Results for 'Walter Sinnott Armstrong'

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  1.  11
    Neurolaw and Neuroprediction: Potential Promises and Perils.Walter SinnottArmstrong Thomas Nadelhoffer - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (9):631-642.
    Neuroscience has been proposed for use in the legal system for purposes of mind reading, assessment of responsibility, and prediction of misconduct. Each of these uses has both promises and perils, and each raises issues regarding the admissibility of neuroscientific evidence.
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  2.  13
    From ‘Is’ to ‘Ought’ in Moral Epistemology.Sinnott-Armstrong Walter - 2000 - Argumentation 14 (2):159-174.
    Many philosophers claim that no formally valid argument can have purely non-normative premises and a normative or moral conclusion that occurs essentially. Mark Nelson recently proposed a new counterexample to this Humean doctrine:All of Dahlia's beliefs are true.Dahlia believes that Bertie morally ought to marry Madeleine.―∴ Bertie morally ought to marry Madeleine.I argue that Nelson's universal premise has no normative content, that Nelson's argument is valid formally, and that Nelson's moral conclusion occurs essentially and not vacuously. Nonetheless, I show that (...)
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  3. Moral Skepticisms.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2006 - Oxford University Press.
    All contentious moral issues--from gay marriage to abortion and affirmative action--raise difficult questions about the justification of moral beliefs. How can we be justified in holding on to our own moral beliefs while recognizing that other intelligent people feel quite differently and that many moral beliefs are distorted by self-interest and by corrupt cultures? Even when almost everyone agrees--e.g. that experimental surgery without consent is immoral--can we know that such beliefs are true? If so, how? These profound questions lead to (...)
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  4. Consequentialism.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  5.  41
    Review of Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (Ed.), Moral Psychology, Volume 2: The Cognitive Science of Morality: Intuition and Diversity[REVIEW]Christian Miller - 2009 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (7).
    This is the second of three volumes on moral psychology edited by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and published by MIT Press in 2008.
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  6.  55
    Review of Jesse S. Summers and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Clean Hands? Philosophical Lessons From Scrupulosity[REVIEW]Noell Birondo - 2020 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 3.
    Philosophical lessons come in many different shapes and sizes. Some lessons are big, some are small. Some lessons go deep and have a big impact, some are shallow and have almost none. Some lessons are not really philosophical at all or would not really be lessons for an audience of academic philosophers. I mention these truisms not to disparage this informative book on 'moral OCD' (moral obsessive-compulsive disorder, or 'Scrupulosity') but rather to emphasize how difficult it can be to discern (...)
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  7.  34
    How to Allow Conscientious Objection in Medicine While Protecting Patient Rights.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Aaron J. Ancell - 2017 - Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 26 (1):120-131.
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  8.  45
    Morality, Normativity, and Society.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 1996 - Philosophical Review 105 (4):552.
    A complete moral theory should combine substantive ethics with metaethics, including moral semantics, moral epistemology, moral ontology, moral psychology, and the definition of morality. All of these topics and more are discussed with great clarity, insight, and originality in Copp’s remarkable book. Some of Copp’s positions are known from earlier articles, but his book reveals interconnections that increase the plausibility of each view separately and of the structure as a whole.
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  9.  11
    Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Ed., Moral Psychology (Vol. 3). The Neuroscience of Morality: Emotion, Brain Disorders, and Development. Reviewed By. [REVIEW]Christian Perring - 2010 - Philosophy in Review 30 (4):301-304.
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  10. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, "Moral Dilemmas". [REVIEW]R. A. Duff - 1989 - Philosophical Quarterly 39 (55):240.
     
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  11. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Ed. Moral Psychology, Volume 2. The Cognitive Science of Morality: Intuition and Diversity. [REVIEW]Whitley Kaufman - 2008 - Philosophy in Review 28 (5):373-375.
     
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  12.  9
    Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Morality Without God Reviewed By.Whitleym R. P. Kaufman - 2010 - Philosophy in Review 30 (3):230-231.
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  13. Moral Dilemmas.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 1988 - Blackwell.
    A strong tradition in philosophy denies the possibility of moral dilemmas. Recently, several philosophers reversed this tradition. In this dissertation, I clarify some fundamental issues in this debate, argue for the possibility of moral dilemmas, and determine some implications of this possibility. ;In chapter I, I define moral dilemmas roughly as situations where an agent morally ought to adopt each of two alternatives but cannot adopt both. Moral dilemmas are resolvable if and only if one of the moral oughts overrides (...)
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  14. It's Not My Fault: Global Warming and Individual Moral Obligations.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2005 - In Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Richard Howarth (eds.), Perspectives on Climate Change. Elsevier. pp. 221–253.
    A survey of various candidates shows that there is no defensible moral principle that shows that individuals have an obligation to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions.
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  15.  52
    Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Robert Audi (Eds.), Rationality, Rules, and Ideals: Critical Essays on Bernard Gert's Moral Theory (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2002), Pp. VIII + 326. [REVIEW]Mark Timmons - 2008 - Utilitas 20 (2):243-246.
  16.  18
    Spreading the Word: Groundings in the Philosophy of Language.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 1987 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48 (1):163-166.
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  17. Is Ethical Naturalism More Plausible Than Supernaturalism? A Reply to Walter Sinnott-Armstrong.Matthew Flannagan - 2012 - Philo 15 (1):19-37.
    In many of his addresses and debates, William Lane Craig has defended a Divine Command Theory of moral obligation (DCT). In a recent article and subsequent monograph, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong has criticized Craig’s position.1 Armstrong contended that a DCT is subject to several devastating objections and further contended that even if theism is true a particular form of ethical naturalism is a more plausible account of the nature of moral obligations than a DCT is. This paper critiques (...)
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  18. Moral Knowledge? New Readings in Moral Epistemology.Sinnott-Armstrong Walter & Timmons Mark (eds.) - 1996 - Oxford University Press.
    In Moral Knowledge? New Readings in Moral Epistemology, editors Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Mark Timmons bring together eleven specially commissioned essays by distinguished moral philosophers exploring the nature and possibility of moral knowledge. Each essay represents a major position within the exciting field of moral epistemology in which a proponent of the position presents and defends his or her view and locates it vis-a-vis competing views. The authors include established philosophers such as Peter Railton, Robert Audi, Richard Brandt, (...)
     
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  19.  15
    Tony Honore, Responsibility and Fault.Sinnott-Armstrong Walter - 2001 - Law and Philosophy 20 (1):103-106.
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  20. Some Varieties of Particularism.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 1999 - Metaphilosophy 30 (1&2):1-12.
    Analytic particularism claims that judgments of moral wrongness are about particular acts rather than general principles. Metaphysical particularism claims that what makes true moral judgments true is not general principles but nonmoral properties of particular acts. Epistemological particularism claims that studying particular acts apart from general principles can justify beliefs in moral judgments. Methodological particularism claims that we will do better morally in everyday life if we look carefully at each particular decision as it arises and give up the search (...)
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  21.  7
    Actions and Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 1991 - Noûs 25 (1):120-123.
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  22. Practical Interests, Relevant Alternatives, and Knowledge Attributions: An Empirical Study.Joshua May, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Jay G. Hull & Aaron Zimmerman - 2010 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (2):265–273.
    In defending his interest-relative account of knowledge in Knowledge and Practical Interests (2005), Jason Stanley relies heavily on intuitions about several bank cases. We experimentally test the empirical claims that Stanley seems to make concerning our common-sense intuitions about these bank cases. Additionally, we test the empirical claims that Jonathan Schaffer seems to make in his critique of Stanley. We argue that our data impugn what both Stanley and Schaffer claim our intuitions about such cases are. To account for these (...)
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  23. `Ought' Conversationally Implies `Can'.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 1984 - Philosophical Review 93 (2):249-261.
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  24. Pyrrhonian Skepticism.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.) - 2004 - Oxford University Press.
    Throughout the history of philosophy, skepticism has posed one of the central challenges of epistemology. Opponents of skepticism--including externalists, contextualists, foundationalists, and coherentists--have focussed largely on one particular variety of skepticism, often called Cartesian or Academic skepticism, which makes the radical claim that nobody can know anything. However, this version of skepticism is something of a straw man, since virtually no philosopher endorses this radical skeptical claim. The only skeptical view that has been truly held--by Sextus, Montaigne, Hume, Wittgenstein, and, (...)
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  25. Moral Intuitionism Meets Empirical Psychology.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2006 - In Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (eds.), Metaethics After Moore. Oxford University Press.
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  26. What’s Wrong with Joyguzzling?Ewan Kingston & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (1):169-186.
    Our thesis is that there is no moral requirement to refrain from emitting reasonable amounts of greenhouse gases solely in order to enjoy oneself. Joyriding in a gas guzzler provides our paradigm example. We first distinguish this claim that there is no moral requirement to refrain from joyguzzling from other more radical claims. We then review several different proposed objections to our view. These include: the claim that joyguzzling exemplifies a vice, causes or contributes to harm, has negative expected value, (...)
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  27. Blame, Not Ability, Impacts Moral “Ought” Judgments for Impossible Actions: Toward an Empirical Refutation of “Ought” Implies “Can”.Vladimir Chituc, Paul Henne, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Felipe De Brigard - 2016 - Cognition 150:20-25.
