17 found
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  1.  24
    An Experimental Study of the Generosity Game.Werner Güth, M. Vittoria Levati & Matteo Ploner - 2012 - Theory and Decision 72 (1):51-63.
    We study ultimatum and dictator variants of the generosity game. In this game, the first mover chooses the amount of money to be distributed between the players within a given interval, knowing that her own share is fixed. Thus, the first mover is not confronted with the typical trade-off between her own and the other’s payoff. For each variant of the game, we study three treatments that vary the range of potential pie sizes so as to assess the influence of (...)
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  2.  77
    An Evolutionary Analysis of Buyer Insurance and Seller Reputation in Online Markets.Werner Güth, Friederike Mengel & Axel Ockenfels - 2007 - Theory and Decision 63 (3):265-282.
    Applying an evolutionary framework, we investigate how a reputation mechanism and a buyer insurance (as used on Internet market platforms such as eBay) interact to promote trustworthiness and trust in markets with moral hazard problems. Our analysis suggests that the costs involved in giving reliable feedback determine the gains from trade that can be obtained in equilibrium. Buyer insurance, on the other hand, can affect the trading dynamics and equilibrium selection. We find that, under reasonable conditions, buyer insurance crowds out (...)
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  3.  37
    Games of Competition in a Stochastic Environment.Judith Avrahami, Werner Güth & Yaakov Kareev - 2005 - Theory and Decision 59 (4):255-294.
    The paper presents a set of games of competition between two or three players in which reward is jointly determined by a stochastic biased mechanism and players’ choices. More specifically, a resource can be found with unequal probabilities in one of two locations. The first agent is rewarded only if it finds the resource and avoids being found by the next agent in line; the latter is rewarded only if it finds the former. Five benchmarks, based on different psychological and (...)
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  4.  30
    Evolutionarily Stable Co-Operative Commitments.Werner Güth - 2000 - Theory and Decision 49 (3):197-222.
    If contracts cannot be fully specified Pareto optimal results may be closed off because individuals cannot rationally trust each other's promises. This paper assumes that human individuals can become internally committed not to act opportunistically and that others can detect to a certain extent whether they are dealing with an uncommitted (untrustworthy) or a committed (trustworthy) partner. Adopting an `indirect evolutionary approach' we show that co-operative commitments can survive in evolutionary competition even if conventional mechanisms like repetition, reputation, contract or (...)
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  5.  38
    Perfect or Bounded Rationality? Some Facts, Speculations and Proposals.Werner Güth & Hartmut Kliemt - 2004 - Analyse & Kritik 26 (2):364-381.
    Simple game experiments of the reward allocation, dictator and ultimatum type are used to demonstrate that true explanations of social phenomena cannot conceivably be derived in terms of the perfect rationality concept underlying neo-classical economics. We explore in some depth, if speculatively, how experimental game theory might bring us closer to a new synthesis or at least the nucleus of a general theory of ‘games and boundedly rational economic behavior’ with enhanced explanatory power.
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  6.  37
    Entitlement and the Efficiency-Equality Trade-Off: An Experimental Study. [REVIEW]Agnes Bäker, Werner Güth, Kerstin Pull & Manfred Stadler - 2014 - Theory and Decision 76 (2):225-240.
    When randomly assigning participants to experimental roles and the according payment prospects, participants seem to receive “manna from heaven.” In our view, this seriously questions the validity of laboratory findings. We depart from this by auctioning off player roles via the incentive compatible random price mechanism thus avoiding the selection effect of competitive second price auctions. Our experiment employs the generosity game where the proposer chooses the size of the pie, facing an exogenously given own agreement payoff, and the responder (...)
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  7.  40
    Correction of 'On the Inconsistency of Equilibrium Refinement'.Werner Güth - 2003 - Theory and Decision 55 (1):85-86.
  8. The Rationality of Rational Fools: The Role of Commitments, Persons and Agents in Rational Choice Modelling.Werner Güth & Hartmut Kliemt - 2007 - In Fabienne Peter & Hans Bernhard Schmid (eds.), Rationality and Commitment. Oxford University Press.
     
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  9.  43
    Now or Later?--Endogenous Timing of Threats.Siegfried K. Berninghaus & Werner Guth - 2003 - Theory and Decision 55 (3):235-256.
    Whereas early threats are chosen before bargaining, late threats are determined after bargaining ended in conflict. Instead of exogenously imposing the timing of threats, these are derived endogenously as in indirect evolution or endogenous timing. Based on a duopoly market, we first derive the equilibrium for all possible constellations regarding the timing of threats. Our analysis surprisingly justifies the early timing of threats as suggested by Nash (1953).
