Search results for 'Will Cartwright' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Nancy Cartwright, Stephan Hartmann, Carl Hoefer & Luc Bovens (eds.) (2008). Nancy Cartwright's Philosophy of Science. Routledge.
    Nancy Cartwright is one of the most distinguished and influential contemporary philosophers of science. Despite the profound impact of her work, there is neither a systematic exposition of Cartwright’s philosophy of science nor a collection of articles that contains in-depth discussions of the major themes of her philosophy. This book is devoted to a critical assessment of Cartwright’s philosophy of science and contains contributions from Cartwright's champions and critics. Broken into three parts, the book begins by (...)
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  2.  56
    Nancy Cartwright (2012). Presidential Address: Will This Policy Work for You? Predicting Effectiveness Better: How Philosophy Helps. Philosophy of Science 79 (5):973-989.
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  3. Nancy Cartwright (2011). Predicting 'It Will Work for Us': (Way) Beyond Statistics. In Phyllis McKay Illari, Federica Russo & Jon Williamson (eds.), Causality in the Sciences. Oxford University Press.
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  4. Will Cartwright (2006). Reasons and Selves: Two Accounts of Responsibility in Theory and Practice. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 13 (2):143-155.
    This paper advances further three of the matters dealt with in “Reasons and Selves: Two Accounts of Responsibility in Theory and Practice” (Cartwright 2006). It discusses the two theories of responsibility at the center of “Reasons and Selves” in the light of remarks made by the two commentators. It takes the sort of person who provided the practical example in “Reasons and Selves,” namely the delinquent with a disastrous background, and assembles a variety of possible ways of thinking about (...)
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  5.  26
    Nancy Cartwright, Jordi Cat, Lola Fleck & Thomas E. Uebel (eds.) (1996). Otto Neurath: Philosophy Between Science and Politics. Cambridge University Press.
    An international team of four authors, led by distinguished philosopher of science, Nancy Cartwright, and leading scholar of the Vienna Circle, Thomas E. Uebel, have produced this lucid and elegant study of a much-neglected figure. The book, which depicts Neurath's science in the political, economic and intellectual milieu in which it was practised, is divided into three sections: Neurath's biographical background and the socio-political context of his economic ideas; the development of his theory of science; and his legacy as (...)
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  6.  45
    Nancy Cartwright (2007). Hunting Causes and Using Them: Approaches in Philosophy and Economics. Cambridge University Press.
    Hunting Causes and Using Them argues that causation is not one thing, as commonly assumed, but many. There is a huge variety of causal relations, each with different characterizing features, different methods for discovery and different uses to which it can be put. In this collection of new and previously published essays, Nancy Cartwright provides a critical survey of philosophical and economic literature on causality, with a special focus on the currently fashionable Bayes-nets and invariance methods - and it (...)
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  7. Nancy Cartwright (1994). Nature's Capacities and Their Measurement. Oxford University Press UK.
    This book argues for the place of capacities within an grounds of meaning, not method. Yet it is questions of method that should concern the modern empiricist: can capacities be measured? Cartwright argues that they are measured if anything is. Stanford University's Gravity-Probe-B will measure capacities in a cryogenic dewar deep in space. More mundanely, we use probabilities to measure capacities, and the assumptions required to ensure that probabilities are a reliable instrument are investigated in the opening chapters (...)
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  8.  33
    Will Cartwright (2006). Responsibility: A Puzzle, Two Theories, and Bad Background. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 13 (2):167-176.
    This essay seeks to illuminate both the theory and practice of holding people responsible. It investi- gates two leading accounts of responsibility, examining some of their implications and certain difficulties that they face. It tests the two accounts by applying them to an illustrative example, which demonstrates how the questions that are decisive in judging an agent’s responsibility are notably different on the two accounts. Although both views are variously illuminating, they each face difficulties and arguably depend on, or foster, (...)
