Klugheit und Moralität werden gewöhnlich für gegensätzlich gehalten. Die Klugheit sagt uns, "Tue das, was Deinen Interessen am besten entspricht". Die Moralität dagegen verlangt von jedem von uns, das Richtige zu tun. Unter dem "Richtigen" wird meist das verstanden, was für jeden – oder zumindest für die meisten – das Beste ist. Die Autoren des Bandes wenden sich dem Problemfeld eine Entscheidung zwischen Klugheit und Moralität aus dem Blickwinkel der Spieltheorie zu. Sie versuchen nicht weniger als eine Theorie der praktischen (...) Vernunft aufzustellen – für eine Welt, die naturwissenschaftlich und individualistisch bestimmt ist. (shrink)
Die Frage nach der Begrundung ethischer Verbindlichkeit und der Geltung ethischer Normen steht im Zentrum der Ethik als Wissenschaft. Diese Grundfragen der Normativitat aus verschiedenen Blickwinkeln zu beleuchten, ist Ziel der Beitrage dieses Bandes. Im ersten Teil werden zunachst die Grundlagen der Normativitat behandelt. Die Beitrage des zweiten Teils setzen sich mit Normativitat unter besonderer Berucksichtigung der Stellung des Individuums auseinander. Der dritte Teil fasst schliesslich normative Fragen gesellschaftlicher Ordnung in den Blick, wobei auch spezifische Probleme aus den Bereichsethiken behandelt (...) werden. Der Band versammelt Essays fuhrender deutscher Ethiker, die ihre je unterschiedlichen inhaltlichen Positionen in den Diskurs der Normativitat einbringen. (shrink)
Free agency can be explained causally if the causal approach does not imply reductionism. A non-reductionist account of action is possible along the lines of Davidsonian 'anomalous monism'. Mental events, i.e. prepositional attitudes activated by indexical beliefs, are the causes of actions. Free agency presupposes a special type of causes to be analysed as rational causes allowing human agents to be self-determinant, autonomous agents in Kantian terms. An action is free if it has rational causes not to be ruled out (...) by natural causes. With causes of actions being activated prepositional attitudes their rationality is analysed in terms of the coherence of prepositional attitudes. Principles of rational choice are not the basic ingredients of free i.e. rational action but have to conform to the prepositional attitudes of the human agent. (shrink)
Free agency can be explained causally if the causal approach does not imply reductionism. A non-reductionist account of action is possible along the lines of Davidsonian 'anomalous monism'. Mental events, i.e. prepositional attitudes activated by indexical beliefs, are the causes of actions. Free agency presupposes a special type of causes to be analysed as rational causes allowing human agents to be self-determinant, autonomous agents in Kantian terms. An action is free if it has rational causes not to be ruled out (...) by natural causes. With causes of actions being activated prepositional attitudes their rationality is analysed in terms of the coherence of prepositional attitudes. Principles of rational choice are not the basic ingredients of free i.e. rational action but have to conform to the prepositional attitudes of the human agent. (shrink)
Free agency can be explained causally if the causal approach does not imply reductionism. A non-reductionist account of action is possible along the lines of Davidsonian 'anomalous monism'. Mental events, i.e. prepositional attitudes activated by indexical beliefs, are the causes of actions. Free agency presupposes a special type of causes to be analysed as rational causes allowing human agents to be self-determinant, autonomous agents in Kantian terms. An action is free if it has rational causes not to be ruled out (...) by natural causes. With causes of actions being activated prepositional attitudes their rationality is analysed in terms of the coherence of prepositional attitudes. Principles of rational choice are not the basic ingredients of free i.e. rational action but have to conform to the prepositional attitudes of the human agent. (shrink)
There is plenty of evidence, e.g. in mathematics, in the sciences, and in economics, that rationality is paramount to all other cognitive powers. There is further evidence that intentions are borne and originate in the mind. We therefore might be inclined to conclude that rational intentions are brought about in the mind internally by the best of all cognitive powers. In this case it would be enough to analyse mental representations which are antecedent to decision making in order to find (...) the basic ingredients causing rational or irrational intentions. But there is neither evidence for representations of this sort nor for mental causes of rational intentions. It is true that intending is a mental state or act, but it would, indeed, be false to believe that intentions are produced or brought about internally, i.e., without reference to the external world. Some intentions seem to be irrational although their mental origin is not different from the origin of rational ones. I shall argue that this indifference of origin of rational and irrational intentions is due to the fact that intentions like all volitional attitudes - have external meanings. This implies that the criteria of rationality themselves are external to the mental activities of reasoning and intending. `External' here means that the contents of volitional attitudes are individuated by the objects they are directed to and not by the mental acts or performances of intending themselves. I shall further argue that the indifference of origin of rational and irrational intentions sheds light on the hybrid nature of rationality. For the sake of argument I shall use examples from the theory of choice. The gist of my argument is that intentional states enable us to choose mental acts, speech acts or non-verbal actions without reflecting alternatives beforehand. (shrink)
