Philosophical tradition sharply distinguishes the conditions under which belief and action are reasonable. This dissertation examines one attempt to sustain this division, namely, the Humean analysis of practical reasons. The Humean analysis divides practical reasons into end and means. The former concerns what one should pursue as goal. The latter, what one should do to realize one's ends. Humeans argue that end reasons are not subject to the conditions of reasonable belief. Since end reasons pick out what has value for (...) an agent, Humeans contend that what makes life meaningful lies largely outside epistemic criteria. I find that Humeans base this claim on two distinct arguments. Each assumes that end reasons are unfit for epistemic appraisal because they lack some feature owned by psychological states suited to epistemic appraisal. A psychological state is fit for epistemic assessment only if its attitude ascribes a truth value to its content and its content owns a truth value. I examine the first conjunct. Regarding , Humeans argue that all genuine end reasons move their agents and, thus, these reasons are wants or take wants as components, since desire is the only source of agent-motivation. But in desiring that p, one does not ascribe a truth-value to p. Thus, end reasons lie outside epistemic criteria, assuming that only those psychological states whose attitude ascribes a truth value to its content are fit for epistemic assessment. Among those who claim that end reasons are a type of conative psychological state in that all genuine end reasons must move their agents are: R. M. Hare, P. H. Nowell-Smith, Gilbert Harman, Donald Davidson, B. A. O. Williams, and Daniel Dennett. I argue that this appeal to motivation fails by examining when an actor is an agent, finding that these conditions do not require that all genuine end reasons motivate. I add that rational failings, such as weakness of will, strongly suggest that not all genuine end reasons motivate. I conclude that end reasons are best conceived as a type of belief and, thus, these reasons do not lie outside epistemic assessment due to their psychological attitude. (shrink)

The author of this perceptive but sometimes rather obscure study treats a number of the major long works of modern poets as expressions of the common theme of metamorphosis. Not only do the metamorphoses of classical mythology figure prominently in the subject matter of works like The Waste Land and the Cantos, but the notion of metamorphosis has become an important means of conveying the "message" of such works: modern man's "need and desire to transcend the psychologically repressive conditions of (...) his mechanized milieu." Sister Quinn is most clear and convincing when she is interpreting poems as literary creations, less so when she attempts to describe, in philosophical terms, what they mean or express.--L. H. (shrink)

In this concise book based on his Arne Ryde Lectures in 2002, Young suggests a conceptual framework for studying strategic learning and highlights theoretical developments in the area. He discusses the interactive learning problem; reinforcement and regret; equilibrium; conditional no-regret learning; prediction, postdiction, and calibration; fictitious play and its variants; Bayesian learning; and hypothesis testing. Young's framework emphasizes the amount of information required to implement different types of learning rules, criteria for evaluating their performance, and alternative notions of (...) equilibrium to which they converge. He also stresses the limits of what can be achieved: for a given type of game and a given amount of information, there may exist no learning procedure that satisfies certain reasonable criteria of performance and convergence. In short, Young has provided a valuable primer that delineates what we know, what we would like to know, and the limits of what we can know, when we try to learn about a system that is composed of other learners. (shrink)

This volume, included in the recently established Library of Philosophy and Religion, devotes its primary attention to recent discussion within analytic philosophy concerning the challenge which determinism offers to the concept of freedom and, thereby, to Christian theism. Although the author does not argue that determinism has been established, he does conclude that it is an empirical proposal and may well represent the situation. He is prepared to fall back upon a libertarianism if necessary, but considers determinism at face value (...) in order to confront the most serious opposition to his proposed compatibilism. There may be a sufficient condition for all acts, which would be, thereby, a determinism. Young’s problem is to establish a compatibilism so that even if a sufficient condition for all acts does hold, man is still free and responsible, and a Christian theism could be preserved. He proceeds to analyze four types of sufficient condition: 1) some laws of logic are sufficient for all outcomes; 2) antecedent causal conditions account for all outcomes; 3) God’s infallible knowledge and His eternal nature are the sufficient conditions for whatever happens; 4) an omnipotent deity is the sufficient condition of all outcomes. Young then attempts to establish that a doctrine of freedom and responsibility is compatible with each of these conditions and, thereby, Christian theism is, to that extent, secured. He offers a very careful analysis of each alternative, considering the strongest claims of recent analysts, and still finds a doctrine of responsible freedom viable, analysed in terms of ability and power to act. In the course of his analysis he gives more attention than the skeptic usually offers to the content of the skeptic’s world, and what would be involved in its analysis of freedom, action, responsibility, and evil. The skeptic’s world offers more theoretical problems than the skeptic’s neglect of his own positive position and his confining of analysis to a critical role has usually acknowledged. Although one might not have expected it to arise in such quarters, it is now well established that analytic philosophy offers a well developed and complex elaboration of natural theology and philosophy of religion, and in the revival of natural theology in analytic circles this book deserves careful attention.—H.A.D. (shrink)

