9 found
Order:
  1.  72
    Condorcet's paradox.William V. Gehrlein - 1983 - Theory and Decision 15 (2):161-197.
  2.  83
    Condorcet's paradox and the likelihood of its occurrence: different perspectives on balanced preferences.William V. Gehrlein - 2002 - Theory and Decision 52 (2):171-199.
    Many studies have considered the probability that a pairwise majority rule (PMR) winner exists for three candidate elections. The absence of a PMR winner indicates an occurrence of Condorcet's Paradox for three candidate elections. This paper summarizes work that has been done in this area with the assumptions of: Impartial Culture, Impartial Anonymous Culture, Maximal Culture, Dual Culture and Uniform Culture. Results are included for the likelihood that there is a strong winner by PMR, a weak winner by PMR, and (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  3.  43
    Which Scoring Rule Maximizes Condorcet Efficiency Under Iac?Davide P. Cervone, William V. Gehrlein & William S. Zwicker - 2005 - Theory and Decision 58 (2):145-185.
    Consider an election in which each of the n voters casts a vote consisting of a strict preference ranking of the three candidates A, B, and C. In the limit as n→∞, which scoring rule maximizes, under the assumption of Impartial Anonymous Culture (uniform probability distribution over profiles), the probability that the Condorcet candidate wins the election, given that a Condorcet candidate exists? We produce an analytic solution, which is not the Borda Count. Our result agrees with recent numerical results (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  4.  26
    An analysis of simple counting methods for ordering incomplete ordinal data.William V. Gehrlein & Peter C. Fishburn - 1977 - Theory and Decision 8 (3):209-227.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  5.  31
    The expected likelihood of transitivity: A survey.William V. Gehrlein - 1994 - Theory and Decision 37 (2):175-209.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  6.  28
    The Unexpected Behavior of Plurality Rule.William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley - 2009 - Theory and Decision 67 (3):267-293.
    When voters’ preferences on candidates are mutually coherent, in the sense that they are at all close to being perfectly single-peaked, perfectly single-troughed, or perfectly polarized, there is a large probability that a Condorcet Winner exists in elections with a small number of candidates. Given this fact, the study develops representations for Condorcet Efficiency of plurality rule as a function of the proximity of voters’ preferences on candidates to being perfectly single-peaked, perfectly single-troughed or perfectly polarized. We find that the (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  7.  2
    Peter C. Fishburn.Fred S. Roberts, William V. Gehrlein & Steven J. Brams - 2021 - Theory and Decision 93 (1):1-6.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8.  53
    Majority efficiencies for simple voting procedures: Summary and interpretation. [REVIEW]Peter C. Fishburn & William V. Gehrlein - 1982 - Theory and Decision 14 (2):141-153.
  9. Mohammed Abdellaoui/Editorial Statement 1–2 Mohammed Abdellaoui and Peter P. Wakker/The likelihood Method for Decision Under Uncertainty 3–76 AAJ Marley and R. Duncan Luce/Independence Properties Vis--Vis Several Utility Representations 77–143. [REVIEW]Davide P. Cervone, William V. Gehrlein, William S. Zwicker, Which Scoring Rule Maximizes Condorcet, Marcello Basili, Alain Chateauneuf & Fulvio Fontini - 2005 - Theory and Decision 58:409-410.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark