Brain implants, such as Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS), which are designed to improve motor, mood and behavioural pathology, present unique challenges to our understanding of identity, agency and free will. This is because these devices can have visible effects on persons' physical and psychological properties yet are essentially undetectable when operating correctly. They can supplement and compensate for one's inherent abilities and faculties when they are compromised by neuropsychiatric disorders. Further, unlike talk therapy or pharmacological treatments, patients need not ‘do’ (...) anything for the treatment to take effect. If one accepts, as we argue here, that brain implants are unique among implantable types of devices, then this can have significant implications for what it means to persist as the same person and be the source of one's thoughts and actions. By examining two of the most common indications for DBS in current use, namely in the motor (Parkinson's Disease) and psychiatric (Major Depression) domains, we further argue that although DBS, as it is currently applied, does not necessarily represent a unique threat to personal identity and agency per se, it introduces an unprecedented ‘third party’ into the debate on these concepts. In this way, DBS can be used as a tool to begin probing, both conceptually and empirically, some of philosophy's most perennial metaphysical questions. (shrink)

This book is a discussion of the most timely and contentious issues in the two branches of neuroethics: the neuroscience of ethics; and the ethics of neuroscience. Drawing upon recent work in psychiatry, neurology, and neurosurgery, it develops a phenomenologically inspired theory of neuroscience to explain the brain-mind relation. The idea that the mind is shaped not just by the brain but also by the body and how the human subject interacts with the environment has significant implications for free will, (...) moral responsibility, and moral justification of actions. It also provides a better understanding of how different interventions in the brain can benefit or harm us. In addition, the book discusses brain imaging techniques to diagnose altered states of consciousness, deep-brain stimulation to treat neuropsychiatric disorders, and restorative neurosurgery for neurodegenerative diseases. It examines the medical and ethical trade-offs of these interventions in the brain when they produce both positive and negative physical and psychological effects, and how these trade-offs shape decisions by physicians and patients about whether to provide and undergo them. (shrink)

The Neuroethics of Memory is a thematically integrated analysis and discussion of neuroethical questions about memory capacity and content, as well as interventions to alter it. These include: how does memory function enable agency, and how does memory dysfunction disable it? To what extent is identity based on our capacity to accurately recall the past? Could a person who becomes aware during surgery be harmed if they have no memory of the experience? How do we weigh the benefits and risks (...) of brain implants designed to enhance, weaken or erase memory? Can a person be responsible for an action if they do not recall it? Would a victim of an assault have an obligation to retain a memory of this act, or the right to erase it? This book uses a framework informed by neuroscience, psychology, and philosophy combined with actual and hypothetical cases to examine these and related questions. (shrink)

Many drugs have therapeutic off-label uses for which they were not originally designed. Some drugs designed to treat neuropsychiatric and other disorders may enhance certain normal cognitive and affective functions. Because the long-term effects of cognitive and affective enhancement are not known and may be harmful, a precautionary principle limiting its use seems warranted. As an expression of autonomy, though, competent individuals should be permitted to take cognition- and mood-enhancing agents. But they need to be aware of the risks in (...) chronic use of these agents and to take responsibility for their effects. A reasonable middle ground between these positions is to warn those who choose to enhance that doing so entails risks. (shrink)

Vulnerability is an important criterion to assess the ethical justification of the inclusion of participants in research trials. Currently, vulnerability is often understood as an attribute inherent to a participant by nature of a diagnosed condition. Accordingly, a common ethical concern relates to the participant’s decisionmaking capacity and ability to provide free and informed consent. We propose an expanded view of vulnerability that moves beyond a focus on consent and the intrinsic attributes of participants. We offer specific suggestions for how (...) relational aspects and the dynamic features of vulnerability could be more fully captured in current discussions and research practices. (shrink)

Many neuroscientists have claimed that our minds are just a function of and thus reducible to our brains. I challenge neuroreductionism by arguing that the mind emerges from and is shaped by interaction among the brain, body, and environment. The mind is not located in the brain but is distributed among these three entities. I then explore the implications of the distributed mind for neuroethics.