The first of a promised trilogy, to be followed by studies of Logic and the Theologians, and Philosophy and the Theologians. Professor Holmer is a superb iconoclast, and the idols he loves to smash are metaphysics, theories, big ideas, ideologies, philosophies, and philosophical theologies. The book is very subtle in analyzing the logic of religious language, which language succeeds very well without philosophical interpretations attempting to state or restate its "meaning." The essay is a careful blending of Kierkegaardian motifs with (...) the linguistic methodologies of the later Wittgenstein. There are few books as successful in elaborating the nuances of the Biblical language unencumbered by theories attempting to reinterpret this language. The tendency to reinterpret and translate in order to provide "the meaning" is the constant, unsuccessful, and unnecessary, temptation of the age. Such attempts inevitably conclude by offering another language and another meaning, and seriously distorting, if not losing, the meaning of the original. No such philosophical translation is necessary if one will but heed the logic and grammar of the original language, which has its own inner structure, message, and meaning, deserving of careful attention, and quite sufficient to keep bright young minds busy. Holmer loves the profundity of simplicity, and would call all who are tempted by abstractions and metaphysics, which are surely the core of the devil’s grammar, to return to the simplicity of the original with its own unique depth and challenge. The "old old story" need not be made "new," nor does it require philosophical explanation. The performatory utterances of the Hebrew children and their Christian offspring are sufficient if one will but study their logic. In the Western world’s attempt to wed Jerusalem and Athens, Holmer will remain in Jerusalem, requiring little from Athens. While needing no philosophy or metaphysics, he nevertheless seems to offer a very intricate philosophy of language, meaning, fact, explanation, reason, concepts, and knowledge, traveling upon this Wittgensteinian way as if no serious challenge had been offered to this anti-philosophical philosophy, and to the anti-metaphysical polemic contained therein; and as if these proposals themselves did not border on the edge of their own metaphysical ideology and vision regarding words and thoughts. One hopes that the promised sequels will deal more directly with the suggestion that all metaphysics be eliminated, for it simply will not do to replace one ideology with another in the name of not having any at all. In spite of this nagging problem, the book is worthwhile.—H.A.D. (shrink)

In his first book on Marx, Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx, published in 1961, Tucker developed three main themes: Marx's philosophy is deeply rooted in the traditions of German philosophy from Kant to the neo-Hegelians; there is a fundamental continuity between the thought of the young Marx of the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts and the mature Marx of the Critique of Political Economy and Das Kapital; the missing clue for a full understanding of Marx, particularly of the apparently (...) contradictory presence of strong moral overtones in Marx's writings and the absence of any supporting philosophy of ethics, is that Marx was basically a utopian religious moralist with an eschatology that envisaged the redemption of man. These three themes are briefly and forcefully restated in the present book without change or qualification and serve as the springboard for extending Tucker's interpretation of Marx and Engels into new areas. The reference to Marx and Engels introduces another element common to both works. Unlike most non-Marxist scholars, Tucker treats Marx and Engels as harmonious collaborators in the fashioning of a single doctrine. The first hundred pages are studded with references to the joint views of both men and their differences in belief are mentioned perfunctorily. Six of the seven chapters in the book have appeared previously as individual essays. The new chapter is on the relevance of Marxism to the modernization theories of the contemporary social sciences. Two other chapters examine Marx and Engels' position on distributive justice and on the state and politics. The latter half of the book takes up Marxism as an ideology of revolutionary movements, with special stress on the appeal of Marxism to the intelligentsia of under-developed countries and on the theoretical contributions of Lenin, Stalin, and Mao tse-Tung. The sixth chapter is on the de-radicalization of Marxism in the USSR and the final chapter finds an enduring value in Marx's utopian "futurology" of a transformed mature humanity living in a transformed world.--H. B. (shrink)

Spanish readers are fortunate in having a publishing house which is committed to reproduce in Spanish the complete works of Georg Lukács. The complete edition will consist of twenty-four, or more, volumes, of which ten are already in print, covering mainly Lukács works on esthetics and literary criticism. The Hegel volume was originally published in German in 1948. The main draft was written as early as the fall of 1938, but the outbreak of World War II delayed publication. Lukács at (...) that time was in the Soviet Union where, following Stalin's lead, Hegel was characterized as an apologist for the Prussian feudal opposition to the French revolution. Considering the winning of the war as more important than provoking a controversy over Hegel, Lukács put his manuscript aside for the duration. In The Young Hegel, Lukács settles his account with Hegel, much as Marx and Engels in The German Ideology--with one significant difference. The objective of Marx and Engels was the abolition of Hegelianism. Their polemic, therefore, was directed against Hegel and the neo-Hegelians. Lukács, on the other hand, sought the restoration of the Hegelian dimension of Marxism, and, while accepting the Marxian critique of Hegelianism, directed his attack against the detractors of Hegel--against the Stalin line within Marxism and against those like Dilthey and Kierkegaard outside of Marxism who transformed Hegel into an "irrationalist." Lukács is consequently much more positive in his treatment of Hegel than Marx and Engels. In History and Class Consciousness, Lukács emphasized the necessity of understanding Hegel in order to properly understand Marx. In The Young Hegel, the emphasis is on the dialectical opposite--Hegel is understood through the eyes of Marx, through the critique of Marx and through a Marxian interpretation by Lukács. Lukács' unique contribution in the present work is the detailed study of the close union of philosophy and economics in the genesis of Hegel's thought. Indeed, the original subtitle of the German edition reads: Über die Beziehungen von Dialektik und Ökonomie. The Spanish edition has a two-and-a-half page preface, written specially for it by Lukács in 1963, in which he states his conviction of the importance in the thought of Hegel and other great philosophers of concern with economic problems, both from the standpoint of economic theory and actual economic conditions. An English edition has been promised by Merlin Press in London, but no date of publication has yet been announced.--H. B. (shrink)

This volume is a welcome, exciting, and unusually informative addition to what now seems a definite trend toward introducing Latin-American philosophers to the English-reading world. The preface contains a brief review of milestones in this development, which the interested reader will find handy as reference. The principal features common to post-revolutionary Latin-American intellectual history are very present in Lipp's examination of Argentine thought; namely, the dedication to some principle of activism, the search for an authentic national character, a national ethos (...) fashioned in the crucible of European traditions and the specific conditions confronting the new nations, the linkage of philosophy to the economic, social, and political conditions of the time and the rejection of abstract speculative philosophy as inconsistent with, and alien to, the needs of the struggling young societies. Lipp's chosen area is the study of twentieth-century Argentine intellectual development as seen through the prewar period of positivism, the postwar reaction against positivism, and the contemporary period. Each period is studied by examining the work of an outstanding Argentine philosopher: positivism and naturalism through Jose Ingenieros, the ethics of human freedom and personalism through Alejandro Korn, and transcendentalist anthropology through the works of Francisco Romero. There is something fresh and appealing in the philosophical expressions of these youthful, undeveloped, or under-developed societies which should find responsive echoes among student youth in this country. Ingenieros' book, The Mediocre Man, inspired generations of Latin-American students to revolt and reform the universities and their respective societies. Korn's strongly ethical views led him to sympathize openly with student revolt and to oppose the divorcing of philosophy from historic reality. Romero put his life where his philosophy was and went to jail for his opposition to Peron. Romero's dream of a humanized transformation of society and Korn's view of man as a "rebellious animal" who strives for human freedom through rebellion and creativity are but two sparks of the book's vitality that recommend it to the English-speaking reader.--H. B. (shrink)

