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William Newton-Smith [4]William H. Newton-Smith [3]
  1. Relativism and the Possibility of Interpretation.William Newton-Smith - 1982 - In Martin Hollis & Steven Lukes, Rationality and relativism. Cambridge: MIT Press. pp. 106--122.
     
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  2.  54
    Modest Realism.William Newton-Smith - 1988 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:179 - 189.
    Realism as an explanatory theory of science (faded realism) is not convincing. However, neither "internal realism" nor instrumentalism are plausible. Assuming common sense realism a non-explanatory form of scientific realism (modest realism) can be defended. Modest realism has affinities with Fine's NOA. To NOA it adds a descriptive thesis about scientific progress towards truth or verisimilitude. In addition it adds a concern with purely philosophical issues which arise in reflections on the nature of science. However, there is little to say (...)
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  3.  19
    Metaphor in science.William Newton-Smith - 2000 - In W. Newton-Smith, A companion to the philosophy of science. Malden, Mass.: Blackwell. pp. 277-282.
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  4.  8
    Pragmatic factors in theory-acceptance.William Newton-Smith - 2000 - In W. Newton-Smith, A companion to the philosophy of science. Malden, Mass.: Blackwell. pp. 349-357.
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  5.  4
    A Study Guide to the Philosophy Pf Physics.William H. Newton-Smith - 1979 - Sub-Faculty of Philosophy, [Oxford University].
  6. On the Rational Explanation of the Scientific Change.William H. Newton-Smith - 1981 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 12 (1):47-77.
    On a rational model of science (cf. Lakatos or Laudan), to decide on the appropriate type of explanation of a given scientific change requires a normative assessment made by reference to the model. Showing that a transition fits the model, displays it to be rational and thereby explains it. On the strong programme in the sociology of scientific knowledge (cf. Bloor and Barnes), normative assessment is irrelevant to explanation. All changes require the same type of explanation (the symmetry thesis); namely, (...)
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  7.  26
    On the Rational Explanation of the Scientific Chance.William H. Newton-Smith - 1981 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 12 (1):47-77.
    On a rational model of science (cf. Lakatos or Laudan), to decide on the appropriate type of explanation of a given scientific change requires a normative assessment made by reference to the model. Showing that a transition fits the model, displays it to be rational and thereby explains it. On the strong programme in the sociology of scientific knowledge (cf. Bloor and Barnes), normative assessment is irrelevant to explanation. All changes require the same type of explanation (the symmetry thesis); namely, (...)
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