In considering the historical treatment of Aboriginal Australians this paper will discuss the different spaces operating in Western Australia’s South West in the late 1920s and the government policies that fed into them. These are the Moore River Native Settlement that is located some 100 km north of Perth and White City, a carnival sideshow located at the bottom of William Street on the banks of the Swan River in Perth. The 1905 Aborigines Act and a provision within that (...) act known as the Proclamation of the Prohibited Area of Perth will be discussed. This will be done by comparing the ways that White City was seen by the government in the 1920s and how in recent years Northbridge has been regulated and discursively constructed. The intent is to look at how Aboriginal people have been treated over time and consider the social, historical and political forces that have shaped that construction. (shrink)
This article mobilizes the troublesome and unrigorous concept of love to open an oblique entry into the equally troublesome concepts of object-oriented ontology and speculative realism. Issues of object fetishism, species companionship, bestiality, and assemblages of desire are traced in the theories of Graham Harman, Donna Haraway, Jane Bennett, Mario Perniola, and other posthumanist thinkers. Both romantic and Christian love are identified in the discursive practices of speculative realists as a way of outlining recurrent tropes in posthumanist thinking. From here, (...) a vector is traced back to the romantic literary tradition, thus linking the posthumanist tendencies of William Blake, for example, to the romanticism of Jane Bennett and Ian Bogost. Pulling against the chains of language, these thinkers challenge the finitude of human being by developing discursive strategies that focus attention sideways, away from human subjectivity and toward the world of organic and inorganic things. The essay concludes with a description of ?applied media theory,? a method developed by the Critical Media Lab to generate objects-to-think-with for the sake of posthumanist speculation. (shrink)
Judie Newman's Utopia and Terror in Contemporary American Fiction offers an illuminating analysis of the ways in which twenty-first-century U.S. writing has begun to turn its back on what Kathryn Hume has called the "Aggressive Fictions" by prominent postmodern writers in the final decades of the twentieth century: texts designed to "repel" their readers by the likes of William Burroughs, Philip Roth, Katherine Dunn, and Bret Easton Ellis that Hume identifies in various ways with "the politics of political despair". (...) In contrast, Newman traces a more recent trend toward emotional immersion, or a focus on narratives that actively draw the reader in. In this way, her book complements work on the topics of... (shrink)
At the forefront of international concerns about global legislation and regulation, a host of noted environmentalists and business ethicists examine ethical issues in consumption from the points of view of environmental sustainability, economic development, and free enterprise.
There is an ongoing debate within the law of unjust enrichment whether the victim of a pickpocket has, in addition to a claim in tort against the thief, one in unjust enrichment. Those who argue that he does say that it follows a fortiori from the availability of claims in unjust enrichment for mistake. If the law gives a claim where the transferor's consent to the transfer was merely vitiated, as it does in cases of mistake, so too should it (...) do so where he was ignorant, giving no consent whatever to the ‘transfer’. This idea is used by the protagonists of ignorance as the basis of an explanation of a number of controversial cases, especially Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale and Foskett v McKeown, as belonging within unjust enrichment. This article questions whether the argument is correct. Differently to the case of a mistaken transfer, where the claimant's title passes to the defendant, the pickpocket victim's title stays put. That would seem to be fatal to any unjust enrichment analysis, for an essential element of such a claim, an enrichment at the claimant's expense, now appears to be missing. The question then is whether that objection can be overcome. Various strategies have been proposed, that the law looks to ‘factual’ rather than ‘technical’ enrichments, that title can be electively transferred by the victim to the thief and that title can simply be renounced. None of these strategies work, however, with the consequence that any claim by a victim against his thief can only be in tort, not unjust enrichment. (shrink)
Analytical philosophers, if they are true to their training, never forget the first lesson of analytical philosophy: philosophers have no moral authority. In so far as analytical philosophers believe this, they find it easy to live with. For them even to assert, let alone successfully lay claim to, moral authority would require, first, hard work of some non-analytical and probably mistaken kind and, secondly, personality traits of leadership or confidence or even charisma, which philosophers may accidentally have but which they (...) are certainly not trained to have and had better not rely upon, while they live by analytical standards. Yet a further reason why analytical philosophers find the denial of their moral authority easy to accept is that they never forget the second lesson of analytical philosophy, either: nobody else has any moral authority. (shrink)
W.M. Gorman has been a major figure in the development of economies during the past forty years. His publications on separability, aggregation, duality and the modelling of consumer demand are recognized as fundamental contributions to economic theory. Many of his unpublished papers have achieved similar status as privately-circulated classics.This volume brings together for the first time all Gorman's important work, much of which has never been published before, on aggregation across commodities and agents, including separability, budgeting, representative agents, (...) and the construction of capital and labour aggregates. Each chapter is preceded by an editorial introduction which describes its origin and place within the literature as well as the main results themselves. A forthcoming second volume, Modelling and Methodology, will cover topics on duality, demand, trade, and welfare.This book will appeal to academic economists interested in either specific aspects of Gorman's work or in the evolution of economic theory. (shrink)
The distinction between the essential and the accidental characteristics of a thing should be understood not in modal terms (the received view) nor in definitional terms (Fine’s recent proposal) but as follows: an essential characteristic of a thing is one that is not explained by any other of that thing’s characteristics, and an accidental characteristic of a thing is one that is so explained. Various versions of this proposal can be formulated.
