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Wayne A. Davis [71]Wayne Alan Davis [1]
  1.  64
    Meaning, Expression and Thought.Wayne A. Davis - 2002 - Cambridge University Press.
    This philosophical treatise on the foundations of semantics is a systematic effort to clarify, deepen, and defend the classical doctrine that words are conventional signs of mental states, principally thoughts and ideas, and that meaning consists in their expression. This expression theory of meaning is developed by carrying out the Gricean program, explaining what it is for words to have meaning in terms of speaker meaning, and what it is for a speaker to mean something in terms of intention. But (...)
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  2. Knowledge Claims and Context: Loose Use.Wayne A. Davis - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 132 (3):395-438.
    There is abundant evidence of contextual variation in the use of “S knows p.” Contextualist theories explain this variation in terms of semantic hypotheses that refer to standards of justification determined by “practical” features of either the subject’s context (Hawthorne & Stanley) or the ascriber’s context (Lewis, Cohen, & DeRose). There is extensive linguistic counterevidence to both forms. I maintain that the contextual variation of knowledge claims is better explained by common pragmatic factors. I show here that one is variable (...)
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  3. Implicature: Intention, Convention, and Principle in the Failure of Gricean Theory.Wayne A. Davis - 1998 - Cambridge University Press.
    H. P. Grice virtually discovered the phenomenon of implicature (to denote the implications of an utterance that are not strictly implied by its content). Gricean theory claims that conversational implicatures can be explained and predicted using general psycho-social principles. This theory has established itself as one of the orthodoxes in the philosophy of language. Wayne Davis argues controversially that Gricean theory does not work. He shows that any principle-based theory understates both the intentionality of what a speaker implicates and the (...)
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  4.  70
    Nondescriptive Meaning and Reference: An Ideational Semantics.Wayne A. Davis - 2005 - Oxford University Press.
    Wayne Davis presents a highly original approach to the foundations of semantics, showing how the so-called "expression" theory of meaning can handle names and other problematic cases of nondescriptive meaning. The fact that thoughts have parts ("ideas" or "concepts") is fundamental: Davis argues that like other unstructured words, names mean what they do because they are conventionally used to express atomic or basic ideas. In the process he shows that many pillars of contemporary philosophical semantics, from twin earth arguments to (...)
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  5. A Causal Theory of Intending.Wayne A. Davis - 1984 - American Philosophical Quarterly 21 (1):43-54.
    My goal is to define intending. I defend the view that believing and desiring something are necessary for intending it. They are not sufficient, however, for some things we both expect and want (e.g., the sun to rise tomorrow) are unintendable. Restricting the objects of intention to our own future actions is unwarranted and unhelpful. Rather, the belief involved in intending must be based on the desire in a certain way. En route, I argue that expected but unwanted consequences are (...)
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  6.  14
    Probabilistic Causality.Wayne A. Davis & Ellery Eells - 1993 - Philosophical Review 102 (3):410.
  7. A Theory of Happiness.Wayne A. Davis - 1981 - American Philosophical Quarterly 18 (2):111-20.
  8. Reasons and Psychological Causes.Wayne A. Davis - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 122 (1):51 - 101.
    The causal theory of reasons holds that acting for a reason entails that the agents action was caused by his or her beliefs and desires. While Donald Davidson (1963) and others effectively silenced the first objections to the theory, a new round has emerged. The most important recent attack is presented by Jonathan Dancy in Practical Reality (2000) and subsequent work. This paper will defend the causal theory against Dancy and others, including Schueler (1995), Stoutland (1999, 2001), and Ginet (2002).Dancy (...)
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  9.  98
    The Two Senses of Desire.Wayne A. Davis - 1984 - Philosophical Studies 45 (2):181-195.
    It has often been said that 'desire' is ambiguous. I do not believe the case for this has been made thoroughly enough, however. The claim typically occurs in the course of defending controversial philosophical theses, such as that intention entails desire, where it tends to look ad hoc. There is need, therefore, for a thorough and single-minded exploration of the ambiguity. I believe the results will be more profound than might be suspected.
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  10.  56
    Propositions as Structured Cognitive Event‐Types.Wayne A. Davis - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.
