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Wolfgang Barz
Goethe University Frankfurt
  1. Repräsentation, Innerlichkeit Und Normalität.Wolfgang Barz - 2019 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 67 (4):702-13.
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  2. The Aporetic Structure of Philosophical Problems.Wolfgang Barz - 2019 - Journal of Didactics of Philosophy 3 ((1)):5-18.
    The central idea of this essay is that philosophical thinking revolves around aporetic clusters, i.e., sets of individually plausible, but collectively inconsistent propositions. The task of philosophy is to dissolve such clusters, either by showing that the propositions in question, contrary to first impression, are compatible with each other, or by showing that it is permissible to abandon at least one of the propositions involved. This view of philosophical problems not only provides a very good description of well-understood philosophizing, but (...)
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  3. Urteilen, Glauben, Bewusstsein: Ein Kommentar zu Andreas Kemmerlings Glauben. Essay über einen Begriff.Wolfgang Barz - 2019 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 73 (2):279-284.
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  4.  30
    „Die Ontologie von Geist: Das Sein von Wahrnehmung, Bewusstsein, Intentionalität Und Handeln“.Wolfgang Barz - 2020 - In J. Urbich & J. Zimmer (eds.), Handbuch Ontologie. Stuttgart: Metzler. pp. 436-442.
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  5. The Puzzle of Transparency and How to Solve It.Wolfgang Barz - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (7):916-935.
    According to the transparency approach, achievement of self-knowledge is a two-stage process: first, the subject arrives at the judgment ‘p’; second, the subject proceeds to the judgment ‘I believe that p.’ The puzzle of transparency is to understand why the transition from the first to the second judgment is rationally permissible. After revisiting the debate between Byrne and Boyle on this matter, I present a novel solution according to which the transition is rationally permissible in virtue of a justifying argument (...)
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  6. Is There Anything to the Authority Thesis?Wolfgang Barz - 2018 - Journal of Philosophical Research 43:125-143.
    Many philosophical theories of self-knowledge can be understood as attempts to explain why self-ascriptions enjoy a certain kind of authority that other-ascriptions lack (the Authority Thesis). The aim of this paper is not to expand the stock of existing explanations but to ask whether the Authority Thesis can be adequately specified. To this end, I identify three requirements that must be met by any satisfactory specification. I conclude that the search for an adequate specification of the Authority Thesis leads to (...)
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  7. Introspektion.Wolfgang Barz - 2019 - In Martin Grajner & Guido Melchior (eds.), Handbuch Erkenntnistheorie. Stuttgart: Metzler. pp. 129-135.
  8. Kommentierte Bibliographie zum Thema Intentionalität.Wolfgang Barz - 2002
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  9. A Note on a Remark of Evans.Wolfgang Barz - 2016 - Polish Journal of Philosophy 10 (2):7-15.
    In his seminal paper, ‘Can There Be Vague Objects?’ (1978), Gareth Evans advanced an argument purporting to prove that the idea of indeterminate identity is incoherent. Aware that his argument was incomplete as it stands, Evans added a remark at the end of his paper, in which he explained how the original argument needed to be modified to arrive at an explicit contradiction. This paper aims to develop a modified version of Evans’ original argument, which I argue is more promising (...)
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  10. Are Introspective Beliefs About One’s Own Visual Experiences Immediate?Wolfgang Barz - 2018 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 95 (1).
    The aim of this paper is to show that introspective beliefs about one’s own current visual experiences are not immediate in the sense that what justifies them does not include other beliefs that the subject in question might possess. The argument will take the following course. First, the author explains the notions of immediacy and truth-sufficiency as they are used here. Second, the author suggests a test to determine whether a given belief lacks immediacy. Third, the author applies this test (...)
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  11. Introspection as a Game of Make‐Believe.Wolfgang Barz - 2014 - Theoria 80 (4):350-367.
    The aim of this article is to provide an account of introspective knowledge concerning visual experiences that is in accordance with the idea of transparent introspection. According to transparent introspection, a person gains knowledge of her own current mental state M solely by paying attention to those aspects of the external world which M is about. In my view, transparent introspection is a promising alternative to inner sense theories. However, it raises the fundamental question why a person who pays attention (...)
