Results for 'Walter Sinnott Armstrong'

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  1. Moral Psychology: Freedom and Responsibility.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.) - 2014 - MIT Press.
  2.  16
    Neurolaw and Neuroprediction: Potential Promises and Perils.Walter SinnottArmstrong Thomas Nadelhoffer - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (9):631-642.
    Neuroscience has been proposed for use in the legal system for purposes of mind reading, assessment of responsibility, and prediction of misconduct. Each of these uses has both promises and perils, and each raises issues regarding the admissibility of neuroscientific evidence.
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  3.  9
    Understanding arguments: an introduction to informal logic.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2015 - Australia: Cengage Learning. Edited by Robert J. Fogelin.
    ADVANGEBOOKS - UNDERSTANDING ARGUMENTS: AN INTRODUCTION TO INFORMAL LOGIC, 9E shows readers how to construct arguments in everyday life, using everyday language. In addition, this easy-to-read textbook also devotes three chapters to the formal aspects of logic including forms of argument, as well as propositional, categorical, and quantificational logic. Plus, this edition helps readers apply informal logic to legal, moral, scientific, religious, and philosophical scenarios, too. Important Notice: Media content referenced within the product description or the product text may not (...)
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  4. Moral Psychology, Vol. 4.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.) - 2014 - MIT Press.
     
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  5.  2
    Think again: how to reason and argue--and why.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2018 - New York City: Oxford University Press.
    Our personal and political worlds are rife with arguments and disagreements, some of them petty and vitriolic. The inability to compromise and understand the opposition is epidemic today, from countries refusing to negotiate, to politicians pandering to their base. Social media has produced a virulent world where extreme positions dominate. There is much demonization of the other side, very little progress is made, and the end result is further widening of positions. How did this happen, and what might be done (...)
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  6.  31
    Spreading the Word: Groundings in the Philosophy of Language.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 1987 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48 (1):163-166.
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  7.  11
    “Mpp, Rip” Rip.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 1999 - Philosophical Papers 28 (2):125-131.
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  8.  39
    The wrongful intentions principle.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 1991 - Philosophical Papers 20 (1):11-24.
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  9. Some Varieties of Particularism.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 1999 - Metaphilosophy 30 (1&2):1-12.
    Analytic particularism claims that judgments of moral wrongness are about particular acts rather than general principles. Metaphysical particularism claims that what makes true moral judgments true is not general principles but nonmoral properties of particular acts. Epistemological particularism claims that studying particular acts apart from general principles can justify beliefs in moral judgments. Methodological particularism claims that we will do better morally in everyday life if we look carefully at each particular decision as it arises and give up the search (...)
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  10.  6
    Robert Audi: Moral Knowledge and Ethical Character.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 1999 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 2 (2):185-187.
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  11. Moral skepticisms.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2006 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    All contentious moral issues--from gay marriage to abortion and affirmative action--raise difficult questions about the justification of moral beliefs. How can we be justified in holding on to our own moral beliefs while recognizing that other intelligent people feel quite differently and that many moral beliefs are distorted by self-interest and by corrupt cultures? Even when almost everyone agrees--e.g. that experimental surgery without consent is immoral--can we know that such beliefs are true? If so, how? These profound questions lead to (...)
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  12. Consequentialism.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  13.  26
    Free will: philosophers and neuroscientists in conversation.Uri Maoz & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (eds.) - 2022 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
    What is free will? Can it exist in a determined universe? How can we determine who, if anyone, possesses it? Philosophers have been debating these questions for millennia. In recent decades neuroscientists have joined the fray with questions of their own. Which neural mechanisms could enable conscious control of action? What are intentional actions? Do contemporary developments in neuroscience rule out free will or, instead, illuminate how it works? Over the past few years, neuroscientists and philosophers have increasingly come to (...)
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  14.  90
    Moral Relativity and Intuitionism.Walter SinnottArmstrong - 2002 - Noûs 36 (s1):305 - 328.
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  15. Modality, morality, and belief: essays in honor of Ruth Barcan Marcus.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Diana Raffman & Nicholas Asher (eds.) - 1995 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    Modality, morality and belief are among the most controversial topics in philosophy today, and few philosophers have shaped these debates as deeply as Ruth Barcan Marcus. Inspired by her work, a distinguished group of philosophers explore these issues, refine and sharpen arguments and develop new positions on such topics as possible worlds, moral dilemmas, essentialism, and the explanation of actions by beliefs. This 'state of the art' collection honours one of the most rigorous and iconoclastic of philosophical pioneers.
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  16. Moral dilemmas.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 1988 - New York, NY, USA: Blackwell.
    A strong tradition in philosophy denies the possibility of moral dilemmas. Recently, several philosophers reversed this tradition. In this dissertation, I clarify some fundamental issues in this debate, argue for the possibility of moral dilemmas, and determine some implications of this possibility. ;In chapter I, I define moral dilemmas roughly as situations where an agent morally ought to adopt each of two alternatives but cannot adopt both. Moral dilemmas are resolvable if and only if one of the moral oughts overrides (...)
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  17.  95
    Brain Images as Legal Evidence.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Adina Roskies, Teneille Brown & Emily Murphy - 2008 - Episteme 5 (3):359-373.
    This paper explores whether brain images may be admitted as evidence in criminal trials under Federal Rule of Evidence 403, which weighs probative value against the danger of being prejudicial, confusing, or misleading to fact finders. The paper summarizes and evaluates recent empirical research relevant to these issues. We argue that currently the probative value of neuroimages for criminal responsibility is minimal, and there is some evidence of their potential to be prejudicial or misleading. We also propose experiments that will (...)
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  18. It's Not My Fault: Global Warming and Individual Moral Obligations.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2005 - In Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Richard B. Howarth (eds.), Perspectives on Climate Change. Elsevier. pp. 221–253.
    A survey of various candidates shows that there is no defensible moral principle that shows that individuals have an obligation to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions.
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  19. Practical Interests, Relevant Alternatives, and Knowledge Attributions: An Empirical Study.Joshua May, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Jay G. Hull & Aaron Zimmerman - 2010 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (2):265–273.
    In defending his interest-relative account of knowledge in Knowledge and Practical Interests (2005), Jason Stanley relies heavily on intuitions about several bank cases. We experimentally test the empirical claims that Stanley seems to make concerning our common-sense intuitions about these bank cases. Additionally, we test the empirical claims that Jonathan Schaffer seems to make in his critique of Stanley. We argue that our data impugn what both Stanley and Schaffer claim our intuitions about such cases are. To account for these (...)
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  20. What’s Wrong with Joyguzzling?Ewan Kingston & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (1):169-186.
    Our thesis is that there is no moral requirement to refrain from emitting reasonable amounts of greenhouse gases solely in order to enjoy oneself. Joyriding in a gas guzzler provides our paradigm example. We first distinguish this claim that there is no moral requirement to refrain from joyguzzling from other more radical claims. We then review several different proposed objections to our view. These include: the claim that joyguzzling exemplifies a vice, causes or contributes to harm, has negative expected value, (...)
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  21.  51
    How to Allow Conscientious Objection in Medicine While Protecting Patient Rights.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Aaron J. Ancell - 2017 - Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 26 (1):120-131.
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  22.  13
    The Structure of Justification.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 1995 - Philosophical Quarterly 45 (180):394-397.
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  23. What is Consequentialism? A Reply to Howard-Snyder.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2001 - Utilitas 13 (3):342.
    If there is a moral reason for A to do X, and if A cannot do X without doing Y, and if doing Y will enable A to do X, then there is a moral reason for A to do Y. This principle is plausible but mysterious, so it needs to be explained. It can be explained by necessary enabler consequentialism, but not by other consequentialisms or any deontological moral theory. Or so I argue. Frances Howard-Snyder objects that this argument (...)
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  24. `Ought' conversationally implies `can'.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 1984 - Philosophical Review 93 (2):249-261.
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  25. Pyrrhonian skepticism.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.) - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Throughout the history of philosophy, skepticism has posed one of the central challenges of epistemology. Opponents of skepticism--including externalists, contextualists, foundationalists, and coherentists--have focussed largely on one particular variety of skepticism, often called Cartesian or Academic skepticism, which makes the radical claim that nobody can know anything. However, this version of skepticism is something of a straw man, since virtually no philosopher endorses this radical skeptical claim. The only skeptical view that has been truly held--by Sextus, Montaigne, Hume, Wittgenstein, and, (...)
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  26. Moral Skepticism and Justification.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 1996 - In Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Mark Timmons (eds.), Moral knowledge?: new readings in moral epistemology. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  27. Moral intuitionism meets empirical psychology.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2006 - In Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (eds.), Metaethics After Moore. Oxford University Press.
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  28.  12
    Actions and Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson. [REVIEW]Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 1991 - Noûs 25 (1):120-123.
