Results for 'Why Pornography is Valuable'

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  1. Obscenity, the Role of Sex, and Social Responsibility.James A. Gould, Why Pornography is Valuable & Taking Sides - 1991 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 6 (2):53-55.
     
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  2.  37
    Why Pornography Is Valuable.James A. Gould - 1991 - International Journal of Applied Philosophy 6 (2):53-55.
  3.  6
    Why Pornography Is Valuable.James A. Gould - 1991 - International Journal of Applied Philosophy 6 (2):53-55.
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  4. Section A: Representing Women: Pornography, Art, and Popular Culture.Why Pornography Matters - 1994 - In Alison M. Jaggar (ed.), Living with contradictions: controversies in feminist social ethics. Boulder: Westview Press.
  5. Why Pornography Can't Be Art.Christy Mag Uidhir - 2009 - Philosophy and Literature 33 (1):193-203.
    Claims that pornography cannot be art typically depend on controversial claims about essential value differences (moral, aesthetic) between pornography and art. In this paper, I offer a value-neutral exclusionary claim, showing pornography to be descriptively at odds with art. I then show how my view is an improvement on similar claims made by Jerrold Levinson. Finally I draw parallels between art and pornography and art and advertising as well as show that my view is consistent with (...)
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  6.  24
    Why studying plant cognition is valuable, even if plants aren’t cognitive.David Colaço - 2022 - Synthese 200 (6):1-18.
    Philosophers and scientists propose the idea that plants are cognitive, which has been met with criticisms. These criticisms focus on the fact that plants do not possess the properties traditionally associated with cognition. By contrast, several proponents introduce novel ways to conceptualize cognition. How should we make sense of this debate? In this paper, I argue that the plant cognition debate is not about whether plants meet a set of well-delineated and agreed-upon criteria according to which they count as cognitive. (...)
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  7. Why Replication is Overrated.Uljana Feest - 2019 - Philosophy of Science 86 (5):895-905.
    Current debates about the replication crisis in psychology take it for granted that direct replication is valuable and focus their attention on questionable research practices in regard to statistical analyses. This paper takes a broader look at the notion of replication as such. It is argued that all experimentation/replication involves individuation judgments and that research in experimental psychology frequently turns on probing the adequacy of such judgments. In this vein, I highlight the ubiquity of conceptual and material questions in (...)
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  8.  41
    Why Jurisprudence Is Not Legal Philosophy.Roger Cotterrell - 2014 - Jurisprudence 5 (1):41-55.
    The aim of this article is to describe and defend jurisprudence as an enterprise of theorising about law that is distinct from what is now understood as legal philosophy in the Anglophone world. Jurisprudence must draw on legal philosophy but also from many other resources. It should be an open quest for juristically significant insights about law. Its purpose is to inform and guide the juristic task of making organised social regulation a valuable practice, rooted and effective in the (...)
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  9.  71
    Why Knowledge is Special.Shane Ryan - 2017 - Philosophy 92 (2):249-269.
    I argue against Greco's account of the value of knowledge, according to which knowledge is distinctively valuable vis-à-vis that which falls short of knowledge in virtue of its status as an achievement and achievements being finally valuable. Instead, I make the case that virtuous belief is also an achievement. I argue that the nature of knowledge is such that knowledge is finally valuable in a way that virtuous belief is not, precisely because knowledge is not simply a (...)
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  10. Why Incest is Usually Wrong.Robert William Fischer - 2012 - Philosophy in the Contemporary World 19 (1):17-31.
    I contend that there are strong moral reasons for most adult family members to avoid having sex with one another; indeed, I argue that even among consenting adults, incestuous sex is usually wrong. The argument is simple. Absent compelling reasons, it's wrong to take a significant risk with something that's extremely valuable. But having sex with a family member takes a significant risk with something extremely valuable—namely, a family relationship. And since compelling reasons for taking such a risk (...)
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  11.  3
    Wit is not enough.Why is Professionalism Education Failing - 2006 - In Delese Wear & Julie M. Aultman (eds.), Professionalism in medicine: critical perspectives. New York: Springer.
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  12. Filling in.Why Dennett is Wrong, Patricia Smith Churchland & Vilayanur S. Ramachandran - 1994 - In Antti Revonsuo & Matti Kamppinen (eds.), Consciousness in Philosophy and Cognitive Neuroscience. Lawrence Erlbaum.