Compared to philosophers, the leading Latin American novelists, poets, and playwrights are relatively well known in the United States and many of their works are available in English translations. The Latin American philosophers, however, are an unknown quantity--not only to the reading public at large, but also to practically all U.S. philosophic and scholastic communities. Yet, Latin America contains a number of important original thinkers whose works would reward study here. Philosophical concepts developed in an ambient of young and (...) not yet fully-formed nations, without a long national cultural tradition of their own and struggling to overcome semi-primitive economic and political conditions, are bound to add some interesting dimensions to what is commonly called the "philosophy of the western world." This is particularly true when the philosophizers are distinguished--as they are in many cases--by a personal moral commitment to social and political involvement and activity. Jose Vasconcelos was such a figure. The volume under review gives us our first English summary of Vasconcelos' whole philosophical system: his metaphysics, his epistemology, his ethics and his aesthetics. It also ties in his social and political philosophy and some biographical details. The full impact of Vasconcelos' aesthetic monism comes through clearly, concisely and forcefully in nine carefully-chosen selections in the Appendix. It is to be hoped that this little volume portends a new trend toward making available in English the works of other outstanding Latin American philosophers.--H. B. (shrink)

With a few exceptions all the essays in this issue of Daedalus are biographies of world intellectual and political leaders. Erik Erikson's "psycho-historical" examination of Gandhi is followed by sketches of Nkrumah, Ataturk, de Gaulle, Bismarck, Andrew Johnson, Newton, James Mill, and William James. There are three exceptions to the biographical motif: 1) an essay on charisma which, although it does not go much beyond Weber, does offer a concise anatomy of the various dimensions of this slippery category which (...) is an underlying theme throughout many of the biographies; 2) a short essay proposing that obstacles to change in underdeveloped countries are connected with obstacles to the perception of change; and 3) an essay which examines the relation of the American intellectual-academic community to government during the first half of this century. Dankwart Rustow's introductory essay consists of "scattered remarks" on various methodologies for the exploration of the anatomy of leadership. His organizing themes are leadership as communication, leadership as learning process, and leadership as sense of timing.--S. O. H. (shrink)

There are few books in any language which attempt to survey the whole range of Lukács' work. English readers may, therefore, consider themselves fortunate to have available the present volume and, doubly fortunate, to have forthcoming in late 1970 or early 1971 yet another book by one of the present contributors, István Mészáros, titled the Life and Work of Georg Lukács. The work under review is based on a series of lectures in 1968 at the Graduate School of Contemporary European (...) Studies at the University of Reading. The Introduction by Parkinson is largely expository and concentrates on Lukacs' celebrated Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein. The individual essays which follow are critical examinations of Lukács' views in the fields of philosophy, sociology, and literary criticism. The essays are generally of a high caliber and the differences which the authors express in relation to various aspects of Lukács are themselves testimony to the complexity and depth of his thought. The most comprehensive, and, in many ways, the most interesting approach to Lukács is in the lead-off essay by Mészáros which, in the context of dealing with his concept of the dialectic, seeks to disclose the basic structure of Lukács' thought and to establish its continuity from the young Lukács to the mature Lukács. Mészáros finds from the very beginning not only a revolutionary turn in Lukács' structure of thought, but along with it--or within it--or perhaps even conditioning it--a complex and far-ranging "ought". The "ought-ridden" character of Lukács' thought, Mészáros claims, is both the source of some of his great intellectual achievements and of some of his great failures, particularly when he substitutes ideology and moral postulates for mediated, concrete reality. Those interested in the development of the concept of the dialectic from Hegel to Marx and from Marx to the present will find Mészáros' discussion of Lukács' categories of "totality" and "mediation" informative and thought-provoking. H. A. Hodges examines Lukács' critique of philosophical irrationalism and singles out for special study his comments on the degree to which Dilthey and Mannheim contributed toward this trend. Parkinson, in addition to writing the introduction, has an essay on the nature of Besonderheit, the central category of Lukács' aesthetics. He translates Besonderheit as "speciality" or "the special." Roy Pascal digs into Lukács' concept of totality as developed in the Ästhetik and as applied in his critique of Walter Scott and of Kafka. In addition, there is an essay by David Craig on how, in Lukács' view, history molds literature, and another essay by Stanley Mitchell on Lukács' concept of the "beautiful." All in all, while the book does not represent a definitive or inclusive introduction to the work of Lukács, it does constitute an important landmark in presenting many important dimensions of his thought, as well as some highly critical appraisals of its validity and importance.--H. B. (shrink)