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  29.  14
    Spreading the Word: Groundings in the Philosophy of Language.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 1984 - Oxford University Press USA.
    Provides a comprehensive introduction to the major philosophical theories attempting to explain the workings of language.
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  30. Moral appraisals affect doing/allowing judgments.Fiery Cushman, Joshua Knobe & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2008 - Cognition 108 (2):353-380.
    An extensive body of research suggests that the distinction between doing and allowing plays a critical role in shaping moral appraisals. Here, we report evidence from a pair of experiments suggesting that the converse is also true: moral appraisals affect doing/allowing judgments. Specifically, morally bad behavior is more likely to be construed as actively ‘doing’ than as passively ‘allowing’. This finding adds to a growing list of folk concepts influenced by moral appraisal, including causation and intentional action. We therefore suggest (...)
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  31.  60
    Moral knowledge?: new readings in moral epistemology.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Mark Timmons (eds.) - 1996 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    In Moral Knowledge? New Readings in Moral Epistemology, editors Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Mark Timmons bring together eleven specially commissioned essays by distinguished moral philosophers exploring the nature and possibility of moral knowledge. Each essay represents a major position within the exciting field of moral epistemology in which a proponent of the position presents and defends his or her view and locates it vis-a-vis competing views. The authors include established philosophers such as Peter Railton, Robert Audi, Richard Brandt, (...)
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  32. Are moral judgments unified?Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Thalia Wheatley - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (4):451-474.
  33.  20
    Think Again: How to Reason and Argue.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2018 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
    Our personal and political worlds are rife with arguments and disagreements, some of them petty and vitriolic. The inability to compromise and understand the opposition is epidemic today, from countries refusing to negotiate, to politicians pandering to their base. Social media has produced a virulent world where extreme positions dominate. There is much demonization of the other side, very little progress is made, and the end result is further widening of positions. How did this happen, and what might be done (...)
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  34.  65
    Moral framing effects within subjects.Paul Rehren & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2021 - Philosophical Psychology 34 (5):611-636.
    Several philosophers and psychologists have argued that evidence of moral framing effects shows that many of our moral judgments are unreliable. However, all previous empirical work on moral framing effects has used between-subject experimental designs. We argue that between-subject designs alone do not allow us to accurately estimate the extent of moral framing effects or to properly evaluate the case from framing effects against the reliability of our moral judgments. To do better, we report results of our new within-subject study (...)
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  35.  88
    Responsibility in Cases of Multiple Personality Disorder.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Stephen Behnke - 2000 - Noûs 34 (s14):301-323.
    Multiple Personality Disorder (MPD), now also known as Dissociative Iden- tity Disorder, raises many questions about the nature of persons, the goals of treatment, the suggestibility of patients, and the reliability of defendant reports of their own mental states. These issues become crucial when courts need to decide whether or not to punish a person with MPD who has committed a crime. This paper will explore that issue and propose a test of when people with MPD should be held criminally (...)
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  36. Begging the question.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 1999 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (2):174 – 191.
    No topic in informal logic is more important than begging the question. Also, none is more subtle or complex. We cannot even begin to understand the fallacy of begging the question without getting clear about arguments, their purposes, and circularity. So I will discuss these preliminary topics first. This will clear the path to my own account of begging the question. Then I will anticipate some objections. Finally, I will apply my account to a well-known and popular response to scepticism (...)
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  37. The Disunity of Morality and Why it Matters to Philosophy.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2012 - The Monist 95 (3):355-377.
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  38. Blame, not ability, impacts moral “ought” judgments for impossible actions: Toward an empirical refutation of “ought” implies “can”.Vladimir Chituc, Paul Henne, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Felipe De Brigard - 2016 - Cognition 150 (C):20-25.
    Recently, psychologists have explored moral concepts including obligation, blame, and ability. While little empirical work has studied the relationships among these concepts, philosophers have widely assumed such a relationship in the principle that “ought” implies “can,” which states that if someone ought to do something, then they must be able to do it. The cognitive underpinnings of these concepts are tested in the three experiments reported here. In Experiment 1, most participants judge that an agent ought to keep a promise (...)
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  39. A contrastivist manifesto.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2008 - Social Epistemology 22 (3):257 – 270.
    General contrastivism holds that all claims of reasons are relative to contrast classes. This approach applies to explanation (reasons why things happen), moral philosophy (reasons for action), and epistemology (reasons for belief), and it illuminates moral dilemmas, free will, and the grue paradox. In epistemology, contrast classes point toward an account of justified belief that is compatible with reliabilism and other externalisms. Contrast classes also provide a model for Pyrrhonian scepticism based on suspending belief about which contrast class is relevant. (...)
