This volume is concerned with the philosophical foundations of Psychical Research. Traditional metaphysical theories have led to apparently insoluble problems concerning the nature of mind, of matter and the relation between the two. The author holds that these theories arise from misconception about the way in which words acquire meaning. His aim is to show that once the relation between words and the experienceable entities which they mean is clearly understood, these seemingly insoluble problems disappear, and the metaphysical theories which (...) give rise to them are seen to be literally nonsensical. The philosophy which results is a radically empirical one, a form of Neutral Monism. The book intended to ‘clear the decks’ for Psychical Research by removing certain traditional pseudo-problems, but it will be of interest to all who followed the revival of Empiricist Philosophy, whether they are students of Psychical Research or not. It is written in a pithy and sparkling style, with a minimum of technical terms, and serves as an introduction to Empiricist Philosophy. Originally published 1949. (shrink)
This is an exploration of what Locke and Whately said about the Argumentatum ad Hominem, especially in the context of what they said about the other ad arguments, and with a view to ascertaining whether what they said lends support to the understanding of this argument implicit in Johnstone's thesis that all valid philosophical arguments are ad hominem. It is concluded that this support is forthcoming insofar as Locke and Whately had in mind an argument concerned with principles.The (...) essay ends with a brief reformulation of Johnstone's generalization regarding philosophical arguments. (shrink)
Richard Whately’s views of arguments involving authority are very different in his Elements of Rhetoric and his Elements of Logic. This essay begins by documenting these differences and wondering why they are. It then proceeds to take a broader and more historical view of Whately’s discussions of authority and finds him occupying an important developmental ground between his predecessor Locke and contemporary views of the argument from authority. In fact, some of the things we now think are important (...) in a good argument from authority are anticipated by Whately. (shrink)
So wohl Campbell als auch Whately sind sehr besorgt um die verschiedenen argumentations Formen zu analisieren, aber nicht in seiner abstrecten Vielfalt, sondern den verschiedenen Ableihungen des gebrauches oder der gegenwärtigen argumentations absicht im Entwurf jedes Arguments. In seiner Analyse haben sie beobachtet, dass die etische Begründung bemerkensmert verschieden als die Wissenschafliche. Beide Verfasser sind damit einverstanden dass es einen grossen Unterschied gibt zwischen: der existenten Prämisse in der Wissenchaftlichen Probe, und zweitens, die Form in der die Prämissen im (...) induktiven (oder moralen) Begründung verbunden sind, wiel in diesen letzten verschaffen die Prämissen getrennter Wiese eine Kosistenz auf dem Abschluss, aber sie müsen zusammen bleiben damit der Abschluss beweisbarer ist. Dieser Unterschied zwischen den art die Wharheit oder probabilität zwischen Wissenschaft und Humanität zu erzeugen, ist eines der grossen Themen der Philosophie aber das hermeneutische Paradigma zweifalt über die wissenschaftliche Folgerung, sind die Prämissen nicht doch der gleichen art vorgestellt, wer weiss, mit einer gewiss logischen Interdependenz zwischen inhnen und eine extralogische argumentative last die sie verbindet dem Anlass die Schlussfolgenung konsistente zu machen. (shrink)
In 1839 and 1840, Newman preached four Oxford University Sermons, which critiqued the evidential apologetics advocated by John Locke (1632-1704) and William Paley (1743-1805) and subsequently restated by Richard Whately (1787-1863). In response, Newman drew upon Whately’s earlier works on logic and rhetoric to develop an alternative account of the reasonableness of religious belief that was based on implicit reasoning from antecedent probabilities. Newman’s argument was a creative response to Whately’s contention that evidential reasoning is the only (...) safeguard against superstition and infidelity. (shrink)
Charles S. Peirce frequently mentioned reading Richard Whately's Elements of Logic when he was 12 years old. Throughout his life, Peirce emphasized the importance of that experience. This valorization of Whately is puzzling at first. Early in his career Peirce rejected Whately's central logical doctrines. What valuable insight concerning logic was robust enough to survive these specific rejections? Peirce recommended a biographical approach to understanding his philosophy. This essay follows that suggestion by considering Peirce's reading of (...) class='Hi'>Whately in a larger life context. Surprisingly many factors in Charles Peirce's personal and intellectual development were at play when he read Whately. His father, Benjamin Peirce, oversaw rigorous home schooling intended to train young Charley for a brilliant intellectual career. Laboratory experience with qualitative chemical analysis exposed the boy to the logic of scientific investigation, specifically to the hypothetico-deductive method of inquiry. However, tensions between father and son developed over Charles' wish to devote his life to studying the logic of science. The two also disagreed upon the value of formal science. Against this background we will review relevant logical doctrines of Whately's book, as well as his innovative formalizing practice of logical inquiry. Then we will see that it was Whately's lessons about formal science that were of such importance to Peirce. (shrink)
