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  1. Explanatory Exclusion and Causal Relevance.André Fuhrmann & Wilson Mendonça - 2002 - Facta Philosophica 4:287-300.
     
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  2.  4
    Argumentos de Superveniência Contra o Realismo Moral Robusto.Wilson Mendonça - 2019 - Filosofia Unisinos 20 (1).
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  3.  16
    Causas Excludentes.André Fuhrmann & Wilson Mendonça - 2000 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 4 (2):257-276.
    We defend J. Kim's principle of explanatory exclusion from a recent criticism advanced by A Marras. We show that the principle follows from a less controversial principle of causal exclusion together with the assumption that claims of explanation are factual. We resolve the tension produced by Marras' argument by drawing a distinction between causal and explanatory relevance. In cross-level explanations the explanans property is not causally but explanatorily relevant to the explanandum. This calls for an account of how explanatorily relevant (...)
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    Experiências, Conhecimento Fenomenal e Materialismo.Wilson Mendonça & Julia Telles Menezes - 2011 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 15 (3):415-438.
    A ideia intuitivamente plausível de que pelo menos alguns de nossos estados mentais teriam aspectos fenomenais qualitativos aos quais nós teríamos um acesso cognitivo privilegiado é considerada por muitos filósofos como incompatível com a ontologia fisicista. Alguns defensores radicais do fisicismo preferem simplesmente negar a existência de aspectos qualitativos, ao passo que outros materialistas procuram reinterpretar a cognição do caráter fenomenal da nossa experiência do mundo como a aquisição de uma habilidade, isto é, como uma forma de know-how , em (...)
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    Supervenience and the Problem of Downward Causation.Wilson Mendonça - 2002 - Manuscrito 25 (3):251-270.
    It seems that higher-level, nonbasic properties can only manifest their causal powers by exerting causal influence on lower-level, physically basic phenomena in the first place. A very influential line of reasoning conceives of this form of downward causation as either reducible to causation by physical properties or as ultimately untenable, because incompatible with the causal closure of physical reality. The paper argues that this is not so. It examines, first, why it is that a recent attempt by Noordhof to substantiate (...)
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    Experiências, Conhecimento Fenomenal e Materialismo.Wilson Mendonça & Julia Telles Menezes - 2011 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 15 (3):415-438.
    The claim that at least some of our mental states have qualitative, phenomenal features to which we have privileged cognitive access is intuitively plausible. Nevertheless, the claim is considered by many philosophers to be incompatible with a physicalist ontology. Some radical physicalists prefer simply to deny the existence of the qualitative character of our mental states, whereas other physicalists try to reinterpret the knowledge of the phenomenal character of our experience as the acquisition of an ability, i.e., as a sort (...)
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  7. Da Teoria Do Conhecimento À Metodologia: Análise Do Projeto Epistemológico de Popper.Wilson Mendonça - forthcoming - Cadernos de História E Filosofia da Ciência.
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  8.  55
    Mental Causation and the Causal Completeness of Physics.Wilson Mendonça - 2002 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 6 (1):121-132.
    This paper takes issue with a widely accepted view of mental causation. This is the view that mental causation is either reducible to physical causation or ultimately untenable, because incompatible with the causal completeness of physics The paper examines, first, why recent attempts to save the phenomena of mental causation by way of the notion of supervenient causation fail The result of t/us examination is the claim that any attempted specification of the most basic causal factors which supposedly underlie a (...)
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