This paper presents the results of an experiment on mutual versus common knowledge of advice in a two-player weak-link game with random matching. Our experimental subjects play in pairs for thirteen rounds. After a brief learning phase common to all treatments, we vary the knowledge levels associated with external advice given in the form of a suggestion to pick the strategy supporting the payoff-dominant equilibrium. Our results are somewhat surprising and can be summarized as follows: in all (...) our treatments both the choice of the efficiency-inducing action and the percentage of efficient equilibrium play are higher with respect to the control treatment, revealing that even a condition as weak as mutual knowledge of level 1 is sufficient to significantly increase the salience of the efficient equilibrium with respect to the absence of advice. Furthermore, and contrary to our hypothesis, mutual knowledge of level 2 induces, under suitable conditions, successful coordination more frequently than common knowledge. (shrink)

This study examined the link between employees’ adult attachment orientations and perceptions of line managers’ interpersonal justice behaviors, and the moderating effect of national culture. Participants from countries categorized as low collectivistic and high collectivistic completed an online survey. Attachment anxiety and avoidance were negatively related to interpersonal justice perceptions. Cultural differences did not moderate the effects of avoidance. However, the relationship between attachment anxiety and interpersonal justice was non-significant in the Southern Asia cultural cluster. Our findings indicate the (...) importance of ‘fit’ between cultural relational values and individual attachment orientations in shaping interpersonal justice perceptions, and highlight the need for more non-western organizational justice research. (shrink)

The topic of this paper is the debate between two accounts of the continuum. On one account the continuum has discrete elements. On the other it has no discrete elements. Each account has its own strengths and weaknesses. The paper introduces several different explications of continuity before stating and discussing an antinomy and some options to resolve it. An assessment follows in which certain astute philosophical views are vetted. If the dispute concerns the reality of the continuum, there seems to (...) be nothing that could further decide the matter. If the dispute concerns our access to the continuum, there are many adequate options. But, in either case, the dispute is not merely verbal. (shrink)

How can our societies be stabilized in a crisis? Why do we enjoy and understand Shakespeare? Why are fruitflies uniform? How do omnivorous eating habits aid our survival? What makes the Mona Lisa's smile beautiful? How do women keep their social structures intact? -- Could there possibly be a single answer to all these questions? This book shows that the statement 'weak links stabilize complex systems' provides the key to understanding each of these intriguing puzzles, and many others too. (...) The author...uses weak (low affinity, low probability) interactions as a thread to introduce a vast variety of networks from proteins to economics and ecosystems. --From publisher description. (shrink)

An ability to accurately recognize negative emotions in others can initiate pro-social behavior and prevent anti-social actions. Thus, it remains of an interest of scholars studying effects of violent video games. While exposure to such games was linked to slower emotion recognition, the evidence regarding accuracy of emotion recognition among players of violent games is weak and inconsistent. The present research investigated the relationship between violent video game exposure and accuracy of negative emotion recognition. We assessed the level (...) of self-reported VVGE in hours per day and the accuracy of the recognition using the Facial Expressions Matching Test. The results, with adolescents and with adults, showed that VVGE was negatively related to accurate recognition of negative emotion expressions, even if controlled for age, gender, and trait empathy, but no causal direction could be assessed. In line with the violent media desensitization model, our findings suggest that higher self-reported VVGE relates to lower recognition of negative emotional expressions of other people. On the one hand, such lower recognition of negative emotions may underlie inaccurate reactions in real-life social situations. On the other hand, lower sensitivity to social cues may help players to better focus on their performance in a violent game. (shrink)

We now move to the demonstration of the left-to-right direction of the equivalence result. Let us assume that there is a winning $$\mathbf {P}$$ P -strategy in the dialogical game for $$\varphi $$ φ.

Weakly acyclic games form a natural generalization of the class of games that have the finite improvement property. In such games one stipulates that from any initial joint strategy some finite improvement path exists. We classify weakly acyclic games using the concept of a scheduler introduced in Simon and Apt. We also show that finite games that can be solved by the iterated elimination of never best response strategies are weakly acyclic. Finally, we explain how the schedulers allow us to (...) improve the bounds on finding a Nash equilibrium in a weakly acyclic game. (shrink)

We study the gameGfin related to weak distributivity of a given Boolean algebraB. Consider the following implication: ifBis weakly -distributive then player I does not have a winning strategy in the gameGfin. We show that this implication is true for properBbut it is not true in general.

