Results for 'Walter Sinnott���Armstrong'

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  1. Moral Skepticisms.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2006 - Oxford University Press.
    All contentious moral issues--from gay marriage to abortion and affirmative action--raise difficult questions about the justification of moral beliefs. How can we be justified in holding on to our own moral beliefs while recognizing that other intelligent people feel quite differently and that many moral beliefs are distorted by self-interest and by corrupt cultures? Even when almost everyone agrees--e.g. that experimental surgery without consent is immoral--can we know that such beliefs are true? If so, how? These profound questions lead to (...)
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  2. Moral Dilemmas.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 1988 - Blackwell.
    A strong tradition in philosophy denies the possibility of moral dilemmas. Recently, several philosophers reversed this tradition. In this dissertation, I clarify some fundamental issues in this debate, argue for the possibility of moral dilemmas, and determine some implications of this possibility. ;In chapter I, I define moral dilemmas roughly as situations where an agent morally ought to adopt each of two alternatives but cannot adopt both. Moral dilemmas are resolvable if and only if one of the moral oughts overrides (...)
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  3. Moral Knowledge? New Readings in Moral Epistemology.Sinnott-Armstrong Walter & Timmons Mark (eds.) - 1996 - Oxford University Press.
    In Moral Knowledge? New Readings in Moral Epistemology, editors Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Mark Timmons bring together eleven specially commissioned essays by distinguished moral philosophers exploring the nature and possibility of moral knowledge. Each essay represents a major position within the exciting field of moral epistemology in which a proponent of the position presents and defends his or her view and locates it vis-a-vis competing views. The authors include established philosophers such as Peter Railton, Robert Audi, Richard Brandt, and Simon (...)
     
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  4. Consequentialism.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  5.  10
    Neurolaw and Neuroprediction: Potential Promises and Perils.Walter Sinnott‐Armstrong Thomas Nadelhoffer - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (9):631-642.
    Neuroscience has been proposed for use in the legal system for purposes of mind reading, assessment of responsibility, and prediction of misconduct. Each of these uses has both promises and perils, and each raises issues regarding the admissibility of neuroscientific evidence.
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  6. Pyrrhonian Skepticism.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.) - 2004 - Oxford University Press.
    Throughout the history of philosophy, skepticism has posed one of the central challenges of epistemology. Opponents of skepticism--including externalists, contextualists, foundationalists, and coherentists--have focussed largely on one particular variety of skepticism, often called Cartesian or Academic skepticism, which makes the radical claim that nobody can know anything. However, this version of skepticism is something of a straw man, since virtually no philosopher endorses this radical skeptical claim. The only skeptical view that has been truly held--by Sextus, Montaigne, Hume, Wittgenstein, and, (...)
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  7.  50
    Review of Jesse S. Summers and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Clean Hands? Philosophical Lessons From Scrupulosity[REVIEW]Noell Birondo - 2020 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 3.
    Philosophical lessons come in many different shapes and sizes. Some lessons are big, some are small. Some lessons go deep and have a big impact, some are shallow and have almost none. Some lessons are not really philosophical at all or would not really be lessons for an audience of academic philosophers. I mention these truisms not to disparage this informative book on 'moral OCD' (moral obsessive-compulsive disorder, or 'Scrupulosity') but rather to emphasize how difficult it can be to discern (...)
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  8. Moral Psychology: Freedom and Responsibility.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.) - forthcoming - MIT Press.
  9. Moral Intuitionism Meets Empirical Psychology.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2006 - In Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (eds.), Metaethics After Moore. Oxford University Press.
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  10.  24
    Moral Psychology: The Neuroscience of Morality: Emotion, Brain Disorders, and Development.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.) - 2007 - MIT Press.
    For much of the twentieth century, philosophy and science went their separate ways. In moral philosophy, fear of the so-called naturalistic fallacy kept moral philosophers from incorporating developments in biology and psychology. Since the 1990s, however, many philosophers have drawn on recent advances in cognitive psychology, brain science, and evolutionary psychology to inform their work. This collaborative trend is especially strong in moral philosophy, and these three volumes bring together some of the most innovative work by both philosophers and psychologists (...)
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  11. The Disunity of Morality and Why It Matters to Philosophy.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2012 - The Monist 95 (3):355-377.
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  12.  11
    From ‘Is’ to ‘Ought’ in Moral Epistemology.Sinnott-Armstrong Walter - 2000 - Argumentation 14 (2):159-174.
    Many philosophers claim that no formally valid argument can have purely non-normative premises and a normative or moral conclusion that occurs essentially. Mark Nelson recently proposed a new counterexample to this Humean doctrine:All of Dahlia's beliefs are true.Dahlia believes that Bertie morally ought to marry Madeleine.―∴ Bertie morally ought to marry Madeleine.I argue that Nelson's universal premise has no normative content, that Nelson's argument is valid formally, and that Nelson's moral conclusion occurs essentially and not vacuously. Nonetheless, I show that (...)
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  13. Intention, Temporal Order, and Moral Judgments.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Ron Mallon, Tom Mccoy & Jay G. Hull - 2008 - Mind and Language 23 (1):90–106.
    The traditional philosophical doctrine of double effect claims that agents’ intentions affect whether acts are morally wrong. Our behavioral study reveals that agents’ intentions do affect whether acts are judged morally wrong, whereas the temporal order of good and bad effects affects whether acts are classified as killings. This finding suggests that the moral judgments are not based on the classifications. Our results also undermine recent claims that prior moral judgments determine whether agents are seen as causing effects intentionally rather (...)
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  14.  18
    Classy pyrrhonism.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2004 - In Pyrrhonian Skepticism. Oxford University Press. pp. 188--207.
    This essay invokes a technical framework of contrast classes within which Pyrrhonians can accept knowledge claims that are relativized to specific contrast classes, but avoid all unrelativized knowledge claims and all presuppositions about which contrast classes are really relevant. Pyrrhonians can then assert part of the content of everyday knowledge claims without privileging the everyday perspective or any other perspective. This framework provides a precise way to understand the central claims of neo-Pyrrhonism while avoiding most, if not all, of the (...)
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  15. Moral Psychology Volume 3.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.) - 2008 - MIT Press.
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  16.  45
    Morality, Normativity, and Society.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 1996 - Philosophical Review 105 (4):552.
    A complete moral theory should combine substantive ethics with metaethics, including moral semantics, moral epistemology, moral ontology, moral psychology, and the definition of morality. All of these topics and more are discussed with great clarity, insight, and originality in Copp’s remarkable book. Some of Copp’s positions are known from earlier articles, but his book reveals interconnections that increase the plausibility of each view separately and of the structure as a whole.
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  17. It's Not My Fault: Global Warming and Individual Moral Obligations.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2005 - In Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Richard Howarth (eds.), Perspectives on Climate Change. Elsevier. pp. 221–253.
    A survey of various candidates shows that there is no defensible moral principle that shows that individuals have an obligation to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions.
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  18. Abstract + Concrete = Paradox.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2007 - In Joshua Knobe & Shaun Nichols (eds.), Experimental Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
  19.  87
    Morality Without God?Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2009 - Oxford University Press.
    This book should fit well with the debates raging over issues like evolution and intelligent design, atheism, and religion and public life as an example of a ...
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  20.  40
    Review of Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (Ed.), Moral Psychology, Volume 2: The Cognitive Science of Morality: Intuition and Diversity[REVIEW]Christian Miller - 2009 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (7).
    This is the second of three volumes on moral psychology edited by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and published by MIT Press in 2008.
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  21.  11
    Expressivism and Embedding.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2000 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 61 (3):677-693.
    Expressivism faces four distinct problems when evaluative sentences are embedded in unassertive contexts like: If lying is wrong, getting someone to lie is wrong, Lying is wrong, so Getting someone to lie is wrong. The initial problem is to show that expressivism is compatible with - being valid. The basic problem is for expressivists to explain why evaluative instances of modus ponens are valid. The deeper problem is to explain why a particular argument like - is valid. The deepest problem (...)
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  22. `Ought' Conversationally Implies `Can'.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 1984 - Philosophical Review 93 (2):249-261.
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  23. Conscious Will and Responsibility: A Tribute to Benjamin Libet.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Lynn Nadel (eds.) - 2010 - Oup Usa.
    We all seem to think that we do the acts we do because we consciously choose to do them. This commonsense view is thrown into dispute by Benjamin Libet's eyebrow-raising experiments, which seem to suggest that conscious will occurs not before but after the start of brain activity that produces physical action.
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  24.  35
    Moral Psychology: The Evolution of Morality: Adaptations and Innateness.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.) - 2007 - Bradford.