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  11.  70
    Knowledge Claims and Context: Belief.Wayne A. Davis - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (2):399-432.
    The use of ‘S knows p’ varies from context to context. The contextualist theories of Cohen, Lewis, and DeRose explain this variation in terms of semantic hypotheses: ‘S knows p’ is indexical in meaning, referring to features of the ascriber’s context like salience, interests, and stakes. The linguistic evidence against contextualism is extensive. I maintain that the contextual variation of knowledge claims results from pragmatic factors. One is variable strictness :395–438, 2007). In addition to its strict use, ‘S knows p’ (...)
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  12.  88
    Are Knowledge Claims Indexical?Wayne A. Davis - 2004 - Erkenntnis 61 (2-3):257-281.
    David Lewis, Stewart Cohen, and Keith DeRose have proposed that sentences of the form S knows P are indexical, and therefore differ in truth value from one context to another.1 On their indexical contextualism, the truth value of S knows P is determined by whether S meets the epistemic standards of the speakers context. I will not be concerned with relational forms of contextualism, according to which the truth value of S knows P is determined by the standards of the (...)
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  13. Implicature: Intention, Convention, and Principle in the Failure of Gricean Theory.Wayne A. Davis - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1):241-244.
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  14. Implicature: Intention, Convention, and Principle in the Failure of Gricean Theory.Wayne A. Davis - 2001 - Noûs 35 (4):630-641.
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  15.  77
    The Semantics of Actuality Terms: Indexical Vs. Descriptive Theories.Wayne A. Davis - 2015 - Noûs 49 (3):470-503.
  16. Indicative and Subjunctive Conditionals.Wayne A. Davis - 1979 - Philosophical Review 88 (4):544-564.
    The idea that english has more than one declarative "mood" has been dismissed as superstitious by empirically-minded grammarians of english for centuries--with such spectacular unsuccess, however, that the indicative/subjunctive dichotomy stands today as a cornerstone for philosophical and logical speculation about "conditionals." let me be next into the breach. i shall urge that there is no grammatical basis for any such distinction. and as for the particular adjudications of mood logicians and philosophers actually propose, there is neither rhyme nor reason (...)
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  17.  93
    Replies to Green, Szabó, Jeshion, and Siebel.Wayne A. Davis - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 137 (3):427-445.
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  18. Reliabilism and the Extra Value of Knowledge.Wayne A. Davis & Christoph Jäger - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (1):93-105.
    Goldman and Olsson ( 2009 ) have responded to the common charge that reliabilist theories of knowledge are incapable of accounting for the value knowledge has beyond mere true belief. We examine their “conditional probability solution” in detail, and show that it does not succeed. The conditional probability relation is too weak to support instrumental value, and the specific relation they describe is inessential to the value of knowledge. At best, they have described conditions in which knowledge indicates that additional (...)
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  19. Concept Individuation, Possession Conditions, and Propositional Attitudes.Wayne A. Davis - 2005 - Noûs 39 (1):140-66.
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  20. On Nonindexical Contextualism.Wayne A. Davis - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):561-574.
    Abstract MacFarlane distinguishes “context sensitivity” from “indexicality,” and argues that “nonindexical contextualism” has significant advantages over the standard indexical form. MacFarlane’s substantive thesis is that the extension of an expression may depend on an epistemic standard variable even though its content does not. Focusing on ‘knows,’ I will argue against the possibility of extension dependence without content dependence when factors such as meaning, time, and world are held constant, and show that MacFarlane’s nonindexical contextualism provides no advantages over indexical contextualism. (...)
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  21.  52
    Cognitive Propositions and Semantic Values.Wayne A. Davis - 2021 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 64 (4):383-423.
    ABSTRACT In recent work, Scott Soames has declared that we need a new conception of propositions to overcome critical objections to traditional theories of semantics and propositional attitudes. Propositions must be cognitive to account for their inherent intentionality, structure, and epistemic accessibility, and to overcome Frege’s and Russell’s problems. I have previously worked out a foundational semantics in which cognitive propositions are what sentences express. My objective in this paper is to identify some of the limitations of Soames’s theory, and (...)