Weak links, in the form of inadequacies in both reasoning and supporting evidence, exist at several critical steps in the derivation of an hierarchical concept of evolution from punctuated equilibria. Punctuation itself is predicated on a distorted reading of phyletic change as phyletic gradualism, and of allopatric speciation as the instantaneous formation of unchanging typological taxa. The concept of punctuation is further confounded by the indescriminate employment of the same term to denote both a causal explanation for evolutionary change (...) and an outcome of substantiated evolutionary processes. Even when the intended usage for the term is specified, each denotation of punctuation entails respective drawbacks. As a causal explanation, punctuation clearly belongs to the class of quantum theories with all their attendant impedimenta, including special salsatory non-adaptive mechanisms of evolutionary change. Redefinition of punctuation as a pattern of morphologic change reduces it to one possible outcome of known microevolutioanry processes, thus obviating any need for an hierarchical explanation of macroevolution. While vacillation between usages has preserved the term in the literature, the end result of this obfuscation has been a circle of faulty reasoning in which the pattern of punctuation is invoked as its own proof. Widespread confusion concerning what constitutes an adequate test of punctuation is directly attributable to imprecision in both the original and revised formulations of the concept.The argument for species-level selection is based on the typological and philosphically flawed premise of species as individuals, and further requires the hypothesis of heritable emergent properties, for which empirical evidence is lacking. (shrink)

The significance of horizontal gene transfer (HGT) in eukaryotic evolution remains controversial. Although many eukaryotic genes are of bacterial origin, they are often interpreted as being derived from mitochondria or plastids. Because of their fixed gene pool and gene loss, however, mitochondria and plastids alone cannot adequately explain the presence of all, or even the majority, of bacterial genes in eukaryotes. Available data indicate that no insurmountable barrier to HGT exists, even in complex multicellular eukaryotes. In addition, the discovery of (...) both recent and ancient HGT events in all major eukaryotic groups suggests that HGT has been a regular occurrence throughout the history of eukaryotic evolution. A model of HGT is proposed that suggests both unicellular and early developmental stages as likely entry points for foreign genes into multicellular eukaryotes. (shrink)

Drawing on Christopher Boorse's Biostatistical Theory (BST), Norman Daniels contends that a genuine health need is one which is necessary to restore normal functioning – a supposedly objective notion which he believes can be read from the natural world without reference to potentially controversial normative categories. But despite his claims to the contrary, this conception of health harbors arbitrary evaluative judgments which make room for intractable disagreement as to which conditions should count as genuine health needs and therefore which needs (...) should be met. I begin by offering a brief summary of Boorse's BST, the theory to which Daniels appeals for providing the conception of health as normal functioning upon which his overall distributive scheme rests. Next, I consider what I call practical objections to Daniels's use of Boorse's theory. Finally I recount Elseljin Kingma's theoretical objection to Boorse's BST and discuss its impact on Daniels's overall theory. Though I conclude that Boorse's view, so weakened, will no longer be able to sustain the judgments which Daniels's theory uses it to reach, in the end, I offer Daniels an olive branch by briefly sketching an alternative strategy for reaching suitably objective conclusions regarding the health and/or disease status of various conditions. (shrink)

Drawing on Christopher Boorse's Biostatistical Theory (BST), Norman Daniels contends that a genuine health need is one which is necessary to restore normal functioning – a supposedly objective notion which he believes can be read from the natural world without reference to potentially controversial normative categories. But despite his claims to the contrary, this conception of health harbors arbitrary evaluative judgments which make room for intractable disagreement as to which conditions should count as genuine health needs and therefore which needs (...) should be met. I begin by offering a brief summary of Boorse's BST, the theory to which Daniels appeals for providing the conception of health as normal functioning upon which his overall distributive scheme rests. Next, I consider what I call practical objections to Daniels's use of Boorse's theory. Finally I recount Elseljin Kingma's theoretical objection to Boorse's BST and discuss its impact on Daniels's overall theory. Though I conclude that Boorse's view, so weakened, will no longer be able to sustain the judgments which Daniels's theory uses it to reach, in the end, I offer Daniels an olive branch by briefly sketching an alternative strategy for reaching suitably objective conclusions regarding the health and/or disease status of various conditions. (shrink)

