Search results for 'Wittgenstein's philosophy of mathematics' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  45
    Pieranna Garavaso (1988). Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics: A Reply to Two Objections. Southern Journal of Philosophy 26 (2):179-191.
    This paper has two main purposes: first to compare Wittgenstein's views to the more traditional views in the philosophy of mathematics; second, to provide a general outline for a Wittgensteinian reply to two objections against Wittgenstein's account of mathematics: the objectivity objection and the consistency objections, respectively. Two fundamental thesmes of Wittgenstein's account of mathematics title the first two sections: mathematical propositions are rules and not descritpions and mathematics is employed within a (...)
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  2.  15
    Ray Monk (2007). Bourgeois, Bolshevist or Anarchist?: The Reception of Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics. In Guy Kahane, Edward Kanterian & Oskari Kuusela (eds.), Wittgenstein and His Interpreters: Essays in Memory of Gordon Baker. Blackwell Pub.
    Introduction 1. Perspectives on Wittgenstein: An Intermittently Opinionated Survey: Hans-Johann Glock. 2. Wittgenstein's Method: Ridding People of Philosophical Prejudices: Katherine Morris. 3. Gordon Baker's Late Interpretation of Wittgenstein: P. M. S. Hacker. 4. The Interpretation of the Philosophical Investigations: Style, Therapy, Nachlass: Alois Pichler. 5. Ways of Reading Wittgenstein: Observations on Certain Uses of the Word 'Metaphysics': Joachim Schulte. 6. Metaphysical/Everyday Use: A Note on a Late Paper by Gordon Baker: Hilary Putnam. 7. Wittgenstein and Transcendental Idealism: A. W. (...)
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  3.  1
    Severin Schroeder, Conjecture, Proof, and Sense in Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics.
    One of the key tenets in Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mathematics is that a mathematical proposition gets its meaning from its proof. This seems to have the paradoxical consequence that a mathematical conjecture has no meaning, or at least not the same meaning that it will have once a proof has been found. Hence, it would appear that a conjecture can never be proven true: for what is proven true must ipso facto be a different proposition from what was (...)
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  4. Axel Arturo Barcelo Aspeitia (2000). Mathematics as Grammar: 'Grammar' in Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics During the Middle Period. Dissertation, Indiana University
    This dissertation looks to make sense of the role 'grammar' plays in Wittgenstein's philosophy of mathematics during the middle period of his career. It constructs a formal model of Wittgenstein's notion of grammar as expressed in his writings of the early thirties, addresses the appropriateness of that model and then employs it to test Wittgenstein's claim that mathematical propositions are ultimately grammatical. ;In order to test Wittgenstein's claim that mathematical propositions are grammatical, the dissertation (...)
     
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  5.  48
    Pasquale Frascolla (1994). Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics. Routledge.
    Wittgenstein's role was vital in establishing mathematics as one of this century's principal areas of philosophic inquiry. In this book, the three phases of Wittgenstein's reflections on mathematics are viewed as a progressive whole, rather than as separate entities. Frascolla builds up a systematic construction of Wittgenstein's representation of the role of arithmetic in the theory of logical operations. He also presents a new interpretation of Wittgenstein's rule-following considerations - the `community view of internal (...)
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  6. Pasquale Frascolla (2013). Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics. Routledge.
    Wittgenstein's role was vital in establishing mathematics as one of this century's principal areas of philosophic inquiry. In this book, the three phases of Wittgenstein's reflections on mathematics are viewed as a progressive whole, rather than as separate entities. Frascolla builds up a systematic construction of Wittgenstein's representation of the role of arithmetic in the theory of logical operations. He also presents a new interpretation of Wittgenstein's rule-following considerations - the `community view of internal (...)
     
