This book is a critical examination of Michel Foucault's relation to ancient Greek thought, in particular his famous analysis of Greek history of sexuality. Wolfgang Detel offers a new understanding of Foucault's theories of power and knowledge based on modern analytical theories of science and concepts of power. He offers a fresh and complex reading of the texts which Foucault discusses, covering topics such as Aristotle's ethics and theory of sex, Hippocratic diatetics, the earliest treatises on economics, and Plato's theory (...) of love. The result is a philosophically rich and probing critique of Foucault's later writings, and a persuasive account of the relation between ethics, power and knowledge in classical antiquity. His book will have a wide appeal to readers interested in Foucault and in Greek thought and culture. (shrink)
Die Überprüfung des Falsifikationismus kann im Lichte einer neuen Methodologie anhand wissenschaftsgeschichtlicher Beispiele erfolgen. Um 1640 wurde das Fallgesetz nicht aufgrund seines empirischen Gehalts, sondern aufgrund seiner logischen Beziehungen zu metaphysischen Annahmen als ernstzunehmende Hypothese betrachtet, die es empirisch zu prüfen galt; ferner wurde eine Falsifikation für die Verwerfung der horror-vacui-Theorie weder als hinreichend noch als notwendig angesehen. Diese wissenschaftsgeschichtlichen Tatsachen sind mit Hilfe der Methodologie der Forschungsprogramme, nicht aber mit Hilfe des Popperschen Falsifikationismus, rational interpretierbar und bestätigen damit die (...) methodologische Kritik, die in den letzten Jahren am Wissenschafts- und Fortschrittskriterium Poppers geübt worden ist. (shrink)
Freud’s metapsychology has been interpreted in a number of different ways. Some scholars see him committed to classical scientism, others to genuine hermeneutics. Many Freud philologists suggest that he moved from an early scientism to hermeneutic methods in his later writings, and some think he misunderstood his own angle, thinking himself to be a natural scientist, but actually practising hermeneutics. The article first looks at Freud’s model of the soul and his remarks about psychoanalytic explanations and concludes that there is (...) overwhelming evidence for the contention that he conceived of psychoanalytic explanations in terms of causal explanations and that his metapsychology is, all things considered, scientistic. However, it seems that Freud did not clearly distinguish between causal and rational explanations. The article emphasizes that he could have found this distinction in the writings of Max Weber. In the last two sections, the article turns to a meticulous analysis of two vignettes describing Freud’s own treatment of two cases that he takes to be fine examples of the technique used in psychoanalytic treatment. It turns out that Freud himself looks at these cases and their treatment, throughout, in terms of rationality and irrationality. In particular, he seems to distinguish between an “external” irrationality and an “internal” rationality of neurotic diseases. He also seems to point to functions of neuroses representing certain solutions for mental disturbances. Thus, there is much evidence for assuming that in his psychoanalytic technique, Freud relied on genuine hermeneutic and functional methods; and therefore, Freud’s official metapsychology seems to be methodologically inconsistent with his analytic technique. (shrink)
My first aim in this article is to describe the origin of the notion of culture of knowledge due to the research activities carried out at the University of Frankfurt by the Research Group Culture of Knowledge and Social Change since 1999. In this context we examined the relation between knowledge and society and proposed the notion of culture of knowledge as a key-concept to emphasize that knowledge does always appear in a specific historical form, and can be investigated only (...) as a social practice. This key-concept turned out to be a helpful heuristic construct and had therefore a widespread diffusion as a general and extremely flexible category which can shed light on mutual relations between knowledge and culture in several historical contexts. Secondly, I will compare the approach taken in the culture of knowledge with other contextualist approaches of contemporary research areas like History of Science and Theory of Culture to show that it is particularly helpful in terms of connecting different fields. Finally, I will drive attention to a basic question concerning the approach of theculture of knowledge which remains still unanswered. The Frankfurter Research Group considered it as a model of knowledge alternative to all those positions in History of Science and Theory of Culture that assume the universal, trans-historical, and trans-cultural validity of fundamental forms of knowledge and cognitive abilities. I will discuss whether and to what extent these positions are really alternative, and for this purpose I will focus on a central point: whether the thesis of a radical historicity of knowledge undermines the very idea of universal rationality and to what extent. (shrink)
In the following attempt at a further clarification of the methodological aspects of Marxian theory construction it is demonstrated that central arguments in the first part of the Kapital, especially the description of the development from simple to capitalist commodity production, can be analysed as functional explanations in the modern logical sense. At the same time it becomes clear that some questionable conclusions which have been arrived at on the ba-sis of this description, e.g. the development of capitalism being a (...) necessary condition for the later formation of socialism, can be understood as results of certain methodological defects in Marx, functional explanations. (shrink)
These specialised and annotated papers closely examine a number of Platonic texts including the Republic, Symposium and Gorgias. Extracts are in English translation.