This paper proposes a unified dependent type analysis of three puzzling phenomena: inversely linked interpretations, weak definite readings in possessives and Haddock-type readings. We argue that the three problematic readings have the same underlying surface structure, and that the surface structure postulated can be interpreted properly and compositionally using dependent types. The dependent type account proposed is the first, to the best of our knowledge, to formally connect the three phenomena. A further advantage of our proposal over previous analyses (...) is that it offers a principled solution to the puzzle of why both inversely linked interpretations and weak definite readings are blocked with certain prepositions. (shrink)

Ethical dissonance arises from conflicts between beliefs or behaviors and affects ethical factors such as normality or conformity. This paper proposes a weak signal-oriented framework to investigate ethical dissonance from experiences linked to human–machine interactions. It is based on a systems engineering principle called human-systems inclusion, which considers any experience feedback of weak signals as beneficial to learn. The framework studies weak signal-based scenarios from testimonies of individual experiences and these scenarios are assessed by other people. For (...) this purpose, the framework proposes several databases as sources of weak signals, formalization tools of experience feedback of weak signals, models of references of conformity, ethical factors, and a list of examples of ethical dissonance. It also includes sequential steps to make the latter credible regarding the results from the experimental protocols. The framework was used to investigate ethical dissonance by analyzing experiences pertaining to achieving inclusive mobility. The first example focuses on ethical dissonance in terms of hindrance that goes against autonomous mobility due to a misunderstanding of how the system functions in terms of negative and positive emotions. Two other examples present possible ethical dissonance when the use of safety systems such as car driver-assistance systems, may create danger. Investigating ethical dissonance can then help system-inclusive design or evaluation processes by taking into account scenarios from weak signal-based experiences and making them credible. (shrink)

We discuss the relationship between various weak distributive laws and games in Boolean algebras. In the first part we give some game characterizations for certain forms of Prikry’s “hyper-weak distributive laws”, and in the second part we construct Suslin algebras in which neither player wins a certain hyper-weak distributivity game. We conclude that in the constructible universe L, all the distributivity games considered in this paper may be undetermined.

Using a laboratory experiment, we examine whether voluntary sanctions induce subjects to coordinate more efficiently in a repeated minimum-effort game. While most groups first experience Pareto inferior coordination in a baseline treatment, the level of effort increases substantially once ex post sanctioning opportunities are introduced, that is, when one can assign costly punishment points to other group members to reduce their payoffs. We compare the effect of this voluntary punishment possibility with the effect of ex post costless communication, which (...) in contrast to the punishment treatment increases efforts only temporarily and fails to bring the players to higher payoff equilibria permanently. Our results indicate that decentralized sanctions can play an important role as a coordination device in Pareto-ranked coordination settings. They also suggest that the motivations behind voluntary sanctions may be more general than usually put forth in the literature on cooperation games. (shrink)

This paper argues that most contemporary accounts of weakness of will either implicitly or explicitly assume that regret is a typical or even necessary element of standard cases of weakness of will and that this assumption is mistaken. I draw on empirical and philosophical work on self-assessment to show that regret need not accompany typical weak-willed behavior, and that we should therefore revise the dominant account of the difference between weakness of will and changes of mind.

Many weaknesses of game theory are cured by new models that embody simple cognitive principles, while maintaining the formalism and generality that makes game theory useful. Social preference models can generate team reasoning by combining reciprocation and correlated equilibrium. Models of limited iterated thinking explain data better than equilibrium models do; and they self-repair problems of implausibility and multiplicity of equilibria.

Economists and biologists have proposed a distinction between two mechanisms – “strong” and “weak” reciprocity – that may explain the evolution of human sociality. Weak reciprocity theorists emphasize the benefits of long-term cooperation and the use of low-cost strategies to deter free-riders. Strong reciprocity theorists, in contrast, claim that cooperation in social dilemma games can be sustained by costly punishment mechanisms, even in one-shot and finitely repeated games. To support this claim, they have generated a large body of (...) evidence concerning the willingness of experimental subjects to punish uncooperative free-riders at a cost to themselves. In this article, I distinguish between a “narrow” and a “wide” reading of the experimental evidence. Under the narrow reading, punishment experiments are just useful devices to measure psychological propensities in controlled laboratory conditions. Under the wide reading, they replicate a mechanism that supports cooperation also in “real-world” situations outside the laboratory. I argue that the wide interpretation must be tested using a combination of laboratory data and evidence about cooperation “in the wild.” In spite of some often-repeated claims, there is no evidence that cooperation in the small egalitarian societies studied by anthropologists is enforced by means of costly punishment. Moreover, studies by economic and social historians show that social dilemmas in the wild are typically solved by institutions that coordinate punishment, reduce its cost, and extend the horizon of cooperation. The lack of field evidence for costly punishment suggests important constraints about what forms of cooperation can or cannot be sustained by means of decentralised policing. (shrink)

