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William S. Robinson [72]William Spencer Robinson [1]
  1. Understanding Phenomenal Consciousness.William S. Robinson - 2004 - Cambridge University Press.
    William S. Robinson has for many years written insightfully about the mind-body problem. In Understanding Phenomenal Consciousness he focuses on sensory experience and perception qualities such as colours, sounds and odours to present a dualistic view of the mind, called Qualitative Event Realism, that goes against the dominant materialist views. This theory is relevant to the development of a science of consciousness which is now being pursued not only by philosophers but by researchers in psychology and the brain sciences. This (...)
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  2.  76
    Experiencing is Not Observing: A Response to Dwayne Moore on Epiphenomenalism and Self-Stultification.William S. Robinson - 2013 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (2):185-192.
    This article defends epiphenomenalism against criticisms raised in Dwayne Moore’s “On Robinson’s Response to the Self-Stultifying Objection”.
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  3. Understanding Phenomenal Consciousness.William S. Robinson - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (222):142-144.
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  4. Russellian Monism and Epiphenomenalism.William S. Robinson - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (1):100-117.
    Contemporaries often reject epiphenomenalism out of hand, while Russellian Monism is regarded as worthy of further development. It is argued here that this difference of attitudes is indefensible, because the easy rejection of EPI is due to its violating a certain Causal Intuition, and RM implicitly violates that same intuition. An enriched version of RM mitigates the violation, but the same mitigation results if we make a parallel enrichment of EPI. If RM and EPI are approached on a level playing (...)
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  5.  99
    Thoughts Without Distinctive Non-Imagistic Phenomenology.William S. Robinson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (3):534-561.
    Silent thinking is often accompanied by subvocal sayings to ourselves, imagery, emotional feelings, and non-sensory experiences such as familiarity, rightness, and confidence that we can go on in certain ways. Phenomenological materials of these kinds, along with our dispositions to give explanations or draw inferences, provide resources that are sufficient to account for our knowledge of what we think, desire, and so on. We do not need to suppose that there is a distinctive, non-imagistic 'what it is like' to think (...)
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  6.  13
    "Intentionality, Ascription, and Understanding: Remarks on Professor Hocutt's" Spartans, Strawmen, and Symptoms".William S. Robinson - 1985 - Behaviorism 13 (2):157-162.
  7.  29
    A Frugal View of Cognitive Phenomenology.William S. Robinson - 2011 - In Tim Bayne and Michelle Montague (ed.), Cognitive Phenomenology. Oxford University Press. pp. 197.
  8. Causation, Sensations, and Knowledge.William S. Robinson - 1982 - Mind 91 (October):524-40.
  9. Brains and People: An Essay on Mentality and its Causal Conditions.William S. Robinson - 1988 - Temple University Press.
  10. Knowing Epiphenomena.William S. Robinson - 2006 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (1-2):85-100.
    This paper begins with a summary of an argument for epiphenomenalism and a review of the author's previous work on the self-stultification objection to that view. The heart of the paper considers an objection to this previous work and provides a new response to it. Questions for this new response are considered and a view is developed in which knowledge of our own mentality is seen to differ from our knowledge of external things.
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  11.  7
    Thoughts Without Distinctive Non-Imagistic Phenomenology.William S. Robinson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (3):534-561.
    Silent thinking is often accompanied by subvocal sayings to ourselves, imagery, emotional feelings, and non-sensory experiences such as familiarity, rightness, and confidence that we can go on in certain ways. Phenomenological materials of these kinds, along with our dispositions to give explanations or draw inferences, provide resources that are sufficient to account for our knowledge of what we think, desire, and so on. We do not need to suppose that there is a distinctive, non-imagistic ‘what it is like’ to think (...)
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  12. Intrinsic Qualities of Experience: Surviving Harman's Critique. [REVIEW]William S. Robinson - 1997 - Erkenntnis 47 (3):285-309.
    Gilbert Harman (1990) seeks to defend psychophysical functionalism by articulating a representationalist view of the qualities of experience. The negative side of the present paper argues that the resources of this representationalist view are insufficient to ground the evident distinction between perception and (mere) thought. This failure makes the view unable to support the uses to which Harman wishes to put it. Several rescuing moves by other representationalists are considered, but none is found successful. Part of the difficulty in Harman's (...)
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  13. Zooming in on Downward Causation.William S. Robinson - 2005 - Biology and Philosophy 20 (1):117-136.
    . An attempt is made to identify a concept of ‘downward causation’ that will fit the claims of some recent writers and apply to interesting cases in biology and cognitive theory, but not to trivial cases. After noting some difficulties in achieving this task, it is proposed that in interesting cases commonly used to illustrate ‘downward causation’, (a) regularities hold between multiply realizable properties and (b) the explanation of the parallel regularity at the level of the realizing properties is non-trivial. (...)
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  14.  42
    States and Beliefs.William S. Robinson - 1990 - Mind 99 (393):33-51.
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  15.  64
    The Hardness of the Hard Problem.William S. Robinson - 1996 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (1):14-25.
    This paper offers an account of why the Hard Problem cannot be solved within our present conceptual framework. The reason is that some property of each conscious experience lacks structure, while explanations of the kind that would overcome the Hard Problem require structure in the occurrences that are to be explained. This account is apt to seem incorrect for reasons that trace to relational theories of consciousness. I thus review a highly developed representative version of relational theory and explain why (...)
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  16.  31
    Computers, Minds, and Robots.William S. Robinson - 1992 - Temple University Press.
  17.  15
    Toward Eliminating Churchland’s Eliminationism.William S. Robinson - 1985 - Philosophical Topics 13 (2):61-68.
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  18.  33
    Toward Eliminating Churchland’s Eliminationism.William S. Robinson - 1985 - Philosophical Topics 13 (2):60-67.
  19. The Legend of the Given.William S. Robinson - 1975 - In Hector-Neri Castaneda (ed.), Action, Knowledge, and Reality. Bobbs-Merrill.
     