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  12.  4
    Repräsentation, Innerlichkeit und Normalität. [REVIEW]Wolfgang Barz - 2019 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 67 (4):702-713.
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  13. Luminosity Guaranteed.Wolfgang Barz - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (S1):480-496.
    This article aims to show that Williamson's anti-luminosity argument does not succeed if we presuppose a constitutive connection between the phenomenal and the doxastic. In contrast to other luminists, however, my strategy is not to critically focus on the refined safety condition in terms of degrees of confidence that anti-luminists typically use in this context. Instead, I will argue that, given a certain conception of what Chalmers calls ‘direct phenomenal concepts,’ luminosity is guaranteed even if the refined safety condition in (...)
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  14. Two‐Dimensional Modal Meinongianism.Wolfgang Barz - 2016 - Ratio 29 (3):249-267.
    The aim of this paper is to show that Priest's modal Meinongianism might benefit from joining forces with two-dimensionalism. For this purpose, I propose a two-dimensional solution to a problem for modal Meinongianism that is posed by Beall, Sauchelli, and Milne, and show that, by taking recourse to two-dimensionalism, divergent intuitions about the question of whether fictional characters might exist can be reconciled. Moreover, two-dimensionalism helps to rebut Kroon's argument to the conclusion that modal Meinongianism cannot rule out the odd (...)
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  15. Transparent Introspection of Wishes.Wolfgang Barz - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (8):1993-2023.
    The aim of this paper is to lay the groundwork for extending the idea of transparent introspection to wishes. First, I elucidate the notion of transparent introspection and highlight its advantages over rival accounts of self-knowledge. Then I pose several problems that seem to obstruct the extension of transparent introspection to wishes. In order to overcome these problems, I call into question the standard propositional attitude analysis of non-doxastic attitudes. My considerations lead to a non-orthodox account of attitudes in general (...)
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  16. Die Transparenz des Geistes.Wolfgang Barz - 2012 - Suhrkamp.
    The key message of this book is that we come to know our own mental states, not by peering inward, but by focusing on the aspects of the external world to which we are intentionally related in virtue of having the mental states in question. Though many philosophers think that the idea of transparency, as it is called, may apply to self-knowledge of some mental states, it is often regarded as hopeless to widen its scope to self-knowledge of mental states (...)
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  17.  56
    Singuläre Propositionen und das Fassen eines Gedankens.Wolfgang Barz - 2011 - Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie 36 (1):71-93.
    This essay develops the thesis that Frege’s notion of grasping does not refer to some special psychological relation between a subject and a proposition. Instead, the verb “to grasp” is a contextually defined technical term that, taken by itself, has no meaning. If that is right, then not only Frege’s resentment to the idea of grasping singular propositions is unfounded. The view that intentionality without representations is possible, championed by some advocates of the New Theory of Reference, is groundless as (...)
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  18. Infallibility, Acquaintance, and Phenomenal Concepts.Wolfgang Barz - 2016 - Dialectica 70 (2):139-168.
    In recent literature, there is a strong tendency to endorse the following argument: There are particular judgments about one's current phenomenal experiences that are infallible; if there are particular judgments about one's current phenomenal experiences that are infallible, then the infallibility of those judgments is due to the relation of acquaintance; therefore, acquaintance explains why those particular judgments about one's current phenomenal experiences are infallible. The aim of this paper is to examine critically both the first and the second premise (...)
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  19. Doubts About One’s Own Existence.Wolfgang Barz - 2014 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (5-6):645-668.
    The aim of this paper is to show that it is not irrational to doubt one’s own existence, even in the face of introspective evidence to the effect that one is currently in a certain mental state. For this purpose, I will outline a situation in which I do not exist, but which cannot be ruled out on the basis of any evidence available to me—including introspective evidence about my current mental states. I use this ‘superskeptical scenario,’ as I will (...)
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  20. Is There a Conceptual Connection Between Intentionality and Consciousness?Wolfgang Barz - 2007 - Acta Analytica 22 (3):183-188.
    It is argued that Searle’s argument for the thesis that there is a conceptual connection between intentionality and consciousness suffers from serious ambiguities. Searle’s argument is reconstructed as consisting of three premises that contain the notions of aspectual shape and irreducible subjectivity. Having identified two different readings of ‘aspectual shape’ and ‘irreducibly subjective,’ I conclude that each version of Searle’s argument incorporates at least one false premise.
