is put at risk is different, (...) and this leads to a new understanding of the concept of privacy. Others appropriate our identities, treating us as objects; by doing so, our standing as autonomous moral agents, controlling how we present ourselves to the world, is thus denied. (shrink)

Suppose an accountant discovers evidence of shady practices while ex amining the books of a client. What should he or she do? Accountants have a professional obligation to respect the confidentiality of their cli ents' accounts. But, as an ordinary citizen, our accountant may feel that the authorities ought to be informed. Suppose a physician discov ers that a patient, a bus driver, has a weak heart. If the patient contin ues bus driving even after being informed of the heart (...) condition, should the physician inform the driver's company? Respect for patient confidentiality would say, no. But what if the driver should suffer a heart attack while on duty, causing an accident in which people are killed or seriously injured? Would the doctor bear some responsibility for these consequences? Special obligations, such as those of confidentiality, apply to any one in business or the professions. These obligations articulate, at least in part, what it is for someone to be, say, an accountant or a physician. Since these obligations are special, they raise a real possibility of con flict with the moral principles we usually accept outside of these spe cial relationships in business and the professions. These conflicts may become more accentuated for a professional who is also a corporate employee-a corporate attorney, an engineer working for a construction company, a nurse working as an employee of a hospital. (shrink)