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  9.  11
    Transforming Will (2010). Samoans Have a Word for “Will”—Loto—but Anthropologists Have Not Always Translated It Thusly, Which Puzzled Me When I First Began Doing Ethnography in American Sāmoa in the 1980s. I Was Taking a Language Class Kindly Offered to Stateside Teachers by a High-Ranking Member of the Government. He Decided to Teach Us a Love Song, Chanting the Language Into Our Heads. He Gave Us the Samoan Version and an English Translation with Every Word Glossed but One—Loto. After Class, I Asked Him to Translate It. He ... [REVIEW] In Keith M. Murphy & C. Jason Throop (eds.), Toward an Anthropology of the Will. Stanford University Press. pp. 123.
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  10.  48
    Nancy Cartwright (2010). Reply to Steel and Pearl Hunting Causes and Using Them: Approaches in Philosophy and Economics , Nancy Cartwright. Cambridge University Press, 2008, X + 270 Pages. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 26 (1):87-94.
  11. Marie Bismark & Jennifer Morris (2014). The Legacy of the Cartwright Report: “Lest It Happen Again”. Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 11 (4):425-429.
    The 1987 Cartwright Report into events at New Zealand’s National Women’s Hospital catalysed sweeping changes to promote and protect patients’ rights. A generation on, it is comfortable to believe that such sustained and deliberate violations of patient rights “couldn’t happen here” and “couldn’t happen now.” And yet, contemporary examples beg a different truth. Three of Cartwright’s messages hold an enduring relevance for health practitioners and patients: the need for patients to be respected as people; to be supported to (...)
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  12. Sheldon R. Smith (2001). Models and the Unity of Classical Physics: Nancy Cartwright's Dappled World. Philosophy of Science 68 (4):456-475.
    In this paper, I examine the claim that any physical theory will have an extremely limited domain of application because 1) we have to use distinct theories to model different situations in the world and 2) no theory has enough textbook models to handle anything beyond a highly simplified situation. Against the first claim, I show that many examples used to bolster it are actually instances of application of the very same classical theory rather than disjoint theories. Thus, there (...)
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  13.  16
    L. Boland (2010). Cartwright on "Economics". Philosophy of the Social Sciences 40 (3):530-538.
    Nancy Cartwright claims that "Causality is a hot topic today both in philosophy and economics." She may be right about philosophers, but not when it comes to economists. Cartwright talks about "economics" but nothing she says about it corresponds to what is taught in economics classes. Today, economics is dominated by model builders—but not all models involve econometrics. While all model builders do respect an endogenous-exogenous distinction between variables, this distinction will not be on the basis of (...)
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  14. Luc Bovens, Carl Hoefer & Stephan Hartmann (eds.) (2010). Nancy Cartwright’s Philosophy of Science. Routledge.
    Nancy Cartwright is one of the most distinguished and influential contemporary philosophers of science. Despite the profound impact of her work, there is neither a systematic exposition of Cartwright’s philosophy of science nor a collection of articles that contains in-depth discussions of the major themes of her philosophy. This book is devoted to a critical assessment of Cartwright’s philosophy of science and contains contributions from Cartwright's champions and critics. Broken into three parts, the book begins by (...)
     
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  15. Luc Bovens, Carl Hoefer & Stephan Hartmann (eds.) (2008). Nancy Cartwright’s Philosophy of Science. Routledge.
    Nancy Cartwright is one of the most distinguished and influential contemporary philosophers of science. Despite the profound impact of her work, there is neither a systematic exposition of Cartwright’s philosophy of science nor a collection of articles that contains in-depth discussions of the major themes of her philosophy. This book is devoted to a critical assessment of Cartwright’s philosophy of science and contains contributions from Cartwright's champions and critics. Broken into three parts, the book begins by (...)
     
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  16.  61
    Sherrilyn Roush (2009). Randomized Controlled Trials and the Flow of Information: Comment on Cartwright. Philosophical Studies 143 (1):137-145.
    The transferability problem—whether the results of an experiment will transfer to a treatment population—affects not only Randomized Controlled Trials but any type of study. The problem for any given type of study can also, potentially, be addressed to some degree through many different types of study. The transferability problem for a given RCT can be investigated further through another RCT, but the variables to use in the further experiment must be discovered. This suggests we could do better on the (...)
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  17.  20
    Steve Clarke (1995). The Lies Remain the Same: A Reply to Chalmers. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73 (1):152 – 155.