    For much of the twentieth century, philosophy and science went their separate ways. In moral philosophy, fear of the so-called naturalistic fallacy kept moral philosophers from incorporating developments in biology and psychology. Since the 1990s, however, many philosophers have drawn on recent advances in cognitive psychology, brain science, and evolutionary psychology to inform their work. This collaborative trend is especially strong in moral philosophy, and these volumes bring together some of the most innovative work by both philosophers and psychologists in (...)
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  25. What’s Wrong with Joyguzzling?Ewan Kingston & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (1):169-186.
    Our thesis is that there is no moral requirement to refrain from emitting reasonable amounts of greenhouse gases solely in order to enjoy oneself. Joyriding in a gas guzzler provides our paradigm example. We first distinguish this claim that there is no moral requirement to refrain from joyguzzling from other more radical claims. We then review several different proposed objections to our view. These include: the claim that joyguzzling exemplifies a vice, causes or contributes to harm, has negative expected value, (...)
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  26.  60
    Ought to Have' and 'Could Have.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 1985 - Analysis 45 (1):44 - 48.
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  27. Are Moral Judgments Unified?Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Thalia Wheatley - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (4):451-474.
  28. Moral Skepticism and Justification.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 1996 - In Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Mark Timmons (eds.), Moral Knowledge? New Readings in Moral Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
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  29.  29
    Moral Psychology: The Cognitive Science of Morality: Intuition and Diversity.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.) - 2007 - Bradford.
    For much of the twentieth century, philosophy and science went their separate ways. In moral philosophy, fear of the so-called naturalistic fallacy kept moral philosophers from incorporating developments in biology and psychology. Since the 1990s, however, many philosophers have drawn on recent advances in cognitive psychology, brain science, and evolutionary psychology to inform their work. This collaborative trend is especially strong in moral philosophy, and these three volumes bring together some of the most innovative work by both philosophers and psychologists (...)
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  30.  61
    Some Problems for Gibbard’s Norm-Expressivism.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 1993 - Philosophical Studies 69 (2-3):297 - 313.
    I conclude that Gibbard fails to solve several of the traditional problems for expressivism. He solves some of these problems, but his solutions to them in effect give up expressivism. Of course, one might respond that it does not really matter whether his theory is expressivist. In some ways, I agree. Gibbard says many fascinating things about morality which have at most indirect connections to his expressivist analysis. I am thinking especially of his later discussions of hyperscepticism, parochialism, and indirect (...)
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  31.  33
    How to Allow Conscientious Objection in Medicine While Protecting Patient Rights.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Aaron J. Ancell - 2017 - Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 26 (1):120-131.
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  32. A Contrastivist Manifesto.Walter Sinnott‐Armstrong - 2008 - Social Epistemology 22 (3):257 – 270.
    General contrastivism holds that all claims of reasons are relative to contrast classes. This approach applies to explanation (reasons why things happen), moral philosophy (reasons for action), and epistemology (reasons for belief), and it illuminates moral dilemmas, free will, and the grue paradox. In epistemology, contrast classes point toward an account of justified belief that is compatible with reliabilism and other externalisms. Contrast classes also provide a model for Pyrrhonian scepticism based on suspending belief about which contrast class is relevant. (...)
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  33. Moral Psychology, 3 Vols.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.) - 2008 - MIT Press.
    For much of the twentieth century, philosophy and science went their separate ways. In moral philosophy, fear of the so-called naturalistic fallacy kept moral philosophers from incorporating developments in biology and psychology. Since the 1990s, however, many philosophers have drawn on recent advances in cognitive psychology, brain science, and evolutionary psychology to inform their work. This collaborative trend is especially strong in moral philosophy, and these three volumes bring together some of the most innovative work by both philosophers and psychologists (...)
     
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  34. Begging the Question.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 1999 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (2):174 – 191.
    No topic in informal logic is more important than begging the question. Also, none is more subtle or complex. We cannot even begin to understand the fallacy of begging the question without getting clear about arguments, their purposes, and circularity. So I will discuss these preliminary topics first. This will clear the path to my own account of begging the question. Then I will anticipate some objections. Finally, I will apply my account to a well-known and popular response to scepticism (...)
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  35. Is Moral Phenomenology Unified?Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2008 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (1):85-97.
    In this short paper, I argue that the phenomenology of moral judgment is not unified across different areas of morality (involving harm, hierarchy, reciprocity, and impurity) or even across different relations to harm. Common responses, such as that moral obligations are experienced as felt demands based on a sense of what is fitting, are either too narrow to cover all moral obligations or too broad to capture anything important and peculiar to morality. The disunity of moral phenomenology is, nonetheless, compatible (...)
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  36.  9
    A Defence Of Modus Tollens.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Alonso Church - 1990 - Analysis 50 (1):9.
  37.  87
    Moral Intuitions.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Liane Young & Fiery Cushman - 2010 - In John Michael Doris (ed.), The Moral Psychology Handbook. Oxford University Press. pp. 246--272.
    Moral intuitions are strong, stable, immediate moral beliefs. Moral philosophers ask when they are justified. This question cannot be answered separately from a psychological question: How do moral intuitions arise? Their reliability depends upon their source. This chapter develops and argues for a new theory of how moral intuitions arise—that they arise through heuristic processes best understood as unconscious attribute substitutions. That is, when asked whether something has the attribute of moral wrongness, people unconsciously substitute a different question about a (...)
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  38. Moral Dilemmas and Incomparability.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 1985 - American Philosophical Quarterly 22 (4):321 - 329.
    The author defines moral dilemmas as situations where there is a moral requirement for an agent to adopt each of two alternatives, And the agent cannot adopt both, But neither moral requirement overrides the other. The author then argues that moral dilemmas are possible because conflicting moral requirements can be either symmetrical or incomparable in a way that is limited enough to be plausible but still strong enough to yield moral dilemmas.
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  39.  94
    What Makes Killing Wrong?Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Franklin G. Miller - 2013 - Journal of Medical Ethics 39 (1):3-7.
    What makes an act of killing morally wrong is not that the act causes loss of life or consciousness but rather that the act causes loss of all remaining abilities. This account implies that it is not even pro tanto morally wrong to kill patients who are universally and irreversibly disabled, because they have no abilities to lose. Applied to vital organ transplantation, this account undermines the dead donor rule and shows how current practices are compatible with morality.
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  40. Mixed-Up Meta-Ethics.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2009 - Philosophical Issues 19 (1):235-256.
    My topic is the old debate between moral realists and moral expressivists. Although I will eventually adopt a Pyrrhonian position, as usual, my main goal is neither to argue for this position nor to resolve this debate but only to explore some new options that mix together realism and expressivism in various ways. Nothing that I say will be conclusive, but I hope that some of it will be suggestive.
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  41. Expressivism and Embedding.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (3):677-693.
    Expressivism faces four distinct problems when evaluative sentences are embedded in unassertive contexts like: If lying is wrong, getting someone to lie is wrong, Lying is wrong, so Getting someone to lie is wrong. The initial problem is to show that expressivism is compatible with - being valid. The basic problem is for expressivists to explain why evaluative instances of modus ponens are valid. The deeper problem is to explain why a particular argument like - is valid. The deepest problem (...)
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  42. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, "Moral Dilemmas". [REVIEW]R. A. Duff - 1989 - Philosophical Quarterly 39 (55):240.
     
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  43. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Ed. Moral Psychology, Volume 2. The Cognitive Science of Morality: Intuition and Diversity. [REVIEW]Whitley Kaufman - 2008 - Philosophy in Review 28 (5):373-375.
     
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  44.  9
    Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Morality Without God Reviewed By.Whitleym R. P. Kaufman - 2010 - Philosophy in Review 30 (3):230-231.
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  45.  10
    Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Ed., Moral Psychology (Vol. 3). The Neuroscience of Morality: Emotion, Brain Disorders, and Development. Reviewed By. [REVIEW]Christian Perring - 2010 - Philosophy in Review 30 (4):301-304.
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  46.  51
    Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Robert Audi (Eds.), Rationality, Rules, and Ideals: Critical Essays on Bernard Gert's Moral Theory (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2002), Pp. VIII + 326. [REVIEW]Mark Timmons - 2008 - Utilitas 20 (2):243-246.
  47.  14
    Tony Honore, Responsibility and Fault.Sinnott-Armstrong Walter - 2001 - Law and Philosophy 20 (1):103-106.
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  48.  18
    Spreading the Word: Groundings in the Philosophy of Language.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 1987 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48 (1):163-166.
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  49.  20
    Moral Relativity and Intuitionism.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2002 - Philosophical Issues 12 (1):305-328.
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  50.  5
    The Structure of Justification.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 1995 - Philosophical Quarterly 45 (180):394-397.
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