In The Ticklish Subject, Žižek argues that the Hegelian concrete universal is not the organic comprehensive totality that it is often assumed to be. Rather, he argues that Hegel's concrete universality is defined in its very concretion by an irreducible rupture, gap, or trauma that not only neither closes it off from otherness nor assimilates otherness within the same, but forever opens it to otherness, constituting it as such exposure. However, by understanding the function of negativity in Hegel's argument in (...) a foundational way, Žižek posits as final what is merely a transitional stage. As a result, he not only misconstrues concrete universality and substitutes for it a particularized universal which, as such, remains abstract, but in doing so he passes by the implications in his own account that could lead to a positive conception of concrete universality above and beyond the strictly negative and empty formality he takes it to be. By avoiding Žižek's foundationalist way of framing the category of universality we can thereby articulate a logic of implications in it that leads us out of the still abstract shape, to which Žižek limits it, to its truly concrete form. Furthermore, the latter contains political implications that are lost in Žižek's version. (shrink)

n his account of the state of exception, Agamben repeatedly relies upon what Hegel would have called emWesenslogik/em or #39;transcendental thinking#39;. Because of this reliance, the state of exception appears in Agamben#39;s account as the hidden ground of modern liberal democracies. When conceived as such a ground, it appears to be a condition of possibility that inexorably persists in the modern state. Moreover, within the state of exception all juridical order is suspended, leaving no normative or juridical criteria on the (...) basis of which to decide what the structure of any emergent political order should look like. This means that from the state of exception we can just as easily land in a totalitarian as we can in a liberal democratic or democratic socialist state. Without such criteria - lacking due to the total suspension characterizing the state of exception - Agamben#39;s own alignment with Benjaminian revolutionary messianism over Schmittian authoritarianism is arbitrary, and he leaves us with no basis for making any such decision ourselves. Drawing upon Hegel#39;s dialectic of freedom and his critique of transcendental thought, this paper argues that within the state of exception there is an implicit logic that points the way out of it. Furthermore, it does so in such a way that the state of exception is neither annexed by the structure of a predetermined juridical order along the lines proposed by Schmitt on the one hand nor posited it as a transcendental structure underlying or always preceding modern liberal democracies on the other. This alternative is overlooked by Agamben precisely because of his own insistence upon conceiving of the state of exception in a transcendent way. (shrink)

Interweaves Hegelian dialectic and the middle voice to develop a holistic account of life and nature, and the ethical orientation of human beings with respect to them.

In this paper I will argue that Hegel’s account of the category of life in the Science of Logic provides ontological grounds for the recognition of living species along with their various ecosystems as the proper objects of ethical regard for environmental ethics. I will begin by enumerating some of the salient problems that have arisen in the more well known theoretical attempts to articulate human duties to nonhuman beings. Then after a brief discussion of Hegel’s methodology and the justification (...) for turning to his ontological account, I will explicate Hegel’s ontology of life with a view toward these problems and issues, presenting my argument as to why that account is relevant to environmental ethics and deriving from it a normative framework that implies a duty to preserve species, habitats, and biological diversity. Finally, I will suggest how the Hegelian account presented here might circumvent the shortcomings of the previously discussed theories while accommodating some of their concerns and provide solutions for some of the problems to which they call attention. (shrink)

In this essay I will attempt to show that Derrida not only mistakenly reads the Hegelian text in terms of reflection, but that his own way of thinking could be characterized from a Hegelian perspective as itself reflective. For this I will not focus upon those writings of Derrida which are explicitly “about” Hegel, nor will I compare those places in both the Derridian and Hegelian corpora which seem to present a contiguity in an at least superficial resemblance between concepts, (...) such as Hegelian difference vis-à-vis Derridian différance. Rather, I will focus upon one of Derrida’s texts which indicates his own contributions to the field of thinking and writing and the directions for inquiry initiated in his work, as well as his engagement with Hegel. Such a text is his masterful essay, White Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy, a writing overtly concerned with the difficulties posed by metaphoricity in the text of philosophy and the attempt in the latter to domesticate and “interiorize” its tropic reserve or condition of possibility within the concept of metaphor itself, which turns out to be a philosopheme. The problems of philosophy are posed in terms of such mastery and interiorization. Since my concern in this essay is to problematize this kind of reading by showing that it presupposes reflective distinctions, I will not here attempt a positive philosophical account of metaphoricity per se. Indeed, Derrida will indicate what he takes to be the conditions of the impossibility of such an account, but it is precisely his reasons for this impossibility that I find problematic in terms of reflection. (shrink)