11 found
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  1. Is Killing No Worse Than Letting Die?Winston Nesbitt - 1995 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 12 (1):101-106.
    ABSTRACT Those who wish to refute the view that it is worse to kill than to let die sometimes produce examples of cases in which an agent lets someone die but would be generally agreed to be no less reprehensible than if he had killed. It is argued that the examples produced typically possess a feature which makes their use in this context illegitimate, and that when modified to remove this feature, they provide support for the view which they were (...)
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  2.  22
    Self‐Esteem and Moral Virtue.Winston Nesbitt - 1993 - Journal of Moral Education 22 (1):51-53.
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  3.  91
    Determinism and the Ability to Do Otherwise.Winston Nesbitt & Stewart Candlish - 1978 - Mind 87 (347):415-420.
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  4.  77
    Euthanasia and the Distinction Between Acts and Omissions.Winston Nesbitt - 1993 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 10 (2):253-256.
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  5.  35
    Necessity and Not Doing Otherwise.Stewart Candlish & Winston Nesbitt - 1982 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 60 (1):76 – 80.
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  6.  32
    Compatibilism - Reply to Locke.Winston Nesbitt - 1981 - Mind 90 (February):435-440.
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  7.  22
    Categorical Imperatives--A Defense.Winston Nesbitt - 1977 - Philosophical Review 86 (2):217-225.
  8.  17
    Performatives and the Gap Between 'Is' and 'Ought'.Winston Nesbitt - 1973 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 51 (2):165 – 170.
  9.  6
    Wilson on Kohlberg and Understanding Reasons.Winston Nesbitt - 1983 - Journal of Moral Education 12 (1):14-17.
    John Wilson has recently criticized the ?Kohlbergian? view that at certain stages of their development, children are unable to understand moral reasoning of certain kinds. He argues that understanding a reason is chiefly a matter of knowing a rule and its application, and that in the case of moral reasons, the relevant rules and concepts can be mastered by almost any child. It will be argued here that Wilson fails to cast doubt on the Kohlbergian view, because his account of (...)
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  10.  9
    Utilitarianism and Benevolence.Winston Nesbitt - 1992 - Cogito 6 (3):170-172.
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  11.  6
    Value-Judgements, Prescriptive Language, and Imperatives.Winston Nesbitt - 1973 - Philosophical Quarterly 23 (92):253-257.