Neuroscientific evidence has educated us in the ways in which the brain mediates our thought and behavior and, therefore, forced us to critically examine how we conceive of free will. This volume, featuring contributions from an international and interdisciplinary group of distinguished researchers and scholars, explores how our increasing knowledge of the brain can elucidate the concept of the will and whether or to what extent it is free. It also examines how brain science can inform our normative judgments of (...) moral and criminal responsibility for our actions. Some chapters point out the different respects in which mental disorders can compromise the will and others show how different forms of neuromodulation can reveal the neural underpinning of the mental capacities associated with the will and can restore or enhance them when they are impaired. (shrink)

Psychopathy involves impaired capacity for prudential and moral reasoning due to impaired capacity for empathy, remorse, and sensitivity to fear-inducing stimuli. Brain abnormalities and genetic polymorphisms associated with these traits appear to justify the claim that psychopaths cannot be morally responsible for their behavior. Yet psychopaths are capable of instrumental reasoning in achieving their goals, which suggests that they have some capacity to respond to moral reasons against performing harmful acts and refrain from performing them. The cognitive and affective impairment (...) of the psychopath justifies mitigated responsibility, but not excuse. (shrink)

Psychopathy is a disorder involving personality and behavioral features associated with a high rate of violent aggression and recidivism. This paper explores potential psychopharmacological therapies to modulate dysfunctional neural pathways in psychopaths and reduce the incidence of their harmful behavior, as well as the ethical and legal implications of offering these therapies as an alternative to incarceration. It also considers whether forced psychopharmacological intervention in adults and children with psychopathic traits manifesting in violent behavior can be justified. More generally, the (...) paper addresses the question of how to weigh the psychopath’s presumptive right to non-interference in his brain and mind against the public interest in avoiding harm. (shrink)

Advances in genetic technology in general and medical genetics in particular will enable us to intervene in the process of human biological development which extends from zygotes and embryos to people. This will allow us to control to a great extent the identities and the length and quality of the lives of people who already exist, as well as those we bring into existence in the near and distant future. Genes and Future People explores two general philosophical questions, one metaphysical, (...) the other moral: (1) How do genes, and different forms of genetic intervention (gene therapy, genetic enhancement, presymptomatic genetic testing of adults, genetic testing of preimplantation embryos), affect the identities of the people who already exist and those we bring into existence? and (2) How do these interventions benefit or harm the people we cause to exist in the near future and those who will exist in the distant future by satisfying or defeating their interest in having reasonably long and disease-free lives? Genes and Future People begins by explaining the connection between genes and disease, placing genetic within a framework of evolutionary biology. It then discusses such topics as how genes and genetic intervention influence personal identity, what genetic testing of individuals and the knowledge resulting from it entails about responsibility to others who may be at risk, as well as how gene therapy and genetic enhancement can affect the identities of people and benefit or harm them. Furthermore, it discusses various moral aspects of cloning human beings and body parts. Finally, it explores the metaphysical and moral implications of genetic manipulation of the mechanisms of aging to extend the human life span.The aim Genes and Future People is to move philosophers, bioethicists, and readers in general to reflect on the extent to which genes determine whether we are healthy or diseased, our identities as persons, the quality of our lives, and our moral obligations to future generations of people. (shrink)

In a provocative 1991 paper, Alvin Moss and Mark Siegler argued that it may be fair to give individuals with alcohol-related end-stage liver disease lower priority for a liver transplant than those who develop end-stage liver disease from other factors. Like other organs, there is a substantial gap between the available livers for transplantation and the number of people who need liver transplants. Yet, unlike those with end-stage renal disease, who can survive for some time on dialysis before receiving a (...) kidney transplant, those with liver failure will die without a liver transplant. (shrink)

In light of the magnitude of interpersonal harm and the risk of greater harm in the future, Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu have argued for pharmacological enhancement of moral behaviour. I discuss moral bioenhancement as a set of collective action problems. Psychotropic drugs or other forms of neuromodulation designed to enhance moral sensitivity would have to produce the same or similar effects in the brains of a majority of people. Also, a significant number of healthy subjects would have to participate (...) in clinical trials testing the safety and efficacy of these drugs, which may expose them to unreasonable risk. Even if the drugs were safe and effective, a majority of people would have to co-operate in a moral enhancement programme for such a project to succeed. This goal would be thwarted if enough people opted out and decided not to enhance. To avoid this scenario, Persson and Savulescu argue that moral enhancement should be compulsory rather than voluntary. But the collective interest in harm reduction through compulsory enhancement would come at the cost of a loss of individual freedom. In general, there are many theoretical and practical reasons for scepticism about the concept and goal of moral enhancement. (shrink)

Many believe that it is morally wrong to give lower priority for a liver transplant to alcoholics with end-stage liver disease than to patients whose disease is not alcohol-related. Presumably, alcoholism is a disease that results from factors beyond one's control and therefore one cannot be causally or morally responsible for alcoholism or the liver failure that results from it. Moreover, giving lower priority to alcoholics unfairly singles them out for the moral vice of heavy drinking. I argue that the (...) etiology of alcoholism may involve enough control for the alcoholic to be responsible for his condition and accordingly have a weaker claim to receive a new liver than someone who acquires the disease through no fault of his own. In addition, I show why it is more plausible to reframe the question of priority in terms of control and responsibility rather than virtue and vice. Given that medical resources like livers are scarce, some people may justifiably be given lower priority than others in receiving these resources. (shrink)