In this chapter I argue that choosing to live forever comes with the threat of an especially pernicious kind of boredom. However, it may be theoretically possible to circumvent it by finding ways to pursue an infinite number of projects consistent with one’s personality, taking on endlessly pursuable endlessly interesting projects, or by rekindling old projects once you’ve forgotten about them. However, each of these possibilities is contingent upon having certain traits that you are likely not currently in a good (...) position to assess. I therefore argue that no one is in a good position to be confident about her prospects for living forever. (shrink)
To date, there have been only two scholarly papers devoted to a comparison of Gestalt psychology with the psychology of William James. An early paper by Mary Whiton Calkins called attention to numerous similarities between these two schools of thought. However, a more recent paper by Mary Henle argues that the ideas of William James, as presented in The Principles of Psychology, are irrelevant to Gestalt psychology. In what follows, this claim is evaluated both in terms of The (...) Principles and Jamesís larger vision as set forth in his mature philosophical works. Although there are important differences between James and the Gestalt psychologists, there are also striking similarities particularly when the two schools are examined in the light of Jamesís mature philosophical perspectives. (shrink)
In "Rights and Reason", Jonathan Gorman sets discussion of the 'rights debate' within a wide-ranging philosophical and historical framework. Drawing on positions in epistemology, metaphysics and the theory of human nature as well as on the ideas of canonical thinkers, Gorman provides an introduction to the philosophy of rights that is firmly grounded in the history of philosophy as well as the concerns of contemporary political and legal philosophy. The book gives readers a clear sense that, just as (...) there are arguments about the content of rights, and just as there are myriad claims to rights, so there are pluralities of theories of rights that offer some understanding of the moral and legal realm and of the place rights may hold within it. Gorman argues that in a pluralist context of inconsistent rights we require pragmatic procedures rather than universal principles of justice to resolve conflicting claims. (shrink)
This paper advances a new agentially undemanding account of the conditions of attributability, the Minimal Approval account, and argues that it has a number of advantages over traditional Deep Self theories, including the way in which it handles agents with conditions like addiction, Tourette syndrome, and misophonia. It is argued that in order for an agent to be attributionally responsible, the mental process that leads to her action must dispose her to be such that she would, upon reflec-tion, approve to (...) some minimal degree of being moved to action by the motive on which she in fact acts. (shrink)
This book describes empirically ways to analyze and then to effectually utilize cognitive processes to advance discovery and invention in the sciences. It also explains how to teach these principles to students.