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  7.  82
    Mark Steiner (2008). Empirical Regularities in Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics. Philosophia Mathematica 17 (1):1-34.
    During the course of about ten years, Wittgenstein revised some of his most basic views in philosophy of mathematics, for example that a mathematical theorem can have only one proof. This essay argues that these changes are rooted in his growing belief that mathematical theorems are ‘internally’ connected to their canonical applications, i.e. , that mathematical theorems are ‘hardened’ empirical regularities, upon which the former are supervenient. The central role Wittgenstein increasingly assigns to empirical regularities had profound implications (...)
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  8.  34
    Sebastian Grève & Felix Mühlhölzer (2014). Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Mathematics: Felix Mühlhölzer in Conversation with Sebastian Grève. Nordic Wittgenstein Review 3 (2):151-180.
    Sebastian Grève interviews Felix Mühlhölzer on his work on the philosophy of mathematics.
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  9.  11
    Pïeranna Garavaso (1991). Anti-Realism and Objectivity in Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics. Philosophica 48.
    In the first section, I characterize realism and illustrate the sense in which Wittgenstein's account of mathematics is anti-realist. In the second section, I spell out the above notion of objectivity and show how and anti-realist account of truth, namely, Putnam's idealized rational acceptability, preserves objectivity. In the third section, I discuss the "majority argument" and illustrate how Wittgenstein's anti-realism can also account for the objectivity of mathematics. What Putnam's and Wittgenstein's anti-realisms ultimately show is (...)
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  10. Pasquale Frascolla (2006). Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics. Routledge.
    Wittgenstein's role was vital in establishing mathematics as one of this century's principal areas of philosophic inquiry. In this book, the three phases of Wittgenstein's reflections on mathematics are viewed as a progressive whole, rather than as separate entities. Frascolla builds up a systematic construction of Wittgenstein's representation of the role of arithmetic in the theory of logical operations. He also presents a new interpretation of Wittgenstein's rule-following considerations - the `community view of internal (...)
     
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  11. Pieranna Garavaso (1985). Objectivity and Consistency in Mathematics: A Critical Analysis of Two Objections to Wittgenstein's Pragmatic Conventionalism. Dissertation, The University of Nebraska - Lincoln
    Wittgenstein's views on mathematics are radically original. He criticizes most of the traditional philosophies of mathematics. His views have been subject to harsh criticisms. In this dissertation, I attempt to defend Wittgenstein's philosophy of mathematics from two objections: the objectivity objection and the consistency objection. The first claims that Wittgenstein's account of mathematics is not sufficient for the objectivity of mathematics; the second claims that it is only a partial account of (...)
     
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  12. Hilary Putnam (1996). On Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 70 (70):243-264.
  13. V. H. Klenk (1976). Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics. Nijhoff.
  14. Mathieu Marion (1991). Quantification and Finitism a Study in Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics.
     
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  15. Stuart Shanker (1984). The Turning-Point in Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics.
     
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  16.  31
    Claire Hill (2002). W. Demopoulos (Ed.), Frege's Philosophy of Mathematics, and W. W. Tait (Ed.), Early Analytic Philosophy, Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, Essays in Honor of Leonard Linsky. [REVIEW] Synthese 133 (3):441-452.
  17.  73
    Michael Dummett (1997). Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics. Journal of Philosophy 94 (7):166--85.
  18. Michael Dummett (1959). Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics. Philosophical Review 68 (3):324-348.
  19.  2
    Carlo Penco (1994). Dummett and Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics. In Brian McGuiness & Gianluigi Oliveri (eds.), The Philosophy of Michael Dummett. Kluwer 113--136.
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  20.  38
    Victor Rodych, Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  21. Reuben Louis Goodstein (1972). Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics'. In Alice Ambrose & Morris Lazerowitz (eds.), Ludwig Wittgenstein: Philosophy and Language. George Allen and Unwin (London), Humanities Press (New York)
     
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  22.  10
    Sorin Bangu (2012). Later Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics. In J. Feiser & B. Dowden (eds.), Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  23. Michael Dummett (1997). Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Mathematics. Journal of Philosophy 94 (7):359-374.
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  24.  40
    Peter C. Kjaergaard (2002). Hertz and Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Science. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 33 (1):121-149.
    The German physicist Heinrich Hertz played a decisive role for Wittgenstein's use of a unique philosophical method. Wittgenstein applied this method successfully to critical problems in logic and mathematics throughout his life. Logical paradoxes and foundational problems including those of mathematics were seen as pseudo-problems requiring clarity instead of solution. In effect, Wittgenstein's controversial response to David Hilbert and Kurt Gödel was deeply influenced by Hertz and can only be fully understood when seen in this context. (...)
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  25.  90
    James Conant (1997). On Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 97 (2):195–222.
  26.  21
    Ray Monk (1995). Full-Blooded Bolshevism: Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics. Wittgenstein-Studien 2 (1).
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  27.  12
    Barry Stroud (1979). Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics. International Studies in Philosophy 11:235-236.
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  28. S. Bhave (1994). Remarks on Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics. Indian Philosophical Quarterly 21 (2):147.
     
