The Analysis of Matter is perhaps best known for marking Russell's rejection of phenomenalism and his development of a variety of Lockean representationalism–-Russell's causal theory of perception. This occupies Part 2 of the work. Part 1, which is certainly less well known, contains many observations on twentieth-century physics. Unfortunately, Russell's discussion of relativity and the foundations of physical geometry is carried out in apparent ignorance of Reichenbach's and Carnap's investigations in the same period. The issue of conventionalism in its then (...) contemporary form is simply not discussed. The only writers of the period who appear to have had any influence on Russell's conception of the philosophical issues raised by relativity were Whitehead and Eddington. Even the work of A. A. Robb fails to receive any extended discussion;1 although Robb's causal theory is certainly relevant to many of Russell's concerns, especially those voiced in Part 3, regarding the construction of points and the topology of space-time. In the case of quantum mechanics, the idiosyncrasy of Russell's selection of topics is more understandable, since the Heisenberg and Schrödinger theories were only just discovered. Nevertheless, it seems bizarre to a contemporary reader that Russell should have given such emphasis2 to G. N. Lewis's suggestion that an atom emits light only when there is another atom to receive it–-a suggestion reminiscent of Leibniz, and one to which Russell frequently returns. In short, the philosophical problems of modern physics with which Russell deals seem remote from the perspective of post-positivist philosophy of physics. (shrink)

Widespread interest in Frege's general philosophical writings is, relatively speaking, a fairly recent phenomenon. But it is only very recently that his philosophy of mathematics has begun to attract the attention it now enjoys. This interest has been elicited by the discovery of the remarkable mathematical properties of Frege's contextual definition of number and of the unique character of his proposals for a theory of the real numbers. This collection of essays addresses three main developments in recent work on Frege's (...) philosophy of mathematics: the emerging interest in the intellectual background to his logicism; the rediscovery of Frege's theorem; and the reevaluation of the mathematical content of The Basic Laws of Arithmetic. Each essay attempts a sympathetic, if not uncritical, reconstruction, evaluation, or extension of a facet of Frege's theory of arithmetic. Together they form an accessible and authoritative introduction to aspects of Frege's thought that have, until now, been largely missed by the philosophical community. (shrink)

The idea that mathematics is reducible to logic has a long history, but it was Frege who gave logicism an articulation and defense that transformed it into a distinctive philosophical thesis with a profound influence on the development of philosophy in the twentieth century. This volume of classic, revised and newly written essays by William Demopoulos examines logicism's principal legacy for philosophy: its elaboration of notions of analysis and reconstruction. The essays reflect on the deployment of these ideas by the (...) principal figures in the history of the subject - Frege, Russell, Ramsey and Carnap - and in doing so illuminate current concerns about the nature of mathematical and theoretical knowledge. Issues addressed include the nature of arithmetical knowledge in the light of Frege's theorem; the status of realism about the theoretical entities of physics; and the proper interpretation of empirical theories that postulate abstract structural constraints. (shrink)

The final work of the esteemed philosopher William Demopoulos supplants logical empiricism's accounts of physical theories, which fail to satisfactorily engage modern physics. Arguing for a new appreciation of the tightly woven character of theory and evidence, Demopoulos offers novel insights into the distinctive nature of quantum reality.

This paper concerns the rational reconstruction of physical theories initially advanced by F. P. Ramsey and later elaborated by Rudolf Carnap. The Carnap–Ramsey reconstruction of theoretical knowledge is a natural development of classical empiricist ideas, one that is informed by Russell's philosophical logic and his theories of propositional understanding and knowledge of matter ; as such, it is not merely a schematic representation of the notion of an empirical theory, but the backbone of a general account of our knowledge of (...) the physical world. Carnap–Ramsey is an illuminating approach to epistemological problems that remain with us, one whose difficulties are shared by accounts that have sought to replace it. 1 Introduction 2 Russell's theory of propositional understanding 3 Ramsey's primary and secondary systems 4 Carnap's reconstruction of the language of science and an observation of Newman 5 Extension of the foregoing to constructive empiricism 6 Putnam's model-theoretic argument and the semantic view of theories 7 The problem clarified and resolved. (shrink)

This paper attempts to confine the preconceptions that prevented Frege from appreciating Hilbert?s Grundlagen der Geometrie to two: (i) Frege?s reliance on what, following Wilfrid Hodges, I call a Frege?Peano language, and (ii) Frege?s view that the sense of an expression wholly determines its reference.I argue that these two preconceptions prevented Frege from achieving the conceptual structure of model theory, whereas Hilbert, at least in his practice, was quite close to the model?theoretic point of view.Moreover, the issues that divided Frege (...) and Hilbert did not revolve around whether one or the other allowed metalogical notions.Frege, e.g., succeeded in formulating the notion of logical consequence, at least to the extent that Bolzano did; the point is rather that even though Frege had certain semantic concepts, he did not articulate them model?theoretically, whereas, in some limited sense, Hilbert did. (shrink)