This volume contains the proceedings of the symposium held at Wofford College in 1968, in celebration of the Bi-centennial of the birth of Hegel. Hegelian philosophy has strong roots in America, and for the past one hundred and fifty years it has offered a major philosophical perspective from which to interpret religious concepts and phenomena. Its immediate dialectical relationship to phenomenology and existentialism made it almost inevitable that the strength of this position would receive fresh attention as more recent moods (...) subsided. Consequently this book undoubtedly heralds a rebirth of Hegel scholarship and a renewed concern with Hegelian philosophy of religion after the serious criticism by Kierkegaardians and Marxists which has dominated recent philosophy of religion. The main papers include "Some Historical Presuppositions of Hegel's System" ; "The Young Hegel and the Postulates of Practical Reason" ; "Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind as a Development of Kant's Basic Ontology" ; "Hegel's 'Unhappy Consciousness' and Nietzsche's 'Slave Morality'" ; "Hegel's Reinterpretation of the Doctrine of Spirit and the Religious Community" ; "Hegel and the Marxist-Leninist Critique of Religion" ; "'Authenticity' and 'Warranted Belief' in Hegel's Dialectic of Religion" ; "Hegel on The Identity of Content in Religion and Philosophy". The volume suggests the possibility of initiating dialogue with analytic philosophers regarding the Hegelian claim that "language is spirit," but such dialogue is never developed. In addition to bringing to light an interpretation of new source material for the study of the development of Hegel's position, there is also a unique interpretation of historical method. Henrich attempts to immerse his study more thoroughly in the immediate setting, biblical, theological, social and philosophical than did either R. Kroner or W. Dilthey in their classic studies of Hegel. At the same time the analysis of Hegel's relationship to Hölderlin is clarified with fresh interest for those who have been made conscious of Hölderlin through Heidegger. A number of the essays devote special attention to the Kant-Hegel relationship, analyzing with great care the Kantian atmosphere at the University of Tübingen and Hegel's place in this setting. If it is the case that secular theology is fundamentally a version of Hegelian immanence, then some of these essays can be seen as a restoration of the Hegelian doctrine of spirit in response to such secularization. On the other hand, if it is the case that the Kierkegaardian critique was a criticism of this very doctrine of immanence in the name of an "infinite gap" and that such Kierkegaardianism dominated philosophy of religion in the first half of this century, it is striking that so little direct confrontation of Hegel and Kierkegaard is attempted in these essays. It is time for Hegelianism to receive such renewed attention; but its dialogue with analysis, Kierkegaard, and phenomenology is still to be undertaken. We may be entering a period of genuine pluralism in contemporary philosophy where this very discussion can occur, and for this conversation these essays offer an excellent starting point.--H. A. D. (shrink)