The Mirror Game (MG) is a common exercise in dance/movement therapy and drama therapy. It is used to promote participants’ ability to enter and remain in a state of togetherness. In spite of the wide use of the MG by practitioners, it is only recently that scientists begun to use the MG in research, examining its correlates, validity and reliability. This study joins this effort by reporting on the identification of scale items to describe the nonverbal behaviour expressed during (...) the MG and its correlation to measures of attachment. Thus, we explored the application of the MG as a tool for assessing the embodiment of attachment in adulthood. Forty-eight participants (22 females, mean age = 33.2) played the MG with the same gender-matched expert players. All MG were videotaped. In addition, participants were evaluated on two central measurements of attachment in adulthood: The Adult Attachment Interview (AAI) and the Experience in Close Relationship questionnaire (ECR). To analyse the data, we developed the “mirror game scale” that coded the nonverbal behavior during the movement interaction, using 19 parameters. The sub-scales were reduced using factor analysis into two dimensions referred to as “together” and “free”. The free factor was significantly correlated to both measurements of attachment: Participants classified as having secure attachment on the AAI, received higher scores on the MG free factor than participants classified as insecure (t (46) = 7.858, p =.000). Participants who were high on the avoidance dimension on the ECR, were low on the MG free factor (r (48) =-.-285, p =.007). This is the first study to examine the MG as it is used by practitioners and its correlation to highly standardized measures. This exploratory study may be considered as part of the first steps of exploring the MG as a standardized assessment tool. The advantages of the MG as a simple, non-verbal movement interaction demonstrate some of the strengths of dance/movement and drama therapy practice. (shrink)

We propose strategic games wherein the strategies consist of players asking each other questions and answering those questions. We study simplifications of such games wherein two players simultaneously ask each other a question that the opponent is then obliged to answer. The motivation for our research is to model conversation including the dynamics of questions and answers, to provide new links between game theory and dynamic logics of information, and to exploit the dynamic/strategic structure that, we think, lies implicitly (...) inside epistemic models for epistemic languages, and to make that structure an explicit subject of logical study. Our main contributions are: the notion of a two-person question-answer game with information goals, the existence and computation of equilibria for these games, the correspondence with Bayesian games and their equilibria, and a connection between logic and game theory namely the existence of equilibria for positive goal formulae. (shrink)

During the COVID-19 pandemic, several countries implemented social distancing measures to contain virus transmission. However, these vital safety measures have the potential to impair mental health or wellbeing, for instance, from increased perceived loneliness. Playing social video games may offer a way to continue to socialize while adhering to social distancing measures. To examine this issue further, the present online survey investigated social gaming during the pandemic and its association to perceived loneliness within a German-speaking sample. Results indicated a small (...) positive correlation between general gaming frequency and perceived loneliness. Detailed analysis revealed a negative association between perceived loneliness and increased social forms of video gaming. Specifically, gamers with a higher social motive for gaming perceived less loneliness, but gamers with a dominant escape motive demonstrated a positive link to perceived loneliness. The use of social gaming in times of social distancing seems to play a small but significant factor in perceived loneliness compared to other demographical data. The findings are discussed with respect to methodological limitations, effect sizes, and sample characteristics. The results enrich the current knowledge on video gaming and its link to social wellbeing and provide a more nuanced picture than simplistic investigations of screen time. (shrink)