Research into the mechanisms of aging has suggested the possibility of extending the human life span. But there may be evolutionary biological reasons for senescence and the limits of the cell cycle that explain the infirmities of aging and the eventual demise of all human organisms. Genetic manipulation of the mechanisms of aging could over many generations alter the course of natural selection and shift the majority of deleterious mutations in humans from later to earlier stages of life. This could (...) harm people in the distant future by making them more susceptible to premature disease and mortality. Thus there are biological and moral reasons to carefully consider the implications of exploiting this technology on a broad scale to extend the lives of people in the present and near future. (shrink)

The American Journal of Bioethics, Volume 11, Issue 8, Page 48-49, August 2011.

In the case of the minimally conscious patient M, the English Court of Protection ruled that it would be unlawful to withdraw artificial nutrition and hydration (ANH) from her. The Court reasoned that the sanctity of life was the determining factor and that it would not be in M's best interests for ANH to be withdrawn. This paper argues that the Court's reasoning is flawed and that continued ANH was not in this patient's best interests and thus should have been (...) withdrawn. (shrink)

In 1999, a case was described on national television in which a woman had enlisted onto an international bone marrow registry with the altruistic desire to offer her bone marrow to some unidentified individual in need of a transplant. The potential donor then was notified that she was a compatible match with someone dying from leukemia and gladly donated her marrow, which cured the recipient of the disease. Years later, though, the recipient developed end-stage renal disease, a consequence of the (...) high-dose chemotherapy she received earlier to destroy her stem cells and prepare her for the bone marrow transplant. Finding a suitable donor for a kidney transplant proved extremely difficult. Desperate, she requested that the donor registry personnel help her locate the individual who earlier was determined to be a compatible donor and asked this now-identifiable individual to consider donating one of her two normally functioning kidneys for a kidney transplant. (shrink)

Neuroimaging showing brain abnormalities is increasingly being introduced in criminal court proceedings to argue that a defendant could not control his behavior and should not be held responsible for it. But imaging has questionable probative value because it does not directly capture brain function or a defendant’s mental states at the time of a criminal act. Advanced techniques could transform imaging from a coarse-grained measure of correlations between brain states and behavior to a fine-grained measure of causal connections between them. (...) Even if this occurs, bias and other attitudes may unduly influence jurors’ interpretation of the data. Moreover, judges’ decisions about whether neuroimaging data is legally relevant and admissible are normative decisions based on more than empirical evidence. Advanced neuroimaging will better inform assessments of criminal responsibility but will not supplant or explain away the psychological and normative foundation of the criminal law. (shrink)

The neurological and psychological traits that regulate our thought and behavior fall along a spectrum that extends from the normal to the pathological, from traits that enable us to perform mental and physical functions to traits that interfere with these functions. Yet many people have a constellation of both normal and pathological mental traits. Some even have traits associated with exceptional intellectual or artistic ability despite being diagnosed as having a neurological or psychiatric disorder. These cases raise medical, ethical and (...) legal questions about which conditions should be diagnosed as mental disorders or pathologies, and whether it is always in one’s best interests to be treated for these conditions. (shrink)

The ethics of human enhancement has been a hotly debated topic in the last 15 years. In this debate, some advocate examining science fiction stories to elucidate the ethical issues regarding the current phenomenon of human enhancement. Stories from science fiction seem well suited to analyze biomedical advances, providing some possible case studies. Of particular interest is the work of screenwriter Andrew Niccol, which often focuses on ethical questions raised by the use of new technologies. Examining the movie In Time, (...) the aim of this paper is to show how science fiction can contribute to the ethical debate of human enhancement. In Time provides an interesting case study to explore what could be some of the consequences of radical life-extension technologies. In this paper, we will show how arguments regarding radical life-extension portrayed in this particular movie differ from what is found in the scientific literature. We will see how In Time gives flesh to arguments defending or rejecting radical life-extension. It articulates feelings of unease, alienation and boredom associated with this possibility. Finally, this article will conclude that science fiction movies in general, and In Time in particular, are a valuable resource for a broad and comprehensive debate about our coming future. (shrink)