     
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  13. Derek Matravers.Why Some Modern Art is Junk - 1994 - Cogito 8:19.
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  14.  92
    Why can’t what is true be valuable?Jim Hutchinson - 2019 - Synthese (7):1-20.
    In recent discussions of the so-called “value of truth,” it is assumed that what is valuable in the relevant way is not the things that are true, but only various states and activities associated with those things: knowing them, investigating them, etc. I consider all the arguments I know of for this assumption, and argue that none provide good reason to accept it. By examining these arguments, we gain a better appreciation of what the value of the things that (...)
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  15.  54
    Why is pornography offensive?David Linton - 1979 - Journal of Value Inquiry 13 (1):57-62.
  16. Why equal opportunity is not a valuable goal.Stephen Kershnar - 2004 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 21 (2):159–172.
    In this paper, I provide an analysis of equal opportunity. I argue that equal opportunity occurs where two or more persons with equal natural abilities and willingness to work hard have chances at various jobs that are in the aggregate of equal value. I then argue that equal opportunity is neither valuable nor something that the government ought to pursue. First, it is not clear why we should value opportunities rather than outcomes. Second, the value of equal opportunity rests (...)
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  17. Why some pornography may be art.Mimi Vasilaki - 2010 - Philosophy and Literature 34 (1):pp. 228-233.
    In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Why Some Pornography May Be ArtMimi VasilakiIn "Why Pornography Can't Be Art,"1 Christy Mag Uidhir argues, as the title declares, that pornography cannot be art and thus that pornography is not art. According to Uidhir, this is because of the different ways in which pornography and art relate to contents and purposes. His argument for the impossibility of something being both art and (...) at the same time runs roughly as follows. If something is pornography, then it has the purpose of sexually arousing (some audience) and that purpose is manner-inspecific. If something is art, then if it has a purpose, then that purpose is manner-specific. So when the purpose is sexual arousal, then it is manner-specific. Thus sexual arousal by art is manner-specific and sexual arousal by pornography is manner-inspecific. Therefore, Uidhir concludes, something cannot be both art and pornography.Here I argue that although this conclusion seems plausible, Uidhir fails to make a strong case for it because he does not establish that the purposes of art are necessarily "manner-specific" as opposed to the purpose of pornography, which is necessarily "manner-inspecific." That is, the paper does not make it plausible either that pornography has manner-inspecific purposes or that art has a manner-specific purpose.IUidhir's exclusivity doctrine is intrinsically implausible. Let us take for example a work mentioned in the article, Red Butt from Jeff Koons's [End Page 228] kitsch photo series of "Made in Heaven." Uidhir writes, "part and parcel of understanding Red Butt is recognizing that it depicts a sexual act involving Jeff Koons and Cicciolina.... Failure to do so precludes satisfaction of the purpose of the work" (p. 198). Here he rightly says that the audience cannot interpret the work without the prior knowledge of who is depicted in Red Butt: the audience must recognize the sexual act and the subjects of the photo as the artist and his wife. In other words, the role of knowledge of context in understanding art is connected with the claim that manner-specificity is essential to the purpose of art. In the case of Red Butt, the appeal to extra-visual and contextual information enables fuller understanding of the artwork. However, in fact, the wider audience (rather than the art critics) perceives the trash aesthetics of Red Butt while being ignorant of Koons's biography and this aesthetic irony might precisely be one of the purposes of the work. Even if it is true that the audience's recognition of the artist's intentional self-parody requires knowledge of who is depicted in the photos, we don't know if Koons intends his work to be understood (solely) in reference to or through this knowledge. It is plausible that Koons intended to blur the distinction between art and pornography by attempting to create art that is pornography. If we accept that pornography can never be art then if Koons intends to create art that is also pornography then he attempts the impossible; if we, on the other hand, allow for the possibility for an artwork to be both art and pornography and if we accept that Koons has succeeded in creating art that is pornography, then we can interpret Red Butt in the most natural way and say he has succeeded in creating both art and pornography. It seems therefore that regardless of the context, it is left to the audience to negotiate and finally decide, if they wish to, whether to appreciate Koons as pornography or as art (or both) despite the lines between these being unclear. This very ambiguity is part of the purpose of the work, which is lost on Uidhir's account.His exclusive model cannot account for artists whose explicit intention is to defy dichotomies by doing art and pornography at the same time. For example Annie Sprinkle, in reply to the question of whether she is doing art or pornography, insists against critics and defenders alike that she is "both an artist and a whore."2 Uidhir's position must be that, in effect, contrary to what she intends and believes, Sprinkle by definition cannot do both... (shrink)
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  18.  19
    The Unity of Robustness: Why Agreement Across Model Reports is Just as Valuable as Agreement Among Experiments.Corey Dethier - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-20.