Contents. Introduction. 1. Preliminaries. 2. Normal Form Games. 3. Extensive Games. 4. Applications of Game Theory. 5. The Methodology of Game Theory. Conclusion. Appendix. Bibliography. Index. Does game theory—the mathematical theory of strategic interaction—provide genuine explanations of human behaviour? Can game theory be used in economic consultancy or other normative contexts? Explaining Games: The Epistemic Programme in Game Theory—the first monograph on the philosophy of game theory—is an attempt to combine insights from epistemic logic (...) and the philosophy of science to investigate the applicability of game theory in such fields as economics, philosophy and strategic consultancy. I prove new mathematical theorems about the beliefs, desires and rationality principles of individual human beings, and explore in detail the logical form of game theory as it is used in explanatory and normative contexts. I argue that game theory reduces to rational choice theory if used as an explanatory device, and that game theory is nonsensical if used as a normative device. A provocative account of the history of game theory reveals that this is not bad news for all of game theory, though. Two central research programmes in game theory tried to find the ultimate characterisation of strategic interaction between rational agents. Yet, while the Nash Equilibrium Refinement Programme has done badly thanks to such research habits as overmathematisation, model-tinkering and introversion, the Epistemic Programme, I argue, has been rather successful in achieving this aim. "The 'epistemic' approach to game theory has emerged over the past twenty-five years. What is this approach? How does it differ from the conventional equilibrium-based approach to game theory? What have been its strengths and weaknesses to date? To find out, read this comprehensive and excellently written account". Adam Brandenburger, J. P. Valles Professor of Business Economics and Strategy, Stern School of Business, New York University "Reading Boudewijn de Bruin's book should be rewarding both for game theorists interested in the conceptual foundations of their discipline and for philosophers who want to learn more about formal analysis of strategic interaction. It provides an in-depth logical study of the currently dominant epistemic approaches to non-cooperative games, with an eye both to the attractions and to the serious challenges facing the Epistemic Programme". Wlodek Rabinowicz, Professor of Practical Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, Lund University . (shrink)

Weakly Aggregative Modal Logic (WAML) is a collection of disguised polyadic modal logics with n-ary modalities whose arguments are all the same. WAML has some interesting applications on epistemic logic and logic of games, so we study some basic model theoretical aspects of WAML in this paper. Specifically, we give a van Benthem-Rosen characterization theorem of WAML based on an intuitive notion of bisimulation and show that each basic WAML system Kn lacks Craig Interpolation.

A previous work by Friedman et al. (Theory and Decision, 61:305–318, 2006) introduces the concept of a hierarchy of a simple voting game and characterizes which hierarchies, induced by the desirability relation, are achievable in linear games. In this paper, we consider the problem of determining all hierarchies, conserving the ordinal equivalence between the Shapley–Shubik and the Penrose–Banzhaf–Coleman power indices, achievable in simple games. It is proved that only four hierarchies are non-achievable in simple games. Moreover, it is also (...) proved that all achievable hierarchies are already obtainable in the class of weakly linear games. Our results prove that given an arbitrary complete pre-ordering defined on a finite set with more than five elements, it is possible to construct a simple game such that the pre-ordering induced by the Shapley–Shubik and the Penrose–Banzhaf–Coleman power indices coincides with the given pre-ordering. (shrink)

Over the past two decades, academic economics has undergone a mild revolution in methodology. The language, concepts and techniques of noncooperative game theory have become central to the discipline. This book provides the reader with some basic concepts from noncooperative theory, and then goes on to explore the strengths, weaknesses, and future of the theory as a tool of economic modelling and analysis. The central theses are that noncooperative game theory has been a remarkably popular tool in economics (...) over the past decade because it allows analysts to capture essential features of dynamic competition and competition where some parties have proprietary information. The theory is weakest in providing a sense of when it - and equilibrium analysis in particular - can be applied and what to do when equilibrium analysis is inappropriate. Many of these weaknesses can be addressed by the consideration of individuals who are boundedly rational and learn imperfectly from the past. Written in a non-technical style and working by analogy, the book, first given as part of the Clarendon Lectures in Economics, is readily accessible to a broad audience and will be of interest to economists and students alike. Knowledge of game theory is not required as the concepts are developed as the book progresses. (shrink)

Interdisciplinary research is becoming more and more popular. Many funding bodies encourage interdisciplinarity, as a criterion that promises scientific progress. Traditionally this has been linked to the idea of integrating or unifying disciplines. Using evolutionary game theory as a case study, Till Grüne-Yanoff (2016) argued that there is no such necessary link between interdisciplinary success and integration. Contrary to this, this paper argues that evolutionary game theory is a genuine case of successful integration between economics and biology, (...) shedding lights on the many dimensions along which integration can take place. (shrink)

