The field of behavioral ethics has seen considerable growth over the last few decades. One of the most significant concerns facing this interdisciplinary field of research is the moral judgment-action gap. The moral judgment-action gap is the inconsistency people display when they know what is right but do what they know is wrong. Much of the research in the field of behavioral ethics is based on early work in moral psychology and American psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg’s foundational cognitive model of moral (...) development. However, Kohlberg’s model of moral development lacks a compelling explanation for the judgment-action gap. Yet, it continues to influence theory, research, teaching, and practice in business ethics today. As such, this paper presents a critical review and analysis of the pertinent literature. This paper also reviews modern theories of ethical decision making in business ethics. Gaps in our current understanding and directions for future research in behavioral business ethics are presented. By providing this important theoretical background information, targeted critical analysis, and directions for future research, this paper assists management scholars as they begin to seek a more unified approach, develop newer models of ethical decision making, and conduct business ethics research that examines the moral judgment-action gap. (shrink)

This challenging study explores the theme of freedom in the philosophy of Hegel and Nietzsche. In the first half Will Dudley sets Hegel's Philosophy of Right within a larger systematic account and deploys the Logic to interpret it. The author shows that freedom involves not only the establishment of certain social and political institutions but also the practice of philosophy itself. In the second half, he reveals how Nietzsche's discussions of decadence, nobility and tragedy map on to an analysis of (...) freedom that critiques heteronomous choice and Kantian autonomy, and ultimately issues in a positive conception of liberation. In boldly bringing Hegel and Nietzsche together into a conversation, something that is rarely attempted, Will Dudley has developed a set of interpretations that will be of considerable importance to students of these philosophers, and more generally to political theorists and historians of ideas. (shrink)

_Comprehensive overview of Hegel’s thought on history._.

This paper responds to Frederick Neuhouser's attempt to make sense of Hegel's social theory, and in particular the conception of freedom that grounds the detailed claims made within that theory, in abstraction from its larger systematic context. I argue that Neuhouser's interpretation, despite its many virtues, could be further improved by increased attention to the importance of absolute spirit for Hegel's account of social freedom, as well as to the logical necessity of the developments within the Philosophy of Right. I (...) conclude by explaining the consequences of these omissions for our understanding of Hegel's conception of freedom and the social theory that arises from it. (shrink)

The essays collected here interpret and develop those insights, while also challenging Hegel's philosophical approach to comprehend present and future phenomena ...

Each chapter illuminates one of Kant's central concepts in his work.

Immanuel Kant is among the most pivotal thinkers in the history of philosophy. His transcendental idealism claims to overcome the skepticism of David Hume, resolve the impasse between empiricism and rationalism, and establish the reality of human freedom and moral agency. A thorough understanding of Kant is indispensable to any philosopher today. The significance of Kant's thought is matched by its complexity. His revolutionary ideas are systematically interconnected and he presents them using a forbidding technical vocabulary. A careful investigation of (...) the key concepts that structure Kant's work is essential to the comprehension of his philosophical project. This book provides an accessible introduction to Kant by explaining each of the key concepts of his philosophy. The book is organized into three parts, which correspond to the main areas of Kant's transcendental idealism: Theoretical Philosophy; Practical Philosophy; and, Aesthetics, Teleology, and Religion. Each chapter presents an overview of a particular topic, while the whole provides a clear and comprehensive account of Kant's philosophical system. (shrink)

"Understanding German Idealism" provides an accessible introduction to the philosophical movement that emerged in 1781, with the publication of Kant's monumental "Critique of Pure Reason", and ended fifty years later, with Hegel's death. The thinkers of this period, and the themes they developed revolutionized almost every area of philosophy and had an impact that continues to be felt across the humanities and social sciences today. Notoriously complex, the central texts of German Idealism have confounded the most capable and patient interpreters (...) for more than 200 years. "Understanding German Idealism" aims to convey the significance of this philosophical movement while avoiding its obscurity. Readers are given a clear understanding of the problems that motivated Kant, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel and the solutions that they proposed. Dudley outlines the main ideas of transcendental idealism and explores how the later German Idealists attempted to carry out the Kantian project more rigorously than Kant himself, striving to develop a fully self-critical and rational philosophy, in order to determine the meaning and sustain the possibility of a free and rational modern life. The book examines some of the most important early criticisms of German Idealism and the philosophical alternatives to which they led, including romanticism, Marxism, existentialism, and naturalism. (shrink)

"Understanding German Idealism" provides an accessible introduction to the philosophical movement that emerged in 1781, with the publication of Kant's monumental "Critique of Pure Reason", and ended fifty years later, with Hegel's death. The thinkers of this period, and the themes they developed revolutionized almost every area of philosophy and had an impact that continues to be felt across the humanities and social sciences today. Notoriously complex, the central texts of German Idealism have confounded the most capable and patient interpreters (...) for more than 200 years. "Understanding German Idealism" aims to convey the significance of this philosophical movement while avoiding its obscurity. Readers are given a clear understanding of the problems that motivated Kant, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel and the solutions that they proposed. Dudley outlines the main ideas of transcendental idealism and explores how the later German Idealists attempted to carry out the Kantian project more rigorously than Kant himself, striving to develop a fully self-critical and rational philosophy, in order to determine the meaning and sustain the possibility of a free and rational modern life. The book examines some of the most important early criticisms of German Idealism and the philosophical alternatives to which they led, including romanticism, Marxism, existentialism, and naturalism. (shrink)