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  21.  53
    Aussersein des reinen Gegenstandes – ein Berührungspunkt zwischen Meinong und Quine.Wolfgang Barz - 2008 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 62 (3):358-384.
    Zusammenfassung. Im ersten Teil meines Aufsatzes versuche ich zu zeigen, dass Meinongs Satz vom Aussersein des reinen Gegenstandes auf Quines These hinausläuft, dass Variablen, die im Einflussbereich eines intentionalen Verbs liegen, nicht durch Quantoren gebunden werden können, die sich außerhalb dieses Bereichs befinden. Im zweiten Teil diskutiere ich eine Schwierigkeit für meine Interpretation: Meinong hält – im Gegensatz zu Quine – an der Idee fest, dass intentionale Zustände Relationen zwischen Personen und Gegenständen sind. Hätte Meinong diese Idee nicht fallenlassen müssen, (...)
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  22.  40
    Praxisform Und Geist. [REVIEW]Wolfgang Barz - 2013 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 61 (3):455-462.
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  23.  39
    Arten von Propositionen.Wolfgang Barz - 2010 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 64 (3):289-309.
    Das Ziel des Aufsatzes besteht darin, den Streit zwischen Fregeanern und Direktreferentialisten zu schlichten. Dieser Streit dreht sich um die Frage, wie wir uns die Proposition zurecht legen sollen, die durch einen Satz der Form „a ist F“ zum Ausdruck gebracht wird. Fregeaner vertreten die Auffassung, daß es sich bei dieser Proposition um einen Komplex handelt, der sich aus der Eigenschaft F und dem Sinn von „a“ zusammensetzt. Direktreferentialisten hingegen nehmen an, daß die betreffende Proposition anstelle des Sinns von „a“ (...)
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  24.  32
    Relationen zu Propositionen.Wolfgang Barz - 2005 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 59 (4):512 - 529.
    Ich versuche zu zeigen, daß die auf Frege zurückgehende These, daß Meinungen Relationen zwischen Personen und Propositionen darstellen, nicht zwangsläufig die Frage nach der Natur des Mechanismus aufwirft, der Personen mit Propositionen verbindet. Um meine Auffassung zu begründen, lasse ich zunächst eine Überlegung Revue passieren, die meines Erachtens den stärksten Beweggrund für die Einführung von Propositionen darstellt. In diesem Zusammenhang zeigt sich, daß sich die These, daß Meinungen Relationen zwischen Personen und Propositionen darstellen, auf die Struktur von Berichten über Meinungen (...)
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  25.  29
    Naturalisierung der Intentionalität.Wolfgang Barz - 2006 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 54 (2):189-200.
    Der Beitrag versucht zu zeigen, dass Intentionalität nicht deshalb problematisch ist, weil sie unser naturalistisches Weltbild herausfordert, sondern deshalb, weil sie gegen gewisse logische Intuitionen zu verstoßen scheint, und dass die angemessene Reaktion auf dieses Problem nicht darin besteht, über die physikalische Realisierung intentionaler mentaler Zustände, sondern über die logische Form intensionaler Sätze nachzudenken. Als Zeuge führt der Autor Fred Dretske an, dessen Analyse der Intentionalität sich bei näherem Hinsehen als naturalistisch verbrämte Theorie der logischen Form intensionaler Sätze herausstellt.
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  26.  58
    The Real Trouble with Intentionality.Wolfgang Barz - 2008 - Philosophical Explorations 11 (2):79 – 92.
    I argue that the project of naturalizing intentionality is misconceived. Intentionality should not be considered as a challenge to our naturalistic world-view, but rather as something which gives rise to a logical problem: how to save the principle of indiscernibility of identicals from apparent counterexamples arising from intensional discourse.
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  27.  16
    Irrtum durch Fehlidentifikation.Wolfgang Barz - 2009 - Conceptus: Zeitschrift Fur Philosophie 93 (93):7-15.
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  28.  91
    Das Problem der Intentionalität.Wolfgang Barz - 2004 - Mentis.
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  29. Die Tücken des Repräsentationsbegriffs.Wolfgang Barz - 2012 - Erwägen Wissen Ethik 23:36-38.
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