    A number of philosophers of science have argued that there are important differences between robustness in modeling and experimental contexts, and—in particular—many of them have claimed that the former is non-confirmatory. In this paper, I argue for the opposite conclusion: robust hypotheses are confirmed under conditions that do not depend on the differences between and models and experiments—that is, the degree to which the robust hypothesis is confirmed depends on precisely the same factors in both situations. The positive argument turns (...)
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  19. Is consciousness intrinsically valuable?Andrew Y. Lee - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (1):1–17.
    Is consciousness intrinsically valuable? Some theorists favor the positive view, according to which consciousness itself accrues intrinsic value, independent of the particular kind of experience instantiated. In contrast, I favor the neutral view, according to which consciousness is neither intrinsically valuable nor disvaluable. The primary purpose of this paper is to clarify what is at stake when we ask whether consciousness is intrinsically valuable, to carve out the theoretical space, and to evaluate the question rigorously. Along the (...)
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  20.  75
    Is explainable artificial intelligence intrinsically valuable?Nathan Colaner - 2022 - AI and Society 37 (1):231-238.
    There is general consensus that explainable artificial intelligence is valuable, but there is significant divergence when we try to articulate why, exactly, it is desirable. This question must be distinguished from two other kinds of questions asked in the XAI literature that are sometimes asked and addressed simultaneously. The first and most obvious is the ‘how’ question—some version of: ‘how do we develop technical strategies to achieve XAI?’ Another question is specifying what kind of explanation is worth having in (...)
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  21. Neighborhoods and States: Why Collective Self-determination is Not Always Valuable.Torsten Menge - manuscript
    Collective self-determination is considered to be an important political value. Many liberal political philosophers appeal to it to defend the right of states to exclude would-be newcomers. In this paper, I challenge the value of collective self-determination in the case of countries like the US, former colonial powers with a history of white supremacist immigration and citizenship policies. I argue for my claim by way of an analogy: There is no value to white neighborhoods in the US, which are the (...)
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  22. Pornography and accommodation.Richard Kimberly Heck - 2021 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 64 (8):830-860.
    ABSTRACT In ‘Scorekeeping in a Pornographic Language Game’, Rae Langton and Caroline West borrow ideas from David Lewis to attempt to explain how pornography might subordinate and silence women. Pornography is supposed to express certain misogynistic claims implicitly, through presupposition, and to convey them indirectly, through accommodation. I argue that the appeal to accommodation cannot do the sort of work Langton and West want it to do: Their case rests upon an overly simplified model of that phenomenon. I (...)
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  23. Deepfake Pornography and the Ethics of Non-Veridical Representations.Daniel Story & Ryan Jenkins - 2023 - Philosophy and Technology 36 (3):1-22.
    We investigate the question of whether (and if so why) creating or distributing deepfake pornography of someone without their consent is inherently objectionable. We argue that nonconsensually distributing deepfake pornography of a living person on the internet is inherently pro tanto wrong in virtue of the fact that nonconsensually distributing intentionally non-veridical representations about someone violates their right that their social identity not be tampered with, a right which is grounded in their interest in being able to exercise (...)
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  24. Why understanding-why is contrastive.Miguel Egler - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):6061-6083.
    Contrastivism about interrogative understanding is the view that ‘S understands why p’ posits a three-place epistemic relation between a subject S, a fact p, and an alternative to p, q. This thesis stands in stark opposition to the natural idea that a subject S can be said to understand why psimpliciter. I argue that contrastivism offers the best explanation for the fact that evaluations of the form ‘S understands why p’ vary depending on the alternatives to p under consideration. I (...)
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    Pornography and Public Reason.Lori Watson - 2007 - Social Theory and Practice 33 (3):467-488.
    This paper has two major goals: First, I argue that Catharine MacKinnon’s and Andrea Dworkin’s anti-pornography activism was an act of public reason and their arguments public reasons arguments. Thus, MacKinnon’s argument that pornography is best understood as a practice of sex discrimination is a public reason argument—and so can be defended as grounded in liberal political principles. Political liberalism, as I defend it, can support MacKinnon’s approach to pornography as embodied in a civil rights ordinance. By (...)
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  26. The Philosophical Case For Pornography.Danny Frederick - manuscript
  27. Why virtual friendship is no genuine friendship.Barbro Fröding & Martin Peterson - 2012 - Ethics and Information Technology 14 (3):201-207.
    Based on a modern reading of Aristotle’s theory of friendship, we argue that virtual friendship does not qualify as genuine friendship. By ‘virtual friendship’ we mean the type of friendship that exists on the internet, and seldom or never is combined with real life interaction. A ‘traditional friendship’ is, in contrast, the type of friendship that involves substantial real life interaction, and we claim that only this type can merit the label ‘genuine friendship’ and thus qualify as morally valuable. (...)
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  28.  33
    Why is the history of philosophy worth our study?Ryan Nichols - 2005 - Metaphilosophy 37 (1):34-52.
    Assume for the sake of argument that doing philosophy is intrinsically valuable, where “doing philosophy” refers to the practice of forging arguments for and against the truth of theses in the domains of metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and so on. The practice of the history of philosophy is devoted instead to discovering arguments for and against the truth of “authorial” propositions, that is, propositions that state the belief of some historical figure about a philosophical proposition. I explore arguments for thinking (...)
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  29. Pornography as Symptom.Jacob M. Held - 2013 - Philosophy in the Contemporary World 20 (1):15-27.
    Anti-Porn activists have argued for decades that pom is discrimination, it hamis women as a class. The Pro-porn response has been to dismiss these concems, laud the First Amendment, or argue that pornography is a valuable contribution to society. The debate has progressed little beyond this stage. In this article, I argue that it is time to frame the pomography debate as a discussion on sexualized media in general. Recent research indicates that the negative results often attributed to (...)
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  30. Art: What it Is and Why it Matters.Catharine Abell - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):671-691.
    In this paper, I provide a descriptive definition of art that is able to accommodate the existence of bad art, while illuminating the value of good art. This, I argue, is something that existing definitions of art fail to do. I approach this task by providing an account according to which what makes something an artwork is the institutional process by which it is made. I argue that Searle’s account of institutions and institutional facts shows that the existence of all (...)
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  31.  78
    Representing Pornography: Feminism, Criticism, and Depictions of Female Violation.Susan Gubar - 1987 - Critical Inquiry 13 (4):712-741.
    It is hardly necessary to rent I Spit on Your Grave or Tool Box Murders for your VCR in order to find images of sexuality contaminated by depersonalization or violence. As far back as Rabelais’ Gargantua, for example, Panurge proposes to build a wall around Paris out of the pleasure-twats of women [which] are much cheaper than stones”: “the largest … in front” would be followed by “the medium-sized, and last of all, the least and smallest,” all interlaced with “many (...)
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  32.  21
    Why is the history of philosophy worth our study? Ryannichols - 2006 - Metaphilosophy 37 (1):34–52.
    Assume for the sake of argument that doing philosophy is intrinsically valuable, where "doing philosophy" refers to the practice of forging arguments for and against the truth of theses in the domains of metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and so on. The practice of the history of philosophy is devoted instead to discovering arguments for and against the truth of "authorial" propositions, that is, propositions that state the belief of some historical figure about a philosophical proposition. I explore arguments for thinking (...)
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  33.  73
    Violent Pornography: censorship, morality and social alternatives.Judith Wagner Decew - 1984 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 1 (1):79-94.
    ABSTRACT I present and assess arguments both for and against censorship of pornography, explaining why the case on each side is inconclusive. In an effort to move beyond issues of censorship and to address the growing problem of violence in pornography, I propose a distinction between erotica and violent pornography. I then utilise this distinction to evaluate the moral status of, and certain social responses to, violent pornography. I show why most arguments that violent pornography (...)
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  34. physical realism, but in fact comports well with it. Our paper has two main parts. In part I we dwell on the phenomenon itself. We explain why conceptual relativity is so puzzling—indeed, why it initially appears impossible. We iden-tify three interrelated assumptions lying behind this apparent impossibility—. [REVIEW]Why Conceptual Relativity Seems Impossible - 2002 - In Ernest Sosa & Enrique Villanueva (eds.), Realism and Relativism. Blackwell.