The primary aim of this paper is to investigate what Hegel means by “reason” and “rationality.” The paper identifies and interprets some of Hegel’s most significant claims concerning the content of these terms, paying particular attention to his claims regarding the relation of the rational and the irrational. The resulting understanding of Hegel’s account of reason is then used to develop an improved interpretation of Hegel’s assertion of the equivalence of the rational and the actual.

The primary aim of this paper is to investigate what Hegel means by “reason” and “rationality.” The paper identifies and interprets some of Hegel’s most significant claims concerning the content of these terms, paying particular attention to his claims regarding the relation of the rational and the irrational. The resulting understanding of Hegel’s account of reason is then used to develop an improved interpretation of Hegel’s assertion of the equivalence of the rational and the actual.

Jason Wirth aims to resurrect interest in Schelling's philosophy in order to effect a transformation of our relationship to nature. Wirth believes that we do violence to nature because we mistakenly understand it mechanistically. He would thus like to overcome the mechanistic conception of nature in the hopes that this will transform our instrumental violence into a love of all beings. His book is intended to contribute to this revolution by offering "eight meditations on different ways of entering into the (...) thinking of Schelling". (shrink)

IN THIS PAPER I ATTEMPT TO UNDERSTAND HEGEL’S CLAIM that the moral will is finite, or incompletely free, as a consequence of the moral will being structured by the logical concept of judgment. Section 2 begins with a brief discussion of judgment. It then identifies the defining features of the moral will and compares them to those of judgment, enabling us to conclude that judgment is the logical structure of the moral will. Section 3 considers the limitations that plague judgment (...) and produce the finitude of the moral will. Section 4 examines three separate attempts of the moral will to overcome this finitude, all of which fail in virtue of their own logical structures. This allows us to conclude that the moral will is insuperably finite, and that the will must be reconceived as having a different logical structure in ethical life if it is to be free. (shrink)

This paper responds to the debate between John Burbidge, Edward Halper, and William Maker about the nature of Hegel’s idealism, and in particular of the relationship between Hegel’s logic and Realphilosophie. I argue that Maker’s position is the one most consistent with both what Hegel says about philosophy and Hegel’s own philosophical practice. I begin by highlighting the essential differences that separate the three interpretations and then turn to Hegel’s texts, to identify the passages that pose difficulties for the readings (...) of Burbidge and Halper. I conclude by considering, and ultimately rejecting, the objections that Burbidge and Halper raise to Maker’s interpretation. (shrink)

RÉSUMÉ: Hegel pense qu’il n’y a rien de plus important à comprendre que la liberté pour nous autres humains, et rien que nous ne comprenions plus mal. Tout son système philosophique, de fait, avec son ampleur et sa précision incroyables, peut être compris comme une unique démonstration très élaborée de l’importance et de la signification de la liberté. Qui plus est, la philosophie de Hegel n’est pas seulement à propos de la liberté, mais elle prétend aussi la produire. Car la (...) recherche philosophique sur ce que cela signifie que d’être libre aboutit chez lui à l’idée que la liberté dépend de la pratique de la philosophie. Comprendre cette position — ce qui est l’objectif principal du présent article — requiert d’examiner ce que Hegel a à dire au sujet de la liberté, de la philosophie et de leur interconnexion. La section 1 prépare cet examen en situant la liberté dans le système de Hegel. La section 2 présente l’explication du concept de liberté qu’il nous fournit dans sa Logique. La section 3 exploite cette explication logique pour interpréter la thèse de Hegel, dans sa Realphilosophie, que tous les êtres spirituels, et eux seuls, sont libres. La section 4 réfléchit sur le rôle attribué à la philosophie dans la libération de tels êtres spirituels. Et la section 5, enfin, conclut l’article en discutant quelques questions qui peuvent être soulevées au sujet de mon interprétation du traitement hégélien de la liberté. (shrink)

IN THIS PAPER I ATTEMPT TO UNDERSTAND HEGEL’S CLAIM that the moral will is finite, or incompletely free, as a consequence of the moral will being structured by the logical concept of judgment. Section 2 begins with a brief discussion of judgment. It then identifies the defining features of the moral will and compares them to those of judgment, enabling us to conclude that judgment is the logical structure of the moral will. Section 3 considers the limitations that plague judgment (...) and produce the finitude of the moral will. Section 4 examines three separate attempts of the moral will to overcome this finitude, all of which fail in virtue of their own logical structures. This allows us to conclude that the moral will is insuperably finite, and that the will must be reconceived as having a different logical structure in ethical life if it is to be free. (shrink)