The recent upsurge in “brain-training and perceptual-cognitive-training", proposing to improve isolated processes such as brain function, visual perception and decision-making, has created significant interest in elite sports practitioners, seeking to create an ‘edge’ for athletes. The claims of these related 'performance-enhancing industries' can be considered together as part of a process training approach proposing enhanced cognitive and perceptual skills and brain capacity, to support performance in everyday life activities, including sport. For example, the 'process-training industry' promotes the idea that playing (...) games not only makes you a better player, but also smarter, more alert, and a faster learner. In this position paper we critically evaluate the effectiveness of both types of process-training programmes in generalizing transfer to sport performance. These issues are addressed in three stages. First, we evaluate empirical evidence in support of perceptual-cognitive process training, and its application to enhancing sport performance. Second, we critically review putative modularised mechanisms underpinning this kind of training, addressing limitations and subsequent problems. Specifically, we consider merits of this highly specific form of training, which focuses on training of isolated processes such as cognitive processes (attention, memory, thinking) and visual perception processes, separately from performance behaviors and actions. We conclude that these approaches may, at best, may provide some 'general transfer' of underlying processes to specific sport environments, but lack 'specificity of transfer' to contextualize actual performance behaviors. A major weakness of process training methods is their focus on enhancing performance in body “modules” (e.g., eye, brain, memory, anticipatory sub-systems). What is lacking is evidence on how these isolated components are modified and subsequently interact with other process “modules”, which are considered to underlie sport performance. Finally, we propose how an ecological dynamics approach, aligned with an embodied framework of cognition undermines the rationale that modularised processes can enhance performance in competitive sport. An ecological dynamics perspective proposes that the body is a complex adaptive system, interacting with performance environments in a functionally integrated manner, emphasising that the inter-relation between motor processes, cognitive and perceptual functions and the constraints of a sport task is best understood at the performer-environment scale of analysis. (shrink)

The link between gaming and negative outcomes has been explored by previous research and has led to the widespread adverse attitude toward gaming (ATG) and gamers, especially from those who are unfamiliar with this activity. By implementing an audit study with gamers and non-gamers as participants (N = 1,280), we found that non-gamer participants rated gamers less as similar to their ideal marriage partners compared to non-gamers, while gamer participants did not differentiate between gamers and non-gamers in the ideal (...) marriage partners similarity rating (IMPSR). The findings also revealed that the difference in IMPSR between gamer and non-gamer participants toward gamers was completely mediated by their ATG. These results imply that non-gamers consider gaming as an undesired characteristic, and this is due to the relatively negative attitude of non-gamers toward gaming. Current study provides a new perspective on exploring the effect of gaming by investigating the social interaction between gamers and non-gamers in real-world and suggests that the unfamiliarity of gaming can lead to the negative ATG, which may, ultimately, place gamers at a disadvantage in the context of mate selection. (shrink)

This paper has two parts. The first is concerned with a variant of a family of games introduced by Holy and Schlicht, that we call Welch games. Player II having a winning strategy in the Welch game of length [Formula: see text] on [Formula: see text] is equivalent to weak compactness. Winning the game of length [Formula: see text] is equivalent to [Formula: see text] being measurable. We show that for games of intermediate length [Formula: see text], (...) II winning implies the existence of precipitous ideals with [Formula: see text]-closed, [Formula: see text]-dense trees. The second part shows the first is not vacuous. For each [Formula: see text] between [Formula: see text] and [Formula: see text], it gives a model where II wins the games of length [Formula: see text], but not [Formula: see text]. The technique also gives models where for all [Formula: see text] there are [Formula: see text]-complete, normal, [Formula: see text]-distributive ideals having dense sets that are [Formula: see text]-closed, but not [Formula: see text]-closed. (shrink)

In the mid twentieth century the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein famously asserted that games are indefinable; there are no common threads that link them all. "Nonsense," says the sensible Bernard Suits: "playing a game is a voluntary attempt to overcome unnecessary obstacles." The short book Suits wrote demonstrating precisely that is as playful as it is insightful, as stimulating as it is delightful. Suits not only argues that games can be meaningfully defined; he also suggests that playing games is (...) a central part of the ideal of human existence, so games belong at the heart of any vision of Utopia. Originally published in 1978, The Grasshopper is now re-issued with a new introduction by Thomas Hurka and with additional material (much of it previously unpublished) by the author, in which he expands on the ideas put forward in The Grasshopper and answers some questions that have been raised by critics. (shrink)