    In her 1983 work How the Laws of Phyiscs Lie [1] Nancy Cartwright argued for antirealism about fundamental laws alongside realism about phenomenological laws. Her position was considerably altered by 1989 when, in Nature's Capacities and Their Measurement [2], she argued for a realist construal of capacities (close relations of Powers, natures, tendencies, propensities and disptısitions), which she took fundamental laws to be about. Most realists about capaeities, and their ilk, are realist about fundamental laws as well. However this (...)
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  18. Alfred R. Mele (2006). Free Will and Luck. Oxford University Press.
    Mele's ultimate purpose in this book is to help readers think more clearly about free will. He identifies and makes vivid the most important conceptual obstacles to justified belief in the existence of free will and meets them head on. Mele clarifies the central issues in the philosophical debate about free will and moral responsibility, criticizes various influential contemporary theories about free will, and develops two overlapping conceptions of free will--one for readers who are convinced (...)
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  19. Daniel C. Dennett (1984). Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting. MIT Press.
    Essays discuss reason, self-control, self-definition, time, cause and effect, accidents, and responsibility, and explain why people want free will.
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  20.  87
    John Martin Fischer (1994). The Metaphysics of Free Will: An Essay on Control. Blackwell.
    The Metaphysics of Free Will provides a through statement of the major grounds for skepticism about the reality of free will and moral responsibility. The author identifies and explains the sort of control that is associated with personhood and accountability, and shows how it is consistent with causal determinism. In so doing, out view of ourselves as morally responsible agents is protected against the disturbing changes posed by science and religion.
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  21. Harry G. Frankfurt (1971). Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person. Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.
    It is my view that one essential difference between persons and other creatures is to be found in the structure of a person's will. Besides wanting and choosing and being moved to do this or that, men may also want to have certain desires and motives. They are capable of wanting to be different, in their preferences and purposes, from what they are. Many animals appear to have the capacity for what I shall call "first-order desires" or "desires of (...)
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  22.  28
    Michelle Ciurria (2014). Moral Responsibility and Mental Health: Applying the Standard of the Reasonable Person. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 21 (1):1-12.
    It is contested whether and to what extent moral responsibility can be ascribed to persons with mental health disabilities. Will Cartwright (2006) evaluates two prevalent theories of responsibility in terms of their suitability for morally appraising sociopathic personality disorder, particularly as embodied in the famous homicidal bank robber Robert Harris. Cartwright argues that our intuitions about Harris conflict because we are instantly horrified by Harris’ actions, but we are forced to reconsider our initial moral reaction when we (...)
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  23. Alfred R. Mele (2007). Free Will and Luck. Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):153 – 155.
    Mele's ultimate purpose in this book is to help readers think more clearly about free will. He identifies and makes vivid the most important conceptual obstacles to justified belief in the existence of free will and meets them head on. Mele clarifies the central issues in the philosophical debate about free will and moral responsibility, criticizes various influential contemporary theories about free will, and develops two overlapping conceptions of free will--one for readers who are convinced (...)
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  24. Eddy Nahmias, Stephen G. Morris, Thomas Nadelhoffer & Jason Turner (2005). Surveying Freedom: Folk Intuitions About Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Philosophical Psychology 18 (5):561-584.
    Philosophers working in the nascent field of ‘experimental philosophy’ have begun using methods borrowed from psychology to collect data about folk intuitions concerning debates ranging from action theory to ethics to epistemology. In this paper we present the results of our attempts to apply this approach to the free will debate, in which philosophers on opposing sides claim that their view best accounts for and accords with folk intuitions. After discussing the motivation for such research, we describe our methodology (...)
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  25. Daniel M. Wegner (2002). The Illusion of Conscious Will. MIT Press.
    In this book Daniel Wegner offers a novel understanding of the relation of consciousness, the will, and our intentional and voluntary actions. Wegner claims that our experience and common sense view according to which we can influence our behavior roughly the way we experience that we do it is an illusion.
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  26. Eddy Nahmias (2011). Intuitions About Free Will, Determinism, and Bypassing. In Robert Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, 2nd Ed. Oxford University Press.
    It is often called “the problem of free will and determinism,” as if the only thing that might challenge free will is determinism and as if determinism is obviously a problem. The traditional debates about free will have proceeded accordingly. Typically, incompatibilists about free will and determinism suggest that their position is intuitive or commonsensical, such that compatibilists have the burden of showing how, despite appearances, the problem of determinism is not really a problem. Compatibilists, in (...)
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  27. Christian List (2014). Free Will, Determinism, and the Possibility of Doing Otherwise. Noûs 48 (1):156-178.
    I argue that free will and determinism are compatible, even when we take free will to require the ability to do otherwise and even when we interpret that ability modally, as the possibility of doing otherwise, and not just conditionally or dispositionally. My argument draws on a distinction between physical and agential possibility. Although in a deterministic world only one future sequence of events is physically possible for each state of the world, the more coarsely defined state of (...)
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  28.  49
    Adina Roskies & Eddy Nahmias (2016). “Local Determination”, Even If We Could Find It, Does Not Challenge Free Will: Commentary on Marcelo Fischborn. Philosophical Psychology:1-9.
    Marcelo Fischborn discusses the significance of neuroscience for debates about free will. Although he concedes that, to date, Libet-style experiments have failed to threaten “libertarian free will”, he argues that, in principle, neuroscience and psychology could do so by supporting local determinism. We argue that, in principle, Libet-style experiments cannot succeed in disproving or even establishing serious doubt about libertarian free will. First, we contend that “local determination”, as Fischborn outlines it, is not a coherent concept. Moreover, (...)
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  29. Gregg D. Caruso (2016). Free Will Skepticism and Criminal Behavior: A Public Health-Quarantine Model. Southwest Philosophy Review 32 (1):25-48.
    One of the most frequently voiced criticisms of free will skepticism is that it is unable to adequately deal with criminal behavior and that the responses it would permit as justified are insufficient for acceptable social policy. This concern is fueled by two factors. The first is that one of the most prominent justifications for punishing criminals, retributivism, is incompatible with free will skepticism. The second concern is that alternative justifications that are not ruled out by the skeptical (...)
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  30. R. Mele Alfred (2009). Effective Intentions: The Power of Conscious Will. Oxford University Press.
    Each of the following claims has been defended in the scientific literature on free will and consciousness: your brain routinely decides what you will do before you become conscious of its decision; there is only a 100 millisecond window of opportunity for free will, and all it can do is veto conscious decisions, intentions, or urges; intentions never play a role in producing corresponding actions; and free will is an illusion. In Effective Intentions Alfred Mele shows (...)
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  31. van Inwagen Peter (1983). An Essay on Free Will. Oxford University Press.
    "This is an important book, and no one interested in issues which touch on the free will will want to ignore it."--Ethics. In this stimulating and thought-provoking book, the author defends the thesis that free will is incompatible with determinism. He disputes the view that determinism is necessary for moral responsbility. Finding no good reason for accepting determinism, but believing moral responsiblity to be indubitable, he concludes that determinism should be rejected.
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  32.  7
    Brian O'Shaughnessy (2008). The Will: A Dual Aspect Theory. Cambridge University Press.
    The phenomenon of action in which the mind moves the body has puzzled philosophers over the centuries. In this new edition of a classic work of analytical philosophy, Brian O'Shaughnessy investigates bodily action and attempts to resolve some of the main problems. His expanded and updated discussion examines the scope of the will and the conditions in which it makes contact with the body, and investigates the epistemology of the body. He sheds light upon the strangely intimate relation of (...)
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  33. Manuel Vargas (forthcoming). Situationism and Moral Responsibility: Free Will in Fragments. In Tillman Vierkant, Julian Kiverstein & Andy Clark (eds.), Decomposing the Will. Oxford Up.
    Many prominent accounts of free will and moral responsibility make use of the idea that agents can be responsive to reasons. Call such theories Reasons accounts. In what follows, I consider the tenability of Reasons accounts in light of situationist social psychology and, to a lesser extent, the automaticity literature. In the first half of this chapter, I argue that Reasons accounts are genuinely threatened by contemporary psychology. In the second half of the paper I consider whether such threats (...)
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  34. Manuel Vargas (2013). How to Solve the Problem of Free Will. In Paul Russell & Oisin Deery (eds.), The Philosophy of Free Will: Essential Readings From the Contemporary Debates. Oup Usa. pp. 400.