Le terme de catallaxie a été forgé par F. Hayek pour exprimer lordre spontané du marché. Hayek a créé ce terme à partir du mot catallactique, ressorti peu avant de loubli par L. Mises, mot venu du verbe grec signifiant « échanger », pour éviter les ambigüités du mot « économie ». Ce papier a pour objet de rechercher la généalogie du terme « catallactique », depuis Richard Whately, qui a été le premier auteur, en 1831, à vouloir rebaptiser (...) « léconomie politique » en « catallactique ». Ce terme était connu et utilisé tout au long du XIX° siècle et on le trouve encore au début du XX° siècle dans divers manuels. Lutilisation de ce terme par Mises, puis Hayek, est donc la reprise dune tradition remontant à Richard Whately. Cest loccasion aussi de se pencher sur la vie de Richard Whately, professeur déconomie politique à Oxford jusquen 1831, puis archevêque anglican de Dublin. Il a notamment joué un grand rôle dans lenseignement de cette discipline, en créant 4 000 cours déconomie politique. Un personnage intéressant, un peu trop ignoré aujourdhui, qui a joué un rôle non négligeable dans la pensée économique. (shrink)
This chapter situates Mill’s System of Logic (1843/1872) in the context of some of the meta-logical themes and disputes characteristic of the 19th century as well as Mill’s empiricism. Particularly, by placing the Logic in relation to Whately’s (1827) Elements of Logic and Mill’s response to the “great paradox” of the informativeness of syllogistic reasoning, the chapter explores the development of Mill’s views on the foundation, function, and the relation between ratiocination and induction. It provides a survey of the (...) Mill-Whewell debate on the nature of induction, Mill’s account of putatively a priori disciplines such as the science of number, and Frege’s criticisms of the Logic as psychologistic. (shrink)
I argue that Darwinian evolutionary theory has a rhetorical dimension and that rhetorical criticism plays a role in how evolutionary science acquires knowledge. I define what I mean by rhetoric by considering Darwin’s Origin. I use the Modern Evolutionary Synthesis to show how rhetoric conceived as situated and addressed argumentation enters into evolutionary theorizing. Finally, I argue that rhetorical criticism helps judge the success, limits, and failures of these theories.
Hamblin held that the conception of 'fallacy' as an argument that seems valid but is not really so was the dominant conception of fallacy in the history of fallacy studies. The present paper explores the extent of support that there is for this view. After presenting a brief analysis of 'the standard definition of fallacy,' a number of the definitions of 'fallacy' in texts from the middle of this century – from the standard treatment – are considered. This is followed (...) by a review of the definitions of 'fallacy' in the earlier history of logic books, including those of Aristotle, Whately, Mill and De Morgan. The essay concludes that there is scarcely any support for Hamblin's view that this particular definition of 'fallacy' was widely held. (shrink)
Most recent discussions of John Stuart Mill’s System of Logic (1843) neglect the fifth book concerned with logical fallacies. Mill not only follows the revival of interest in the traditional Aristotelian doctrine of fallacies in Richard Whately and Augustus De Morgan, but he also develops new categories and an original analysis which enhance the study of fallacies within the context of what he calls ‘the philosophy of error’. After an exploration of this approach, the essay relates the philosophy of (...) error to the discussion of truth and error in chapter two of On Liberty (1859) concerned with freedom of thought and discussion. Drawing on Socratic and Baconian perspectives, Mill defends both the traditional study of logic against Jevons, Boole, De Morgan, and others, as well as the study of fallacies as the key to maintaining truth and its dissemination in numerous fields, such as science, morality, politics, and religion. In Mill’s view the study of fallacies also liberates ordinary people to explore the truth and falsity of ideas and, as such, to participate in society and politics and develop themselves as progressive beings. (shrink)
This essay examines Augustus DeMorgan's chapter on fallacy in his Formal Logic (1847) in order to show how DeMorgan's treatment represents an expansion and advance upon Aristotle. It is important that Aristotle clearly distinguishes among dialectical, didactic, demonstrative, and contentious types of argument, based upon the acceptability of premises and the aims of participants. Appropriating Aristotle's list of fallacies, DeMorgan discusses examples that reveal how the charge and countercharge of fallacy function in contentious argument, which is more widespread than Aristotle (...) imagined. DeMorgan's treatment of fallacy is in the spirit of Aristotle because of its focus on dialogue arguments, but it represents an advance because it expands the possible scenes of contention and shows how unshared premises and the will to win inform many argument situations. The emphasis on contention in natural-language argument puts DeMorgan in the company of his l9th century peers, Mill and Whately. (shrink)
After discussing the contents of this sermon—which is structured around the Athanasian Creed and emphasizes the inner life of the Trinity—this study raises the question of whether Newman wrote this sermon as a response to the Trinitarian heterodoxy of his one-time mentor, Richard Whately, Anglican Archbishop of Dublin.