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  22.  88
    Grice’s Razor and Epistemic Invariantism.Wayne A. Davis - 2013 - Journal of Philosophical Research 38:147-176.
    Grice’s Razor is a methodological principle that many philosophers and linguists have used to help justify pragmatic explanations of linguistic phenomena over semantic explanations. A number of authors in the debate over contextualism argue that an invariant semantics together with Grice’s (1975) conversational principles can account for the contextual variability of knowledge claims. I show here that the defense of Grice’s Razor found in these “Gricean invariantists,” and its use against epistemic contextualism, display all the problems pointed out earlier in (...)
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  23.  46
    A Causal Theory of Enjoyment.Wayne A. Davis - 1982 - Mind 91 (April):240-256.
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  24.  78
    Meaning, Expression, and Indication: Reply to Buchanan.Wayne A. Davis - 2013 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):62-66.
  25.  87
    Expression of Emotion.Wayne A. Davis - 1988 - American Philosophical Quarterly 25 (4):279-291.
  26.  65
    On Occurrences of Types in Types.Wayne A. Davis - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (2):349-363.
    The different occurrences of a word in a sentence cannot be identified with the one word type, nor with its many tokens. What then are occurrences of a word? How can one type occur more than once in another type? Is the conception of ‘structural universals’ that leads to these questions incoherent, as Lewis maintained? I argue against the answer Wetzel suggested, which identifies sentences with functions from numbers to expressions, and propose instead that occurrences of one type in another (...)
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  27. Concepts and Epistemic Individuation.Wayne A. Davis - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):290-325.
    Christopher Peacocke has presented an original version of the perennial philosophical thesis that we can gain substantive metaphysical and epistemological insight from an analysis of our concepts. Peacocke's innovation is to look at how concepts are individuated by their possession conditions, which he believes can be specified in terms of conditions in which certain propositions containing those concepts are accepted. The ability to provide such insight is one of Peacocke's major arguments for his theory of concepts. I will critically examine (...)
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  28.  73
    Psychologism and Humeanism: Review of Dancy's Practical Reality.Wayne A. Davis - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):452-459.
    In Practical Reality, Jonathan Dancy argues that our reasons for action are not psychological states, but things we take to be facts about the world, and shows that the reasons themselves are not causes. Dancy concludes that intentional actions are not explained by beliefs and desires, and that explanations of action in terms of reasons are not causal explanations. I show that these further conclusions are unwarranted by sketching an alternative theory of reasons according to which what it is for (...)
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  29. Contextualist Theories of Knowledge.Wayne A. Davis - 2005 - Acta Analytica 20 (1):29-42.
    Contextualist theories of knowledge offer a semantic hypothesis to explain the observed contextual variation in what people say they know, and the difficulty people have resolving skeptical paradoxes. Subject or speaker relative versions make the truth conditions of “S knows that p” depend on the standards of either the knower’s context (Hawthorne and Stanley) or those of the speaker’s context (Cohen and DeRose). Speaker contextualism avoids objections to subject contextualism, but is implausible in light of evidence that “know” does not (...)
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  30.  59
    Communicating, Telling and Informing.Wayne A. Davis - 1999 - Philosophical Inquiry 21 (1):21-43.
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  31.  67
    The Varieties of Fear.Wayne A. Davis - 1987 - Philosophical Studies 51 (3):287 - 310.
    I shall conclude with a methodological moral. I have tried to show that there are several fundamentally different kinds of fear. One is a pure propositional attitude, one is partially a bodily state, and one is a relation between a person and a nonpropositional object. Other emotions come in similar varieties, such as hope and happiness, but with significant differences. The state of happiness, for example, does not entail any particular bodily state or feeling. So one lesson is this: it (...)
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  32.  39
    Minimizing Indexicality.Wayne A. Davis - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (1):1-20.
    I critically examine Cappelen and Lepore’s definition of and tests for indexicality, and refine them to improve their adequacy. Indexicals cannot be defined as expressions with different referents in different contexts unless linguistic meaning and circumstances of evaluation are held constant. I show that despite Cappelen and Lepore’s claim that there are only a handful of indexical expressions, their “basic set” includes a number of large and open classes, and generates an infinity of indexical phrases. And while the tests can (...)