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  10.  48
    On the Inconsistency of Equilibrium Refinement.Werner Güth - 2002 - Theory and Decision 53 (4):371-392.
    Consistency and optimality together with converse consistency provide an illuminating and novel characterization of the equilibrium concept (Peleg and Tijs, 1996). But (together with non-emptiness) they preclude refinements of the equilibrium notion and selection of a unique equilibrium (Norde et al., 1996). We suggest two escape routes: By generalizing the concept of strict equilibrium we question the practical relevance of the existence requirement for refinements. To allow for equilibrium selection we suggest more complex reduced games which capture the inclinations of (...)
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  11.  8
    Behavioral Patterns and Reduction of Sub-Optimality: An Experimental Choice Analysis.Daniela Di Cagno, Arianna Galliera, Werner Güth & Noemi Pace - 2018 - Theory and Decision 85 (2):151-177.
    This paper attempts to identify behavioral patterns and compare their average success considering several criteria of bounded rationality. Experimentally observed choice behavior in various decision tasks is used to assess heterogeneity in how individual participants respond to 15 randomly ordered portfolio choices, each of which is experienced twice. Treatments differ in granting probability information and in eliciting aspirations. Since in our setting neither other regarding concerns nor risk attitude matter and probability of the binary chance move is choice irrelevant, categorizing (...)
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  12.  19
    Collectively Ranking Candidates Via Bidding in Procedurally Fair Ways.Werner Güth - 2015 - Theory and Decision 78 (1):23-31.
    Different evaluators typically disagree how to rank different candidates due to their idiosyncratic concerns for the various qualities of the candidates. Our ranking mechanism asks all evaluators to submit individual bids assigning a monetary amount for each possible rank order. The rules specify for all possible vectors of such individual bids the collectively binding rank order of candidates and the payments, due to the different evaluators. Three requirements uniquely determine procedurally fair ranking rules as a game form. Only when additionally (...)
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  13.  1
    Telling the Other What One Knows? Strategic Lying in a Modified Acquiring-a-Company Experiment with Two-Sided Private Information.Andrej Angelovski, Daniela Di Cagno, Werner Güth & Francesca Marazzi - 2020 - Theory and Decision 88 (1):97-119.
    Lying for a strategic advantage is to be expected in commercial interactions. But would this be more or less obvious when lying could come from either party and question mutually profitable exchange? To explore this, we modify the acquiring-a-company game by letting both, buyer and seller, be privately informed. Specifically, the value of the company for the buyer is known only by the seller; whereas, only the buyer is aware by which proportion the sellers evaluation is lower than that of (...)
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  14.  4
    Hard Choices Softened Locally. Enacting New Rules for Organ Allocation.Werner Güth, Hartmut Kliemt & Thomas Wujciak - 2001 - Analyse & Kritik 23 (2):205-220.
    The implementation of a new kidney allocation algorithm by Eurotransplant was a 'rule choice' with serious ethical, legal, and political implications. Eurotransplant made that choice in view of a careful analysis of empirically predictable consequences of alternative rule specifications. This paper studies in a stylized way how the decision on the allocation algorithm emerged. Hopefully an understanding of central features of the described successful case of initiating improvements may be helpful in other cases with a similar structure.
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  15.  4
    The Evolution of Trustin the Net.Werner Güth & Hartmut Kliemt - 2004 - Analyse & Kritik 26 (1):203-219.
    The main results of our indirect evolutionary approach to trust in large interactions suggest that trustworthiness must be detectable if good conduct in trust-relationships is to survive. According to theoretical reasoning there is a niche then for an organization offering a costly service of keeping track of the conduct of participants on the net. We compare traits of an organizational design as suggested by economic reasoning with those that actually emerged and ask whether institutions like eBay will increasingly have to (...)
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  16. Comment : Putting the Problem of Social Order Into Perspective.Werner Güth & Hartmut Kliemt - 2009 - In Chrysostomos Mantzavinos (ed.), Philosophy of the Social Sciences: Philosophical Theory and Scientific Practice. Cambridge University Press.
  17. Fools: The Role of Commitments, Persons, and Agents in Rational Choice Modelling.Werner Guth & Hartmut Kliemt - 2007 - In Fabienne Peter (ed.), Rationality and Commitment. Oxford University Press, Usa. pp. 124.
     
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