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  29.  36
    Esther Ramharter (2009). Christine Redecker. Wittgensteins Philosophie der Mathematik: Eine Neubewertung Im Ausgang Von der Kritik an Cantors Beweis der Überabzählbarkeit der Reellen Zahlen. [Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics: A Reassessment Starting From the Critique of Cantor's Proof of the Uncountability of the Real Numbers]. Philosophia Mathematica 17 (3):382-392.
  30.  3
    Hilary Putnam & James Conant (1996). On Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 70 (1):243-266.
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  31.  23
    Michael Wrigley (1977). Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics. Philosophical Quarterly 27 (106):50-59.
  32.  24
    Victor Rodych (1995). Review of P. Frascolla, Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics. [REVIEW] Philosophia Mathematica 3 (3).
  33.  6
    Hans Johann Glock (1997). Review of P. Frascola, Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 47 (189):552-555.
  34. Sorin Bangu (2012). Wynn’s Experiments and the Later Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Mathematics. Iyyun 61:219-240.
  35. L. Goldstein (1996). Pasquale Frascolla, Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics. Philosophical Investigations 19:337-341.
     
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  36.  13
    Shelley Stillwell (1989). Book Review: S. G. Shanker. Wittgenstein and the Turning Point in the Philosophy of Mathematics. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 30 (4):629-645.
  37.  3
    Mark Steiner (1989). Review: S. G. Shanker, Wittgenstein and the Turing-Point in the Philosophy of Mathematics. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 54 (3):1098-1100.
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  38. Mark Steiner (1989). Shanker S. G.. Wittgenstein and the Turning-Point in the Philosophy of Mathematics. Croom Helm, Beckenham, Kent, and State University of New York Press, Albany 1987, Xi + 358 Pp. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 54 (3):1098-1100.
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  39. C. Penco (1988). S.G. Shanker, "Wittgenstein and the Turning Point in the Philosophy of Mathematics". [REVIEW] Epistemologia 11 (1):163.
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  40.  31
    Simo Säätelä (2013). Aesthetics - Wittgenstein's Paradigm of Philosophy? Aisthesis. Pratiche, Linguaggi E Saperi Dell’Estetico 6 (1):35-53.
    This paper attempts to elucidate Wittgenstein’s remark about the “strange resemblance between a philosophical investigation (especially in mathematics) and an aesthetic one” from 1937 by looking at its textual and philosophical context. The conclusion is that the remark can be seen both as a description of a particular conception of philosophy, a prescription or declaration of intent (to proceed in a particular way), and a reminder (to Wittgenstein himself) about the form of a philosophical investigation. Furthermore, it is (...)
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  41.  76
    Steve Gerrard (1991). Wittgenstein's Philosophies of Mathematics. Synthese 87 (1):125-142.
    Wittgenstein's philosophy of mathematics has long been notorious. Part of the problem is that it has not been recognized that Wittgenstein, in fact, had two chief post-Tractatus conceptions of mathematics. I have labelled these the calculus conception and the language-game conception. The calculus conception forms a distinct middle period. The goal of my article is to provide a new framework for examining Wittgenstein's philosophies of mathematics and the evolution of his career as a whole. (...)
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  42.  14
    Marc A. Joseph (1998). Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Arithmetic. Dialogue 37 (01):83-.
    It is argued that the finitist interpretation of wittgenstein fails to take seriously his claim that philosophy is a descriptive activity. Wittgenstein's concentration on relatively simple mathematical examples is not to be explained in terms of finitism, But rather in terms of the fact that with them the central philosophical task of a clear 'ubersicht' of its subject matter is more tractable than with more complex mathematics. Other aspects of wittgenstein's philosophy of mathematics are (...)
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  43.  58
    Juliet Floyd (2004). Wittgenstein on Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics. Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 25 (2):227-287.