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  20.  11
    Mild Realism, Causation, and Folk Psychology.William S. Robinson - 1995 - Philosophical Psychology 8 (2):167-187.
  21.  57
    Mild Realism, Causation, and Folk Psychology.William S. Robinson - 1996 - Philosophical Psychology 8 (2):167-87.
    Daniel Dennett (1991) has advanced a mild realism in which beliefs are described as patterns “discernible in agents' (observable) behavior” (p. 30). I clarify the conflict between this otherwise attractive theory and the strong realist view that beliefs are internal states that cause actions. Support for strong realism is sometimes derived from the assumption that the everyday psychology of the folk is committed to it. My main thesis here is that we have sufficient reason neither for strong realism nor for (...)
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  22.  75
    What is It Like to Like?William S. Robinson - 2006 - Philosophical Psychology 19 (6):743-765.
    The liking of a sensation, e.g., a taste, is a conscious occurrent but does not consist in having the liked sensation accompanied by a "pleasure sensation" - for there is no such sensation. Several alternative accounts of liking, including Aydede's "feeling episode" theory and Schroeder's representationalist theory are considered. The proposal that liking a sensation is having the non-sensory experience of liking directed upon it is explained and defended. The pleasure provided by thoughts, conversations, walks, etc., is analyzed and brought (...)
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  23.  12
    Brains and People.William S. Robinson - 1990 - Behavior and Philosophy 18 (2):101-104.
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  24.  54
    Ascription, Intentionality and Understanding.William S. Robinson - 1986 - The Monist 69 (4):584-597.
    The three terms of my title are connected in an interesting and mutually illuminating way. To exhibit this connection I shall first state a view about our ascriptions of psychological states. I shall then make use of this view in sketching an account of intentionality. Defending this account will require us to envisage a certain kind of involvement in linguistic practice. This involvement is related to historical understanding and to the view that this must be contrasted with explanation. In my (...)
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  25.  68
    Some Nonhuman Animals Can Have Pains in a Morally Relevant Sense.William S. Robinson - 1997 - Biology and Philosophy 12 (1):51-71.
    In a series of works, Peter Carruthers has argued for the denial of the title proposition. Here, I defend that proposition by offering direct support drawn from relevant sciences and by undercutting Carruthers argument. In doing the latter, I distinguish an intrinsic theory of consciousness from Carruthers relational theory of consciousness. This relational theory has two readings, one of which makes essential appeal to evolutionary theory. I argue that neither reading offers a successful view.
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  26.  22
    A Few Thoughts Too Many?William S. Robinson - 2004 - In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins.
  27. Orwell, Stalin, and Determinate Qualia.William S. Robinson - 1994 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 75 (2):151-64.
  28. Sellarsian Materialism.William S. Robinson - 1982 - Philosophy of Science 49 (June):212-27.
    Wilfrid Sellars has proposed a materialist account of sensation which relies in part on the postulation of special kinds of individuals. This postulational strategy appears to be analogous to the one that introduces such entities as electrons. After setting out Sellars' account, I focus on his application of the postulational strategy. I argue that this application requires the discovery of new effects for familiar properties; that this kind of discovery is disanalogous to what postulation usually does; and that this kind (...)
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  29.  81
    Jackson's Apostasy.William S. Robinson - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 111 (3):277-293.
    Frank Jackson has abandoned his famous knowledge argument, and has explained why in a brief "Postscript on Qualia" . This explanation consists of a direct argument, and an attempt to explain away the intuition that lies at the heart of the knowledge argument. The direct argument is clarified and found to be subtly question-begging. The attempt to explain away the key intuition is reviewed and found to be inadequate. False memory traces, which Jackson mentions at the beginning of the direct (...)
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  30. Why I Am a Dualist.William S. Robinson - 1982 - In Philosophy: The Basic Issues, Klemke. New York: St Martin's Press.
     