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  33. Weak and Strong Conditionals.Wayne A. Davis - 1983 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64 (1):57.
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  34.  85
    Cogitative and Cognitive Speaker Meaning.Wayne A. Davis - 1992 - Philosophical Studies 67 (1):71 - 88.
  35.  98
    The Case for Contextualism: Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context, Vol. 1, by Keith DeRose.: Book Reviews. [REVIEW]Wayne A. Davis - 2010 - Mind 119 (476):1152-1157.
  36.  88
    Précis of Meaning, Expression, and Thought.Wayne A. Davis - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 137 (3):383-387.
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  37. Thought Structure, Belief Content, and Possession Conditions.Wayne A. Davis - 2008 - Acta Analytica 23 (3):207-231.
    According to Peacocke, concepts are individuated by their possession conditions, which are specified in terms of conditions in which certain propositions containing those concepts are believed. In support, Peacocke tries to explain what it is for a thought to have a structure and what it is for a belief to have a propositional content. I show that the possession condition theory cannot answer such fundamental questions. Peacocke’s theory founders because concepts are metaphysically fundamental. They individuate the propositions and thoughts containing (...)
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  38.  18
    Irregular Negations.Wayne A. Davis - unknown
    Horn (1989) identified a number of irregular or marked negations that are not used in accordance with the standard rule of propositional logic. He concluded that negation was pragmatically ambiguous. Van der Sandt (1991) disputed Horn’s ambiguity claim, and proposed a uniform semantics for all negations. I will provide an informal explanation of van der Sandt’s theory, and develop a number of objections. I show that irregular negations are not anaphoric, as Van der Sandt believes, but compositional. I argue for (...)
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  39.  47
    Swain's Counterfactual Analysis of Causation.Wayne A. Davis - 1980 - Philosophical Studies 38 (2):169 - 176.
  40. Two Senses of Desire.Wayne A. Davis - 1986 - In J. Marks (ed.), The Ways of Desire. Precedent. pp. 181-196.
  41.  29
    Miller on Wanting, Intending, and Being Willing.Wayne A. Davis - 1982 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 43 (1):107-110.
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  42. An Introduction to Logic.Wayne A. Davis - 1986
  43.  61
    Davidson's Conceptual Argument for Rational Cognition: Wayne A. Davis.Wayne A. Davis - 1997 - Legal Theory 3 (2):205-210.
    According to Jules Coleman, Rational Choice Theory holds that human action is both intentional and rational. “The rationality of intentional action is evaluated along the two dimensions corresponding to the two elements of the belief-desire model.” On the belief-dimension, RC Theory assumes that people are “able to draw appropriate inferences from the information they possess.”.
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  44. Grice's Meaning Project.Wayne A. Davis - 2007 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 26 (2):41-58.
  45.  10
    Grice’s Razor and Epistemic Invariantism.Wayne A. Davis - 2013 - Journal of Philosophical Research 38:147-176.
    Grice’s Razor is a methodological principle that many philosophers and linguists have used to help justify pragmatic explanations of linguistic phenomena over semantic explanations. A number of authors in the debate over contextualism argue that an invariant semantics together with Grice’s conversational principles can account for the contextual variability of knowledge claims. I show here that the defense of Grice’s Razor found in these “Gricean invariantists,” and its use against epistemic contextualism, display all the problems pointed out earlier in Davis. (...)
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  46.  25
    Intentionalism, Descriptivism, and Proper Names.Wayne A. Davis - 2007 - In Savas L. Tsohatzidis (ed.), John Searle's Philosophy of Language: Force, Meaning, and Mind. Cambridge University Press. pp. 102.
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  47. Implicature: Intention, Convention, and Principle in the Failure of Gricean Theory.Wayne A. Davis - 2000 - Mind 109 (435):573-579.
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  48.  41
    Jackson on Counterfactuals.Wayne A. Davis - 1980 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 58 (1):62 – 65.
  49.  35
    Knowledge, Acceptance, and Belief.Wayne A. Davis - 1988 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 26 (2):169-178.
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  50.  1
    Knowledge, Acceptance, and Belief.Wayne A. Davis - 1988 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 26 (2):169-178.
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