    This paper outlines one way of thinking about the problem of free will, some general reasons for dissatisfactions with traditional approaches to solving it, and some considerations in favor of pursuing a broadly revisionist solution to it. If you are looking for a student-friendly introduction to revisionist theorizing about free will, this is probably the thing to look at.
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  35. Marcus Arvan (2013). A New Theory of Free Will. Philosophical Forum 44 (1):1-48.
    This paper shows that several live philosophical and scientific hypotheses – including the holographic principle and multiverse theory in quantum physics, and eternalism and mind-body dualism in philosophy – jointly imply an audacious new theory of free will. This new theory, "Libertarian Compatibilism", holds that the physical world is an eternally existing array of two-dimensional information – a vast number of possible pasts, presents, and futures – and the mind a nonphysical entity or set of properties that "read" that (...)
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  36.  4
    Martín López-Corredoira (2016). Against Free Will in the Contemporary Natural Sciences. In Free Will: Interpretations, Implementations and Assessments. Nova Science Publ..
    The claim of the freedom of the will (understood as an individual who is transcendent to Nature) in the name of XXth century scientific knowledge, against the perspective of XVIIIth-XIXth century scientific materialism, is analysed and refuted in the present paper. The hypothesis of reductionism finds no obstacle within contemporary natural sciences. Determinism in classical physics is irrefutable, unless classical physics is itself refuted. From quantum mechanics, some authors argue that free will is possible because there is an (...)
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  37. Saul Smilansky (2000). Free Will and Illusion. Oxford University Press.
    Saul Smilansky presents an original new approach to the problem of free will, which lies at the heart of morality and self-understanding. He maintains that the key to the problem is the role played by illusion. Smilansky boldly claims that we could not live adequately with a complete awareness of the truth about human freedom and that illusion lies at the center of the human condition.
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  38. Gregg Caruso (forthcoming). Free Will Skepticism and Its Implications: An Argument for Optimism. In Elizabeth Shaw (ed.), Free Will Skepticism in Law and Society.
  39. Randolph Clarke (2009). Dispositions, Abilities to Act, and Free Will: The New Dispositionalism. Mind 118 (470):323-351.
    This paper examines recent attempts to revive a classic compatibilist position on free will, according to which having an ability to perform a certain action is having a certain disposition. Since having unmanifested dispositions is compatible with determinism, having unexercised abilities to act, it is held, is likewise compatible. Here it is argued that although there is a kind of capacity to act possession of which is a matter of having a disposition, the new dispositionalism leaves unresolved the main (...)
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    E. Schultz, E. T. Cokely & A. Feltz (2011). Persistent Bias in Expert Judgments About Free Will and Moral Responsibility: A Test of the Expertise Defense. Consciousness and Cognition 20 (4):1722-1731.
    Many philosophers appeal to intuitions to support some philosophical views. However, there is reason to be concerned about this practice as scientific evidence has documented systematic bias in philosophically relevant intuitions as a function of seemingly irrelevant features (e.g., personality). One popular defense used to insulate philosophers from these concerns holds that philosophical expertise eliminates the influence of these extraneous factors. Here, we test this assumption. We present data suggesting that verifiable philosophical expertise in the free will debate-as measured (...)
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  41.  89
    George Ainslie (2005). Precis of Breakdown of Will. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (5):635-650.
    Behavioral science has long been puzzled by the experience of temptation, the resulting impulsiveness, and the variably successful control of this impulsiveness. In conventional theories, a governing faculty like the ego evaluates future choices consistently over time, discounting their value for delay exponentially, that is, by a constant rate; impulses arise when this ego is confronted by a conditioned appetite. Breakdown of Will presents evidence that contradicts this model. Both people and nonhuman animals spontaneously discount the value of expected (...)
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  42.  25
    Neal A. Tognazzini (forthcoming). Free Will and Time Travel. In Meghan Griffith, Neil Levy & Kevin Timpe (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Free Will. Routledge.
    In this chapter I articulate the threat that time travel to the past allegedly poses to the free will of the time traveler, and I argue that on the traditional way of thinking about free will, the incompatibilist about time travel and free will wins the day. However, a residual worry about the incompatibilist view points the way toward a novel way of thinking about free will, one that I tentatively explore toward the end of the (...)