In this paper, I look at Millikan′s theory of local natural signs as presented in Varieties of Meaning. I try to make sense of the exact way Millikan relates the notion of natural signs with intentional signs. Compared to traditional views, for instance in semiotics, Millikan′s approach represents, as I see it, a remarkable theoretical progress in clarifying the conditions under which organisms can interpret and use natural signs as elementary representations. This approach is also helpful for illustrating more clearly (...) in what way teleosemantics must be based on an independent theory of representation and should take on a non-dretskenean, consumer-orientated form. (shrink)
Seit einiger Zeit werden wissenschaftstheoretische Behauptungen zunehmend durch wissenschaftshistorische Hinweise gestützt oder bestritten. Die vorliegenden Ansätze zu einer methodologischen Reflexion auf dieses Verfahfahren sind aber unzureichend. Eine genauere logische Analyse zeigt, daß wissenschaftshistorische Begründungen wissenschaftstheoretischer Behauptungen spezielle Formen praktischer Syllogismen sind und daß die Zulässigkeit derartiger Begründungen nicht nur von der Gültigkeit praktischer Syllogismen abhängt, sondern auch von der Feststellbarkeit des Erkenntnisfortschritts sowie von der Rechtfertigung wissenschaftshistorischer Aussagen unabhängig von allen erst noch zu prüfenden methodologischen Modellen.
In sociology, social philosophy, social ontology, and classical choice theory the notion of a social norm is usually introduced by using a rich normative, semantic, and social vocabulary, while the notions that evolutionary game theory proceeds from seem too poor to elucidate the idea of social norms. In this paper, I suggest to define a notion of social norms that is as basic as possible, in the sense that it relies only on notions like affects, feelings as well as regularities, (...) standards, and corrections of behaviour. These notions suffice to explain non-linguistic traditions, practices, sanctions, and, finally, basic social norms. Two of the aims of the paper are, first, to clarify the idea of genuine normativity and second, to explore whether the sort of normativity involved in basic social norms is part of a bridge between nature and the social realm. (shrink)
Die Hypothese meines Beitrags ist, dass Interpretationen fiktionaler Romane zum Teil rationale Erklärungen der emotionalen Zustände fiktiver Romanfiguren sein sollten. Der Hintergrund dieser Hypothese ist zum einen die generelle Definition von Interpretationen als rationalen Erklärungen und zum anderen die neue Theorie der affektiven Intentionalität von Gefühlen (eine Variante der kognitiven Gefühlstheorie). Diese Theorie unterscheidet mehrere Komponenten von Gefühlen und weist nach, dass eine überwiegend rationale Vernetzung dieser Komponenten eine notwendige Bedingung für ihre Interpretation ist (Abschnitt 1). Dieser methodische Zugriff lässt (...) sich an geeigneten Romanen testen und verifizieren, beispielsweise an Flauberts 'Madame Bovary' – einer fiktionalen Geschichte, die sich als eine einzige komplexe und verkettete rationale Erklärung der suizidalen Verzweiflung Emmas deuten lässt. Das bedeutet allerdings nicht, dass eine solche rationale Erklärung die Interpretation fiktionaler Romane ausschöpft. Vielmehr lassen sich fünf verschiedene, ineinandergreifende Stufen von Romaninterpretationen unterscheiden (Abschnitt 2). Gerade wenn Literaturinterpretationen eine komplexe Form annehmen, wird das bekannte Paradox virulent, dass wir uns bemüßigt fühlen, komplexe Interpretationen der Emotionen und Handlungen von Figuren zu liefern, die nicht existieren. In neueren Arbeiten zeichnet sich eine primär psychologische Lösung dieses Paradoxes ab. Zu dieser Lösung gehört der Befund, dass das Bemühen um rationale Erklärungen fiktiver Figuren unsere Fähigkeit, reale Personen in unserem sozialen Umfeld, aber auch in fremden Kulturen angemessen zu interpretieren, in erstaunlichem Ausmaß fördert. (shrink)
Proceeding from a set of conditions that an adequate notion of a non-mathematical function should satisfy, we examine some of the most influential of these notions, including Cummins-functions, to conclude that the teleosemantic notion of a non-mathematical proper function, suggested originally by Ruth Millikan, best satisfies the proposed conditions. In particular, this notion allows us to talk consistently about organisms having some functions while operating, at the same time, dysfunctionally. In addition, we show that the teleosemantic notion of relational and (...) adaptive proper functions can be applied to singular events being part of developments in evolution and learning processes. We conclude that it is in this framework, rather than on the basis of the so-called theory of memes, that an application of the teleosemantic notion of a proper function to social areas can be seriously considered. (shrink)
