5 found
Order:
  1. Intrinsicality Without Naturalness.D. Gene Witmer, William Butchard & Kelly Trogdon - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):326–350.
    Defense of an account of intrinsic properties in terms of (what is now called) grounding rather than naturalness.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   45 citations  
  2.  62
    “Counting As” a Bridge Principle: Against Searle Against Social-Scientific Laws.William Butchard & Robert D’Amico - 2011 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 41 (4):455-469.
    John Searle’s argument that social-scientific laws are impossible depends on a special open-ended feature of social kinds. We demonstrate that under a noncontentious understanding of bridging principles the so-called "counts-as" relation, found in the expression "X counts as Y in (context) C," provides a bridging principle for social kinds. If we are correct, not only are social-scientific laws possible, but the "counts as" relation might provide a more perspicuous formulation for candidate bridge principles.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  3.  19
    Alone Together: Why “Incentivization” Fails as an Account of Institutional Facts.William Butchard & Robert D’Amico - 2015 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 45 (3):315-330.
    In two articles, Smits, Buekens, and du Plessis have argued that John Searle’s account of institutional facts suffers serious flaws and should be replaced with a reductive account they call “incentivization.” We argue against their view in two ways. First, the specific flaws they find in Searle are based on misunderstandings. Second, “incentivization,” as they present it, fails as a reduction of strict collective actions and, thus, cannot account for institutional facts such as money or property.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  4.  15
    Alone Together: Why “Incentivization” Fails as an Account of Institutional Facts.William Butchard & Robert D’Amico - 2015 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 45 (3):315-330.
    In two articles, Smits, Buekens, and du Plessis have argued that John Searle’s account of institutional facts suffers serious flaws and should be replaced with a reductive account they call “incentivization.” We argue against their view in two ways. First, the specific flaws they find in Searle are based on misunderstandings. Second, “incentivization,” as they present it, fails as a reduction of strict collective actions and, thus, cannot account for institutional facts such as money or property.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  5.  12
    Reply to Further Defenses of Incentivization.William Butchard & Robert D’Amico - 2017 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 47 (6):463-471.
    In a previous article, we challenged the “incentivization view” held by J. P. Smit, Filip Buekens, and Stan du Plessis as failing to cover social phenomena involving strict joint actions. The authors’ response to our criticism seriously misstates our main point. We have therefore, as briefly and sharply as we can, restated the problem in this note.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark