Order:
  1.  94
    Against Two Modest Conceptions of Hard Paternalism.William Glod - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (2):409-422.
    People in our liberal pluralistic society have conflicting intuitions about the legitimacy of coercive hard paternalism, though respect for agency provides a common source of objection to it. The hard paternalist must give adequate reasons for her coercion which are acceptable to a free and equal agent. Coercion that fails to meet with an agent’s reasonable evaluative commitments is at least problematic and risks being authoritarian. Even if the coercer claims no normative authority over the coercee, the former still uses (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2.  99
    Political Liberalism, Basic Liberties, and Legal Paternalism.William Glod - 2010 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 48 (2):177-196.
    This essay argues that neutral paternalism (NP) is problematic for antiperfectionist liberal theories. Section 2 raises textual evidence that Rawlsian liberalism does not oppose and may even support NP. In section 3, I cast doubt on whether NP should have a place in political liberalism by defending a partially comprehensive conception of the good I call “moral capacity at each moment,” or MCEM, that is inconsistent with NP. I then explain why MCEM is a reasonable conception on Rawls's account of (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3. How Not to Argue Against Paternalism.William Glod - 2008 - Reason Papers 30:7-22.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  4.  13
    How Nudges Often Fail to Treat People According to Their Own Preferences.William Glod - 2015 - Social Theory and Practice 41 (4):599-617.
    I focus on “prima facie problematic” nudges to argue that libertarian paternalism often fails in its promise to track target agents’ own normative standards. I argue that PFP nudges are unjustified to significant numbers of people by virtue of autonomy-based defeaters—what I call “self-determination” and “discretion.” I then argue that in many cases, we face informational constraints on what a person’s good really is. In such cases, these nudges may not even benefit a significant number of agents and so fail (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5.  21
    Conditional Preferences and Refusal of Treatment.William Glod - 2010 - HEC Forum 22 (4):299-309.
    In this essay, I will use a minimalist standard of decision-making capacity (DMC) to ascertain two cases in the medical ethics literature: the 1978 case of Mary C. Northern and a more recent case involving a paranoid war veteran (call him Jack). In both cases the patients refuse medical treatment out of denial that they are genuinely ill. I believe these cases illustrate two matters: (1) the need of holding oneself to a minimal DMC standard so as to make as (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  6.  18
    The Practice of Liberal Pluralism.William Glod - 2005 - Journal of Value Inquiry 39 (3-4):527-530.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography