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Wlodek Rabinowicz
Lund University
  1. The Strike of the Demon: On Fitting Pro‐Attitudes and Value.Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni Rønnow‐Rasmussen - 2004 - Ethics 114 (3):391-423.
    The paper presents and discusses the so-called Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem (WKR problem) that arises for the fitting-attitudes analysis of value. This format of analysis is exemplified for example by Scanlon's buck-passing account, on which an object's value consists in the existence of reasons to favour the object- to respond to it in a positive way. The WKR problem can be put as follows: It appears that in some situations we might well have reasons to have pro-attitudes toward objects (...)
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  2. Buck-Passing and the Right Kind of Reasons.Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (222):114–120.
    The ‘buck-passing’ account equates the value of an object with the existence of reasons to favour it. As we argued in an earlier paper, this analysis faces the ‘wrong kind of reasons’ problem: there may be reasons for pro-attitudes towards worthless objects, in particular if it is the pro-attitudes, rather than their objects, that are valuable. Jonas Olson has recently suggested how to resolve this difficulty: a reason to favour an object is of the right kind only if its formulation (...)
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  3. Democratic Answers to Complex Questions – An Epistemic Perspective.Luc Bovens & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2006 - Synthese 150 (1):131-153.
    This paper addresses a problem for theories of epistemic democracy. In a decision on a complex issue which can be decomposed into several parts, a collective can use different voting procedures: Either its members vote on each sub-question and the answers that gain majority support are used as premises for the conclusion on the main issue, or the vote is conducted on the main issue itself. The two procedures can lead to different results. We investigate which of these procedures is (...)
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  4. Value Relations.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2008 - Theoria 74 (1):18-49.
    Abstract: The paper provides a general account of value relations. It takes its departure in a special type of value relation, parity, which according to Ruth Chang is a form of evaluative comparability that differs from the three standard forms of comparability: betterness, worseness and equal goodness. Recently, Joshua Gert has suggested that the notion of parity can be accounted for if value comparisons are interpreted as normative assessments of preference. While Gert's basic idea is attractive, the way he develops (...)
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  5.  25
    Value Superiority.Gustaf Arrhenius & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2015 - In Iwao Hirose & Jonas Olson (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory. Oxford University Press USA.
    Suppose that A and B are two kinds of goods such that more of each is better than less. A is strongly superior to B if any amount of A is better than any amount of B. It is weakly superior to B if some amount of A is better than any amount of B. There are many examples of these relations in the literature, sometimes under the labels “higher goods” and “discontinuity.” The chapter gives a precise and generalized statement (...)
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  6.  12
    A Distinction in Value: Intrinsic and for Its Own Sake.Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni R.?Nnow-Rasmussen - 2000 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 (1):33 - 51.
    The paper argues that the final value of an object-i.e., its value for its own sake-need not be intrinsic. Extrinsic final value, which accrues to things (or persons) in virtue of their relational rather than internal features, cannot be traced back to the intrinsic value of states that involve these things together with their relations. On the contrary, such states, insofar as they are valuable at all, derive their value from the things involved. The endeavour to reduce thing-values to state-values (...)
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  7. Incommensurability and Vagueness.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2009 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):71-94.
    This paper casts doubts on John Broome's view that vagueness in value comparisons crowds out incommensurability in value. It shows how vagueness can be imposed on a formal model of value relations that has room for different types of incommensurability. The model implements some basic insights of the 'fitting attitudes' analysis of value.
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  8. A Distinction in Value: Intrinsic and for its Own Sake.Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2000 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 (1):33–51.
    The paper argues that the final value of an object-i.e., its value for its own sake-need not be intrinsic. Extrinsic final value, which accrues to things (or persons) in virtue of their relational rather than internal features, cannot be traced back to the intrinsic value of states that involve these things together with their relations. On the contrary, such states, insofar as they are valuable at all, derive their value from the things involved. The endeavour to reduce thing-values to state-values (...)
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  9. Backwards Induction in the Centipede Game.John Broome & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 1999 - Analysis 59 (4):237-242.
    The standard backward-induction reasoning in a game like the centipede assumes that the players maintain a common belief in rationality throughout the game. But that is a dubious assumption. Suppose the first player X didn't terminate the game in the first round; what would the second player Y think then? Since the backwards-induction argument says X should terminate the game, and it is supposed to be a sound argument, Y might be entitled to doubt X's rationality. Alternatively, Y might doubt (...)
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  10. Prioritarianism for Prospects.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2002 - Utilitas 14 (1):2-21.
    The Interpersonal Addition Theorem, due to John Broome, states that, given certain seemingly innocuous assumptions, the overall utility of an uncertain prospect can be represented as the sum of its individual utilities. Given ‘Bernoulli's hypothesis’ according to which individual utility coincides with individual welfare, this result appears to be incompatible with the Priority View. On that view, due to Derek Parfit, the benefits to the worse off should count for more, in the overall evaluation, than the comparable benefits to the (...)
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  11. 10. Peter Singer, One World: The Ethics of Globalization Peter Singer, One World: The Ethics of Globalization (Pp. 634-638). [REVIEW]Wlodek Rabinowicz, Toni Rønnow‐Rasmussen, Douglas Lavin, Rachana Kamtekar, Joshua Gert, Elijah Millgram, David Copp & Stephen M. Gardiner - 2004 - Ethics 114 (3).
     
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  12.  43
    Does Practical Deliberation Crowd Out Self-Prediction?Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2002 - Erkenntnis 57 (1):91-122.
    It is a popular view thatpractical deliberation excludes foreknowledge of one's choice. Wolfgang Spohn and Isaac Levi have argued that not even a purely probabilistic self-predictionis available to thedeliberator, if one takes subjective probabilities to be conceptually linked to betting rates. It makes no sense to have a betting rate for an option, for one's willingness to bet on the option depends on the net gain from the bet, in combination with the option's antecedent utility, rather than on the offered (...)
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  13.  75
    Value Relations Revisited.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2012 - Economics and Philosophy 28 (2):133-164.
    In Rabinowicz, I considered how value relations can best be analysed in terms of fitting pro-attitudes. In the formal model of that paper, fitting pro-attitudes are represented by the class of permissible preference orderings on a domain of items that are being compared. As it turns out, this approach opens up for a multiplicity of different types of value relationships, along with the standard relations of,, and. Unfortunately, the approach is vulnerable to a number of objections. I believe these objections (...)
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  14.  21
    A Distinction in Value: Intrinsic and for its Own Sake.Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2005 - In Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen & Michael J. Zimmerman (eds.), Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. Springer. pp. 115--129.
    The paper argues that the final value of an object-i.e., its value for its own sake-need not be intrinsic. Extrinsic final value, which accrues to things in virtue of their relational rather than internal features, cannot be traced back to the intrinsic value of states that involve these things together with their relations. On the contrary, such states, insofar as they are valuable at all, derive their value from the things involved. The endeavour to reduce thing-values to state-values is largely (...)
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  15.  66
    DDL Unlimited: Dynamic Doxastic Logic for Introspective Agents.Sten Lindström & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 1999 - Erkenntnis 50 (2-3):353-385.
    The theories of belief change developed within the AGM-tradition are not logics in the proper sense, but rather informal axiomatic theories of belief change. Instead of characterizing the models of belief and belief change in a formalized object language, the AGM-approach uses a natural language — ordinary mathematical English — to characterize the mathematical structures that are under study. Recently, however, various authors such as Johan van Benthem and Maarten de Rijke have suggested representing doxastic change within a formal logical (...)
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  16.  67
    Broome and the Intuition of Neutrality.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2009 - Philosophical Issues 19 (1):389-411.