    Recently, psychologists have explored moral concepts including obligation, blame, and ability. While little empirical work has studied the relationships among these concepts, philosophers have widely assumed such a relationship in the principle that “ought” implies “can,” which states that if someone ought to do something, then they must be able to do it. The cognitive underpinnings of these concepts are tested in the three experiments reported here. In Experiment 1, most participants judge that an agent ought to keep a promise (...)
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  28. Moral Psychology: Freedom and Responsibility.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.) - forthcoming - MIT Press.
  29.  38
    Moral Psychology: The Evolution of Morality: Adaptations and Innateness.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.) - 2007 - Bradford.
    For much of the twentieth century, philosophy and science went their separate ways. In moral philosophy, fear of the so-called naturalistic fallacy kept moral philosophers from incorporating developments in biology and psychology. Since the 1990s, however, many philosophers have drawn on recent advances in cognitive psychology, brain science, and evolutionary psychology to inform their work. This collaborative trend is especially strong in moral philosophy, and these volumes bring together some of the most innovative work by both philosophers and psychologists in (...)
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  30.  32
    Moral Psychology: The Cognitive Science of Morality: Intuition and Diversity.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.) - 2007 - Bradford.
    For much of the twentieth century, philosophy and science went their separate ways. In moral philosophy, fear of the so-called naturalistic fallacy kept moral philosophers from incorporating developments in biology and psychology. Since the 1990s, however, many philosophers have drawn on recent advances in cognitive psychology, brain science, and evolutionary psychology to inform their work. This collaborative trend is especially strong in moral philosophy, and these three volumes bring together some of the most innovative work by both philosophers and psychologists (...)
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  31. Moral Skepticism and Justification.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 1996 - In Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Mark Timmons (eds.), Moral Knowledge? New Readings in Moral Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
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  32. Are Moral Judgments Unified?Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Thalia Wheatley - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (4):451-474.
  33.  87
    Brain Images as Legal Evidence.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Adina Roskies, Teneille Brown & Emily Murphy - 2008 - Episteme 5 (3):359-373.
    This paper explores whether brain images may be admitted as evidence in criminal trials under Federal Rule of Evidence 403, which weighs probative value against the danger of being prejudicial, confusing, or misleading to fact finders. The paper summarizes and evaluates recent empirical research relevant to these issues. We argue that currently the probative value of neuroimages for criminal responsibility is minimal, and there is some evidence of their potential to be prejudicial or misleading. We also propose experiments that will (...)
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  34.  27
    Moral Psychology: The Neuroscience of Morality: Emotion, Brain Disorders, and Development.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.) - 2007 - MIT Press.
    For much of the twentieth century, philosophy and science went their separate ways. In moral philosophy, fear of the so-called naturalistic fallacy kept moral philosophers from incorporating developments in biology and psychology. Since the 1990s, however, many philosophers have drawn on recent advances in cognitive psychology, brain science, and evolutionary psychology to inform their work. This collaborative trend is especially strong in moral philosophy, and these three volumes bring together some of the most innovative work by both philosophers and psychologists (...)
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  35. Is Morality Unified? Evidence That Distinct Neural Systems Underlie Moral Judgments of Harm, Dishonesty, and Disgust.Carolyn Parkinson, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Philipp E. Koralus, Angela Mendelovici, Victoria McGeer & Thalia Wheatley - 2011 - Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 23 (10):3162-3180.
    Much recent research has sought to uncover the neural basis of moral judgment. However, it has remained unclear whether "moral judgments" are sufficiently homogenous to be studied scientifically as a unified category. We tested this assumption by using fMRI to examine the neural correlates of moral judgments within three moral areas: (physical) harm, dishonesty, and (sexual) disgust. We found that the judgment ofmoral wrongness was subserved by distinct neural systems for each of the different moral areas and that these differences (...)
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  36. A Contrastivist Manifesto.Walter SinnottArmstrong - 2008 - Social Epistemology 22 (3):257 – 270.
    General contrastivism holds that all claims of reasons are relative to contrast classes. This approach applies to explanation (reasons why things happen), moral philosophy (reasons for action), and epistemology (reasons for belief), and it illuminates moral dilemmas, free will, and the grue paradox. In epistemology, contrast classes point toward an account of justified belief that is compatible with reliabilism and other externalisms. Contrast classes also provide a model for Pyrrhonian scepticism based on suspending belief about which contrast class is relevant. (...)
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  37. Moral Appraisals Affect Doing/Allowing Judgments.Fiery Cushman, Joshua Knobe & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2008 - Cognition 108 (2):353-380.
    An extensive body of research suggests that the distinction between doing and allowing plays a critical role in shaping moral appraisals. Here, we report evidence from a pair of experiments suggesting that the converse is also true: moral appraisals affect doing/allowing judgments. Specifically, morally bad behavior is more likely to be construed as actively ‘doing’ than as passively ‘allowing’. This finding adds to a growing list of folk concepts influenced by moral appraisal, including causation and intentional action. We therefore suggest (...)
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  38.  28
    Moral Skepticisms - by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong.Luke Russell - 2008 - Philosophical Books 49 (1):80-81.
  39. The Disunity of Morality and Why It Matters to Philosophy.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2012 - The Monist 95 (3):355-377.
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  40.  5
    The Structure of Justification.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 1995 - Philosophical Quarterly 45 (180):394-397.
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  41. Begging the Question.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 1999 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (2):174 – 191.
    No topic in informal logic is more important than begging the question. Also, none is more subtle or complex. We cannot even begin to understand the fallacy of begging the question without getting clear about arguments, their purposes, and circularity. So I will discuss these preliminary topics first. This will clear the path to my own account of begging the question. Then I will anticipate some objections. Finally, I will apply my account to a well-known and popular response to scepticism (...)
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  42.  26
    Moral Appraisals Affect Doing/Allowing Judgments.Fiery Cushman, Joshua Knobe & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2008 - Cognition 108 (1):281-289.
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  43. Is Moral Phenomenology Unified?Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2008 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (1):85-97.
    In this short paper, I argue that the phenomenology of moral judgment is not unified across different areas of morality (involving harm, hierarchy, reciprocity, and impurity) or even across different relations to harm. Common responses, such as that moral obligations are experienced as felt demands based on a sense of what is fitting, are either too narrow to cover all moral obligations or too broad to capture anything important and peculiar to morality. The disunity of moral phenomenology is, nonetheless, compatible (...)
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  44.  4
    The Invention of Autonomy: A History of Modern Moral Philosophy.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 1998 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 2 (2):185-187.
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  45. Intention, Temporal Order, and Moral Judgments.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Ron Mallon, Tom Mccoy & Jay G. Hull - 2008 - Mind and Language 23 (1):90–106.
    The traditional philosophical doctrine of double effect claims that agents’ intentions affect whether acts are morally wrong. Our behavioral study reveals that agents’ intentions do affect whether acts are judged morally wrong, whereas the temporal order of good and bad effects affects whether acts are classified as killings. This finding suggests that the moral judgments are not based on the classifications. Our results also undermine recent claims that prior moral judgments determine whether agents are seen as causing effects intentionally rather (...)
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  46.  83
    Moral Relativity and Intuitionism.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2002 - Noûs 36 (s1):305 - 328.
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  47.  94
    Moral Intuitions.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Liane Young & Fiery Cushman - 2010 - In John Michael Doris (ed.), The Moral Psychology Handbook. Oxford University Press. pp. 246--272.
    Moral intuitions are strong, stable, immediate moral beliefs. Moral philosophers ask when they are justified. This question cannot be answered separately from a psychological question: How do moral intuitions arise? Their reliability depends upon their source. This chapter develops and argues for a new theory of how moral intuitions arise—that they arise through heuristic processes best understood as unconscious attribute substitutions. That is, when asked whether something has the attribute of moral wrongness, people unconsciously substitute a different question about a (...)
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  48.  32
    Review of Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (Ed.), Moral Psychology, Volume 3: The Neuroscience of Morality: Emotion, Brain Disorders, and Development[REVIEW]Christian Miller - 2009 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (7).
    This is the third of three volumes on moral psychology edited by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and published by MIT Press in 2008.
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  49. Moral Dilemmas and Incomparability.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 1985 - American Philosophical Quarterly 22 (4):321 - 329.
    The author defines moral dilemmas as situations where there is a moral requirement for an agent to adopt each of two alternatives, And the agent cannot adopt both, But neither moral requirement overrides the other. The author then argues that moral dilemmas are possible because conflicting moral requirements can be either symmetrical or incomparable in a way that is limited enough to be plausible but still strong enough to yield moral dilemmas.
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  50.  19
    Classy pyrrhonism.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2004 - In Pyrrhonian Skepticism. Oxford University Press. pp. 188--207.
    This essay invokes a technical framework of contrast classes within which Pyrrhonians can accept knowledge claims that are relativized to specific contrast classes, but avoid all unrelativized knowledge claims and all presuppositions about which contrast classes are really relevant. Pyrrhonians can then assert part of the content of everyday knowledge claims without privileging the everyday perspective or any other perspective. This framework provides a precise way to understand the central claims of neo-Pyrrhonism while avoiding most, if not all, of the (...)
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