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  31.  53
    Judgments Involving Identification.William S. Robinson - 1964 - Analysis 24 (6):206 - 208.
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  32.  67
    Brain Symbols and Computationalist Explanation.William S. Robinson - 1995 - Minds and Machines 5 (1):25-44.
    Computationalist theories of mind require brain symbols, that is, neural events that represent kinds or instances of kinds. Standard models of computation require multiple inscriptions of symbols with the same representational content. The satisfaction of two conditions makes it easy to see how this requirement is met in computers, but we have no reason to think that these conditions are satisfied in the brain. Thus, if we wish to give computationalist explanations of human cognition, without committing ourselvesa priori to a (...)
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  33.  22
    Pictures, Images and Conceptual Change, An Analysis of Wilfrid Sellars' Philosophy of Science.William S. Robinson - 1983 - Philosophy of Science 50 (4):671-672.
  34.  54
    Dennett's Analysis of Awareness.William S. Robinson - 1972 - Philosophical Studies 23 (3):147-52.
  35.  30
    Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind.William S. Robinson - 1989 - Review of Metaphysics 42 (3):619-620.
    Psychosemantics consists of four chapters, a brief epilogue, and an appendix. The chapters explain and argue for the book's main thesis, which is that "We have no reason to doubt--indeed, we have substantial reason to believe--that it is possible to have a scientific psychology that vindicates commonsense belief/desire explanation". The epilogue offers a quasi-transcendental deduction of the innateness of our knowledge of human psychology. The appendix gives three updated and refined arguments for the thesis of its title, "Why There Still (...)
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  36.  36
    Direct Representation.William S. Robinson - 1995 - Philosophical Studies 80 (3):305-22.
  37.  21
    A Gap Not Bridged.William S. Robinson - 1998 - Consciousness and Cognition 7 (2):210-211.
  38.  27
    A Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness?William S. Robinson - 1999 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 5.
    Peter Carruthers offers a model that embraces first order representations and higher order representations or higher order thoughts . His model stipulates certain features of FORs and HOTs. Carruthers agrees with qualia realists that the FORs of his model are not adequate for phenomenal consciousness, and invokes HOTs to supply the required addition. It is argued that Carruthers' HOTs fail to provide anything that will enable him to account for phenomenal consciousness, i.e., that his model fails to include phenomenal consciousness (...)
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  39.  1
    Commentary.William S. Robinson - unknown
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  40.  24
    Concept Acquisition and Experiential Change.William S. Robinson - 2014 - The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 9.
    Many have held the Acquisition of Concepts Thesis that concept acquisition can change perceptual experience. This paper explains the close relation of ACT to ADT, the thesis that acquisition of dispositions to quickly and reliably recognize a kind of thing can change perceptual experience. It then states a highly developed argument given by Siegel which, if successful, would offer strong support for ADT and indirect support for ACT. Examination of this argument, however, reveals difficulties that undermine its promise. Distinctions made (...)
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  41. Colors, Arousal, Functionalism, and Individual Differences.William S. Robinson - 2004 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 10.
    Some philosophers have regarded the connection between hues and certain arousal or affective qualities as so intimate as to make them inseparable, and this “necessary concomitance view” has been invoked to defend functionalism against arguments based on inverted spectra. Support for the necessary concomitance view has sometimes been thought to accrue from experiments in psychology. This paper examines three experiments, two of which apparently offer support for the view. It argues that careful consideration of these experiments undermines this appearance of (...)
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  42. Could a Robot Be Qualitatively Conscious?William S. Robinson - 1998 - Aisb 99:13-18.
     
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  43.  30
    Chisholm's Paralogism.William S. Robinson - 1979 - Philosophical Studies 36 (3):309 - 316.
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  44.  27
    Dennett's Dilemma.William S. Robinson & A. David Kline - 1979 - Journal of Critical Analysis 8 (1):1-4.
  45. Dretske's Etiological View.William S. Robinson - 1983 - Southwest Philosophical Studies 9:23-29.
  46.  21
    Do Pains Make a Difference to Our Behavior?William S. Robinson - 1979 - American Philosophical Quarterly 16 (4):327-34.
  47.  7
    3 Experience and Representation.William S. Robinson - 2008 - In Edmond Wright (ed.), The Case for Qualia. MIT Press. pp. 73.
  48. 8 Evolution and Self-Evidence.William S. Robinson - 1999 - In Philip R. Loockvane (ed.), The Nature of Concepts: Evolution, Structure, and Representation. Routledge. pp. 168.
     
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  49.  12
    Elmer Daniel Klemke, 1926-2000. [REVIEW]Michael Bishop & William S. Robinson - 2001 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 74 (5):238 - 239.
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  50. Intentionality, Ascription, and Understanding: Remarks on Professor Hocutt's: "Spartans, Strawmen, and Symptoms".William S. Robinson - 1985 - Behavior and Philosophy 13 (2):157.
     
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