    In “Weighing Lives” (2004) John Broome criticizes a view common to many population axiologists. On that view, population increases with extra people leading decent lives are axiologically neutral: they make the world neither better nor worse, ceteris paribus. Broome argues that this intuition, however, attractive, cannot be sustained, for several independent reasons. I respond to his criticisms and suggest that the neutrality intuition, if correctly interpreted, can after all be defended.On the version I defend,the world with added extra people at (...)
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  17.  68
    The Interference Problem for the Betting Interpretation of Degrees of Belief.Lina Eriksson & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2013 - Synthese 190 (5):809-830.
    The paper’s target is the historically influential betting interpretation of subjective probabilities due to Ramsey and de Finetti. While there are several classical and well-known objections to this interpretation, the paper focuses on just one fundamental problem: There is a sense in which degrees of belief cannot be interpreted as betting rates. The reasons differ in different cases, but there’s one crucial feature that all these cases have in common: The agent’s degree of belief in a proposition A does not (...)
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  18.  49
    Value Taxonomy.Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2015 - In .
    The paper presents main conceptual distinctions underlying much of modern philosophical thinking about value. The introductory Section 1 is followed in Section 2 by an outline of the contrast between non-relational value and relational value. In Section 3, the focus is on the distinction between final and non-final value as well as on different kinds of final value. In Section 4, we consider value relations, such as being better/worse/equally good/on a par. Recent discussions suggest that we might need to considerably (...)
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  19.  69
    Value Based on Preferences.Wlodek Rabinowicz & Jan Österberg - 1996 - Economics and Philosophy 12 (1):1.
    What distinguishes preference utilitarianism from other utilitarian positions is the axiological component: the view concerning what is intrinsically valuable. According to PU, intrinsic value is based on preferences. Intrinsically valuable states are connected to our preferences being satisfied.
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  20. Analyticity and Possible-World Semantics.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2010 - Erkenntnis 72 (3):295-314.
    Standard approaches to possible-world semantics allow us to define necessity and logical truth, but analyticity is considerably more difficult to account for. The source of this difficulty lies in the received model-theoretical conception of a language interpretation. In intuitive terms, analyticity amounts to truth in virtue of meaning alone, i.e. solely in virtue of the interpretation of linguistic expressions. In other words, an analytic sentence should remain true under all variations of ‘extralinguistic reality’ as long as the interpretation is kept (...)
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  21.  95
    Actual Truth, Possible Knowledge.Wlodek Rabinowicz & Krister Segerberg - 1994 - Topoi 13 (2):101-115.
    The well-known argument of Frederick Fitch, purporting to show that verificationism (= Truth implies knowability) entails the absurd conclusion that all the truths are known, has been disarmed by Dorothy Edgington''s suggestion that the proper formulation of verificationism presupposes that we make use of anactuality operator along with the standardly invoked epistemic and modal operators. According to her interpretation of verificationism, the actual truth of a proposition implies that it could be known in some possible situation that the proposition holds (...)
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  22.  35
    Incommensurability and Vagueness in Spectrum Arguments: Options for Saving Transitivity of Betterness.Toby Handfield & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (9):2373-2387.
    The spectrum argument purports to show that the better-than relation is not transitive, and consequently that orthodox value theory is built on dubious foundations. The argument works by constructing a sequence of increasingly less painful but more drawn-out experiences, such that each experience in the spectrum is worse than the previous one, yet the final experience is better than the experience with which the spectrum began. Hence the betterness relation admits cycles, threatening either transitivity or asymmetry of the relation. This (...)
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  23.  10
    Letters From Long Ago: On Causal Decision Theory and Centered Chances.Wlodek Rabinowicz - unknown
    This paper argues that expected utility theory for actions in chancy environments should be formulated in terms of centered chances. The subjective expected utility of an option A may be seen as a weighted sum of the utilities of A in different possible worlds, with weights being the credences that the agent assigns to these worlds. The utility of A in a given world is then definable as a weighted sum of the values of A’s different possible outcomes, with weights (...)
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  24.  4
    Introduction to the Special Issue “Beliefs in Groups” of Theory and Decision.Franz Dietrich & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2018 - Theory and Decision 85 (1):1-4.
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  25. Millian Superiorities.Gustaf Arrhenius & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2005 - Utilitas 17 (2):127-146.
    Suppose one sets up a sequence of less and less valuable objects such that each object in the sequence is only marginally worse than its immediate predecessor. Could one in this way arrive at something that is dramatically inferior to the point of departure? It has been claimed that if there is a radical value difference between the objects at each end of the sequence, then at some point there must be a corresponding radical difference between the adjacent elements. The (...)
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  26.  45
    On Probabilistic Representation of Non-Probabilistic Belief Revision.Sten Lindström & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 1989 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 18 (1):69 - 101.
  27. Bets on Hats: On Dutch Books Against Groups, Degrees of Belief as Betting Rates, and Group-Reflection.Luc Bovens & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2011 - Episteme 8 (3):281-300.
    The Puzzle of the Hats is a puzzle in social epistemology. It describes a situation in which a group of rational agents with common priors and common goals seems vulnerable to a Dutch book if they are exposed to different information and make decisions independently. Situations in which this happens involve violations of what might be called the Group-Reflection Principle. As it turns out, the Dutch book is flawed. It is based on the betting interpretation of the subjective probabilities, but (...)
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  28.  39
    Epistemic Entrenchment with Incomparabilities and Relational Belief Revision.Sten Lindström & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 1991 - In André Fuhrmann & Michael Morreau (eds.), The Logic of Theory Change. Springer. pp. 93--126.
    In earlier papers (Lindström & Rabinowicz, 1989. 1990), we proposed a generalization of the AGM approach to belief revision. Our proposal was to view belief revision as a relation rather thanas a function on theories (or belief sets). The idea was to allow for there being several equally reasonable revisions of a theory with a given proposition. In the present paper, we show that the relational approach is the natural result of generalizing in a certain way an approach to belief (...)
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  29.  93
    To Have One's Cake and Eat It, Too: Sequential Choice and Expected-Utility Violations.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 1995 - Journal of Philosophy 92 (11):586-620.
    An agent whose preferences violate the Independence Axiom or for some other reason are not representable by an expected utility function, can avoid 'dynamic inconsistency' either by foresight ('sophisticated choice') or by subsequent adjustment of preferences to the chosen plan of action ('resolute choice'). Contrary to McClennen and Machina, among others, it is argued these two seemingly conflicting approaches to 'dynamic rationality' need not be incompatible. 'Wise choice' reconciles foresight with a possibility of preference adjustment by rejecting the two assumptions (...)
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  30.  91
    Value and Unacceptable Risk.Gustaf Arrhenius & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2005 - Economics and Philosophy 21 (2):177-197.
    Consider a transitive value ordering of outcomes and lotteries on outcomes, which satisfies substitutivity of equivalents and obeys “continuity for easy cases,” i.e., allows compensating risks of small losses by chances of small improvements. Temkin (2001) has argued that such an ordering must also – rather counter-intuitively – allow chances of small improvements to compensate risks of huge losses. In this paper, we show that Temkin's argument is flawed but that a better proof is possible. However, it is more difficult (...)
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  31.  7
    To Have One's Cake and Eat It, Too: Sequential Choice and Expected-Utility Violations.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 1995 - Journal of Philosophy 92 (11):586.
  32.  77
    Reconsidering the Foole's Rejoinder: Backward Induction in Indefinitely Iterated Prisoner's Dilemmas.Magnus Jiborn & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2003 - Synthese 136 (2):135-157.
    According to the so-called “Folk Theorem” for repeated games, stable cooperative relations can be sustained in a Prisoner’s Dilemma if the game is repeated an indefinite number of times. This result depends on the possibility of applying strategies that are based on reciprocity, i.e., strategies that reward cooperation with subsequent cooperation and punish defectionwith subsequent defection. If future interactions are sufficiently important, i.e., if the discount rate is relatively small, each agent may be motivated to cooperate by fear of retaliation (...)
