207 found
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  1.  78
    Consciousness Explained.William G. Lycan - 1993 - Philosophical Review 102 (3):424.
  2. Consciousness and Experience.William G. Lycan - 1996 - MIT Press.
    Lycan not only uses the numerous arguments against materialism, and functionalist theories of mind in particular, to gain a more detailed positive view of the ..
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  3.  75
    On the Plurality of Worlds.William G. Lycan - 1988 - Journal of Philosophy 85 (1):42-47.
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  4. Judgement and Justification.William G. Lycan - 1988 - Cambridge University Press.
    Toward theory a homuncular of believing For years and years, philosophers took thoughts and beliefs to be modifications of incorporeal Cartesian egos. ...
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  5. Consciousness.William G. Lycan - 1987 - MIT Press.
    In this book, William Lycan reviews the diverse philosophical views on consciousness--including those of Kripke, Block, Campbell, Sellars, and Casteneda--and ..
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  6. Form, Function and Feel.William G. Lycan - 1981 - Journal of Philosophy 78 (January):24-50.
  7.  35
    Real Conditionals.William G. Lycan - 2001 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    This book contends that insufficient attention has been paid to the syntax of conditionals, as investigated by linguists.
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  8. The Continuity of Levels of Nature.William G. Lycan - 1990 - In Mind and Cognition: A Reader. Blackwell. pp. 77--96.
  9. On the Gettier Problem Problem.William G. Lycan - 2006 - In Stephen Hetherington (ed.), Epistemology Futures. Oxford University Press. pp. 148--168.
     
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  10. Philosophy of Language: A Contemporary Introduction.William G. Lycan - 1999 - Routledge.
    _Philosophy of Language_ introduces the student to the main issues and theories in twentieth-century philosophy of language. Topics are structured in three parts in the book. Part I, Reference and Referring Expressions, includes topics such as Russell's Theory of Desciptions, Donnellan's distinction, problems of anaphora, the description theory of proper names, Searle's cluster theory, and the causal-historical theory. Part II, Theories of Meaning, surveys the competing theories of linguistic meaning and compares their various advantages and liabilities. Part III, Pragmatics and (...)
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  11.  25
    Mind and Meaning.William G. Lycan - 1984 - Philosophical Review 93 (2):282.
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  12. Giving Dualism its Due.William G. Lycan - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):551-563.
    Despite the current resurgence of modest forms of mind?body dualism, traditional Cartesian immaterial-substance dualism has few, if any, defenders. This paper argues that no convincing case has been made against substance dualism, and that standard objections to it can be credibly answered.
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  13. The Case for Phenomenal Externalism.William G. Lycan - 2001 - Philosophical Perspectives 15:17-35.
    Since Twin Earth was discovered by American philosophical-space explorers in the 1970s, the domain of.
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  14. A Simple Argument for a Higher-Order Representation Theory of Consciousness.William G. Lycan - 2001 - Analysis 61 (1):3-4.
  15. The Trouble with Possible Worlds.William G. Lycan - 1979 - In Michael J. Loux (ed.), The Possible and the Actual. Cornell University Press.
  16. Knowing Who.Steven E. Boër & William G. Lycan - 1975 - Philosophical Studies 28 (5):299 - 344.
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  17. What is the "Subjectivity" of the Mental?William G. Lycan - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:229-238.
  18. Moore Against the New Skeptics.William G. Lycan - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 103 (1):35 - 53.
  19. Tacit Belief.William G. Lycan - 1986 - In R. Bogdan (ed.), Belief: Form, Content, and Function. Oxford University Press.
     
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  20. The Superiority of Hop to HOT.William G. Lycan - 2004 - In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins. pp. 93–114.
  21. Consciousness as Internal Monitoring.William G. Lycan - 1995 - Philosophical Perspectives 9:1-14.
    Locke put forward the theory of consciousness as "internal Sense" or "reflection"; Kant made it inner sense, by means of which the mind intuits itself or its inner state." On that theory, consciousness is a perception-like second-order representing of our own psychological states events. The term "consciousness," of course, has many distinct uses.
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  22.  25
    The Case for Phenomenal Externalism.William G. Lycan - 2001 - Noûs 35 (s15):17-35.
  23.  17
    What is the "Subjectivity" of the Mental.William G. Lycan - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:109-130.
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  24. Is Property Dualism Better Off Than Substance Dualism?William G. Lycan - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (2):533-542.
    It is widely thought that mind–body substance dualism is implausible at best, though mere “property” dualism is defensible and even flourishing. This paper argues that substance dualism is no less plausible than property dualism and even has two advantages over it.
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  25. Attention and Internal Monitoring: A Farewell to HOP.Wesley Sauret & William G. Lycan - 2014 - Analysis 74 (3):363-370.
    Higher-Order Perception (HOP) theories in the philosophy of mind are offered as explanations of what it is that makes a mental state a conscious state. According to HOP, a mental state is conscious just in case it is itself represented in a quasi-perceptual way by an internal monitor or scanning device. We start with one of the more popular objections to HOP and a seemingly innocuous concession to it: identifying the internal monitor with the faculty of attention. We show how (...)
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  26.  79
    On the Plurality of Worlds by David Lewis. [REVIEW]William G. Lycan - 1988 - Journal of Philosophy 85 (1):42-47.
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  27. Representational Theories of Consciousness.William G. Lycan - 2000 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    The idea of representation has been central in discussions of intentionality for many years. But only more recently has it begun playing a wider role in the philosophy of mind, particularly in theories of consciousness. Indeed, there are now multiple representational theories of consciousness, corresponding to different uses of the term "conscious," each attempting to explain the corresponding phenomenon in terms of representation. More cautiously, each theory attempts to explain its target phenomenon in terms of _intentionality_, and assumes that intentionality (...)
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  28.  98
    Explanationist Rebuttals (Coherentism Defended Again).William G. Lycan - 2012 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):5-20.
    An explanatory coherence theory of justification is sketched and then defended against a number of recent objections: conservatism and relativism; wild and crazy beliefs; reliability; warranted necessary falsehoods; basing; distant, unknown coherences; Sosa's “self- and present-abstracts”; and Bayesian impossibility results.
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  29. Deflationism, Meaning and Truth-Conditions.Claire Horisk, Dorit Bar-On & William G. Lycan - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 101 (1):1 - 28.
  30. Explanation and Epistemology.William G. Lycan - 2002 - In Paul K. Moser (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 413.
    Second, there is a form of ampliative inference that has come to be called ‘inference to the best explanation,’ or more briefly ‘explanatory inference.’ Roughly: From the fact that a certain hypothesis would explain the data at hand better than any other available hypothesis, we infer with some degree of confidence that that leading hypothesis is correct. There is no question but that this inference is often performed. Arguably, every human being performs it many times in a day, perhaps without (...)
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  31. Desire Considered as a Propositional Attitude.William G. Lycan - 2012 - Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):201-215.
  32.  12
    The Nature of Mind and Other Essays.William G. Lycan - 1983 - Philosophical Review 92 (3):471.
  33. Phenomenal Conservatism and the Principle of Credulity.William G. Lycan - 2013 - In Chris Tucker (ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism. Oxford University Press. pp. 293-305.
    Lycan (1985, 1988) defended a “Principle of Credulity”: “Accept at the outset each of those things that seem to be true” (1988, p. 165). Though that takes the form of a rule rather than a thesis, it does not seem very different from Huemer’s (2001, 2006, 2007) doctrine of phenomenal conservatism (PC): “If it seems to S that p , then, in the absence of defeaters, S thereby has at least some degree of justification for believing that p ” (2007, (...)
     
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  34.  87
    Epistemic Value.William G. Lycan - 1985 - Synthese 64 (2):137 - 164.
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  35.  91
    Moral Facts and Moral Knowledge.William G. Lycan - 1986 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 24 (S1):79-94.
  36. Who, Me?Steven E. Boer & William G. Lycan - 1980 - Philosophical Review 89 (3):427 - 466.
  37. Externalism, Naturalism, Nominalism, and Mathematics.William G. Lycan, Penelope Maddy, Gideon Rosen & Nathan Salmon - 2001 - Philosophical Perspectives 15:17-117.
     
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  38. Evidence One Does Not Possess.William G. Lycan - 1977 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 55 (2):114 – 126.
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  39.  85
    Layered Perceptual Representation.William G. Lycan - 1996 - Philosophical Issues 7:81-100.
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  40. Toward a Homuncular Theory of Believing.William G. Lycan - 1981 - Cognition and Brain Theory 4 (2):139-59.
     
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  41. What is Eliminative Materialism?William G. Lycan & George S. Pappas - 1972 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (2):149-59.
    In 19651 Richard Rorty defended a theory of mind which has since come to be called' eliminative materialism'. The theory has attained some status as a distinct, autonomous brand of materialism; and it has been criticized at length in the literature, ... \n.
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  42.  91
    MPP, Rip.William G. Lycan - 1993 - Philosophical Perspectives 7:411-428.
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  43. Have We Neglected Phenomenal Consciousness?William G. Lycan - 2001 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 7.
    Charles Siewert's _The Significance of Consciousness_ contends that most philosophers and psychologists who have written about "consciousness" have neglected a crucial type or aspect that Siewert calls "phenomenal consciousness" and tries carefully to define. The present article argues that some philosophers, at least, have not neglected phenomenal consciousness and have offered tenable theories of it.
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  44. Enactive Intentionality.William G. Lycan - 2006 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 12.
    Though Noë is concerned to emphasize that perceptual experiences are not per se internal representations, he does not really say why, and he is fairly quiet about what he takes intentionality and representation themselves to be. Drawing on a subsequent paper (Noë (forthcoming)), I bring out and criticize his in fact radically negative view of those fundamental mental capacities.
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  45. Free Will and the Burden of Proof.William G. Lycan - 2003 - In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge University Press. pp. 107-122.
    (3) A compatibilist needs to explain how free will can co-exist with determinism, paradigmatically by offering an analysis of ‘free’ action that is demonstrably compatible with determinism. (Here is the late Roderick Chisholm, in defense of irreducible or libertarian agent-causation: ‘Now if you can analyze such statements as “Jones killed his uncle” into event-causation statements, then you may have earned the right to make jokes about the agent as cause. But if you haven’t done this, and if all the same (...)
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  46.  54
    On Two Main Themes in Gutting's What Philosophers Know.William G. Lycan - 2013 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 51 (1):112-120.
    This paper addresses each of two of Gutting's three main contentions: that like anyone else, philosophers are entitled to begin with what they find obvious and that philosophy has produced a distinctive body of knowledge. I emphatically agree with the first contention and expand on it, defending a stronger claim. The second contention I dispute, in spirit if not in letter, on each of several grounds.
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  47.  16
    “Is” and “Ought” in Cognitive Science.William G. Lycan - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):344-345.
  48. Serious Metaphysics: Frank Jackson's Defense of Conceptual Analysis.William G. Lycan - 2009 - In Ian Ravenscroft (ed.), Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals: Themes From the Philosophy of Frank Jackson. Oxford University Press.
  49.  76
    Psychological Laws.William G. Lycan - 1981 - Philosophical Topics 12 (3):9-38.
  50.  52
    Even and Even If.William G. Lycan - 1991 - Linguistics and Philosophy 14 (2):115 - 150.
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