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Willem van der Deijl [12]Willem J. A. van der Deijl [1]
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Willem van der Deijl
Tilburg University
  1.  72
    The sentience argument for experientialism about welfare.Willem van der Deijl - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (1):187-208.
    Can a person’s degree of wellbeing be affected by things that do not enter her experience? Experientialists deny that it can, extra-experientialists affirm it. The debate between these two positions has focused on an argument against experientialism—the experience machine objection—but few arguments exist for it. I present an argument for experientialism. It builds on the claim that theories of wellbeing should not only state what constitutes wellbeing, but also which entities are welfare subjects. Moreover, the claims it makes about these (...)
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  2.  30
    Can Subjectivism Account for Degrees of Wellbeing?Willem van der Deijl & Huub Brouwer - 2021 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24 (3):767-788.
    Wellbeing describes how good life is for the person living it. Wellbeing comes in degrees. Subjective theories of wellbeing maintain that for objects or states of affairs to benefit us, we need to have a positive attitude towards these objects or states of affairs: the Resonance Constraint. In this article, we investigate to what extent subjectivism can plausibly account for degrees of wellbeing. There is a vast literature on whether preference-satisfaction theory – one particular subjective theory – can account for (...)
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  3.  35
    Are Measures of Well-Being Philosophically Adequate?Willem van der Deijl - 2017 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 47 (3):209-234.
    The concept of well-being is increasingly gaining acceptance as an object of science, and many different types of well-being measures have been developed. A debate has emerged about which measures are able to capture well-being successfully. An important underlying problem is that there is no unified conceptual framework about the nature of well-being—a hotly debated topic of philosophical discussion. I argue that while there is little agreement about the nature of well-being in philosophy, there is an important agreement on some (...)
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  4.  30
    Which Problem of Adaptation?Willem van der Deijl - 2017 - Utilitas 29 (4):474-492.
    One widespread argument against the efficacy of subjective well-being as a measure of well-being is the adaptation problem as formulated by Sen and Nussbaum: the phenomenon that people may adapt to deprivation and find satisfaction or happiness in objectively bad circumstances. It is not generally noticed that there are two distinct arguments for why the phenomenon of adaptation is a problem for subjective well-being as a measure of well-being. The Axiological Adaptation Argument is a counter-example to theories of well-being that (...)
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  5. All Animals Are Equal, but Some More Than Others?Huub Brouwer & Willem van der Deijl - 2020 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 17 (3):342-357.
    Does the moral badness of pain depend on who feels it? A common, but generally only implicitly stated view, is that it does not. This view, ‘unitarianism’, maintains that the same interests of different beings should count equally in our moral calculus. Shelly Kagan’s project in How to Count Animals, more or less is to reject this common view, and develop an alternative to it: a hierarchical view of moral status, on which the badness of pain does depend on who (...)
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  6.  16
    Can Happiness Measures Be Calibrated?Mats Ingelström & Willem van der Deijl - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):5719-5746.
    Measures of happiness are increasingly being used throughout the social sciences. While these measures have attracted numerous types of criticisms, a crucial aspect of these measures has been left largely unexplored—their calibration. Using Eran Tal’s recently developed notion of calibration we argue first that the prospect of continued calibration of happiness measures is crucial for the science of happiness, and second, that continued calibration of happiness measures faces a particular problem—The Two Unknowns Problem. The Two Unknowns Problem relies on the (...)
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  7.  45
    Can Welfare Be Measured with a Preference-Satisfaction Index?Willem van der Deijl - 2018 - Journal of Economic Methodology 25 (2):126-142.
    Welfare in economics is generally conceived of in terms of the satisfaction of preferences, but a general, comparable index measure of welfare is generally not taken to be possible. In recent years, in response to the usage of measures of subjective well-being as indices of welfare in economics, a number of economists have started to develop measures of welfare based on preference-satisfaction. In order to evaluate the success of such measures, I formulate criteria of policy-relevance and theoretical success in the (...)
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  8. What Happiness Science Can Learn From John Stuart Mill.Willem van der Deijl - 2016 - International Journal of Wellbeing 1 (6):164-179.
    Many researchers studying subjective wellbeing (SWB) understand SWB as a concept that is close to Bentham’s notion of happiness. This conception of happiness is philosophically controversial, because it treats pleasure as a homogenous experience. I analyze an important deviation from Bentham in John Stuart Mill’s Utilitarianism and its relevance for SWB research: qualitative differences in pleasurable experiences. I argue that in cases where lives involving qualitatively different experiences are compared, Mill’s qualitative perspective is incompatible with an important assumption in the (...)
     
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  9.  15
    Two Concepts of Meaningful Work.Willem van der Deijl - forthcoming - Journal of Applied Philosophy.
    Journal of Applied Philosophy, EarlyView.
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  10. Distributive Justice: Getting What We Deserve From Our Country, Fred Feldman. Oxford University Press, 2016, Ix + 279 Pages. [REVIEW]Huub Brouwer & Willem van der Deijl - 2017 - Economics and Philosophy 33 (1):146-153.
  11.  17
    Can desire-satisfaction alienate our good?Willem van der Deijl - forthcoming - Journal of Value Inquiry:1-14.
  12.  13
    A Challenge for Capability Measures of Wellbeing.Willem J. A. van der Deijl - 2020 - Social Theory and Practice 46 (3):605-631.
    The measurement of wellbeing is among the central aims of the capability approach. I develop one particular challenge to the operationalizability of the approach in the context of wellbeing measurement. I argue that the capability approach is both committed to Individuation of Wellbeing—the view that the wellbeing contribution of different capabilities and functionings is person-dependent—as well as Rejection of Subjectivism—the view that wellbeing should not be conceptualized in terms of subjective judgments of preference-satisfaction or happiness. I argue that there is (...)
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  13.  8
    Can Desert Solve the Problem of Stakes? A Reply to Olsaretti.Huub Brouwer & Willem van der Deijl - forthcoming - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society.
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