In a recent set of papers, Aaron Spital has proposed conscription or routine recovery of cadaveric organs without consent as a way of ameliorating the severe shortage of organs for transplantation. Under the existing consent requirement, organs can be taken from the bodies of the deceased if they expressed a wish and intention to donate while alive. Organs may also be taken when families or other substitute decisionmakers decide on behalf of the deceased to allow organ procurement for the purpose (...) of transplantation. When patients or families do not consent to organ procurement, many transplantable organs are lost. This is a tragic yet avoidable situation. The dead are beyond any benefit or harm, and their organs could be used to prevent harm by saving and improving the lives of many people suffering and dying from end-stage organ failure. (shrink)

Today, advances in medicine and biotechnology occur at a rapid pace and have a profound impact on our lives. Mechanical devices can sustain an injured person's life indefinitely. Computed tomography (CT) and magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scans of the body and brain can reveal disorders before symptoms appear. Genetic testing of embryos can predict whether people will have diseases earlier or later in life. It may even become possible to clone human beings. These and other developments raise difficult ethical questions. (...) Biomedical Ethics is an engaging philosophical introduction to the most important ethical positions and arguments in six areas of biomedicine: the patient-doctor relationship, medical research on humans, reproductive rights and technologies, genetics, medical decisions at the end of life, and the allocation of scarce medical resources. Concisely capturing the historical, contemporary, and future-oriented aspects of the field, author Walter Glannon discusses both perennial issues in medicine, such as doctors' duties to patients, and recent and emerging issues in scientific innovation, including gene therapy and cloning. Ideal for undergraduate courses in contemporary moral problems, introduction to ethics, and introduction to bioethics, Biomedical Ethics is accessible to students who have little or no background in ethical theory, medicine, or biotechnology. (shrink)

Obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) and other psychiatric disorders can interfere with a person’s capacity to control the nature of his mental states and how they issue in his decisions and actions. Insofar as this sort of control is identified with free will, and psychiatric disorders can impair this control, these disorders can impair free will. The will can be compromised by dysregulated neural networks that disable the mental mechanisms necessary to regulate thought, motivation, and action. Neural and mental dys-function result in (...) the maladaptive and pathological behaviors associated with these disorders. In “Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder, Free Will, and Control,” Gerben Meynen (2012) rightly .. (shrink)

In a recent article in this journal, we argued that living organ donation from a parent to a child should be described as a beneficent rather than an altruistic act. Emotional relationships can generate an obligation of beneficence to help those with whom we have these relationships. This may involve an obligation for a parent to donate an organ to a child, even though it entails some risk to the parent. The parent's donation is not altruistic because altruistic acts are (...) not obligatory but optional, and they are motivated solely or primarily by other-regarding concerns. In contrast, donor parents' other-regarding concerns are inseparable from their own self-regarding concerns. An individual who donates to a stranger is acting altruistically. She may choose to help others to whom she is not emotionally related for a variety of reasons—sympathy, compassion, generosity, or a desire to give something back to humanity. But she does not have an obligation to do so. Although she may benefit as a consequence of donating, this is not her reason for donating. Instead, her action is motivated by a concern for the recipient's own sake. This is what makes the donation altruistic, and it can be justified without any expectation of benefit to the donor. However, although the potential competent donor decides whether the donation is in her best interests, physicians have the right to refuse to perform a transplant if the risks to the donor are too great or the potential benefits to the recipient are too small. (shrink)

In defending what he calls ‘full-blooded Epicureanism’, James Stacey Taylor argues that the dead cannot be harmed or wronged.1 This has implications for a range of bioethical issues pertaining to death, including posthumous organ procurement. Taylor claims that respecting the autonomy of persons requires that their desires regarding the treatment of their postmortem bodies be given due consideration while these persons are alive. It is not obvious what this means in practical terms, though Taylor says that respect for autonomy requires (...) that these wishes be recorded with the intention that they be followed. Yet if respect for autonomy only applies to the wishes of premortem persons, and if there are no posthumous harms or wrongs, then it is not clear why it would matter morally whether one's wishes about what to do with one's organs were fulfilled or thwarted after one's death.Most of us have an interest in what happens to our bodies not just during our lives but also after our deaths. Personal sovereignty and autonomy give persons a right to control what happens to their bodies, and since the body …. (shrink)

Perhaps the most frequently cited argument in philosophical discussions of death is the one embodied in the following passage from Epicurus’ Letter to Menoeceus.

In “Minds, Brains, and Norms,” Michael Pardo and Dennis Patterson claim that the idea that ‘you are your brain’ does not contribute to a plausible account of human behavior. I argue that they leave too little of the brain in their account of different types of behavior.