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  33.  76
    Derek Parfit's Contributions to Philosophy.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2016 - Theoria 82 (2):104-109.
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  34.  23
    Grappling With the Centipede: Defence of Backward Induction for BI-Terminating Games.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 1998 - Economics and Philosophy 14 (1):95.
    According to a standard objection to the use of backward induction in extensive-form games with perfect information, backward induction can only work if the players are confident that each player is resiliently rational - disposed to act rationally at each possible node that the game can reach, even at the nodes that will certainly never be reached in actual play - and also confident that these beliefs in the players’ future resilient rationality are robust, i.e. that they would be kept (...)
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  35. Levi on Money Pumps and Diachronic Dutch Books.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2006 - In Erik J. Olsson (ed.), Knowledge and Inquiry: Essays on the Pragmatism of Isaac Levi. Cambridge University Press.
    The paper's focus is on pragmatic arguments for various ‘rationality constraints’ on a decision maker’s state of mind: on his beliefs or preferences. An argument of this kind purports to show that a violator of a given constraint can be exposed to a decision problem in which he will act to his guaranteed disadvantage. Dramatically put, he can be exploited by a clever bookie who doesn’t know more than the agent himself. Examples of pragmatic arguments of this kind are synchronic (...)
     
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  36.  6
    II-A Distinction in Value: Intrinsic and For Its Own Sake.Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni Ronnow-Rasmussen - 2000 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 (1):33-51.
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  37. Two Intuitions About Free Will: Alternative Possibilities and Intentional Endorsement.Wlodek Rabinowicz & Christian List - 2014 - Philosophical Perspectives 28 (1):155-172.
    Free will is widely thought to require (i) the possibility of acting otherwise and (ii) the intentional endorsement of one’s actions (“indeterministic picking is not enough”). According to (i), a necessary condition for free will is agential-level indeterminism: at some points in time, an agent’s prior history admits more than one possible continuation. According to (ii), however, a free action must be intentionally endorsed, and indeterminism may threaten freedom: if several alternative actions could each have been actualized, then none of (...)
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  38.  4
    Kaplan i Uppsala.Sten Lindström & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 1988 - Filosofisk Tidskrift 9 (4):24-41.
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  39.  40
    Value, Fitting‐Attitude Account Of.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2013 - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley-Blackwell.
  40. (Hard Ernst) Corrigendum Van Brakel, J., Philosophy of Chemistry (U. Klein).Hallvard Lillehammer, Moral Realism, Normative Reasons, Rational Intelligibility, Wlodek Rabinowicz, Does Practical Deliberation, Crowd Out Self-Prediction & Peter McLaughlin - 2002 - Erkenntnis 57 (1).
     
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  41.  29
    A Dutch Book for Group Decision-Making?Luc Bovens & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2009 - In Benedikt Löwe, Eric Pacuit & Jan-Willem Romeijn (eds.), Foundations of the Formal Sciences Vi: Probabilistic Reasoning and Reasoning With Probabilities. Studies in Logic. London UK: College Publication. pp. 91-101.
    The Puzzle of the Hats is a betting arrangement which seems to show that a Dutch book can be made against a group of rational players with common priors who act in the common interest and have full trust in the other players’ rationality. But we show that appearances are misleading—no such Dutch book can be made. There are four morals. First, what can be learned from the puzzle is that there is a class of situations in which credences and (...)
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  42.  44
    Remarks on the Absentminded Driver.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2003 - Studia Logica 73 (2):241-256.
    Piccione and Rubinstein present and analyse the sequential decision problem of an "absentminded driver". The driver's absentmindedness leads him to time-inconsistent strategy evaluations. His original evaluation gets replaced by a new one under impact of the information that the circumstances have changed, notwithstanding the fact that this change in circumstances has been expected by him all along. The time inconsistency in strategy evaluation suggests that such an agent might have reason to renege on his adopted strategy. As we shall see, (...)