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  35.  47
    Why is informed consent important?Rebecca Roache - 2014 - Journal of Medical Ethics 40 (7):435-436.
    Decision-making is a prominent theme in this edition of the Journal of Medical Ethics. Our feature article examines the relationship between trust and informed consent. Informed consent is, of course, central to the decision-making process in medicine. In addition, several articles consider decision-making in medicine from a variety of angles.Informed consent and trust: Eyal's argumentIn our feature article, Nir Eyal attacks attempts by bioethicists including Onora O'Neill, Torbjörn Tännsjö, and Jennifer Jackson to ground the importance of informed consent in its (...)
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  36.  26
    Why Is the First Principle of the Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre Foundational for Fichte’s Entire Wissenschaftslehre?Alexander Schnell - 2021 - Fichte-Studien 49:79-93.
    This article aims at a new interpretation of paragraph §1 of Fichte’s main work of 1794/95, the Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre. This well-known text of the early Jena period explicitly introduces a number of thought motifs that will prove to be valuable for the later versions of the Wissenschaftslehre – including the second version of 1804 – and these motifs will furthermore illuminate the significance of the first principle for Fichte’s entire Wissenschaftslehre.
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  37. How Not To Watch Feminist Pornography.Richard Kimberly Heck - 2021 - Feminist Philosophical Quarterly 7 (1):Article 3.
    This paper has three goals. The first is to defend Tristan Taromino and Erika Lust (or some of their films) from criticisms that Rebecca Whisnant and Hans Maes make of them. Toward that end, I will be arguing against the narrow conceptions that Whisnant and Maes have of what `feminist' pornography must be like. More generally, I hope to show by example why it is important to take pornographic films seriously as films if we're to understand their potential to (...)
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  38.  29
    Why More Choice is Sometimes Worse than Less.Kerah Gordon-Solmon - 2017 - Law and Philosophy 36 (1):25-44.
    In this paper, I shall argue that personal autonomy requires the availability of an adequate range of valuable options from which to choose, but that the availability of a larger rather than a smaller set of valuable options can be inimical to, rather than supportive, of autonomy.
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  39. Why Care about Being an Agent.Caroline T. Arruda - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (3):488-504.
    The question ‘Why care about being an agent?’ asks for reasons to be something that appears to be non-optional. But perhaps it is closer to the question ‘Why be moral?’; or so I shall argue. Here the constitutivist answer—that we cannot help but have this aim—seems to be the best answer available. I suggest that, regardless of whether constitutivism is true, it is an incomplete answer. I argue that we should instead answer the question by looking at our evaluative commitments (...)
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  40.  16
    Why ‘Indirect Discrimination’ Is a Useful Legal but Not a Useful Moral Concept.Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen - 2022 - Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics 15 (1).
    A policy indirectly discriminates against a group, G, if, and only if: it does not reflect an objectionable mental state regarding the members of G; it disadvantages members of G; the disadvantages are disproportionate; and G is a socially salient group. I argue that indirect discrimination is not non-instrumentally morally wrong. Clearly, if it were, that would be because it harms members of G disproportionately, i.e., in virtue of features and. Harming members of a group disproportionately does appear non-instrumentally wrong. (...)
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  41. Pornography and power.Amy Allen - 2001 - Journal of Social Philosophy 32 (4):512–531.
    When it was at its height, the feminist pornography debate tended to generate more heat than light. Only now that there has been a cease fire in the sex war does it seem possible to reflect on the debate in a more productive way and to address some of the questions that were left unresolved by it. In this paper, I shall argue that one of the major unresolved questions is that of how feminists should conceptualize power. The antipornography (...)
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  42. Art and Pornography: Philosophical Essays.Hans Maes & Jerrold Levinson (eds.) - 2012 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
    Art and Pornography presents a series of essays which investigate the artistic status and aesthetic dimension of pornographic pictures, films, and literature, and explores the distinction, if there is any, between pornography and erotic art. Is there any overlap between art and pornography, or are the two mutually exclusive? If they are, why is that? If they are not, how might we characterize pornographic art or artistic pornography, and how might pornographic art be distinguished, if at (...)
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  43. Understanding Why.Alison Hills - 2015 - Noûs 49 (2):661-688.
    I argue that understanding why p involves a kind of intellectual know how and differsfrom both knowledge that p and knowledge why p (as they are standardly understood).I argue that understanding, in this sense, is valuable.
