This essay explores the notion of practical religious knowledge in three steps. I examine a short passage in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (A 132-3 / B 171-2) on judgment, a passage that points out that we (necessarily) know more than we can say or state. I then introduce Michael Polanyi’s account of tacit knowledge to suggest what “religious tacit knowledge” is. Finally, I analyze a text from Master Eckhart’s Counsels on Discernment (Reden der Unterweisung) to show the relevance of (...) this notion of practical (or tacit) knowledge in religious contexts. (shrink)

We are happy to present the proceedings of the international symposium on Rationality and Religious Trust which were held at the University of Antwerp in this volume of Bijdragen. Rationality and religious trust is of course a topic that falls within the scope of the epistemology of religion. Contemporary epistemology of religion has been the scene of a vigorous debate about the nature of religious belief, or more precisely about the role of rationality and rational argument with respect to religious (...) belief. What is at stake in the debate, is the very way the concept of belief applies to the religious life. More specifically, the issue is about the place to be reserved for belief within the religious life at large, and again, about the role played especially by rational arguments in holding or not holding those beliefs. (shrink)

Occassioned by the recent publication of the Dutch translation of Varieties of Religion Today this critical notice tries to present and discuss Charles Taylor’s main arguments in that book. His treatment of William James and his historical assessment of our contemporary religious situation are thought to have enormous diagnostic value.