Continental philosophy of science has developed alongside mainstream analytic philosophy of science. But where continental approaches are inclusive, analytic philosophies of science are not?excluding not merely Nietzsche?s philosophy of science but Gödel?s philosophy of physics. As a radicalization of Kant, Nietzsche?s critical philosophy of science puts science in question and Nietzsche?s critique of the methodological foundations of classical philology bears on science, particularly evolution as well as style (in art and science). In addition to the critical (in Mach, Nietzsche, Heidegger (...) but also Husserl just to the extent that continental philosophy of science tends to depart from a reflection on the crisis of foundations), other continental philosophies of science include phenomenology (Husserl, Bachelard, Merleau?Ponty, etc.) and hermeneutics (Heidegger, Gadamer, Heelan, etc.), especially incorporating history of science (Nietzsche, Mach, Duhem, Butterfield, Feyerabend, etc.). Examples are drawn from the philosophy of sciences (chemistry, geology, and biology) other than physics. (shrink)

Several essays, articles, and papers have appeared during the last fifteen years which have shed light on the place and function of science in the intellectual life of eighteenth-century Scotland. Some have concentrated on ideological factors such as the increasing concerns with polite culture, improvement, and the reaction of the Scottish élite to the Act of Union. Others have noted the roles of Jacobites and Whigs in the production of a culture which was unique to Scotland. The generalist educational (...) ideals held by Scots have been explored, as have their philosophical, methodological, and mathematical traditions. Another set of papers has fruitfully examined ‘the social role of knowledge’ and has attempted through studies of the politics of Scottish science and a consideration of its audience to show how the characteristics of local provincial society could influence if not ‘determine scientific activity, its social organization or intellectual structure’. Concerns with the institutionalization of scientific activities and the acceptance of new values have also led to studies of the universities, medical corporations, and societies which provided focuses for scientific enquiry. All of these studies have emphasized the aspects of science north of the Tweed between about 1690 and 1830 which seem uniquely Scottish. No one would deny the value of these works but perhaps it is now time to redress the balance and to notice how typical much of the scientific work of the Scots was, and how easily it and the institutions through which it was pursued can be fitted into the wider context of the European Enlightenment. (shrink)

In the Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association for the fall of 1988, we find the view that “the power of philosophy lies in its radicalness.” The author, Tom Foster Digby, tells us that in our own day “the radical potency of philosophy is particularly well-illustrated by contemporary feminist philosophy” in ways that “could eventually reorder human life.” The claim that philosophy is essentially radical has deep historical roots. Aristotle and Plato each created a distinctive style of social philosophy. Following (...) Ernest Barker, I shall call Aristotle's way of doing social philosophy “whiggish,” having in mind that the O.E.D. characterizes ‘whig’ as “a word that says in one syllable what ‘conservative liberal’ says in seven.” Later whigs shared with Aristotle the conviction that traditional arrangements have great moral weight, and that common opinion is a primary source of moral truth. The paradigm example of a whig moral philosopher is Henry Sidgwick, with his constant appeal to Common Sense and to “established morality.” On the more liberal side, we have philosophers like David Hume who cautions us to “adjust [political] innovations as much as possible to the ancient fabric,” and William James who insists that the liberal philosopher must reject radicalism. In modern times, many social philosophers have followed the more radical example of Plato, who was convinced that common opinion was benighted and in need of much consciousness-raising. Looking on society as a Cave that distorted real values, Plato showed a great readiness to discount traditional arrangements. He was perhaps the first philosopher to construct an ideal of a society that reflected principles of justice, inspiring generations of utopian social philosophers. (shrink)

The paper is devoted to demonstrating the systematic value of the “Two Treatises of Government”. Even though their genesis is rooted in the political circumstances of Locke’s life-time, the “Treatises” are not simply a pamphlet designed to support the Whig cause, as Locke’s political ideas are derived from his theoretical philosophy and from his concept of natural law.