The concept of weak emergence is a refinement or specification of the intuitive, general notion of emergence. Basically, a fact about a system is said to be weakly emergent if its holding both (i) is derivable from the fundamental laws of the system together with some set of basic (non-emergent) facts about it, and yet (ii) is only derivable in a particular manner, called “simulation.” This essay analyzes the application of this notion Conway’s Game of Life, and concludes (...) that a modification of the notion would provide a better refinement of the general notion of emergence. It is proposed that emergence be taken as a matter of degree, defined in terms of the amount of simulation required to derive a fact. (shrink)

We investigate in this work the meaning of weak values through the prism of property ascription in quantum systems. Indeed, the weak measurements framework contains only ingredients of the standard quantum formalism, and as such weak measurements are from a technical point of view uncontroversial. However attempting to describe properties of quantum systems through weak values—the output of weak measurements—goes beyond the usual interpretation of quantum mechanics, that relies on eigenvalues. We first recall the usual (...) form of property ascription, based on the eigenstate-eigenvalue link and the existence of “elements of reality”. We then describe against this backdrop the different meanings that have been given to weak values. We finally argue that weak values can be related to a specific form of property ascription, weaker than the eigenvalues case but still relevant to a partial description of a quantum system. (shrink)

Wittgenstein has often explored language games that have to do with musical objects of different sizes (phrases, themes, formal sections or entire works). These games can refer to a technical language or to common parlance and correspond to different targets. One of these coincides with the intention to suggest a way of conceiving musical understanding. His model takes the form of the invitation to "hear (something) as (something)": typically, to hear a musical passage as an introduction or as a conclusion (...) or in a certain tonality. However one may ask to what extent or in what terms (literal or metaphorical) these procedures, and usually the intervention of language games, is requested by our common ways of understanding music. This article shows through the use of some examples that aspectual perception inherent to musical understanding does not require language games as a necessary condition (although in many cases the link between them seems very strong), in contradiction with the thesis of an essential linguistic character of music. At a basic level, it seems more appropriate to insist on the notion of a game: to understand music means to enter into the orbit of "music games" which show an autonomous functioning. Language games have, however, an important function when we develop this comprehension in the light of the criteria of judgment that substantiate the manner in which music is incorporated in and operates within specific forms of life. (shrink)

Mental conflict not always amounts to weakness of will. Irresistible motives not always speak of addiction. This book proposes an integrated account of what singles out these phenomena: addiction and weakness of will are both forms of secondary akrasia. By integrating these two phenomena into a classical conception of akrasia as poor resolution of an unnecessary conflict – valuing without intending while intending without valuing – the book makes an original contribution to central issues in moral psychology and philosophy of (...) action, including the relationship between responsibility and intentional agency, and the nature and scope of moral appraisal. In particular, the proposed integrated account is grounded in a general theory of responsibility and a related model of action as actualisation bringing together insights from both volitional and non-volitional conceptions, such as the intuition that it is unfair to hold a person responsible for things that are not up to her and the parity of actions and attitudes as legitimate objects of moral appraisal. Furthermore, the actualisation model supports a distinctive version of the Guise of the Good thesis which links valuing and intending in terms of success in action and explains why akratic actions and their offspring – addiction and weakness of will – are necessarily less than successful yet fully responsible. (shrink)

Godfrey-Smith advocates for linking deception in sender-receiver games to the existence of undermining signals. I present games in which deceptive signals can be arbitrarily frequent, without this undermining information transfer between sender and receiver.