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  43. Gregg Caruso (2013). Introduction: Exploring the Illusion of Free Will and Moral Responsibility. In Gregg D. Caruso (ed.), Exploring the Illusion of Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Lexington Books.
    This introductory chapter discusses the philosophical and scientific arguments for free will skepticism and their implications--including the debate between Saul Smilansky's "illusionism," Thomas Nadelhoffer's "disillusionism," Shaun Nichols' "anti-revolution," and the "optimistic skepticism" of Derk Pereboom, Bruce Waller, Tamler Sommers, and others.
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  44. Manuel Vargas (2011). Revisionist Accounts of Free Will: Origins, Varieties, and Challenges. In Robert Kane (ed.), Oxford Handbook on Free Will, 2nd Edition. Oxford University Press.
    The present chapter is concerned with revisionism about free will. It begins by offering a new characterization of revisionist accounts and the way such accounts fit (or do not) in the familiar framework of compatibilism and incompatibilism. It then traces some of the recent history of the development of revisionist accounts, and concludes by remarking on some challenges for them.
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    Manuel Vargas (2014). Social Explanations and the Free Will Problem. In Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Moral Psychology, Vol. 4: Free Will and Moral Responsibility. pp. 403-411.
    There is strikingly little agreement across academic fields about the existence of free will, what experimental results show, and even what the term ‘free will’ means. In Lee and Harris’ “A Social Perspective on Debates About Free Will” the authors argue that group identities and their attendant social rewards are part of the problem. As they portray it, “different philosophical stances create social groups and inherent conflict, hindering interdisciplinary intellectual exploration on the question of free will (...)
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    Manuel Vargas (2014). Reconsidering Scientific Threats to Free Will. In Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Moral Psychology, Vol. 4: Free Will and Moral Responsibility. MIT Press. pp. 417-425.
    In “Free Will and Substance Dualism: The Real Scientific Threat to Free Will?” Al Mele extends his groundbreaking work on scientific arguments against free will. He replies to charges that he has missed the real threat to free will posed by experimental work, and he focuses on two issues: (1) the claim that the “real” threat of scientific work is bound up with substance dualism, and (2) recent work by Soon et al. that has been taken (...)
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  47. Christian Miller (forthcoming). Situationism and Free Will. In Griffith Meghan, Timpe Kevin & Levy Neil (eds.), Routledge Companion to Free Will. Routledge.
    This handbook article reviews the situationist movements in psychology and philosophy, before turning to possible implications for issues about free will and moral responsibility. Particular attention is paid to possible threats to reasons-responsiveness and to agency.
     
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  48. Benjamin Vilhauer (2008). Incompatibilism and Ontological Priority in Kant's Theory of Free Will. In Pablo Muchnik (ed.), Incompatibilism and Ontological Priority in Kant's Theory of Free Will.
    This paper concerns the role of the transcendental distinction between agents qua phenomena and qua noumena in Kant's theory of free will. It argues (1) that Kant's incompatibilism can be accommodated if one accepts the "ontological" interpretation of this distinction (i.e. the view that agents qua noumena are ontologically prior to agents qua phenomena), and (2) that Kant's incompatibilism cannot be accommodated by the "two-aspect" interpretation, whose defining feature is the rejection of the ontological priority of agents qua noumena. (...)
     
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  49.  41
    Caruso Gregg (forthcoming). Consciousness, Free Will, Moral Responsibility. In Rocco Gennaro (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Consciousness. Routledge.
    In recent decades, with advances in the behavioral, cognitive, and neurosciences, the idea that patterns of human behavior may ultimately be due to factors beyond our conscious control has increasingly gained traction and renewed interest in the age-old problem of free will. To properly assess what, if anything, these empirical advances can tell us about free will and moral responsibility, we first need to get clear on the following questions: Is consciousness necessary for free will? If so, (...)
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  50. Mark Balaguer (2010). Free Will as an Open Scientific Problem. MIT Press.
    In this largely antimetaphysical treatment of free will and determinism, Mark Balaguer argues that the philosophical problem of free will boils down to an open ...
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