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  40. Is Morality Unified? Evidence that Distinct Neural Systems Underlie Moral Judgments of Harm, Dishonesty, and Disgust.Carolyn Parkinson, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Philipp E. Koralus, Angela Mendelovici, Victoria McGeer & Thalia Wheatley - 2011 - Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 23 (10):3162-3180.
    Much recent research has sought to uncover the neural basis of moral judgment. However, it has remained unclear whether "moral judgments" are sufficiently homogenous to be studied scientifically as a unified category. We tested this assumption by using fMRI to examine the neural correlates of moral judgments within three moral areas: (physical) harm, dishonesty, and (sexual) disgust. We found that the judgment ofmoral wrongness was subserved by distinct neural systems for each of the different moral areas and that these differences (...)
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  41. Moral Dilemmas and Incomparability.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 1985 - American Philosophical Quarterly 22 (4):321 - 329.
    The author defines moral dilemmas as situations where there is a moral requirement for an agent to adopt each of two alternatives, And the agent cannot adopt both, But neither moral requirement overrides the other. The author then argues that moral dilemmas are possible because conflicting moral requirements can be either symmetrical or incomparable in a way that is limited enough to be plausible but still strong enough to yield moral dilemmas.
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  42.  25
    On Primoratz's Definition of Terrorism.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 1991 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 8 (1):115-120.
    ABSTRACT In “What is terrorism?” Igor Primoratz defines ‘terrorism’ as “the deliberate use of violence, or threat of its use, against innocent people, with the aim of intimidating them, or other people, into a course of action they otherwise would not take.” I argue that this definition needs to be modified (1) by requiring that the harm or threat be to persons other than those intimidated, (2) by including aims which do not concern action, and (3) by distinguishing terrorists who (...)
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  43.  31
    Moral Psychology, Volume 3: The Neuroscience of Morality: Emotion, Brain Disorders, and Development.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.) - 2007 - MIT Press.
    For much of the twentieth century, philosophy and science went their separate ways. In moral philosophy, fear of the so-called naturalistic fallacy kept moral philosophers from incorporating developments in biology and psychology. Since the 1990s, however, many philosophers have drawn on recent advances in cognitive psychology, brain science, and evolutionary psychology to inform their work. This collaborative trend is especially strong in moral philosophy, and these three volumes bring together some of the most innovative work by both philosophers and psychologists (...)
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  44. Abstract + concrete = paradox.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2007 - In Joshua Michael Knobe & Shaun Nichols (eds.), Experimental Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
  45.  25
    Neuroscience and philosophy.Felipe De Brigard & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (eds.) - 2022 - Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
    State-of-the-art collection on how neuroscience and philosophy can mutually illuminate each other on core psychological concepts. An interdisciplinary collection in the best sense.
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  46. Philosophy of Neuroscience.Felipe De Brigard & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (eds.) - 2022 - MIT Press.
     
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  47.  39
    Moral appraisals affect doing/allowing judgments.Fiery Cushman, Joshua Knobe & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2008 - Cognition 108 (1):281-289.
  48.  32
    Classy pyrrhonism.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2004 - In Pyrrhonian Skepticism. Oxford University Press. pp. 188--207.
    This essay invokes a technical framework of contrast classes within which Pyrrhonians can accept knowledge claims that are relativized to specific contrast classes, but avoid all unrelativized knowledge claims and all presuppositions about which contrast classes are really relevant. Pyrrhonians can then assert part of the content of everyday knowledge claims without privileging the everyday perspective or any other perspective. This framework provides a precise way to understand the central claims of neo-Pyrrhonism while avoiding most, if not all, of the (...)
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  49.  28
    Moral Relativity and Intuitionism.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2002 - Philosophical Issues 12 (1):305-328.
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  50. Moral intuitions.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Liane Young & Fiery Cushman - 2010 - In John M. Doris (ed.), Moral Psychology Handbook. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 246--272.
    Moral intuitions are strong, stable, immediate moral beliefs. Moral philosophers ask when they are justified. This question cannot be answered separately from a psychological question: How do moral intuitions arise? Their reliability depends upon their source. This chapter develops and argues for a new theory of how moral intuitions arise—that they arise through heuristic processes best understood as unconscious attribute substitutions. That is, when asked whether something has the attribute of moral wrongness, people unconsciously substitute a different question about a (...)
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