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  43.  37
    Prioritarianism and Uncertainty: On the Interpersonal Addition Theorem and the Priority View.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2001 - In Dan Egonsson (ed.), Exploring Practical Philosophy: From Action to Values. Ashgate. pp. 139-165.
    I begin, in section 1, with a presentation of the Interpersonal Addition Theorem. The theorem, due to John Broome (1991), is a re-formulation of the classical result by Harsanyi (1955). It implies that, given some seemingly mild assumptions, the overall utility of an uncertain prospect can be seen as the sum of its individual utilities. In sections 1 and 2, I discuss the theorem's connection with utilitarianism and in particular consider its implications for the Priority View, according to which benefits (...)
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  44.  5
    The Puzzle of the Hats.Luc Bovens & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2010 - Synthese 172 (1):57-78.
    The Puzzle of the Hats is a betting arrangement which seems to show that a Dutch book can be made against a group of rational players with common priors who act in the common interest and have full trust in the other players’ rationality. But we show that appearances are misleading—no such Dutch book can be made. There are four morals. First, what can be learned from the puzzle is that there is a class of situations in which credences and (...)
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  45.  67
    Voting Procedures for Complex Collective Decisions. An Epistemic Perspective.Luc Bovens & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2004 - Ratio Juris 17 (2):241-258.
    Suppose a committee or a jury confronts a complex question, the answer to which requires attending to several sub-questions. Two different voting procedures can be used. On one, the committee members vote on each sub-question and the voting results are used as premises for the committee’s conclusion on the main issue. This premise-based procedure can be contrasted with the conclusion-based approach, which requires the members to directly vote on the conclusion, with the vote of each member being guided by her (...)
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  46.  5
    I—Wlodek Rabinowicz: Incommensurability and Vagueness.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2009 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):71-94.
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  47.  3
    Føllesdal i Uppsala.Sten Lindström & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 1987 - Filosofisk Tidskrift 8 (4).
    Årets Hägerströmföreläsningar i Uppsala gavs i februari av den norske filosofen Dagfinn Føllesdal. Ämnet var "Mening og Erfaring". Dagfinn Føllesdal doktorerade 1961 vid Harvard med Willard Van Quine som handledare på en avhandling om kvantifierad modallogik. Han blev internationellt känd främst för studier om Husserls fenomenologi och dess förhållande till Frege samt för sina arbeten om Quines språkfilosofi. Allt sedan 60-talet har Føllesdal delat sin tid mellan Oslouniversitetet och Stanforduniversitetet i Kalifornien. I sina föreläsningar diskuterade Føllesdal meningsbegreppet med anknytning till (...)
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  48.  46
    The Value of Existence.Wlodek Rabinowicz & Gustaf Arrhenius - 2015 - In Iwao Hirose & Jonas Olson (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory. Oxford University Press USA.
    Can it be better or worse for a person to exist than not to exist at all? This old and challenging existential question has been raised anew in contemporary moral philosophy, mainly for two reasons. First, traditional “impersonal” ethical theories, such as utilitarianism, have counterintuitive implications in population ethics, for example, the repugnant conclusion. Second, it has seemed evident to many that an outcome can be better than another only if it is better for someone, and that only moral theories (...)
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  49.  43
    The Ramsey Test Revisited.Sten Lindström & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 1995 - In G. Crocco, L. Fariñas del Cerro & A. Herzig (eds.), Conditionals: From Philosophy to Computer Science. Oxford University Press. pp. 131-182.
  50.  24
    Conditionals and the Ramsey Test.Sten Lindström & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 1998 - In D. Gabbay & P. Smets (eds.), Handbook of Defeasible Reasoning and Uncertainty Management Systems, Vol 3.
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