Mind, Cognition, and Neuroscience: A Philosophical Introduction is specifically designed for interdisciplinary audiences. The textbook will offer a comprehensive overview of a wide range of contemporary topics that are relevant to the study of mind. Each chapter will situate current philosophical research and neuroscientific findings within historically relevant debates in philosophy of cognitive science. By situating cutting-edge research within the theoretical trajectory of the field, students will gain a fundamental understanding of the cognitive neurosciences, as well as the progressive nature (...) of the field. To enable this level of detail, each chapter will be written by experts in their area of specialization. The textbook will be modeled upon scientific textbooks, making it accessible to a wide audience without presupposing a background in philosophy or neuroscience. -/- Chapters include: Ch. 1 Introduction (Benjamin Young & Carolyn Dicey Jennings), -/- Ch. 2 Introduction to Cognitive Neuroscience (Adina Roskies), -/- Ch. 3 Introduction to Molecular and Cellular Cognition (John Bickle & Ann-Sophie Barwich), -/- Ch. 4 Introduction to Experimental Methods in Cognitive Neuroscience (Kristina Backer), Ch. 5 Introduction to Philosophy of Mind (Joe Vukov), Ch. 6 Introduction to Philosophy of Science (Carlos Mariscal), Ch. 7 Metaphysical issues of relevance to Cognitive Neuroscience (Crystal L'Hote), Ch. 8 Epistemic issues pertaining to Neuroscientific methods (Carl Craver), Ch. 9 Thought and Artificial Intelligence (Diane Proudfoot and Jack Copeland), Ch. 10 Modularity (Aleksandra Mroczko-Wasowicz), Ch. 11 Mental Architecture (Pierre Poirier, Othalia Larue, Jean-Nicolas Bourdon, & Mylène Legault), Ch. 12 Language (David Pereplyotchik), Ch. 13 Mental Content (Tobias Schlict & Krzysztof Dolega), Ch. 14 Concepts and non-conceptual content (Arnon Cahen), Ch. 15 Animal Cognition (Irina Mikhalevich), Ch. 16 Kinds of Consciousness (Jacob Berger), Ch. 17 Philosophical Theories of Consciousness (William Lycan), Ch. 18 Neurobiological Theories of Consciousness (Myrto Mylopoulos), Ch. 19 Unity of Consciousness (Rocco Gennaro), Ch. 20 Attention (Carolyn Dicey Jennings), Ch. 21 Time and Memory (Felipe de Brigard & Sarah Robins), Ch. 22 The Unconscious Mind (Ran Hassin, Alon Goldstein, & Benjamin Young), Ch. 23 Perception (Tony Cheng), Ch. 24 Mental Imagery (Amy Kind), Ch. 25 Action and Skill (Katia Samoilova), Ch. 26 Embodiment and Enactivism (Amanda Corris & Tony Chemero), Ch. 27 Emotions (Jesse Prinz & Sarah Arnaud), Ch. 28 Social Cognition and Theory of Mind (Evan Westra), Ch. 29 Neuroscience and Psychopathologies (Dominic Murphy, Gemma Lucy Smart, & Alexander Pereira), and Ch. 30 NeuroEthics (Katrina Sifferd and Joshua VanArsdall). (shrink)

In 2001, leaders with palliative care convened to discuss the standardization of palliative care and formed the National Consensus Project for Quality Palliative Care. In 2004, the National Consensus Project for Quality Palliative Care produced the first edition of Clinical Guidelines for Quality Palliative Care. The Guidelines were developed by leaders in the field who examined other national and international standards with the intent to promote consistent, accessible, comprehensive, optimal palliative care through the health care spectrum. Within the guidelines there (...) are eight domains to the provision of palliative care. This article focuses on the last, but very significant Domain 8—Ethical and Legal Aspects of Care. (shrink)

In this paper we continue, from [2], the development of provably recursive analysis, that is, the study of real numbers defined by programs which can be proven to be correct in some fixed axiom system S. In particular we develop the provable analogue of an effective operator on the set C of recursive real numbers, namely, a provably correct operator on the set P of provably recursive real numbers. In Theorems 1 and 2 we exhibit a provably correct operator on (...) P which is discontinuous at 0; we thus disprove the analogue of the Ceitin-Moschovakis theorem of recursive analysis, which states that every effective operator on C is (effectively) continuous. Our final theorems show, however, that no provably correct operator on P can be proven (in S) to be discontinuous. (shrink)

During the British socialist revival of the 1880s competing theories of evolution were central to disagreements about strategy for social change. In News from Nowhere (1891), William Morris had portrayed socialism as the result of Lamarckian processes, and imagined a non-Malthusian future. H.G. Wells, an enthusiastic admirer of Morris in the early days of the movement, became disillusioned as a result of the Malthusianism he learnt from Huxley and his subsequent rejection of Lamarckism in light of Weismann's experiments on (...) mice. This brought him into conflict with his fellow Fabian, George Bernard Shaw, who rejected neo-Darwinism in favour of a Lamarckian conception of change he called "creative evolution.". (shrink)

