While he rejects the paradigmatic method in its historic intent, Mr. Weiss has a good deal to say about "nonassociated man" as a model for the understanding of human association and its aims. It seems fair to say that it is really this paradigmatic element which enables Mr. Weiss to support comments on the inadequacies of the analytic and empirical procedures. If the process of analysis itself gives no clue to the elements to be discovered in analysis, and if the (...) empirical investigation of social life does not provide any key to the distinction between the essential and the irrelevant, then the clue or key must lie in some concept of man. For clearly the "socially habituated ways of acting" from which this dialectical procedure sets out do not themselves provide any infallible guide to what is essential and what is irrelevant, to what is beneficial and what is inimical, in human existence. To know what society, state, culture, and civilization are in essence is to have more than a knowledge of existing social forms themselves. The features of prevailing social patterns cannot alone suggest what is normative or ideal, unless ultimately what is is to be taken for what ought to be. (shrink)

The problem of determinacy versus indeterminacy in morals is the problem of the foundation of ethical judgment. The most relative of relativisms, the emotive theory of ethics, has in its most flagrant and simplified form held moral judgments to rest basically upon attitudes and therefore to be neither true nor false. As ethical disagreements involve oppositions of attitudes, they cannot be resolved through any appeal, however attractive to the cognitivist, to beliefs. That ethical disagreement is ultimate simply because individuals differ (...) in their attitudes, is challenged by Professor Edel as a semi-apriorism which may be broken through an appeal, in particular cases, to the steadily increasing knowledge of human life. The removal of arbitrary barriers raised by the emotivist and others opens the way to the recovery of the cognitive element as a basis of moral judgment and the restoration of ethics as a practical science. (shrink)