Of the three views of theoretical knowledge which form the focus of this article, the first has its source in the work of Russell, the second in Ramsey, and the third in Carnap. Although very different, all three views subscribe to a principle I formulate as ‘the structuralist thesis’; they are also naturally expressed using the concept of a Ramsey sentence. I distinguish the framework of assumptions which give rise to the structuralist thesis from an unproblematic emphasis on the importance (...) of ‘structural’ differences for the analysis and interpretation of theories belonging to the exact sciences, and I review a number of logical properties of Ramsey sentences using very simple arithmetical theories and their models. I then develop a reconstruction of the views of Russell, Ramsey, and Carnap that clarifies the interrelationships among them by appealing to aspects of the arithmetical examples that inform my discussion of Ramsey sentences. I conclude with an account of the philosophical basis of the structuralist thesis and the fundamental difficulty to which it leads. (shrink)

The common thread running through the logicism of Frege, Dedekind, and Russell is their opposition to the Kantian thesis that our knowledge of arithmetic rests on spatio-temporal intuition. Our critical exposition of the view proceeds by tracing its answers to three fundamental questions: What is the basis for our knowledge of the infinity of the numbers? How is arithmetic applicable to reality? Why is reasoning by induction justified?

Richard G. Heck, On the Philosophical Significance of Frege's Theorem. Language, Thought, and Logic, Essays in Honour of Michael Dummett.George Boolos, Is Hume's Principle Analytic?.Charles Parsons, Wright onion and Set Theory.Richard G. Heck, The Julius Caesar Objection.

This paper has three goals: (i) to show that the foundational program begun in the Begriffsschroft, and carried forward in the Grundlagen, represented Frege's attempt to establish the autonomy of arithmetic from geometry and kinematics; the cogency and coherence of 'intuitive' reasoning were not in question. (ii) To place Frege's logicism in the context of the nineteenth century tradition in mathematical analysis, and, in particular, to show how the modern concept of a function made it possible for Frege to pursue (...) the goal of autonomy within the framework of the system of second-order logic of the Begriffsschrift. (iii) To address certain criticisms of Frege by Parsons and Boolos, and thereby to clarify what was and was not achieved by the development, in Part III of the Begriffsschrift, of a fragment of the theory of relations. (shrink)

The present paper offers some remarks on the significance of first order model theory for our understanding of theories, and more generally, for our understanding of the “structuralist” accounts of the nature of theoretical knowledge that we associate with Russell, Ramsey and Carnap. What is unique about the presentation is the prominence it assigns to Craig’s Interpolation Lemma, some of its corollaries, and the manner of their demonstration. They form the underlying logical basis of the analysis.

This paper contains a close analysis of Frege's proofs of the axioms of arithmetic §§70-83 of Die Grundlagen, with special attention to the proof of the existence of successors in §§82-83. Reluctantly and hesitantly, we come to the conclusion that Frege was at least somewhat confused in those two sections and that he cannot be said to have outlined, or even to have intended, any correct proof there. The proof he sketches is in many ways similar to that given in (...) Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, but fidelity to what Frege wrote in Die Grundlagen and in Grundgesetze requires us to reject the charitable suggestion that it was this (beautiful) proof that he had in mind in §§82-83. (shrink)

The following paper presents a characterization of three distinctions fundamental to computationalism, viz., the distinction between analog and digital machines, representation and nonrepresentation-using systems, and direct and indirect perceptual processes. Each distinction is shown to rest on nothing more than the methodological principles which justify the explanatory framework of the special sciences.

This paper concerns the epistemic status of "Hume's principle"--the assertion that for any concepts and , the number of s is the same as the number of s just in case the s and the s are in one-one correspondence. I oppose the view that Hume's principle is a stipulation governing the introduction of a new concept with the thesis that it represents the correct analysis of a concept in use. Frege's derivation of the basic laws of arithmetic from Hume's (...) principle shows our pure arithmetical knowledge to arise out of the most common everyday applications we make of the numbers. The analysis of arithmetical knowledge in terms of Hume's principle ties our conception of number to the interconnections of which our concepts of divided reference are capable; in so doing, it locates the origin of our conception of number in the structure of our conceptual framework. (shrink)

This paper is concerned with Wittgenstein's early doctrine of the independence of elementary propositions. Using the notion of a free generator for a logical calculus–a concept we claim was anticipated by Wittgenstein–we show precisely why certain difficulties associated with his doctrine cannot be overcome. We then show that Russell's version of logical atomism–with independent particulars instead of elementary propositions–avoids the same difficulties.

The quantum logical and quantum information-theoretic traditions have exerted an especially powerful influence on Bub’s thinking about the conceptual foundations of quantum mechanics. This paper discusses both the quantum logical and information-theoretic traditions from the point of view of their representational frameworks. I argue that it is at this level—at the level of its framework—that the quantum logical tradition has retained its centrality to Bub’s thought. It is further argued that there is implicit in the quantum information-theoretic tradition a set (...) of ideas that mark a genuinely new alternative to the framework of quantum logic. These ideas are of considerable interest for the philosophy of quantum mechanics, a claim which I defend with an extended discussion of their application to our understanding of the philosophical significance of the no hidden variable theorem of Kochen and Specker. (shrink)

The essays in this volume were written by leading researchers on classical mechanics, statistical mechanics, quantum theory, and relativity. They detail central topics in the foundations of physics, including the role of symmetry principles in classical and quantum physics, Einstein's hole argument in general relativity, quantum mechanics and special relativity, quantum correlations, quantum logic, and quantum probability and information.

A central problem in the interpretation of non-relativistic quantum mechanics is to relate the conceptual structure of the theory to the classical idea of the state of a physical system. This paper approaches the problem by presenting an analysis of the notion of an elementary physical proposition. The notion is shown to be realized in standard formulations of the theory and to illuminate the significance of proofs of the impossibility of hidden variable extensions. In the interpretation of quantum mechanics that (...) emerges from this analysis, the philosophically distinctive features of the theory derive from the fact that it seeks to represent a reality of which complete knowledge is essentially unattainable. (shrink)

A feature of Frege's philosophy of arithmetic that has elicited a great deal of attention in the recent secondary literature is his contention that numbers are ‘self‐subsistent’ objects. The considerable interest in this thesis among the contemporary philosophy of mathematics community stands in marked contrast to Kreisel's folk‐lore observation that the central problem in the philosophy of mathematics is not the existence of mathematical objects, but the objectivity of mathematics. Although Frege was undoubtedly concerned with both questions, a goal of (...) the present paper is to argue that his success in securing the objectivity of arithmetic depends on a less contentious commitment to numbers as objects than either he or his critics have supposed. As such, this paper is an articulation and defense of both Frege's analysis of arithmetic and Kreisel's observation. (shrink)

The concept of a linguistic framework and the distinction between internal and external questions are the central ideas of Rudolf Carnap's "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology." It is not uncommon to encounter the suggestion that reflection on the theoretical and experimental investigations which led to the acceptance of the atomic hypothesis undermines Carnap's distinction between these two types of question and the utility of his notion of a linguistic framework. I believe this is a mistake. There is a natural development of (...) the distinction and the notion of framework choice with which it is paired that is perfectly capable of accommodating this case. I show this by bringing out a subtlety that arises in the extension of the con ceptual apparatus of ESO to the realism/instrumentalism controversy. When this subtlety is taken into account, the question contested by the nineteenth- and early twentieth-century opponents and proponents of the atomic hypothesis, and successfully addressed by Einstein and Perrin, is readily seen to be internal. Moreover, this formulation of the distinction and the controversy are both independent of Carnap's views on cognitive significance and factual content. I conclude with a presentation and discussion of two formulations of the realism/instrumentalism controversy that are based on Carnap's explication of the factual content of a theory in terms of the notion of its Ramsey sentence. (shrink)

A feature of Frege's philosophy of arithmetic that has elicited a great deal of attention in the recent secondary literature is his contention that numbers are ‘self‐subsistent’ objects. The considerable interest in this thesis among the contemporary philosophy of mathematics community stands in marked contrast to Kreisel's folk‐lore observation that the central problem in the philosophy of mathematics is not the existence of mathematical objects, but the objectivity of mathematics. Although Frege was undoubtedly concerned with both questions, a goal of (...) the present paper is to argue that his success in securing the objectivity of arithmetic depends on a less contentious commitment to numbers as objects than either he or his critics have supposed. As such, this paper is an articulation and defense of both Frege's analysis of arithmetic and Kreisel's observation. (shrink)

The paper considers Fregean and neo-Fregean strategies for securing the apriority of arithmetic. The Fregean strategy recovers the apriority of arithmetic from that of logic and a family of explicit definitions. The neo-Fregean strategy relies on a principle which, though not an explicit definition, is given the status of a stipulation; unlike the Fregean strategy it relies on an extension of second order logic which is not merely a definitional extension. The paper argues that this methodological difference is important in (...) assessing the success of the neo-Fregean strategy. (shrink)

This volume features work on learning by researchers in various disciplines who share an interest in the systematic study of cognition and in the study of the formal and semantic aspects of language acquisition. A recurring theme is that language learning involves the acquisition of certain competencies and the formation of a system of beliefs which are significantly underdetermined by the linguistic and nonlinguistic inputs available to the learner. Theories of language learning must confront the epistemological problem of how it (...) is possible to induce and fixate a belief-system on the basis of exposure to limited data. A typical strategy in dealing with this problem has been to specify various types of formal and empirical constraints on linguistic and conceptual development in terms of specific hypotheses about the character of what is learned and about the kinds of resources and strategies available to the learner. Most of the contributions in this volume are concerned with the specification and evaluation of such constraints. (shrink)