In this paper I propose to examine the cognitive status of mystical experience. There are, I think, three distinct but overlapping sorts of religious experience. In the first place, there are two kinds of mystical experience. The extrovertive or nature mystic identifies himself with a world which is both transfigured and one. The introvertive mystic withdraws from the world and, after stripping the mind of concepts and images, experiences union with something which can be described as an undifferentiated unity. Introvertive (...) mysticism is a more important phenomenon than extrovertive mysticism. Numinous experiences are complex experiences involving dread, awe, wonder, and fascination. One finds oneself confronted with something which is radically unlike ordinary objects. Before its overwhelming majesty and power, one is nothing but dust and ashes. In contrasting oneself with its uncanny beauty and goodness, one experiences one's own uncleanness and ugliness. The experiences bound up with the devotional life of the ordinary believer are also religious in character. Nevertheless these more ordinary experiences should, I think, be distinguished both from numinous experiences and from mystical experiences, for they do not appear to involve the sense of immediate presence which characterises the latter. (shrink)
Bernard Williams argues that human mortality is a good thing because living forever would necessarily be intolerably boring. His argument is often attacked for unfoundedly proposing asymmetrical requirements on the desirability of living for mortal and immortal lives. My first aim in this paper is to advance a new interpretation of Williams' argument that avoids these objections, drawing in part on some of his other writings to contextualize it. My second aim is to show how even the best version of (...) his argument only supports a somewhat weaker thesis: it may be possible for some people with certain special psychological features to enjoy an immortal life, but no one has good reason to bet on being such a person. (shrink)
Although the idea of intellectual property (IP) rights—proprietary rights to what one invents, writes, paints, composes or creates—is firmlyembedded in Western thinking, these rights are now being challenged across the globe in a number of areas. This paper will focus on one of these challenges: government-sanctioned copying of patented drugs without permission or license of the patent owner in the name of national security, in health emergencies, or life-threatening epidemics. After discussing standard rights-based and utilitarian arguments defending intellectual property we (...) will present another model. IP is almost always a result of a long history of scientific or technological development and numbers of networks of creativity, not the act of a single person or a group of people at one moment in time. Thus thinking about and evaluating IP requires thinking about IP as shared rights. A network approach to IP challenges a traditional model of IP. It follows that the owner of those rights has some obligations to share that information or its outcomes. If that conclusion is applied to the distribution of antiretroviral drugs, what pharmaceutical companies are ethically required to do to increase access to these medicines in the developing world will have to be reanalyzed from a more systemic perspective. (shrink)
The societal and ethical impacts of emerging technological and business systems cannot entirely be foreseen; therefore, management of these innovations will require at least some ethicists to work closely with researchers. This is particularly critical in the development of new systems because the maximum degrees of freedom for changing technological direction occurs at or just after the point of breakthrough; that is also the point where the long-term implications are hardest to visualize. Recent work on shared expertise in Science & (...) Technology Studies (STS) can help create productive collaborations among scientists, engineers, ethicists and other stakeholders as these new systems are designed and implemented. But collaboration across these disciplines will be successful only if scientists, engineers, and ethicists can communicate meaningfully with each other. The establishment of a trading zone coupled with moral imagination present one method for such collaborative communication. (shrink)
The paper takes up a traditional view that has also been a part of some recent analytic metaphysics, namely, the view that substance is to be understood in terms of independence. Taking as my point of departure some recent remarks by Kit Fine, I propose reviving the Aristotelian-scholastic idea that the sense in which substances are independent is that they are non-inherent, and I do so by developing a broad notion of inherence that is more usable in the context of (...) contemporary analytic metaphysics than the traditional notion is. I end by showing how non-inherence, while necessary for being a substance, cannot be taken as sufficient without some qualifying remarks. (shrink)
This article argues that Thomas Aquinas's virtue ethics approach to just war theory provides a solid ethical foundation for thinking about the problem of war. After briefly indicating some shortcomings of contemporary views of international justice, including pacifism, legalism, progressivism, realism, pragmatism, and consequentialism, the article examines Aquinas's question ?On War? in the Summa Theologiae. It then attempts to show that Aquinas's thinking on war is rooted in his understanding of the virtues by providing a brief overview of how the (...) cardinal virtues (prudence, justice, fortitude, temperance) and theological virtues (faith, hope, and charity) are connected to just war considerations. (shrink)
The phrase ‘trading zone’ is often used to denote any kind of interdisciplinary partnership in which two or more perspectives are combined and a new, shared language develops. In this paper we distinguish between different types of trading zone by asking whether the collaboration is co-operative or coerced and whether the end-state is a heterogeneous or homogeneous culture. In so doing, we find that the voluntary development of a new language community—what we call an inter-language trading zone—represents only one of (...) four possible configurations. In developing this argument we show how different modes of collaboration result in different kinds of trading zone, how different kinds of trading zone may be ‘nested’ inside each other and discuss how a single collaboration might move between different kinds of trading zone over time. One implication of our analysis is that interactional expertise is a central component of at least one class of trading zone.Keywords: Trading zones; Interactional expertise; Interdisciplinarity; Creole. (shrink)
Concern about the integrity of empirical research has arisen in recent years in the light of studies showing the vast majority of publications in academic journals report positive results, many of these results are false and cannot be replicated, and many positive results are the product of data dredging and the application of flexible data analysis practices coupled with selective reporting. While a number of potential solutions have been proposed, the effects of these are poorly understood and empirical evaluation of (...) each would take many years. We propose that methods from the systems sciences be used to assess the effects, both positive and negative, of proposed solutions to the problem of declining research integrity such as study registration, Registered Reports, and open access to methods and data. In order to illustrate the potential application of systems science methods to the study of research integrity, we describe three broad types of models: one built on the characteristics of specific academic disciplines; one a diffusion of research norms model conceptualizing researchers as susceptible, “infected” and recovered; and one conceptualizing publications as a product produced by an industry comprised of academics who respond to incentives and disincentives. (shrink)
The traditional claim that Christ is one person who is both divine and human might seem inconsistent with classical conceptions of understanding divinity and humanity. For example, the classical understanding of divinity would seem to require us to hold that divine beings are immaterial, while the classical understanding of humanity would seem to require us to hold that human beings are material, leaving us unable to speak consistently of one person who is divine and human both. This paper argues that (...) revised versions of classical theism and classical anthropology can be developed, versions that avoid these problems. (shrink)
Although data sharing is one of the primary measures proposed to improve the integrity and quality of published research, studies show it remains the exception not the rule. The current study examines the availability of data in papers reporting the results of analyses of empirical data from original research in high-impact addiction journals. Thirteen high-impact journals with data sharing policies were selected from those included in the substance abuse category of the 2018 Clarivate Analytics’ Journal Citation Report. The first 10 (...) full or short original research reports that included empirical data in the most recent complete issue of each journal were electronically searched and reviewed for reference to where their data can be obtained and for a formal data sharing statement. Only eight of the 130 papers contained a data sharing statement in their text or supplementary online materials, and just one contained a direct link to the data analyzed. Data sharing was rare in the 13 high-impact addiction journals reviewed. The nature of the data reported in addiction journals might partly explain this. Currently, data sharing is not a procedure likely to improve the quality and integrity of published addiction research. (shrink)
The lives of persons are valuable, but are all humans persons? Some humans—the immature, the damaged, and the defective—are not capable, here and now, of engaging in the rational activities characteristic of persons, and for this reason, one might call their personhood into question. A standard way of defendingit is by appeal to potentiality: we know they are persons because we know they have the potentiality to engage in rational activities. In this paper I develop acomplementary strategy based on normativity. (...) We know that the humans in question are persons because we know that lacking the here-and-now ability to engage in rational activities is—for them, unlike for tulips or kittens—a falling-short of some norm. Their personhood, in other words, is established on the basis of their being subject to the norm of having those here-and-now capacities. (shrink)
v. 1. William and Henry, 1861-1884 -- v. 2. William and Henry, 1885-1896 -- v. 3. William and Henry, 1897-1910 -- v. 4. 1856-1877 -- v. 5. 1878-1884 -- v. 6. 1885-1889 -- v. 7. 1890-1894 -- v. 8. 1895-June 1899 -- v. 9. July 1899-1901 -- v. 10. 1902-March 1905 -- v. 11. April 1905-March 1908 -- v. 12. April 1908-August 1910.
According to Christian belief, Jesus Christ is a divine person who became “incarnate,” i.e., who became human. A key event in the second act of the drama of creation and redemption, the incarnation could not have failed to interest Aquinas, and he discusses it in a number of places. A proper understanding of what he thought about it is thus part of any complete understanding of his work. It is, furthermore, a window into his ideas on a variety of other (...) topics: God, human nature, language, substance, and so on. Finally, it forces us to come to grips with what is at stake in acknowledging that Aquinas was not only a philosopher but a theologian as well. (shrink)
A certain theory of substance, one that grows out of Aristotelian philosophy but which has adherents today as well, draws a distinction between the features a substance has by instantiating a universal and the features it has by possessing a trope. An adherent of this theory might say that a certain cat is red because it possesses a redness-trope, but that it is a cat because it instantiates the universal CAT. A problem that must be faced by philosophers who hold (...) this sort of view is the following: Which features are which? In other words, which features are the ones had in virtue of trope-possession, and which are the ones had in virtue of instantiation? In this paper I discuss this problem, consider and reject a competing view, and propose my own Aristotelian solution. I also raise and answer an objection. (shrink)
In this paper I explain Thomas Aquinas's view that Christ is a composite person, and then I explain the role of Christ's compositeness in Thomas‘s solutions to a range of Christological problems. On the topics I will be discussing, Thomas‘s views did not change significantly over the course of his career; for the sake of simplicity, then, I will focus on texts from the Summa theologiae, citing parallels in the notes.