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Whitney Schwab
University of Maryland, Baltimore County
  1.  15
    Is Plato an Innatist in the Meno?David Bronstein & Whitney Schwab - 2019 - Phronesis 64 (4):392-430.
    Plato in the Meno is standardly interpreted as committed to condition innatism: human beings are born with latent innate states of knowledge. Against this view, Gail Fine has argued for prenatalism: human souls possess knowledge in a disembodied state but lose it upon being embodied. We argue against both views and in favor of content innatism: human beings are born with innate cognitive contents that can be, but do not exist innately in the soul as, the contents of states of (...)
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  2. Explanation in the Epistemology of the Meno.Whitney Schwab - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 48:1-36.
     
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  3.  37
    The Birth of Belief.Jessica Moss & Whitney Schwab - 2019 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 57 (1):1-32.
    did plato and aristotle have anything to say about belief? The answer to this question might seem blindingly obvious: of course they did. Plato distinguishes belief from knowledge in the Meno, Republic, and Theaetetus, and Aristotle does so in the Posterior Analytics. Plato distinguishes belief from perception in the Theaetetus, and Aristotle does so in the De anima. They talk about the distinction between true and false beliefs, and the ways in which belief can mislead and the ways in which (...)
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  4.  10
    The Metaphysics of Recollection in Plato’s Meno.Whitney Schwab - forthcoming - Apeiron.
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  5.  83
    Skepticism, Belief, and the Criterion of Truth.Whitney Schwab - 2013 - Apeiron 46 (3):327-344.
    In this paper I examine, and reject, one of the chief philosophical arguments that purports to show that Pyrrhonian Skepticism is incompatible with possessing any beliefs. That argument, first put forward by Jonathan Barnes and since accepted by many philosophers, focuses on the skeptic's resolute suspension of judgment concerning one philosophical issue, namely whether criteria of truth exist. In short, the argument holds that, because skeptics suspend judgment whether criteria of truth exist, they have no basis on which to discriminate (...)
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  6. Understanding Epistēmē in Plato’s Republic.Whitney Schwab - 2016 - Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 51:41-85.
     
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