The story of the end of the Philosophical Society of Edinburgh in 1783, is linked with that of the founding of the Society of Antiquaries of Scotland and the Royal Society of Edinburgh , both of which were given Royal Charters sealed on 6 May 1783. It is a story which has been admirably told by Steven Shapin. He persuasively argued that the P.S.E. was a casualty of bitter quarrels rooted in local Edinburgh politics, in personal animosities and in disputes (...) about the control of cultural property and intellectual leadership. In all this he was surely correct just as he was in finding the principal actors in this controversy to be: David Erskine, 11th Earl of Buchan; the Reverend Dr John Walker, Professor of Natural History in Edinburgh University; Dr William Cullen, Professor of the Theory and Practice of Medicine and Vice-President of the P.S.E.; Mr William Smellie, Printer to the Society of Antiquaries; Henry Home, Lord Kames, S.C.J. and President of the P.S.E.; Sir George Clerk-Maxwell, Vice-President of the P.S.E.; John Robison, Professor of Natural Philosophy and Secretary to the P.S.E.; Edinburgh University's Principal, William Robertson; the Curators of the Advocates Library: Ilay Campbell, Robert Blair, Alexander Abercromby, Alexander Fraser Tytler, Professor of Public Law; Henry Dundas, Lord Advocate and M.P. for Midlothian. In a peripheral way, the Royal Colleges of Physicians and Surgeons were probably also involved; so too were Lord Buchan's brothers, Henry and Thomas Erskine, Foxite Whigs who opposed Dundas politically. Henry Erskine displaced Dundas as Lord Advocate in August 1783. After the change of ministry on 18 December 1783 he was ousted, but became Dean of the Faculty of Advocates in 1785. National as well as burgh politics touched these disputes and gave the parties of the Erskines and Dundas and his friends some leverage in London. (shrink)

In recent years the Chemical Revolution has become a renewed focus of interest among historians of science. This interest isshaped by interpretive strategies associated with the emergence anddevelopment of the discipline of the history of science. The disciplineoccupies a contested intellectual terrain formed in part by thedevelopment and cultural entanglements of science itself. Threestages in this development are analyzed in this paper. Theinterpretive strategies that characterized each stage are elucidatedand traced to the disciplinary interests that gave rise to them. Whilepositivists (...) and whigs appropriated the history of science to thejustificatory and celebratory needs of science itself, postpositivistslinked it to philosophical models of rationality, and sociologists ofknowledge sought its sociological reconstruction. Since none of thesestrategies do justice to the complexity of historical events, a modelof the Chemical Revolution is outlined which upholds the autonomyand specificity of history and the methods used to study it. (shrink)

This volume of The Writings and Speeches of Edmund Burke continues the story of Edmund Burke, the Rockingham party in British politics, and the American crisis. By 1774 Burke was already recognized as a master of parliamentary debate and an accomplished writer. By 1780, however, his reputation was to have risen substantially. Probably the most important single reason was his Speech on Conciliation with America, which was presented to the House of Commons in March 1775, published, and circulated to a (...) wide audience on both sides of the Atlantic. In that speech, Burke used the full force of his intellect and eloquence to set out the Rockinghams' first comprehensive plan for achieving lasting peace in the Empire. The public commendation he received helped him to gain recognition for offerings such as his second conciliation proposal in November 1775, and his Letter to the Sheriffs of Bristol in 1777. It also gave him some of the confidence he needed to announce the Whig party's historic conversion to a moderate reform programme in his celebrated speeches on economical reform in 1779 and 1780. Numerous writings and speeches in this volume are transcriptions of previously unpublished manuscripts from the collections at Sheffield and Northampton. These allow the reader new insights into the workings of Burke's mind not just in relation to the major political issues, but also to a multitude of engaging subjects such as education, capital punishment, religious dissent, and the return of the Rockingham Whigs to government power. (shrink)

RESUMO A crítica de Hume ao contrato social admite um alcance para além do debate com o contratualismo de Locke: nosso autor tem em vista, sobretudo, desconstruir os princípios filosóficos que são a base da prática política dos Whigs. Uma vez que o contrato original organiza esses princípios, Hume se dedicará a analisá-lo em termos filosóficos e históricos, na tentativa de modernizar o pensamento político de sua época. ABSTRACT Hume's criticism of the social contract allows a range beyond the (...) debate with Locke's theory: our author aims mainly to deconstruct the philosophical principles that are the basis of the political practice of the Whigs. Since the original contract organizes these principles, Hume will be devoted to evaluating it in philosophical and historical terms, in an attempt to modernize the political thought of his time. (shrink)

Introduction : a search for icons -- Burke in brief : a "philosophical" primer -- Old seeds, new soil : the land of Paine -- John and J.Q. Adams : federalist persuasions -- Democratic America : the ethos of liberalism -- American Whigs : a conservative response -- The Gilded Age : eclectic interpretations -- Theodore Roosevelt : blazing forward, looking backward -- Woodrow Wilson : confronting American maturity -- Modern times : conjunctions and consensus -- Natural law : (...) a neo-traditionalist revival -- The Cold War : existential threat redux -- Contemporary conservatives : victories and illusions -- Conclusion : a world without fathers. (shrink)

Despite the recent boom in research on the reception and influence of Hume's writings, most scholars have overlooked the fact that his enigmatic essay “Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth,” published in thePolitical Discoursesin 1752, not only attracted the attention of some French intellectuals before and after the Revolution, but was also taken seriously by a significant number of radicals—such as Paine, Price, Godwin, Wollstonecraft—and other reform-minded Whigs—such as James Mackintosh. Although the influence of Hume's plan onThe Federalist, No 10, (...) has been much discussed, what is more important is that these British reformers often associated his plan with the National Assembly after the Revolution in France. This essay demonstrates that Hume's plan of a large republic with a bicameral system through a two-tier election was an important intellectual resource for his contemporaries and for later generations. (shrink)

The Third Earl of Shaftesbury has been celebrated for his commitment to free public discourse regulated only by standards of politeness, a commitment exemplified by his defence of the freedom to ridicule. This article complicates this picture by tracing Shaftesbury's response to the early eighteenth-century crisis of public speech precipitated by the demise of pre-publication censorship and growing uncertainty about intellectual property in the print trade. Shaftesbury, the article shows, was a determined opponent of pre-publication censorship through licensing, but he (...) was also aware of the dangers posed to religious liberty by, in particular, clerical attacks on toleration, and sought ways to curb them that included corrective action by the state. When the Whigs opted to impeach the High Church cleric Henry Sacheverell, whose supporters had capitalized on an unregulated print market to disseminate his sermons ridiculing Whig principles, Shaftesbury expressed satisfaction with this use of state power to silence him. But he did not stop there. The article reads Shaftesbury's 1710Soliloquy, or Advice to an Authoragainst the backdrop of the Sacheverell controversy, and shows how the earl used it to undercut Sacheverell's claim that clerical speech enjoyed special status. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This article draws attention to the reception that François Fénelon's Télémaque received in England in the first half of the eighteenth century. It overturns the historiographical assumption that the Jacobites were the leading disseminators of this continental bestseller on the other side of the Channel. Even though in the English intellectual context Télémaque's framework was unorthodox, many staunch supporters of the Glorious Revolution were fascinated by the book's portrayal of a virtuous king who respects laws, rights and liberties, and (...) sacrifices himself to improve the wellbeing of his subjects. Moderate Whigs - who included several Huguenot refugees - capitalised on the poem's esprit du roi in order both to celebrate the English kings and to construct the ‘Myth of Louis XIV' as an example of how a sovereign should not rule. The study of the book's reception thus presents a somewhat emblematic case study from which to view the genesis of ‘Englishness', that of an ideological discourse largely based on a process of overturning. In addition, the Télémaque responded to the thirst for ‘useful Knowledge' that distinguished the advocates of ‘politeness' and, not least, its mild pedagogical approach rendered it a precious resource for the ‘moderation’ of the youth. (shrink)

Bolingbroke, a Tory, adopted Whig history and stressed the ancient constitution and the age-old heritage of Commons and freedom in England in order to show that people were less free under Walpole than they had been in ancient times. Walpole, a Whig, made Brady and Tory history respectable to counter this partisan use of history. Walpole said that Commons developed as a result of feudal obligation; freedom began with the Glorious Revolution and was based on Locke's natural rights as supported (...) by the Whigs. This was a reversal of the Old Whig position that, used the ancient constitution to support the rights of parliament against the claims of the Tory kind. The reversal began when Whig clergy used Tory history to support their position in the Convocation Controversy after 1697. By making Brady's history respectable, Walpole performed a great service to English historiography. (shrink)

John Locke, long associated with the “standard” approach to fallacies and the “logical” approach to valid inference, had both logical and dialectical reasons for favoring certain proofs and denigrating others. While the logical approach to argumentation stands forth in Locke’s philosophical writings, a dialectical approach can be found in his contributions to public controversies regarding religion and toleration. Understanding Locke’s dialectical approach to argumentation not only makes his work more relevant to the contemporary discipline of informal logic, but this understanding (...) also prompts a reconsideration of Locke’s rhetorical purpose. He approached argumentation dialectically because he wanted to appeal to a universal audience of free rational subjects, people not unlike the real historical audience whom Locke addressed: radical Whigs, latitudinarian Anglicans, early-Enlightenment philosophes. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis article signals at a dearth of critical engagement with Thomas Carlyle's Presbyterian heritage resulting from the received whiggish narrative of his Calvinism as unenlightened, anachronistic, and backward-looking. It proceeds to challenge this view by examining closely Carlyle's creative use of key Calvinist concepts in his cosmopolitan and enlightened dialogue with the contemporary periodical press over British and European cultures. Carlyle is shown to be an adept purveyor both of the Edinburgh Magazine's enlightened idiom and of Blackwood's morally conservative and (...) artistically cosmopolitan agendas, while also making creative capital of the Anti-Jacobin's powerful Gothic imagery and of the critical verve of the Westminster Review. The main addressees of Carlyle's reading of the signs of the times, I argue, are contemporary Whigs. Carlyle's depiction of Macaulay as a ‘spiritual hippopotamus’ spells Carlyle's broader critique of the modern lack of imagination of the spiritual which sponsors deterministic religious and secular readings of reality. Carlyle displays his enlightened Calvinist perspective in discussing the French Revolution through such key Scottish Enlightenment concepts as free will, conscience, civilisational and moral progress, and divine providence. Insightful and creative use of his inherited Scottish Calvinist heritage characterises Carlyle's open, cosmopolitan reading of the signs of the times. (shrink)

In the face of new forms of popular radicalism in the 1790s, British Whigs turned increasingly hostile to the French Revolution and doctrines of radical social improvement. Yet, rather than turn to Burke's Reflections on the Revolution in France to frame their anti-radical arguments, Whiggism took up the claims of Thomas Malthus' Essay on the Principle of Population. By eschewing the voluntarist idiom of Burke's Reflections in favour of a Newtonian rhetoric which resonated with the discursive traditions of radicalism (...) itself, Malthus provided a powerful anti-radical weapon which became a central pillar of the emerging ‘science’ of political economy. Debates in political economy thus moved to the forefront of the contest between Whigs and popular radicals. (shrink)

SUMMARYThe Machiavellian Moment was largely responsible for establishing what remains the dominant understanding of American Revolutionary ideology. Patriots, on this account, were radical whigs; their great preoccupation was a terror of crown power and executive corruption. This essay proposes to test the whig reading of patriot political thought in a manner suggested by Professor Pocock's pioneering first book, The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law. The whig tradition, as he taught us, located in the remote Saxon past an ‘ancient (...) constitution’ of liberty, in which elected monarchs merely executed laws approved by their free subjects in a primeval parliament. This republican idyll, whigs believed, was then tragically interrupted by the Norman Conquest of 1066, which introduced feudal tenures and monarchical tyranny. Did patriot theorists accept this narrative? The answer, I shall argue, is strikingly mixed. By the early 1770s, appeals to the ‘ancient constitution’ had become less common in patriot writing. And by the end of the 1770s, many patriots had absorbed a completely different understanding of the feudal past—one pioneered by Royalist historians of the seventeenth century and then adapted by Scottish historians of the eighteenth. This shift reflects a broader transformation in patriot political and constitutional theory. (shrink)

En post-scriptum de la Constitution de la Liberté, Friedrich Hayek situa le coeur de ses convictions où il perçut qu’était leur place dans l’histoire des idées. Il était, il insistait, “simplement un vieux Whig impénitent”, en insistant sur le “vieux”. Le Whiggisme, il venait de le soutenir, était le nom du seul et unique courant de pensée qui s’opposa sérieusement à tout pouvoir arbitraire. En mettant en avant le fait que le “vrai libéralisme” n’avait pas de nom reconnaissable afin de (...) le distinguer du “faux libéralisme”, Hayek suggéra celui de “vieux Whig” – bien qu’il sembla plus proche de sa validité historique que de son utilité dans le monde réel. Cet essai tente d’illustrer ce qu’Hayek voulait dire en s’appelant lui même vieux Whig ou Whig Burkéen, comme il se décrivit plus tard. Il soulève des questions quant à la validité de la conception qu’Hayek avait de lui, et quant à la vraie nature des vieux Whig historiques. Cet article explore le modèle historique créé par Hayek, centré sur l’événement clé de la Révolution Française, pour expliquer ce qu’il appela une “contre-renaissance” en faveur du collectivisme.In is postscript to The Constitution of Liberty, Friedrich Hayek placed his core beliefs into what he perceived as their proper place in the history of ideas. He was, he insisted, ‘simply an unrepentant Old Whig – with the stress on the “old”. Whiggism, he went on to assert, was the name of the only set of ideals that had consistently opposed all arbitrary power. Highlighting the fact that ‘true liberalism’ had no recognisable name with which to distinguish itself from ‘false liberalism’, Hayek tossed ‘Old Whig’ into the ring as his suggestion – though he seemed more confident of its historical validity than its real-world usefulness. This essay attempts to illustrate just what Hayek meant by calling himself an Old Whig, or Burkean Whig, as he later described himself. It raises some questions about the validity of Hayek’s self-conception, and the true nature of the historical Old Whigs. It also explores the historical model that Hayek created, centred on the key event of the French Revolution, to explain what he called a ‘counterrenaissance’ in favour of collectivism. (shrink)