Although it may seem from its formalism that game theory must have sprung from the mind of John von Neumann as a corollary of his work on computers or theoretical physics, it should come as no real surprise to philosophers that game theory is the articulation of a historically developing philosophical conception of rationality in thought and action. The history of ideas about rationality is deeply contradictory at many turns. While there are theories of rationality that claim it (...) is fundamentally social and aims at understanding and molding all facets of human psychological life, game theory takes rationality to be essentially located in individuals and to concern only the means to achieve predetermined ends. Thus, there are some thinkers who have made important contributions to this history who do not appear in the story of game theory at all, among them, Plato, Kant, and Hegel. There is, however, a clear trail to follow linking theories of instrumental rationality from Aristotle to the nineteenth-century marginalist economists and ultimately to von Neumann and Morgenstern and contemporary game theorists, that historically grounds game theory as a model of rational interaction. (shrink)

This paper investigates the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria in discontinuous and nonquasiconcave games. We introduce a new notion of continuity, called weakly continuous security, which is weaker than the most known weak notions of continuity, including the surrogate point secure of SSYM game of Carbonell-Nicolau and Mclean (Econ Theory, 2018a), the continuous security of Barelli and Meneghel (Econometrica 81:813–824, 2013), C-security of McLennan et al. (Econometrica 79:1643–1664 2011), generalized weakly transfer continuity of Nessah (Economics 47:659–662, 2011), (...) generalized better-reply security of Carmona (Econ Theory 48:1–4, 2011), Barelli and Soza (On the existence of Nash equilibria in discontinuous and qualitative games, 2009), Barelli and Meneghel (Econometrica 81:813–824, 2013), lower single deviation property of Reny (Further results on the existence of Nash equilibria in discontinuous games. University of Chicago, 2009), better-reply security of Reny (Econometrica 67:1029–1056, 1999) and the results of Prokopovych (Econ Theory 48:5–16, 2011, Econ Theory 53:383–402, 2013) and Carmona (J Econ Theory 144:1333–1340, 2009). We show that a compact, convex and weakly continuous secure Hausdorff locally convex topological vector space game has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Moreover, it holds in a large class of discontinuous games. (shrink)

SummaryCorrectly understood, Wittgenstein's “picture theory of language” is remarkably similar to the basic ideas of a Tarskian‐type logical semantics, except for the crucial Wittgensteinian doctrine that semantical relations can only be shown, not said. This is an instance of the idea van Heijenoort calls “logic as language”.What happens in the transition to Wittgenstein's later philosophy is not that the picture idea is rejected but that a new view of the connections between language and reality is introduced. The basic representative relations (...) between language and the world, which are left unanalyzed in the Tractatus, are now assumed to be created and sustained by different language‐games. The primary function, if not the only one, of Wittgenstein's language‐games is thus to link language to the world.Wittgenstein's persistent attitude of “logic as language” nevertheless led him to claim that language‐games are as ineffable as the naming relations of the Tractatus. For instance, new language‐games cannot be defined by new rules, because games are primary with respect to their rules.The author's semantical games, especially the games of seeking and finding, provide examples to illustrate Wittgenstein's language‐games and also to cast doubt on their ineffability. (shrink)

Although it may seem from its formalism that game theory must have sprung from the mind of John von Neumann as a corollary of his work on computers or theoretical physics, it should come as no real surprise to philosophers that game theory is the articulation of a historically developing philosophical conception of rationality in thought and action. The history of ideas about rationality is deeply contradictory at many turns. While there are theories of rationality that claim it (...) is fundamentally social and aims at understanding and molding all facets of human psychological life, game theory takes rationality to be essentially located in individuals and to concern only the means to achieve predetermined ends. Thus, there are some thinkers who have made important contributions to this history who do not appear in the story of game theory at all, among them, Plato, Kant, and Hegel. There is, however, a clear trail to follow linking theories of instrumental rationality from Aristotle to the nineteenth-century marginalist economists and ultimately to von Neumann and Morgenstern and contemporary game theorists, that historically grounds game theory as a model of rational interaction. (shrink)

Moral theorists and game theorists are both interested in situations where rational agents are to constrain their future actions and co-operate with others instead of being free riders. These theorists have constructed a variety of hypothetical games which illuminate this problem of constraint. In this paper, I draw a distinction between like the Newcomb paradox and like Kavka's toxin puzzle, a prisoner's dilemma and Parfit's hitchhiker example. I then employ this distinction to argue that agents who subscribe to the (...) orthodox theory of rationality do significantly better in disposition games than those who subscribe to revisionist theories like David Gauthier's, while revisionist agents do marginally better in behaviour games. I argue that because of agents' ability to manipulate their own weakness of will, orthodox agents do better at all of these games than has previously been thought. And, by elucidating the distinction between behaviour games and disposition games, I uncover the virtues that underlie the success of each theory of rationality. (shrink)