    A survey of Wittgenstein's writings on logic and mathematics; an analytical bibliography of contemporary articles on rule-following, social constructivism, Wittgenstein, Godel, and constructivism is appended. Various historical accounts of the nature of mathematical knowledge glossed over the effects of linguistic expression on our understanding of its status and content. Initially Wittgenstein rejected Frege's and Russell's logicism, aiming to operationalize the notions of logical consequence, necessity and sense. Vienna positivists took this to place analysis of meaning at the heart (...)
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  44. Francesco Berto (2009). The Gödel Paradox and Wittgenstein's Reasons. Philosophia Mathematica 17 (2):208-219.
    An interpretation of Wittgenstein’s much criticized remarks on Gödel’s First Incompleteness Theorem is provided in the light of paraconsistent arithmetic: in taking Gödel’s proof as a paradoxical derivation, Wittgenstein was drawing the consequences of his deliberate rejection of the standard distinction between theory and metatheory. The reasoning behind the proof of the truth of the Gödel sentence is then performed within the formal system itself, which turns out to be inconsistent. It is shown that the features of paraconsistent arithmetics match (...)
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  45. Ludwig Wittgenstein (1975). Wittgenstein's Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics, Cambridge, 1939: From the Notes of R.G. Bosanquet, Norman Malcolm, Rush Rhees, and Yorick Smythies. University of Chicago Press.
    From his return to Cambridge in 1929 to his death in 1951, Wittgenstein influenced philosophy almost exclusively through teaching and discussion. These lecture notes indicate what he considered to be salient features of his thinking in this period of his life.
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  46. Ian Hacking (2011). Why is There Philosophy of Mathematics AT ALL? South African Journal of Philosophy 30 (1):1-15.
    Mathematics plays an inordinate role in the work of many of famous Western philosophers, from the time of Plato, through Husserl and Wittgenstein, and even to the present. Why? This paper points to the experience of learning or making mathematics, with an emphasis on proof. It distinguishes two sources of the perennial impact of mathematics on philosophy. They are classified as Ancient and Enlightenment. Plato is emblematic of the former, and Kant of the latter. The Ancient (...)
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  47.  86
    Boudewijn de Bruin (2008). Wittgenstein on Circularity in the Frege-Russell Definition of Cardinal Number. Philosophia Mathematica 16 (3):354-373.
    Several scholars have argued that Wittgenstein held the view that the notion of number is presupposed by the notion of one-one correlation, and that therefore Hume's principle is not a sound basis for a definition of number. I offer a new interpretation of the relevant fragments on philosophy of mathematics from Wittgenstein's Nachlass, showing that if different uses of ‘presupposition’ are understood in terms of de re and de dicto knowledge, Wittgenstein's argument against the Frege-Russell definition (...)
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  48.  3
    S. G. Shanker (1987). Wittgenstein and the Turning Point in the Philosophy of Mathematics. State University of New York Press.
    First published in 2005. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.
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  49.  63
    P. M. S. Hacker, The Relevance of Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Psychology to The.
    Th e con fusion a nd b arren ness o f psycho logy is no t to be e xplain ed b y calling it a “yo ung science”; its state is not comparable with that of physics, for instance, in its beginnings. (Rather with that of certain branches of mathematics. Set theory.) For in psychology there are experimental methods and conceptual confusion. (As in the oth er case, con cep tual co nfusion and m ethod s of pro (...)
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  50.  4
    Cora Diamond (1977). Wittgenstein's Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics, Cambridge 1939. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 37 (4):584-586.
    For several terms at Cambridge in 1939, Ludwig Wittgenstein lectured on the philosophical foundations of mathematics. A lecture class taught by Wittgenstein, however, hardly resembled a lecture. He sat on a chair in the middle of the room, with some of the class sitting in chairs, some on the floor. He never used notes. He paused frequently, sometimes for several minutes, while he puzzled out a problem. He often asked his listeners questions and reacted to their replies. Many meetings (...)
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