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  44. Notice After Notice-and-Consent: Why Privacy Disclosures Are Valuable Even If Consent Frameworks Aren’t.Daniel Susser - 2019 - Journal of Information Policy 9:37-62.
    The dominant legal and regulatory approach to protecting information privacy is a form of mandated disclosure commonly known as “notice-and-consent.” Many have criticized this approach, arguing that privacy decisions are too complicated, and privacy disclosures too convoluted, for individuals to make meaningful consent decisions about privacy choices—decisions that often require us to waive important rights. While I agree with these criticisms, I argue that they only meaningfully call into question the “consent” part of notice-and-consent, and that they say little about (...)
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  45. Why Think for Yourself?Jonathan Matheson - 2022 - Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology:1-19.
    Life is a group project. It takes a village. The same is true of our intellectual lives. Since we are finite cognitive creatures with limited time and resources, any healthy intellectual life requires that we rely quite heavily on others. For nearly any question you want to investigate, there is someone who is in a better epistemic position than you are to determine the answer. For most people, their expertise does not extend far beyond their own personal lives, and even (...)
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  46. Eco-anxiety: What it is and why it matters.Charlie Kurth & Panu Pihkala - 2022 - Frontiers in Psychology 13:981814.
    Researchers are increasingly trying to understand both the emotions that we experience in response to ecological crises like climate change and the ways in which these emotions might be valuable for our (psychical, psychological, and moral) wellbeing. However, much of the existing work on these issues has been hampered by conceptual and methodological difficulties. As a first step toward addressing these challenges, this review focuses on eco-anxiety. Analyzing a broad range of studies through the use of methods from philosophy, (...)
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  47.  20
    Why is Popper's critical method fascinating? [REVIEW]Paweł Jan Polak - 2021 - Philosophical Problems in Science 71:211-216.
    This review article presents an important, newly published study of Popper's critical method by Zbigniew Liana. The review emphasizes the very high level of the study, points to its originality, and explains why the book is recommended mainly to specialists of Popper's thought. It is also explained how the book manages to contain so many original and valuable analyses in a small volume.
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  48. Aesthetic Derogation: Hate Speech, Pornography, and Aesthetic Contexts,.Lynne Tirrell - 1999 - In Jerrold Levinson (ed.), Aesthetics and Ethics: Essays at the Intersection. Cambridge University Press.
    Derogatory terms (racist, sexist, ethnic epithets) have long played various roles and achieved diverse ends in works of art. Focusing on basic aspects of an aesthetic object or work, this article examines the interpretive relation between point of view and content, asking how aesthetic contextualization shapes the impact of such terms. Can context, particularly aesthetic contexts, detach the derogatory force from powerful epithets and racist and sexist images? What would it be about aesthetic contexts that would make this possible? The (...)
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  49.  16
    Why We Should Stop Fethishing Democracy.Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij - 2021 - Journal of Philosophical Research 46:145-154.
    Democracy is in trouble, and it is democracy’s own fault—that is Robert Talisse’s intriguing contention is his recent book, Overdoing Democracy: Why We Must Put Politics in its Place (2019). What gets democracy into trouble, according to Talisse, is the idea that a democratic form of government is intrinsically valuable, which in turn entails a deliberative conception of democracy that, in combination with the social-psychological fact of social sorting, leads to rampant polarization. According to Talisse, we therefore need to (...)
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    Why Internet Porn Matters.Margret Grebowicz - 2013 - Stanford University Press.
    Now that pornography is on the Internet, its political and social functions have changed. So contends Margret Grebowicz in this imperative philosophical analysis of Internet porn. The production and consumption of Internet porn, in her account, are a symptom of the obsession with self-exposure in today's social networking media, which is, in turn, a symptom of the modern democratic construction of the governable subject as both transparent and communicative. In this first feminist critique to privilege the effects of (...)'s Internet distribution rather than what it depicts, Grebowicz examines porn-sharing communities and the politics of putting women's sexual pleasure on display as part of the larger democratic project. Arguing against this project, she shows that sexual pleasure is not a human right. Unlikely convergences between thinkers like Catherine MacKinnon, Jean Baudrillard, Judith Butler, and Jean-François Lyotard allow her to formulate a theory of the relationships between sex, speech, and power that stands as an alternative to such cyber-libertarian mottos as "freedom of speech" and "sexual freedom.". (shrink)
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