As suggested in the subtitle, A New Philosophical Reading, the editor aspires in his Introduction and his notes to “facilitate a deeper understanding and a critical evaluation (...) of this crucial and difficult philosophical work” (p. ix). This was the last important book which James published during his lifetime. With it James aims at a critical evaluation of Hegelian monism and an exploration of the philosophical and theological alternatives. “Our world of some one hundred years on”—the editor says (p. ix)—“is (...) much the better for James’ contribution, and understanding William James on pluralism deeply contributes even now to America’s self-understanding.”. (shrink)

Utilitarianism has a fairly bad reputation in military ethics, mainly because it is thought to make military expedience override all other concerns. The atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki is a famous instance of such a skewed utilitarian calculation that “the rules of war and the rights they are designed to protect” should have stopped (Walzer 1992: 263-8). Most of its critics seem to think that utilitarianism is not bad per se, but prone to be misapplied in a self-serving way. (...) That idea, William H. Shaw argues in his careful and mostly convincing defense of utilitarian thinking about the moral issues that war occasions, is misguided, as are most of the other common objections to utilitarian thinking about the moral issues war raises. (shrink)

Eldon Soifer and Béla Szabados argue that hypocrisy poses a problem for consequentialism because the hypocrite, in pretending to live up to a norm he or she does not really accept, acts in ways that have good results. They argue, however, that consequentialists can meet this challenge and show the wrongness of hypocrisy by adopting a desirefulfilment version of their theory. This essay raises some doubts about Soifer and Szabados's proposal and argues that consequentialism has no difficulty coming to grips (...) with hypocrisy, whether or not one favours a desire-fulfilment account of the good. (shrink)

William H. Poteat’s thought, while indebted to Michael Polanyi, originates in Poteat’s own project of remembering all articulate significances to their pre-articulate grounding in the mindbody. He invented the term mindbody both to overstep the traditional distinction between mind and body and to name the living arche of all meaning and meaning-discernment. In focusing on the recovery of the mindbody as the bedrock ontological matrix for the aquisition of speech, the act of explicit reference par excellence, Poteat radicalizes and (...) advances Polanyi’s efforts to reclaim the tacit roots of all explicit knowledge. (shrink)

As is well known among readers of Tradition and Discovery, William H. Poteat was a central influence in bringing Michael Polanyi to the attention of American scholars and, particularly, to the interest of scholarship in religion and theology. Poteat’s own work was heavily impacted by Polanyi. In turn, Polanyi’s affiliation with Poteat at Duke and elsewhere clearly impressed and edified Polanyi and led to Polanyi’s request for Poteat’s collaboration with him on Meaning and to the prospect of Polanyi’s coming (...) to Duke for six weeksto facilitate this. Unfortunately, that promising time was not realized. This present essay represents an effort to discern a direction in which such a collaboration might have deeply and felicitously influenced Polanyi’s interpretation and celebration of his own poignant, yet quite restless, religious sensibilities. (shrink)

The great Falsification Debate about the logical status of religious beliefs seems fairly quiescent at present. Most philosophers of religion have opted for one or the other of two opposite responses to the falsificationists' challenge.

This essay provides a timeline charting contact between Michael Polanyi and William H. Poteat. We trace the contours of the intimate, multifaceted, and mutually influential friendship of Polanyi and Poteat which developed over more than twenty years.

Since World War II, political theory has increasingly focused on the question of the origins and nature of the modern age. William H. Poteat’s explication of the Greek and Hebraic ontologies and his argument that modernity is the result of their incoherent combination in Christian theology can provide a framework to synthesize and extend the major competing theories about the modern era.

I here introduce a set of essays on William H. Poteat by quoting in full a 1968 letter from Poteat to Marjorie Grene. Poteat articulates reasons he cannot collaborate with Grene in editing the volume of Polanyi essays that was eventually published as Knowing and Being: Essays by Michael Polanyi in 1969.

William H. Poteat’s thought, while indebted to Michael Polanyi, originates in Poteat’s own project of remembering all articulate significances to their pre-articulate grounding in the mindbody. He invented the term mindbody both to overstep the traditional distinction between mind and body and to name the living arche of all meaning and meaning-discernment. In focusing on the recovery of the mindbody as the bedrock ontological matrix for the aquisition of speech, the act of explicit reference par excellence, Poteat radicalizes and (...) advances Polanyi’s efforts to reclaim the tacit roots of all explicit knowledge. (shrink)